In re Interest of Charlicia H.

I n re I nterest of C harlICIa h., a ChIld
under 18 years of age .
state of nebraska , appellee , v. C harlICIa h.,
appellee , and nebraska department
of health and human
servICes , appellant.
I n re I nterest of JauvIer p., a ChIld
under 18 years of age .
state of nebraska , appellee , v. JauvIer p.,
appellee , and nebraska department
of health and human
servICes , appellant.
809 N.W.2d 274
Filed February 24, 2012. 	Nos. S-11-450, S-11-451.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. In reviewing questions of law arising under
the Nebraska Juvenile Code, an appellate court reaches conclusions independent
of the lower court’s rulings.
2. Juvenile Courts: Judgments: Child Custody: Appeal and Error. Placement
orders in juvenile cases are dispositional in nature and therefore final orders for
purposes of appeal.
Appeals 	from 	the 	Separate 	Juvenile 	Court 	of 	Douglas
County: vernon danIels, Judge. Affirmed.
Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General, and John M. Baker,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Donald 	W. 	Kleine, 	Douglas 	County 	Attorney, 	Cody
Miltenberger, and Kailee Smith, Senior Certified Law Student,
for appellee State of Nebraska.
heavICan, 	C.J., 	C onnolly, 	stephan, 	mCC ormaCk , 	and
mIller-lerman, JJ.
heavICan, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the
juvenile court had the authority to discharge the Office of
Juvenile Services (OJS) and instead place the juveniles at issue
in the instant cases on probation. We conclude that the juvenile
court does have such power and accordingly affirm.
362 	283 NeBRASKA RePORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

BACKGROUND
The facts are undisputed. The juveniles in these two cases,
Charlicia H. and Jauvier P., were both adjudicated for law vio-
lations. Charlicia was adjudicated for shoplifting, and Jauvier
was adjudicated as being an accessory to a felony.
For Charlicia, who was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-247(1) (Reissue 2008), a predispositional investigation
was done by the Office of Probation Administration (Probation),
followed by a temporary placement with OJS, an agency of the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
for an evaluation. Following that evaluation, Charlicia was
placed with OJS. Subsequently, the juvenile court discharged
OJS and Charlicia was transferred to juvenile probation.
Jauvier’s path was similar, though not identical. Following
a predispositional investigation, Jauvier, who was adjudicated
under § 43-247(2), was temporarily placed with DHHS at OJS
for an evaluation. Following that evaluation, the juvenile court
placed Jauvier with Probation. The juvenile court subsequently
also committed Jauvier to the temporary custody of OJS for
placement. Jauvier was then placed first in the parental home,
then with an aunt. Following that placement, the juvenile court
discharged OJS and transferred Jauvier to Probation.
DHHS appealed, arguing that the juvenile court lacked juris-
diction to transfer a juvenile from OJS to Probation. DHHS
does not contend that the placements with Probation are harm-
ful to the juveniles or not in their best interests. We consoli-
dated these cases and moved them to our docket.
ASSIGNMeNT OF eRROR
DHHS assigns, restated and consolidated, that the juvenile
court lacked the jurisdiction to discharge a juvenile from OJS
and instead place that juvenile on probation.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] In reviewing questions of law arising under the Nebraska
Juvenile Code, an appellate court reaches conclusions indepen-
dent of the lower court’s rulings.1
1 In re Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., 267 Neb. 232, 674 N.W.2d 442
(2004).
IN Re INTeReST OF CHARLICIA H. 	363
Cite as 283 Neb. 362

