State v. Parks

his license revocation. We vacate the sentence and remand the
cause for resentencing.
Sentence vacated, and cauSe
remanded for reSentencing.
State of nebraSka , appellee , v.
Jerad n. parkS, appellant.
803 N.W.2d 761
Filed September 30, 2011. 	No. S-11-092.
1. Criminal Law: Courts: Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A
trial court’s denial of a motion to transfer a pending criminal proceeding to the
juvenile court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Jurisdictional questions can be raised by the
Nebraska Supreme Court sua sponte.
4. ____: ____. A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is
determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.
5. Criminal Law: Courts: Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-247 (Reissue 2008), when a juvenile has been charged with a felony, the
district court and the juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction.
6. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction over any indi-
vidual adjudged to be within the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (Reissue
2008) shall continue until the individual reaches the age of majority or the court
otherwise discharges the individual from its jurisdiction.
7. Juvenile Courts: Words and Phrases. For purposes of the Nebraska Juvenile
Code, “age of majority” means 19 years of age and “juvenile” means any person
under the age of 18.
8. Statutes. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be
given their ordinary meaning.
9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not read anything plain,
direct, or unambiguous out of a statute.
10. Statutes. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it
can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous
or meaningless.
11. ____. A court must place on a statute a reasonable construction which best
achieves the statute’s purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat
that purpose.
12. Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. In construing a statute, an appellate court
looks to the statutory objective to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought
to be remedied, and the purpose to be served.
454 	282 NebRASkA RepoRTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

13. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordi-
nary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain
the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Jodi
nelSon, Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis R. keefe, Lancaster County public Defender, and
Shawn elliott for appellant.
Jon bruning, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss for
appellee.
H eavican, 	c.J., 	WrigHt, 	connolly, 	gerrard, 	StepHan,
mccormack , and miller-lerman, JJ.
H eavican, c.J.
INTRoDUCTIoN
Jerad N. parks appeals his convictions and sentences for
attempted second degree sexual assault and felony child abuse,
alleging that the district court erred when it refused to transfer
his case to the juvenile court. parks also claims that because
he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, the district court
erred in finding him subject to the Sex offender Registration
Act (SoRA), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4001 to 29-4014 (Reissue
2008 & Supp. 2009), and the Sex offender Commitment Act
(SoCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-1201 to 71-1226 (Reissue
2009). We affirm.
bACkGRoUND
parks was originally charged with first degree sexual assault
on a child. The victim, e.C., is parks’ nephew, and the alleged
offenses occurred between May 1 and September 16, 2000.
At the time of the offenses, e.C. was 5 years old and parks
was 14 or 15 years old. e.C. first reported the assault in 2009,
and parks was arrested and charged shortly thereafter. Further
details of the offenses will be discussed below.
parks filed a motion to transfer to the juvenile court because
he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, although he was
24 years of age at the time he was charged. The district court
denied the motion to transfer, and parks filed an interlocutory
appeal, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
STATe v. pARkS 	455
Cite as 282 Neb. 454

parks then pled no contest to one count of attempted second
degree sexual assault and one count of felony child abuse. The
district court sentenced parks to 180 days in jail and 3 years’
probation. The district court also ordered parks to register as
a sex offender as required by Nebraska law, to undergo a sex-
offender-specific evaluation, and to comply with any treatment
recommendations of the evaluation as directed by his probation
officer. parks appeals from his convictions and sentences.
ASSIGNMeNTS oF eRRoR
parks assigns that the district court erred in (1) denying his
motion to transfer to the juvenile court and (2) finding that he
was subject to the requirements of SoRA and SoCA, because
he was a juvenile at the time of the offense.
STANDARD oF ReVIeW
[1] A trial court’s denial of a motion to transfer a pending
criminal proceeding to the juvenile court is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.1
[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an indepen-
dent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
court below.2
ANALYSIS
Trial Court Did Not Err When It Denied Parks’
Motion to Transfer Case to Juvenile Court.
parks first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. parks admits that
such a transfer would be tantamount to a dismissal, because
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (Reissue 2008), the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction ends once the juvenile reaches the age of
majority. However, parks claims that his age at the time of the
offense mandates a transfer to the juvenile court, and he alleges
that a “delay in the prosecution” has “depriv[ed] him the pro-
tection of the juvenile court system.”3
1 State v. Goodwin, 278 Neb. 945, 774 N.W.2d 733 (2009).
2 State v. Tamayo, 280 Neb. 836, 791 N.W.2d 152 (2010).
3 brief for appellant at 13.
456 	282 NebRASkA RepoRTS

parks points us to Roper v. Simmons,4 alleging that Roper
sets forth the differences in adult and juvenile criminal culpa-
bility. parks also cites Graham v. Florida5 for the proposition
that juveniles have lessened culpability.
Roper presents a very different issue, however: whether it is
cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty when
the offense was committed while the defendant was a juvenile.6
Roper does not require that a juvenile be tried in the juvenile
court under all circumstances, or in all cases; instead, it holds
that a person cannot be sentenced to death if he or she commit-
ted the crime while a juvenile, because that would be a viola-
tion of the eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. And
Graham addressed the issue of whether the imposition of life
without parole on a juvenile who had not committed homicide
could be considered cruel and unusual punishment.7 Neither
Roper nor Graham gives parks an unassailable right to be tried
as a juvenile for crimes he committed while a juvenile.
[3,4] In fact, under the plain language of our statutes, the
juvenile court would never have jurisdiction in a case such as
this one. Although the State did not raise the issue, jurisdic-
tional questions can be raised by the Nebraska Supreme Court
sua sponte.8 A jurisdictional question which does not involve a
factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law.9
[5-7] Under § 43-247, when a juvenile has been charged
with a felony, the district court and the juvenile court have
concurrent jurisdiction.10 However, § 43-247 states that “the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over any individual adjudged to
4 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. ed. 2d 1
(2005).
5 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. ed. 2d 825
(2010).
6 Roper, supra note 4.
7 Graham, supra note 5.
8 State ex rel. NSBA v. Krepela, 259 Neb. 395, 610 N.W.2d 1 (2000).
9 Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100, 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005).
10 See Goodwin, supra note 1.
STATe v. pARkS 	457
Cite as 282 Neb. 454

