State v. Nadeem

STATE v. NADEEM 	513
Cite as 284 Neb. 513
provided, it may not be used as evidence against the
Respondent in any way.
Pursuant to § 3‑313, and given the conditional admission,
we find that respondent knowingly does not challenge or
contest the matters set forth in the formal charges. We further
determine that by his conduct with respect to count I, respond‑
ent violated professional conduct rules §§ 3‑501.1, 3‑501.3,
3‑501.5, 3‑501.16, and 3‑508.4, as well as his oath of office as
an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nebraska.
We further determine that by his conduct with respect to counts
II and III of the formal charges, respondent violated profes‑
sional conduct rule § 3‑501.5, as well as his oath of office as
an attorney. Respondent has waived all additional proceedings
against him in connection herewith. Upon due consideration,
the court approves the conditional admission and enters the
orders as indicated below.
CONCLUSION
Respondent is publicly reprimanded and is placed on pro‑
bation for a period of 1 year, including monitoring subject to
the terms agreed to by respondent in the conditional admis‑
sion and outlined above. Respondent is directed to pay costs
and expenses in accordance with Neb. Ct. R. §§ 3‑310(P) and
3‑323(B) within 60 days after the order imposing costs and
expenses, if any, is entered by the court.
Judgment of public reprimand.
State of nebraSka, appellee, v.
mohammed nadeem, appellant.
822 N.W.2d 372
Filed October 19, 2012. 	No. S‑10‑981.
1. Trial: Juries: Appeal and Error. A district court’s decision regarding impanel‑
ing an anonymous jury is reviewed under the deferential abuse‑of‑discretion
standard.
2. Appeal and Error. Although an appellate court ordinarily considers only those
errors assigned and discussed in the briefs, the appellate court may, at its option,
notice plain error.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:40 AM CST

514 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
3. Courts: Appeal and Error. Regarding a question of law, the Nebraska Supreme
Court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the
Nebraska Court of Appeals.
4. Juries: Words and Phrases. Generally, the term “anonymous jury” describes a
situation where juror identification information is withheld from both the public
and the parties.
5. ____: ____. If only the jurors’ names are kept from the parties and the jurors are
referred to by number, the jury may be called a numbers jury.
6. Juries: Appeal and Error. A court should not impanel an anonymous jury unless
it (1) concludes that there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection
and (2) takes reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the
defendant and to ensure that his or her fundamental rights are protected.
7. Trial: Waiver: Appeal and Error. Failure to make a timely objection waives the
right to assert prejudicial error on appeal.
8. Appeal and Error. When an issue is raised for the first time in an appellate
court, it will be disregarded inasmuch as a lower court cannot commit error in
resolving an issue never presented and submitted to it for disposition.
9. Trial: Waiver: Appeal and Error. One may not waive an error, gamble on a
favorable result, and, upon obtaining an unfavorable result, assert the previously
waived error.
10. Trial: Appeal and Error. An issue not presented to or decided on by the trial
court is not an appropriate issue for consideration on appeal.
11. 	Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. Plain error is error plainly evident from
the record and of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in dam‑
age to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
inbody, Chief Judge, and SieverS and pirtle, Judges, on appeal
thereto from the District Court for Lancaster County, Steven
d. burnS, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and
cause remanded for further proceedings.
Dennis R. Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, and
Elizabeth D. Elliott for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust for
appellee.
heavican, c.J., Wright, connolly, Stephan, mccormack,
and miller-lerman, JJ.
Wright, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Mohammed Nadeem was convicted in a jury trial of one
count of attempted first degree sexual assault and one count

