State v. Graham

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Ashton J. Graham, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed April 2, 2024. 	No. A-23-001.
1. Jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently
reviews questions of law decided by a lower court.
3. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s
determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial
grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous.
4. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class or
category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
the general subject matter involved.
5. Jurisdiction. Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a
judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may subject mat-
ter jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of
the parties.
6. Actions: Jurisdiction. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte.
7. ____: ____. A court action taken without subject matter jurisdiction
is void.
8. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court has an independent
duty to decide jurisdictional issues on appeal, even if the parties have
not raised the issue.
9. ____: ____. When a trial court lacks the power, that is, jurisdiction, to
adjudicate the merits of a claim, an appellate court also lacks the power
to adjudicate the merits of the claim.
10. Jurisdiction: Fees. The failure to pay the docket fee is jurisdictional.
11. Courts: Appeal and Error. In regard to a criminal case in county
court, a defendant may appeal, but the State is limited to an exception
proceeding.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 07:41 AM CDT

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
12. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy
before it.
Appeal from the District Court for Adams County, Morgan
R. Farquhar, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Adams County, Michael O. Mead, Judge. Judgment of
District Court reversed and vacated, and cause remanded with
directions.
T. Charles James, of Langvardt, Valle & James, P.C., L.L.O.,
for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust
for appellee.
Riedmann, Bishop, and Welch, Judges.
Welch, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Ashton J. Graham appeals the decision of the Adams County
District Court that reversed the county court’s order dismiss-
ing his criminal case based on a violation of his statutory right
to a speedy trial. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse
and vacate the district court’s order and remand the cause to
the district court with directions to remand the cause to the
county court.
BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2020, the State charged Graham in the
county court for Adams County with one count of driving
under the influence. Graham appeared pro se at the December
17 arraignment and requested a continuance so that he could
retain counsel. The following colloquy occurred during the
arraignment:
THE COURT: . . . Are you asking for a continuance
then, so that you can retain [counsel]?
[Graham:] Yes.
THE COURT: Any objection by the State?

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STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
[State:] No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. We’ll come back January 22 nd
at 9 a.m. for a further hearing in this matter. At that time,
you’ll come back with your attorney; he’ll probably do an
entry of plea and he’ll let you know what to do. There’s a
bond set that will continue. Speedy trial tolls today’s date
through January 22 nd.
The court did not make any further advisement regarding
Graham’s right to a speedy trial.
On January 18, 2021, Graham’s counsel entered his appear-
ance, 	tendered 	Graham’s 	written 	plea 	of 	not 	guilty, 	and
requested the matter be set for a jury trial. On February 11,
Graham filed a motion to suppress, and the suppression hear-
ing was held on April 28. The court denied the motion to sup-
press on August 3 and set the matter for a jury trial. During
the October 19 pretrial hearing, Graham waived his right to a
jury trial, and the court scheduled the bench trial to commence
on December 28.
On December 28, 2021, Graham filed a motion for dis-
charge on constitutional and statutory speedy trial grounds. A
hearing thereon was held in February 2022. On July 22, the
county court granted Graham’s motion for discharge based on
a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Specifically,
the county court found that during the arraignment, the county
court did not advise Graham, who was unrepresented by coun-
sel, of the effect of requesting a continuance. The court only
stated that “[s]peedy trial tolls today’s date through January
22nd .” Because of the court’s failure to advise Graham of the
effect of waiving his right to a speedy trial pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) (Reissue 2016), the county court
found that the time from the December 17, 2020, original
arraignment date to the January 22, 2021, continued arraign-
ment date was not excludable.
On August 1, 2022, the State filed in the county court its
notice of intent to take exception to the county court’s order
pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2317 (Reissue 2016). An