be within the provisions of this section shall continue until the
individual reaches the age of majority or the court otherwise
discharges the individual from its jurisdiction.” For the pur-
poses of the Nebraska Juvenile Code, “[a]ge of majority means
nineteen years of age” and “[j]uvenile means any person under
the age of eighteen.”11
[8-12] Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in
a statute will be given their ordinary meaning.12 An appellate
court will not read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out
of a statute.13 A court must attempt to give effect to all parts
of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sen-
tence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless.14 A court
must place on a statute a reasonable construction which best
achieves the statute’s purpose, rather than a construction which
would defeat that purpose.15 In construing a statute, an appel-
late court looks to the statutory objective to be accomplished,
the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose
to be served.16
Under the plain language of the juvenile code, the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction ends when the juvenile reaches the age of
majority, but the district court’s jurisdiction continues. The dis-
trict court therefore had sole jurisdiction over parks, and it was
not required to weigh the factors found under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-276 (Cum. Supp. 2010). For that reason, the district court
did not err in denying parks’ motion to transfer.
SORA and SOCA.
parks’ second assignment of error is that the district court
erred when it determined that he was subject to SoRA and
SoCA, because those laws do not apply to juveniles. parks
further claims that the main purpose of those laws is to protect
11 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(1) and (7) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
12 Herrington v. P.R. Ventures, 279 Neb. 754, 781 N.W.2d 196 (2010).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
458 	282 NebRASkA RepoRTS

juveniles and not to punish them, and that therefore, he should
not be subject to the requirements of SoRA or SoCA.
First, we note that parks has not been found to be subject to
SoCA; hence, that claim is premature. The district court did
notify parks that his conviction for attempted second degree
sexual assault was an offense requiring a civil commitment
evaluation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4018 (Reissue 2008).
However, parks has not claimed that anyone alleged him to
be a dangerous sex offender under § 71-1205. We addressed
a similar issue in State v. Schreiner,17 in which the defendant
appealed the finding that he was subject to lifetime community
supervision under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-174.03 (Cum. Supp.
2006). We found that the defendant would not be subject to
lifetime community supervision until after his release from
prison and that therefore, his claim was not ripe for review.
Similarly, parks will not be subject to SoCA until he is
released from incarceration, so that claim is not ripe for review.
The district court found that parks was required to register as a
sex offender under SoRA, however.
Although parks argues that SoRA does not apply to juve-
niles, we need not decide whether SoRA may ever be applied
to juveniles who are adjudicated as having committed a reg-
istrable offense under § 29-4003. As discussed above, parks’
case properly remained with the district court. parks pled no
contest to attempted sexual assault in the second degree, a reg-
istrable offense as an adult, and was found guilty of the same
by the district court.
[13] We agree with the State where it points out that
§ 29-4003(1)(a)(i) states that SoRA shall apply to “any per-
son” who pleads guilty to, pleads nolo contendere to, or is
found guilty of attempted sexual assault in the second or third
degree. As we noted above, statutory language is to be given
its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not
resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory
words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.18 Therefore,
parks’ second assignment of error is also without merit.
17 State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. 393, 754 N.W.2d 742 (2008).
18 State v. Fuller, 278 Neb. 585, 772 N.W.2d 868 (2009).
STATe v. pARkS 	459
Cite as 282 Neb. 454

CoNCLUSIoN
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
parks’ motion to transfer, because the juvenile court does not
have jurisdiction over a person who has reached the age of
majority. The mere fact that parks was a juvenile at the time
of the offenses does not automatically give him the right to be
tried as a juvenile. Furthermore, because parks pled no contest
to a registrable offense under SoRA, the plain language of the
statute requires parks to register as a sex offender.
affirmed.
State of nebraSka ex rel . counSel for diScipline of
tHe nebraSka Supreme court, relator , v.
Jeremy r. SHirk , alSo knoWn aS Jeremy
muckey-SHirk , reSpondent.
803 N.W.2d 518
Filed September 30, 2011. 	No. S-11-319.
original action. Judgment of public reprimand.
H eavican, 	c.J., 	WrigHt, 	connolly, 	gerrard, 	StepHan,
mccormack , and miller-lerman, JJ.
per curiam.
INTRoDUCTIoN
Respondent, 	Jeremy 	R. 	Shirk, 	also 	known 	as 	Jeremy
Muckey-Shirk, was admitted to the practice of law in the State
of Nebraska on June 16, 2010, and in the State of Iowa on
September 25, 2009. At all times relevant hereto, respondent
was engaged in the private practice of law in Douglas County
in omaha, Nebraska. on April 19, 2011, formal charges were
filed against respondent. The formal charges set forth one
count and included the charge that respondent violated Neb.
Ct. R. of prof. Cond. § 3-508.4(a) through (d) (misconduct).
The formal charges also allege respondent violated his oath
of office as an attorney licensed to practice law in the State
of Nebraska, as provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-104 (Reissue
460 	282 NebRASkA RepoRTS