STATE v. NADEEM 	515
Cite as 284 Neb. 513
of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child. During
the proceedings, the jurors were addressed by juror number
instead of by name, with a few exceptions. Nadeem appealed
his convictions and sentences. Noting plain error, the Nebraska
Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the
cause for a new trial, after determining that the district court
abused its discretion in impaneling an “anonymous jury.” See
State v. Nadeem, 19 Neb. App. 565, 809 N.W.2d 825 (2012)
(Nadeem II). This court granted the State’s petition for fur‑
ther review.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
[1] A district court’s decision regarding impaneling an
anonymous jury is reviewed under the deferential abuse‑of‑
discretion standard. State v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309, 788
N.W.2d 172 (2010).
[2] Although an appellate court ordinarily considers only
those errors assigned and discussed in the briefs, the appellate
court may, at its option, notice plain error. State v. Paul, 256
Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999).
[3] Regarding a question of law, the Nebraska Supreme
Court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination
reached by the Nebraska Court of Appeals. State v. Moore, 276
Neb. 1, 751 N.W.2d 631 (2008).
FACTS
background
On August 6, 2009, 14‑year‑old H.K. went to a library in
Lincoln, Nebraska, to research places to visit during an upcom‑
ing vacation to South Dakota. She went to a reading room in
the library to use her laptop computer and sat at a table next
to a magazine rack. After about 20 minutes, H.K. saw a man,
later identified as Nadeem, standing a few feet from her with a
newspaper in his hands. Nadeem occasionally glanced over the
newspaper at H.K.
Nadeem began a conversation with H.K., asking where
she went to school, her name, her age, and whether she had
a boyfriend. Nadeem also asked for H.K.’s telephone number,
which H.K. refused to give him. Nadeem left the room for

516 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
several minutes, but he later returned, handed H.K. a piece
of paper with a telephone number on it, and said he expected
a call. When Nadeem left the room, he said he hoped to see
H.K. again.
H.K. reported the incident to her mother, who had her report
it to the library branch manager. H.K.’s mother also filed a
police report. H.K. was interviewed by police, who asked if
she would make a controlled call to Nadeem. H.K. and her
mother agreed.
The next day, H.K. called the telephone number Nadeem
gave to her at the library and eventually spoke to Nadeem.
She and Nadeem had a 20‑minute conversation that became
sexually explicit. At the direction of police, H.K. arranged to
meet Nadeem at the library around 2:30 p.m. At about 2:15
p.m., police saw Nadeem heading toward the library. Upon his
arrival at the library, Nadeem was arrested.
trial proceedingS
On October 2, 2009, Nadeem was charged by information in
Lancaster County District Court with one count of attempted
first degree sexual assault and one count of attempted third
degree sexual assault of a child. The case was tried to a jury.
Before trial, the jurors completed questionnaires. The State
presumably had access to the questionnaires, because it spe‑
cifically noted in voir dire that juror No. 5 “reported on [the]
questionnaire that [the juror knew] the attorney general.” No
questionnaires are included in the record.
Throughout most of the proceedings, the jurors were referred
to by number instead of name, though there were a few excep‑
tions. One juror was called by name for a sidebar with the
court and counsel. Juror No. 23 reported knowing a juror,
whom he named, and whom the court identified as juror No.
21. Similarly, juror No. 11 stated that he was acquainted with a
juror, whom he named, and whom the court identified as juror
No. 34. At the end of the case, the court excused juror No. 34
by name.
During voir dire, both attorneys questioned jurors by number
and jurors were excused by number. Defense counsel asked if
juror No. 6 was familiar with him, and the juror claimed he

STATE v. NADEEM 	517
Cite as 284 Neb. 513
was not. However, defense counsel correctly suggested that
juror No. 6 graduated from “Benson” in 1968. Finally, the
court referred to “prospective jurors whose number ha[d] not
yet been called.”
On June 30, 2010, the jury found Nadeem guilty of attempted
first degree sexual assault and attempted third degree sexual
assault of a child. On August 18, he moved to release juror
information so he could investigate if “the jurors were manipu‑
lated or influenced by the defendant[’s] religious and national
origins, or whether any other factor may have play[ed] a part in
their decision making.” Nadeem requested “the jurors’ names
and information.” The motion was overruled.
Nadeem was sentenced on September 16, 2010. He received
3 to 6 years’ imprisonment on the attempted first degree sexual
assault conviction and not less than nor more than 1 year’s
imprisonment on the attempted third degree sexual assault
of a child conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently,
and credit for 162 days served. Nadeem was also required
to register under Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act.
Nadeem appealed.
In an opinion filed January 17, 2012, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the district court abused its discretion by impan‑
eling an anonymous jury. See State v. Nadeem, 19 Neb. App.
466, 808 N.W.2d 95 (2012). On March 6, the Court of Appeals
sustained the State’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its initial
opinion, and filed a second opinion reaching the same result
on different reasoning. See Nadeem II. The Court of Appeals
determined that the district court abused its discretion in
impaneling an anonymous jury and that this constituted plain
error. Because the evidence presented by the State was suffi‑
cient to sustain Nadeem’s convictions, the court reversed, and
remanded for a new trial. Id. The State petitioned for further
review, which this court granted.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In its petition for further review, the State assigns, restated,
that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) finding on plain error
review that the district court abused its discretion in impanel‑
ing an anonymous jury, despite a silent record; (2) reversing,