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STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
identical notice was filed in the district court on August 19.
According to the State’s brief on appeal, the State did not pay
the docket fee or request to pay the docket fee to the county
court. Instead, the State paid the docket fee in the form of a
claim collectible to the district court when it filed the identical
notice of appeal in the district court.
On December 1, 2022, the district court reversed the county
court’s order that had granted Graham’s motion for discharge
due to a violation of Graham’s statutory right to a speedy
trial and remanded the cause to the county court for fur-
ther proceedings. Graham has timely appealed the district
court’s order.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Graham assigns that the district court (1) did not have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal and (2) erred
when it reversed the county court’s order granting his motion
for discharge.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] 	Subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	is 	a 	question 	of 	law.
Schaeffer v. Frakes, 313 Neb. 337, 984 N.W.2d 290 (2023). An
appellate court independently reviews questions of law decided
by a lower court. Id.
[3] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether
charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a
factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous. State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d
64 (2019).
ANALYSIS
Graham’s first assignment of error is that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal from the county
court’s order granting his motion for discharge. More spe-
cifically, he argues that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the State’s appeal because the State failed to

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STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
deposit a docket fee as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2729
(Cum. Supp. 2022) in connection with pursuing an excep-
tion proceeding.
[4-7] Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal
to hear and determine a case in the general class or category
to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
the general subject matter involved. Huff v. Otto, 28 Neb.
App. 646, 947 N.W.2d 343 (2020). Parties cannot confer
subject matter jurisdiction upon a judicial tribunal by either
acquiescence or consent, nor may subject matter jurisdiction
be created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of the par-
ties. Id. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any time by any party or by the court sua sponte. Id. A court
action taken without subject matter jurisdiction is void. Id.
[8-10] An appellate court has an independent duty to decide
jurisdictional issues on appeal, even if the parties have not
raised the issue. Davis v. State, 297 Neb. 955, 902 N.W.2d 165,
(2017). And when a trial court lacks the power, that is, juris-
diction, to adjudicate the merits of a claim, an appellate court
also lacks the power to adjudicate the merits of the claim. Id. It
has been repeatedly held that the failure to pay the docket fee
is jurisdictional. Kowalewski v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Comrs.,
310 Neb. 812, 969 N.W.2d 392 (2022).
Here, following the county court’s dismissal of the State’s
case against Graham, the State filed a notice of appeal pursu-
ant to § 29-2317 in the county court. The State filed an identi-
cal notice of appeal in the district court. In its brief on appeal,
the State asserts that it electronically paid the docket fee to
the district court in the form of a claim collectible instead of
depositing the docket fee with the clerk of the county court,
as required under § 25-2729(1)(b). Accordingly, the State
concedes that the district court may have lacked jurisdiction
to consider the State’s appeal.
[11] The issue requires that we examine the procedural
rules governing the perfection of criminal appeals from the
county court to the district court. In State v. Thalken, 299

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STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
Neb. 857, 871-72, 911 N.W.2d 562, 574 (2018), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held:
In contrast to the statutes governing district courts,
the statute limiting appeals from county court in criminal
cases [under § 25-2729] is explicit: “Any party in a civil
case and any defendant in a criminal case may appeal
from the final judgment or final order of the county court
to the district court of the county where the county court
is located.” This statute also states in part, “In a crimi-
nal case, a prosecuting attorney may obtain review by
exception proceedings pursuant to sections 29-2317 to
29-2319.” Thus, it is clear that in regard to a criminal
case in county court, a defendant may “appeal,” but the
State is limited to an “exception proceeding[].”
(Emphasis omitted.)
Following the dictates of State v. Thalken, supra, in order
to obtain review of a county court order in a criminal case,
the State was required to comply with the exception pro-
ceeding rules set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2317 to
29-2319 (Reissue 2016). We note that although § 29-2318
was amended effective September 2, 2023, that amendment
was not in effect at the time of the State’s appeal of the dis-
trict court’s order in this case. See § 29-2318 (Supp. 2023).
As relevant to this appeal, the question becomes whether the
rules governing exception proceedings require the State to pay
a docket fee in order to perfect that review.
Section 29-2317 provides:
(1) A prosecuting attorney may take exception to any
ruling or decision of the county court made during the
prosecution of a cause by presenting to the court a notice
of intent to take an appeal to the district court with ref-
erence to the rulings or decisions of which complaint
is made.
(2) The notice shall contain a copy of the rulings or
decisions complained of, the basis and reasons for objec-
tion thereto, and a statement by the prosecuting attorney