ANALYSIS
Juvenile Court’s Authority.
In these cases, DHHS concedes that the juvenile court has
the authority to place a juvenile on probation, but then subse-
quently revoke that probation and place the juvenile with OJS.
However, DHHS argues that there is no legislative authority
to do the opposite and that the juvenile court was without the
authority to discharge OJS and place Charlicia and Jauvier with
Probation.
We begin with a primer on the relevant statutes. Under
§ 43-247, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over certain cat-
egories of juveniles. Once the court adjudicates a juvenile
under § 43-247(1) or (2), the court has the ability to order a
predispositional investigation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-281
(Reissue 2008). Following a predispositional investigation, a
juvenile appears for disposition. In these cases, because both
Charlicia and Jauvier were accused of law violations, disposi-
tion occurred under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279 (Reissue 2008).
The juvenile court has the ability under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-286 (Supp. 2011) to order several different dispositions: It
may (1) place the juvenile on probation subject to the supervi-
sion of a probation officer2; (2) permit the juvenile to remain in
the family home, but under the supervision of a probation offi-
cer;3 (3) place the juvenile in a suitable family home or institu-
tion, again subject to the supervision of a probation officer; or
(4) place the juvenile with OJS.4 This court has noted that it
is permissible to order both OJS and Probation to be simulta-
neously involved in the dispositional plan for a juvenile.5
If the juvenile court places a juvenile on probation under
§ 43-286(1)(a), it retains the authority, as it would under the
criminal code, to revoke that probation.6 The possible results of
that revocation are as follows:
2 § 43-286(1)(a)(i).
3 § 43-286(1)(a)(ii).
4 § 43-286(1)(b).
5 See In re Interest of Katrina R., 281 Neb. 907, 799 N.W.2d 673 (2011).
6 § 43-286(5)(b).
364 	283 NeBRASKA RePORTS

If the juvenile is found by the court to have violated the
terms of his or her probation or supervision or an order of
the court, the court may modify the terms and conditions
of the probation, supervision, or other court order, extend
the period of probation, supervision, or other court order,
or enter any order of disposition that could have been
made at the time the original order was entered[.]7
If, instead of probation, the juvenile court chooses to place
a juvenile with OJS, the juvenile court then orders an initial
level of treatment8 and continues to monitor the juvenile until
the juvenile is legally discharged or attains the age of 19.9 The
monitoring includes the ability to change treatment options10
and to determine whether in-home or out-of-home placement is
in the best interests of the juvenile.11
Throughout this process, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
shall continue over any juvenile brought before the court
or committed under the Nebraska Juvenile Code and the
court shall have power to order a change in the custody
or care of any such juvenile if at any time it is made to
appear to the court that it would be for the best interests
of the juvenile to make such change.12
According to § 43-412(1), “[e]very juvenile committed to
[OJS] shall remain committed until he or she attains the age of
nineteen or is legally discharged.”
We turn to DHHS’ argument that the juvenile court lacks
jurisdiction to place a juvenile on probation after it has com-
mitted the juvenile to OJS. DHHS acknowledges that upon
adjudication, the court may elect to place the juvenile on pro-
bation or commit him or her to OJS,13 and that if probation is
ordered but later revoked, the juvenile court may exercise any
7 § 43-286(5)(b)(v).
8 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-408(2) (Reissue 2008).
9 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-412(1) (Reissue 2008).
10 § 43-408(3).
11 Id.
12 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-295 (Reissue 2008).
13 See § 43-286.
IN Re INTeReST OF CHARLICIA H. 	365
Cite as 283 Neb. 362

of its original disposition options, including commitment to
OJS.14 But, DHHS contends, when a juvenile court commits a
juvenile to OJS, it has no authority to subsequently revoke the
commitment and place the juvenile on probation.
We find both §§ 43-295 and 43-412 relevant to our resolu-
tion of this question. When Charlicia and Jauvier were commit-
ted to OJS, § 43-412 provided in full:
(1) every juvenile committed to [OJS] pursuant to the
Nebraska Juvenile Code or pursuant to subsection (3) of
section 29-2204 shall remain committed until he or she
attains the age of nineteen or is legally discharged.
(2) The discharge of any juvenile pursuant to the rules
and regulations or upon his or her attainment of the age
of nineteen shall be a complete release from all penalties
incurred by conviction or adjudication of the offense for
which he or she was committed.
DHHS argues that § 43-412 explicitly provides that a juvenile
committed to OJS remains committed until he or she attains the
age of 19 or is legally discharged. The crux of DHHS’ argu-
ment, then, is that once the juvenile court has placed a juvenile
with OJS, it cannot undo that placement. We disagree that
§ 43-412 should be read as such.
To begin, we find DHHS’ interpretation of § 43-412 to be
inconsistent with the juvenile court’s ongoing power to moni-
tor a juvenile’s progress while he or she is under the juvenile
court’s authority as set forth in § 43-408 and, in particular,
with the juvenile court’s powers under § 43-295. That sec-
tion provides:
except when the juvenile has been legally adopted,
the jurisdiction of the court shall continue over any juve-
nile brought before the court or committed under the
Nebraska Juvenile Code and the court shall have power
to order a change in the custody or care of any such juve-
nile if at any time it is made to appear to the court that
it would be for the best interests of the juvenile to make
such change.
14 See § 43-286(5)(b)(v).
366 	283 NeBRASKA RePORTS