518 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
and remanding for a new trial rather than remanding for further
proceedings; (3) finding that the district court impaneled an
anonymous jury; and (4) applying the two‑part test from State
v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309, 788 N.W.2d 172 (2010), to a “num‑
bers jury.”
ANALYSIS
anonymouS Jury
[4,5] This court addressed anonymous juries for the first
time in State v. Sandoval, supra. Generally, the term “anony‑
mous jury” describes a situation where juror identification
information is withheld from both the public and the parties.
See id. If only the jurors’ names are kept from the parties and
the jurors are referred to by number, the jury may be called a
numbers jury. See id.
In Sandoval, 280 Neb. at 326‑27, 788 N.W.2d at 195, this
court determined that “[g]enerally, impaneling an anonymous
jury is a drastic measure that should only be undertaken in lim‑
ited circumstances . . . and there is a danger that the practice
could prejudice jurors against the [defendant].”
We explained that juror anonymity can prejudice a defend‑
ant in two ways. First, during voir dire, a lack of knowledge
about the jurors’ biographical information could prevent the
defense counsel from making intelligent decisions regarding
peremptory strikes. See State v. Sandoval, supra. We have rec‑
ognized that voir dire plays a critical function in ensuring that
the defendant’s right to an impartial jury is honored. See, State
v. Iromuanya, 282 Neb. 798, 806 N.W.2d 404 (2011); State v.
Sandoval, supra (stating that other courts have recognized that
defendant’s fundamental right to unbiased jury is adequately
protected by court’s conduct of voir dire designed to uncover
bias as to issues in cases and as to defendant himself). Second,
prospective jurors could interpret the anonymity as an indi‑
cation that the court believes that the defendant is guilty or
dangerous, thus implicating the defendant’s presumption of
innocence. See id.
[6] Sandoval laid out a two‑part test for the use of an anony‑
mous jury: “[A] court should not impanel such a jury unless it
(1) concludes that there is a strong reason to believe the jury

STATE v. NADEEM 	519
Cite as 284 Neb. 513
needs protection and (2) takes reasonable precautions to mini‑
mize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that
his or her fundamental rights are protected.” 280 Neb. at 327,
788 N.W.2d at 195‑96. To guide trial courts, we set out five
factors for determining whether a jury needs protection.
The jury announced its verdict in Nadeem’s case on June
30, 2010. The opinion in Sandoval was filed on July 30.
Thus, when the verdict in Nadeem’s case was announced, nei‑
ther the district court nor the parties could rely on Sandoval
as precedent.
On August 18, 2010, Nadeem moved to release the “jurors’
names and information.” In his motion, Nadeem did not allege
that using an anonymous jury was improper. Instead, he sought
release of information under “Neb. Rev. Stat. §25‑1638,” a
statute which was repealed by 1979 Neb. Laws, L.B. 234,
§ 18. At the hearing on the motion, Nadeem did not raise a
claim that the district court erred by impaneling an anonymous
jury. The court overruled the motion, and Nadeem was sen‑
tenced on September 16. Nadeem timely appealed.
Waiver of anonymouS Jury
On appeal, Nadeem asserts error, claiming the district court
erred by using an anonymous jury. Nadeem did not object to
the impaneling of the jury and passed the jury for cause. No
claim was made to the district court regarding the jury that was
impaneled. He has waived this claim of error by his failure
to object.
[7‑10] We have often said that failure to make a timely
objection waives the right to assert prejudicial error on appeal.
See, State v. Collins, 281 Neb. 927, 799 N.W.2d 693 (2011);
State v. Kinkennon, 275 Neb. 570, 747 N.W.2d 437 (2008).
When an issue is raised for the first time in an appellate court,
it will be disregarded inasmuch as a lower court cannot com‑
mit error in resolving an issue never presented and submitted
to it for disposition. State v. Collins, supra; State v. Ford,
279 Neb. 453, 778 N.W.2d 473 (2010). One may not waive
an error, gamble on a favorable result, and, upon obtaining
an unfavorable result, assert the previously waived error.
State v. Collins, supra; State v. Harms, 263 Neb. 814, 643