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STATE v. GRAHAM
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as to the part of the record he or she proposes to present
to the district court. The notice shall be presented to the
court within twenty days after the final order is entered
in the cause. If the court finds it is in conformity with
the truth, the judge shall sign it and shall indicate thereon
whether, in his or her opinion, the part of the record
which the prosecuting attorney proposes to present to the
district court is adequate for a proper consideration of
the matter.
(3) The prosecuting attorney shall then file the notice
in the district court within thirty days from the date of
final order and within thirty days from the date of filing
the notice shall file a bill of exceptions covering the part
of the record referred to in the notice. Such appeal shall
be on the record.
Section 29-2318 (Reissue 2016) provides:
When a notice is filed, the trial court shall appoint a
lawyer to argue the case against the prosecuting attorney,
which lawyer shall receive for his or her services a fee
not exceeding two hundred dollars to be fixed by the
court and to be paid out of the treasury of the county.
The court may appoint the defendant’s attorney, but if
an attorney is not appointed the defendant may be repre-
sented by an attorney of his or her choice.
Section 29-2319 provides:
(1) The judgment of the court in any action taken
under the provisions of sections 29-2317 and 29-2318
shall not be reversed nor in any manner affected when
the defendant in the trial court has been placed legally
in jeopardy, but in such cases the decision of the district
court shall determine the law to govern in any similar
case which may be pending at the time the decision is
rendered, or which may thereafter arise in the district.
(2) When the decision of the district court establishes
that the final order of the trial court was erroneous
and that the defendant had not been placed legally in

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STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
jeopardy prior to the entry of such erroneous order, the
trial court may upon application of the prosecuting attor-
ney issue its warrant for the rearrest of the defendant and
the cause against the defendant shall thereupon proceed
in accordance with the law as determined by the decision
of the district court.
(3) The prosecuting attorney may take exception to
any ruling or decision of the district court in the manner
provided by sections 29-2315.01 to 29-2316.
After reviewing these statutes, it is clear that there is no
mention of a docket fee in connection with perfecting this
review. Nevertheless, in suggesting that a docket fee must be
paid to perfect this review, Graham cites to this court’s hold-
ing in State v. McArthur, 12 Neb. App. 657, 685 N.W.2d 733
(2004), and suggests it dictates a similar result here.
In State v. McArthur, supra, this court considered whether
the State was required to pay a docket fee in connection with
its appeal of a county court’s order granting a motion to sup-
press pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-824 to 29-826 (Reissue
2016). In finding that the payment of a docket fee was required
to perfect that appeal, we recognized that, although § 29-824
granted the State the right to appeal from an order granting
a motion to suppress in the manner provided in §§ 29-824
to 29-826, and nothing in those statutes explicitly required
the payment of a docket fee, “[s]ections 29-824 to 29-826
are silent, however, with regard to paying a docket fee. We
find that this silence simply means that there is not a more
stringent requirement placed upon the State than the standard
requirement for appeals.” State v. McArthur, 12 Neb. App. at
666, 685 N.W.2d at 740. In making this finding, we analyzed
§ 25-2729, which sets forth the requirement for payment of a
docket fee in connection with county court appeals, and noted
the explicit language contained in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2728(2)
(Cum. Supp. 2002):
Section 25-2728(2) expressly states that Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 25-2728 to 25-2738 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp.