Nor do we believe that DHHS’ proposed interpretation is
consistent with our recent decisions suggesting that a flexible
approach must be taken in juvenile cases similar to these cases.
Recently in In Re Interest of Katrina R.,15 we were presented
with the question of whether a juvenile adjudicated under
§ 43-247(3)(b) could be simultaneously committed to DHHS
and placed on probation. We reasoned that the juvenile court
had been vested with the authority to order both types of dis-
positions and noted that concurrent supervision was envisioned
by the relevant statutory provisions. We declined to adopt
DHHS’ narrow interpretation of the relevant statutes because
we felt that to do so would “fail[] to maintain a sensible
scheme which gives effect to every provision of the [Nebraska
Juvenile] Code.”16
Particularly when the question is considered in light of the
discretion given by § 43-295, we conclude that a sensible read-
ing of § 43-412 would limit its application to a procedural one,
setting forth the consequences of discharge from OJS. We do
not believe that § 43-412 should be read as a policy statement
regarding OJS’ perpetual involvement in juvenile court cases.
Nor do we believe that the juvenile court’s action in placing
these juveniles with Probation equates with discharge as con-
templated by § 43-412.
In In re Interest of Katrina R., we reasoned that “[a]bsent
any provision affirmatively stating otherwise, it is within the
juvenile court’s discretion to issue whatever combination of
statutorily authorized dispositions . . . the court deems neces-
sary to protect the juvenile’s best interests.”17 There is nothing
to explicitly prevent the juvenile court from doing what it did
in these cases. And the juvenile court has been vested with
the power to place a juvenile with either OJS or Probation.
Because of this, and because there is no contention that the
juvenile court’s action harmed either of these juveniles or was
not in their best interests, we conclude that the juvenile court
15 In re Interest of Katrina R., supra note 5.
16 Id. at 915, 799 N.W.2d at 679.
17 Id.
IN Re INTeReST OF CHARLICIA H. 	367
Cite as 283 Neb. 362

had the authority to discharge OJS and place these juveniles
with Probation. We accordingly affirm the decisions of the
juvenile court.
State’s Arguments on Appeal.
In addition to the arguments made in its brief filed in case
No. S-11-451 pertaining to the issues discussed above, the
State also argues that the juvenile court erred on December 16,
2010, when it originally placed Jauvier on probation. The State
contends that the juvenile court was without authority to place
Jauvier on probation and set the matter for continued disposi-
tion. According to the State,
[h]ad it not been for the court committing plain error on
December 16, 2010, in setting the matter for continued
disposition after entering a [§] 43-286 dispositional order,
the April 15, 2011 order and all subsequent orders would
not have been issued as they were. Accordingly, the juve-
nile should never have been removed from probation and
placed in OJS custody because the court failed to uti-
lize the applicable statutory procedure which constituted
plain error.18
[2] We decline to reach the State’s arguments regarding the
December 16, 2010, order. First, this order would be appropri-
ately appealed within 30 days following entry of the December
16 order, which as a placement order is dispositional in nature
and therefore final.19 No such appeal was taken. And even if the
December 16 order was not final, the proper avenue for raising
an argument such as the one raised here by the State would be
by cross-appeal.20 This was not done.
CONCLUSION
The decisions of the juvenile court are affirmed.
affIrmed.
WrIght, J., not participating.
18 Brief for appellee State in No. S-11-451 at 20.
19 See In re Interest of Taylor W., 276 Neb. 679, 757 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
20 Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(D)(4) (rev. 2008). See, also, Trieweiler v.
Sears, 268 Neb. 952, 689 N.W.2d 807 (2004).
368 	283 NeBRASKA RePORTS