520 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
N.W.2d 359 (2002). For that reason, an issue not presented
to or decided on by the trial court is not an appropriate issue
for consideration on appeal. State v. Collins, supra. See State
v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003), abrogated
on other grounds, State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37, 760 N.W.2d
35 (2009).
We have applied the above principles to find waiver of both
statutory and constitutional rights when a defendant fails to
raise them. For example, the failure of a defendant to raise the
unconstitutionality of the charging statute has been held to be
waived by the failure of the defendant to raise such objection.
State v. Collins, supra. This court has also held that alleged
violations of procedural due process and confrontation were
waived by the defendant’s failure to object. Id. See, also, State
v. Daly, 278 Neb. 903, 775 N.W.2d 47 (2009) (confrontation).
A district court’s consideration of lesser‑included offenses
was waived when the defendant failed to object. State v.
Collins, supra, citing State v. Keup, 265 Neb. 96, 655 N.W.2d
25 (2003).
This court has also held that a defendant waived his objec‑
tion to the voir dire procedure utilized by the trial court by
his failure to object to it. State v. Collins, supra. See State v.
Anderson, 269 Neb. 365, 693 N.W.2d 267 (2005). We have
held that defendants who failed to object or use peremptory
challenges regarding the selection of their juries have waived
their complaints regarding jury selection. State v. Collins,
supra. See State v. Green, 236 Neb. 33, 458 N.W.2d 472
(1990), overruled on other grounds, State v. Tingle, 239 Neb.
558, 477 N.W.2d 544 (1991). Defendants have been found, by
their failure to object, to have waived any argument regarding
the trial court’s procedure for handling jury questions after
submission of the case and regarding the court’s trial man‑
agement. State v. Collins, supra. See, State v. Schreiner, 276
Neb. 393, 754 N.W.2d 742 (2008) (trial management); State v.
Gutierrez, 272 Neb. 995, 726 N.W.2d 542 (2007) (procedure
for addressing jury questions after submission), abrogated
on other grounds, State v. Thorpe, 280 Neb. 11, 783 N.W.2d
749 (2010).

STATE v. NADEEM 	521
Cite as 284 Neb. 513
Nadeem did not object to the type of jury impaneled during
voir dire, at trial, or in his motion to release juror information.
He did not file any action or motion on the basis that use of an
anonymous jury was an abuse of discretion that denied him a
fair trial. Even after this court’s opinion in State v. Sandoval,
280 Neb. 309, 788 N.W.2d 172 (2010), was filed on July 30,
2010, Nadeem did not seek relief based on our decision in
Sandoval. The first time he claimed error in the use of an
anonymous jury was on appeal.
A similar issue was decided in State v. Sundberg, 349 Or.
608, 247 P.3d 1213 (2011). Defense counsel was told that juror
numbers would be used instead of names. When counsel found
out he would not be given the names of the potential jurors,
he objected, fearing he would be unable to gather sufficient
juror information. The trial court overruled the objection. The
defendant also objected to the jury selection process in his
motion for new trial.
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that “defendant pre‑
served his core claim—that he was entitled to have access to
juror names during jury selection—by putting the trial court
on notice when that purported error occurred and providing
the court an opportunity to correct it.” Id. at 614, 247 P.3d at
1216. The defendant did not suppress facts he knew hoping
for a favorable verdict and raise those facts after the verdict
went against him. Rather, his “objections prior to voir dire
and in his new trial motion sufficiently preserved for appeal
his argument that the trial court’s use of an anonymous jury
violated his [state constitutional] rights.” Id. at 615, 247 P.3d
at 1217.
In contrast, Nadeem did not preserve his core claim, if any
existed, that he was entitled to have the names of the jurors
during jury selection. He did not object to the type of jury,
anonymous or otherwise, either before or during voir dire, or
in any posttrial motion. At the time of voir dire, Nadeem had
to have been aware of facts bearing on whether his jury was
anonymous. As noted below, the record strongly suggests that
trial counsel had access to the jurors’ biographical information
on their questionnaires.