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2002) “shall not apply to” and then lists several statutes,
among which §§ 29-824 to 29-826 are not included. [The
defendant] argues that because § 25-2728(2) does not
exclude application of § 25-2729 to §§ 29-824 to 29-826,
§ 25-2729 must necessarily apply to §§ 29-824 to 29-826.
We agree.
State v. McArthur, 12 Neb. App. at 662, 685 N.W.2d at 737.
The current version of the statute, which was amended in
2018, likewise does not exclude application of § 25-2729 to
§§ 29-824 to 29-826.
In noting that pursuant to the language of § 25-2728(2),
the Legislature specifically provided that Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 25-2728 to 25-2738 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002)
shall not apply to certain types of appeals, we ultimately
concluded that “the Legislature’s omission of §§ 29-824 to
29-826 from § 25-2728(2) indicates an intent that § 25-2729
apply to §§ 29-824 to 29-826.” State v. McArthur, 12 Neb.
App. at 664, 685 N.W.2d at 738. Graham makes a similar
argument here. He notes that because §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319
are likewise omitted from § 25-2728(2) (Cum. Supp. 2022),
the same reasoning should apply, and that the general docket
fee requirement in § 25-2729 should apply to an exception
proceeding under §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319.
As it relates to this very specific issue, we noted in dicta in
State v. McArthur:
Sections 29-2317 to 29-2319 contain no language specifi-
cally addressing whether a prosecuting attorney need not
pay a docket fee. Furthermore, we find the Legislature’s
recognition in § 25-2728(1) of a prosecuting attorney’s
right to obtain review by exception proceedings pursuant
to §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319, and then its omission of those
sections from § 25-2728(2), indicative of an intent that
the docket fee requirement contained in § 25-2729 does
apply to §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319.
12 Neb. App. at 663, 685 N.W.2d at 738.

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STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
That language was dicta in State v. McArthur, supra,
because the issue in that case was whether a docket fee was
required by the State in connection with an appeal under
§§ 29-824 to 29-826, not an appeal under §§ 29-2317 to
29-2319. And there is a difference between appeals under
those different statutory constructs in that, in § 25-2728(1),
the Legislature never makes mention of §§ 29-824 to 29-826,
whereas the Legislature specifically noted in § 25-2728(1)
that “[i]n a criminal case, a prosecuting attorney may obtain
review by exception proceedings pursuant to sections 29-2317
to 29-2319.” The question becomes whether that specific
directive in § 25-2728(1) indicates that § 25-2729 should
not apply to an exception proceeding pursuant to §§ 29-2317
to 29-2319.
[12] Nebraska’s appellate courts have never been called
upon to directly decide that issue. But in McArthur, we rea-
soned that the subsequent omission of §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319
from § 25-2728(2) was indicative of the Legislature’s intent
to apply § 25-2729 to this type of appeal. We further note that
following our opinion in McArthur, § 25-2728 was amended
in 2018 without any changes in relation to this specific issue.
Accordingly, we will not depart from that reasoning now
and specifically hold that the Legislature’s recognition in
§ 25-2728(1) of a prosecuting attorney’s right to obtain review
by exception proceedings pursuant to §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319,
followed by its omission of those sections from § 25-2728(2),
is indicative of an intent that the docket fee requirement
in § 25-2729 does apply to exception proceedings under
§§ 29-2317 to 29-2319. Because the State acknowledged fail-
ing to timely pay the docket fee in accordance with that
section, we find the district court lacked subject matter juris-
diction over this appeal, as do we. See State v. Pauly, 311
Neb. 418, 972 N.W.2d 907 (2022) (where lower court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate merits of claim, issue,
or question, appellate court also lacks power to determine
merits of claim, issue, or question presented to lower court).

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STATE v. GRAHAM
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Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order
and remand the cause to the district court with directions to
remand the cause to the county court. Because of this determi-
nation, we need not consider Graham’s remaining assignment
of error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and con-
troversy before it. State v. Williams, 313 Neb. 981, 987 N.W.2d
613 (2023).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse and vacate the
district court’s order that reversed the county court’s order
dismissing the State’s complaint against Graham for a speedy
trial violation and remand the cause to the district court with
directions to remand the cause to the county court.
Reversed and vacated, and cause
remanded with directions.
Bishop, Judge, dissenting.
The majority determines that because of dicta in State v.
McArthur, 12 Neb. App. 657, 685 N.W.2d 733 (2004), the
State’s payment of the docket fee in the district court, rather
than in the county court, resulted in the district court’s lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the State’s exception proceed-
ing. I do not agree that the dicta in McArthur should control
here; rather, only the requirements set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-2317 (Reissue 2016) should govern the district court’s
jurisdiction. The applicable jurisdictional statute for exception
proceedings filed from the county court to the district court,
§ 29-2317, says nothing about a docket fee, unlike the appli-
cable jurisdictional statute for exception proceedings filed
from the district court to an appellate court, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-2315.01 (Cum. Supp. 2022). Section 29-2315.01 refers
to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2022), which does
require a docket fee. Whether the Legislature intentionally or
mistakenly omitted a docket fee requirement in the applicable