522 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Even before Sandoval, there were cases from other jurisdic‑
tions concluding that impaneling an anonymous jury was trial
error. See State v. Sandoval, supra. Yet, Nadeem did not object
to the court’s referring to the jurors by number. He did not
object to impaneling the jury. In fact, he passed the jury panel
for cause. The record does not show that Nadeem was tried by
an anonymous jury or that defense counsel was hindered in his
ability to conduct effective voir dire. Now that he is dissatis‑
fied with the verdict, Nadeem cannot claim the court erred by
impaneling an anonymous jury.
Nadeem was required to alert the district court to its error of
impaneling an anonymous jury, if indeed that was the type of
jury the court impaneled. Because Nadeem did not object, the
district court had no opportunity to determine if the impanel‑
ing of the jury was improper. Nadeem may not waive an error,
gamble on a favorable result, and, upon obtaining an unfavor‑
able result, assert the previously waived error. See id. The
impaneling of an anonymous jury was not presented to the
district court, and we will not consider it on appeal.
plain error
We next consider the Court of Appeals’ opinion that found
plain error regarding the impaneling of the jury, which the
Court of Appeals determined was an anonymous jury. It pointed
out the State’s arguments that Nadeem had waived any error
because he did not object to the use of an anonymous jury and
raised the issue for the first time on appeal. It briefly discussed
the rationale that when an issue is raised for the first time in
an appellate court, it will be disregarded inasmuch as a lower
court cannot commit error in resolving an issue never pre‑
sented and submitted to it for disposition. See State v. Collins,
281 Neb. 927, 799 N.W.2d 693 (2011). The Court of Appeals
concluded that Nadeem clearly had an opportunity to object.
That said, the court then turned to the “well‑established excep‑
tion to the waiver rule,” that an appellate court may consider
an issue not raised to the trial court if such issue amounts to
plain error. See Nadeem II, 19 Neb. App. at 572, 809 N.W.2d
at 831.

STATE v. NADEEM 	523
Cite as 284 Neb. 513
The Court of Appeals noted there was an absence of infor‑
mation in the record to explain why the court impaneled a
numbers jury or an anonymous jury. It recognized that the
district court did not have the benefit of our decision in State
v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309, 788 N.W.2d 172 (2010). But it
concluded that the record failed to show the existence of any
substantive prerequisites that justified impaneling an anony‑
mous jury, “a drastic measure that should only be under‑
taken in limited circumstances.” Nadeem II, 19 Neb. App.
at 569, 809 N.W.2d at 829. It found plain error because the
record showed neither a compelling need to protect the jurors
nor that the court took precautions against an anonymous
jury’s having an adverse impact on Nadeem’s presumption
of innocence.
The Court of Appeals assumed prejudice occurs if a trial
court fails to follow our two‑part test in Sandoval, and we
clearly did not hold that. Instead, to ensure that jury anonym‑
ity did not impact the constitutionality of the trial, an appel‑
late court must closely scrutinize the record and evaluate it in
the light of reason, principle, and common sense. See State
v. Sandoval, supra. First, an appellate court must determine
whether the record shows that the defendant’s counsel lacked
sufficient information to make intelligent decisions regard‑
ing peremptory strikes during voir dire. Second, an appel‑
late court must ask whether the record shows that the trial
court took any steps to protect the defendant’s presumption
of innocence.
[11] Although an appellate court ordinarily considers only
those errors assigned and discussed in the briefs, the appellate
court may, at its option, notice plain error. State v. Paul, 256
Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999). Plain error is error plainly
evident from the record and of such a nature that to leave it
uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation,
or fairness of the judicial process. See id.
The Court of Appeals determined that the district court
abused its discretion in impaneling an anonymous jury and
that such was plain error. See Nadeem II. It concluded that
a hearing on Nadeem’s postverdict motion to release juror