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county court statute does not matter; it is not the province of
an appellate court to read something into a statute that is not
there. See State v. Godek, 312 Neb. 1004, 981 N.W.2d 810
(2022) (not within province of courts to read meaning into
statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain
out of statute). I conclude the district court had jurisdiction
over the State’s exception proceeding, and therefore, I would
allow Graham’s appeal to proceed in this court to consider the
speedy trial issue.
I begin my analysis with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2728 (Cum.
Supp. 2022), the current version of the statute interpreted by
this court in State v. McArthur, supra, to require a docket
fee under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2729 (Cum. Supp. 2022) for
exception proceedings brought by the State pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319 (Reissue 2016), despite such
proceedings not being at issue in that case. McArthur focused
on the fact that exception proceedings were not listed in
§ 25-2728(2), which this court suggested made the docket fee
requirement in § 25-2729 applicable. However, in my opinion,
§ 25-2728(2) is irrelevant to exception proceedings because
§ 25-2728(1) specifically directs a prosecuting attorney to
§§ 29-2317 to 29-2319 to obtain review by exception proceed-
ings, thus making §§ 25-2728(2) and 25-2729 inapplicable.
Section 25-2728(1) provides:
Any party in a civil case and any defendant in a criminal
case may appeal from the final judgment or final order
of the county court to the district court of the county
where the county court is located. In a criminal case,
a prosecuting attorney may obtain review by exception
proceedings pursuant to sections 29-2317 to 29-2319.
In considering § 25-2728(1), the Nebraska Supreme Court has
stated, “[I]t is clear that in regard to a criminal case in county
court, a defendant may ‘appeal,’ but the State is limited to an
‘exception proceeding[].’” State v. Thalken, 299 Neb. 857, 872,
911 N.W.2d 562, 574 (2018). The Supreme Court explained:

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At one time, the method of review of all criminal cases
in the Supreme Court was upon writ of error. The transi-
tion away from writs of error began in 1957, continued
in 1961 and 1973, and culminated in 1982. And an
understanding of the writ of error procedure is essential
to making sense of the exception proceedings now per-
mitted to be taken by the State.
. . . .
In contrast to the statutes governing district courts,
the statute limiting appeals from county court in crimi-
nal cases is explicit: “Any party in a civil case and any
defendant in a criminal case may appeal from the final
judgment or final order of the county court to the district
court of the county where the county court is located.”
This statute also states in part, “In a criminal case, a
prosecuting attorney may obtain review by exception pro-
ceedings pursuant to sections 29-2317 to 29-2319.” Thus,
it is clear that in regard to a criminal case in county court,
a defendant may “appeal,” but the State is limited to an
“exception proceeding[].”
Id. at 871-72, 911 N.W.2d at 574 (emphasis in original) (quot-
ing § 25-2728(1)).
The distinction in Thalken between an “appeal” filed by
a criminal defendant and an “exception proceeding” filed by
the State is important, particularly when reminded that “[i]n
the absence of specific statutory authorization, the State, as
a general rule, has no right to appeal an adverse ruling in
a criminal case.” State v. Johnson, 259 Neb. 942, 945, 613
N.W.2d 459, 462 (2000). Further, the scope of review per-
mitted in exception proceedings filed by the State is very
limited. See, § 29-2319(1) (county court judgments “shall not
be reversed nor in any manner affected when the defendant in
the trial court has been placed legally in jeopardy,” but district
court’s decision “shall determine the law to govern in any
similar case which may be pending at the time the decision
is rendered, or which may thereafter arise in the district”);