524 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
information suggested that the court had withheld the jurors’
names from Nadeem’s counsel.
We disagree. At the hearing, the following exchange occurred
among the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor:
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], you want a release of
juror information?
[Defense counsel]: Right, your Honor.
The second motion to release juror information. My
client and his family have some concerns as to whether
or not the jurors were influenced by either his religion or
national origin and wanted an opportunity to talk with the
jurors and to interview the jurors.
And if I understand Nebraska law correctly, in order to
release the names of the jurors that we have to get court
permission to do that. That’s all that we’re asking. So we
can interview the jurors and find out what their reasoning
was behind their verdict.
. . . .
[Prosecutor]: There is no statutory basis to allow
[defense counsel] to contact the jurors and ask about their
deliberations.
If the Court allows that fishing expedition in this case
they would have to do it in every single case. That’s a
problem solely for the juries, the deliberations.
Unless information has been brought to [defense coun‑
sel’s] attention that a juror or jurors used extraneous
prejudicial information, there is nothing that allows him
to conduct his own investigation or any investigation into
the jury deliberations.
THE COURT: Anything further?
[Defense counsel]: Well, your Honor, I understand
what the State — I understand what the State’s posi‑
tion is. I think the problem is, like a lot of things when
a decision is made and one doesn’t have a full clear
understanding how people reached that decision, I think
it’s beneficial — I think it’s beneficial to just to have
some idea and I think that’s the investigation of con‑
tacts necessary.
THE COURT: I’m going to deny the request.

STATE v. NADEEM 	525
Cite as 284 Neb. 513
This exchange does not show that Nadeem was denied
access to the names of the jurors at trial and was therefore
convicted by an anonymous jury. It does not show that Nadeem
had the names of the jurors. It shows only that defense counsel
wanted permission to talk to the jurors to find out why they
convicted his client. Neither defense counsel’s motion nor his
colloquy establishes that the jury was anonymous.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ opinion, the record
strongly supports a conclusion that defense counsel had access
to the jurors’ biographical information on their questionnaires.
During voir dire, the State asked six prospective jurors about
their occupations based upon their responses in the question‑
naires and asked another prospective juror about his relation‑
ship with the Attorney General. Obviously, Nadeem’s defense
counsel would have objected at this point if he did not have
access to the same biographical information. Juror No. 23
reported knowing juror No. 21, who was identified by name.
Juror No. 11 stated that he was acquainted with juror No. 34,
who was also identified by name.
The Court of Appeals found that the record failed to show
whether the district court took steps to protect Nadeem’s
presumption of innocence. But in State v. Sandoval, 280
Neb. 309, 788 N.W.2d 172 (2010), we concluded that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s impaneling of a
numbers jury when the trial court did not draw attention to
the fact that juror numbers were used instead of names and
there was no indication that the jurors considered the practice
to be unusual. We also noted that (1) all jurors had stated that
they could be impartial and were not biased and (2) the court
had instructed the jurors that the defendant was presumed
innocent and that the State must prove the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
record shows the district court impaneled an anonymous jury.
Instead, the record strongly supports a conclusion that the court
impaneled a numbers jury. It erred in determining that the dis‑
trict court abused its discretion by impaneling an anonymous
jury and that such was plain error. Plain error review was inap‑
propriate because the error was not plainly evident from the

526 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
record. As stated above, the record does not clearly establish
that the district court impaneled an anonymous jury. It may be
inferred that the court impaneled a numbers jury and that at
the hearing on the motion to release juror information, defense
counsel was not asking for the names of the jurors but simply
wanted an opportunity to talk with the jurors and wanted the
court’s permission to release the names of the jurors. Thus, the
record does not support a plain error review.
CONCLUSION
In the case at bar, Nadeem waived any objection to the jury
that was impaneled. Plain error review was improper because
the record does not plainly show that the district court impan‑
eled an anonymous jury. Therefore, we reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings regarding Nadeem’s remaining
assignments of error.
reverSed and remanded for
further proceedingS.
caSSel, J., not participating.
Jerry a. martin and leonard g. martin, appellantS,
v. anna b. ullSperger, individually, and
lonnie a. martin, individually, appelleeS.
822 N.W.2d 382
Filed October 19, 2012. 	No. S‑11‑1066.
1. Decedents’ Estates: Wills. An action seeking to revoke a beneficiary’s interest
under a no contest provision of a will requires a court to construe the will and
consider any governing statutes.
2. Wills: Trusts. The interpretation of the words in a will or a trust presents a ques‑
tion of law.
3. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently reviews ques‑
tions of law decided by a lower court.
5. Decedents’ Estates: Wills: Partition: Time. After a probate court enters its final
decree closing an estate, a devisee cannot affect a testator’s restriction against a
partition. So a devisee’s partition action after the estate has been closed cannot be
a will contest that attacks the testator’s will.