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§ 29-2319(2) (if defendant is not “placed legally in jeopardy
prior to the entry of such erroneous order, the trial court may
upon application of the prosecuting attorney issue its war-
rant for the rearrest of the defendant and the cause against
the defendant shall thereupon proceed in accordance with
the law as determined by the decision of the district court”);
§ 29-2319(3) (“prosecuting attorney may take exception to
any ruling or decision of the district court in the manner pro-
vided by sections 29-2315.01 to 29-2316”); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-2316 (Reissue 2016) (district court judgments “shall not
be reversed nor in any manner affected when the defendant in
the trial court has been placed legally in jeopardy,” but appel-
late court’s decision “shall determine the law to govern in any
similar case which may be pending at the time the decision
is rendered or which may thereafter arise in the state”; and if
defendant is not “placed legally in jeopardy prior to the entry
of such erroneous order, the trial court may upon application
of the prosecuting attorney issue its warrant for the rearrest of
the defendant and the cause against him or her shall thereupon
proceed in accordance with the law as determined by the deci-
sion of the appellate court”).
The 	Nebraska 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	further 	stated 	that
§ 25-2728 authorizes an appeal by a defendant in a crimi-
nal case in county court and that § 25-2729 “prescribes the
procedure to be followed in taking such an appeal.” State v.
Thalken, 299 Neb. 857, 872, 911 N.W.2d 562, 574 (2018).
Notably, the court then distinguished an appeal filed by a
defendant in a criminal proceeding from an exception pro-
ceeding filed by the State, pointing out that “[s]eparate stat-
utes authorize exception proceedings from the respective trial
courts.” Id. “Prior to the reorganization of county courts in
the early 1970’s, there was no procedure for appeals from
county court judgments in criminal cases by the State.” Id.
at 873, 911 N.W.2d at 575. “In 1975, a statute, comparable
to the procedures applicable to district courts, was enacted
to permit a prosecuting attorney to take an ‘exception’ to the

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district court from a county court ruling or decision.” Id. at
874, 911 N.W.2d at 575. I view Thalken as confirming that a
defendant in a criminal case may appeal from a county court
as prescribed in § 25-2729, whereas an exception proceeding
filed by the State is authorized under separate statutes. In the
case of an exception proceeding filed by the State from the
county court, the applicable separate statutes are §§ 29-2317
to 29-2319, thus making § 25-2729 and its docket fee require-
ment inapplicable to such proceedings.
The procedure for the State to file an exception proceed-
ing from the county court to the district court is routed from
§ 25-2728(1) directly to §§ 29-2317 to 29-2319; therefore,
only those criminal procedure statutes dictate the require-
ments for how the State may file an exception proceeding
from the county court to the district court. And as the major-
ity acknowledges, those statutes do not say anything about a
required docket fee. On the other hand, the statute specific
to the filing of an exception proceeding by the State from
the district court to an appellate court, § 29-2315.01, does
refer to § 25-1912, which requires payment of a docket fee in
appeals filed from a district court’s judgment, decree, or final
order. Notably, the county court exception proceeding statutes
are almost identical to the comparable district court statutes,
except that the county court statutes make no reference to a
docket fee. And, as the Nebraska Supreme Court has held:
Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the text
is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. An appel-
late court will not resort to interpretation of statutory
language to ascertain the meaning of words which are
plain, direct, and unambiguous. Similarly, it is not within
the province of the courts to read meaning into a statute
that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out
of a statute.
State v. Godek, 312 Neb. 1004, 1011, 981 N.W.2d 810, 816
(2022).

- 762 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
STATE v. GRAHAM
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 747
Since § 29-2317 does not require a docket fee, this court
should not read such a requirement into that statute. This is
particularly important since § 29-2317 (exception proceed-
ings from county court) and § 29-2315.01 (exception pro-
ceedings from district court) constitute the prerequisite proce-
dures for a reviewing court to acquire jurisdiction to conduct
its review. See, State v. Johnson, 259 Neb. 942, 945-46, 613
N.W.2d 459, 462 (2000) (State’s exception dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction because State’s application to take exception to
district court’s decision failed to bear signature of trial judge
or contain trial judge’s opinion, as required by § 29-2315.01;
appellate court’s “preliminary inquiry is whether the manda-
tory requirements of § 29-2315.01 have been met, thereby
conferring jurisdiction” upon the appellate court to “decide
the merits of the issues raised in the State’s exception”; and
State’s right to seek appellate review of adverse criminal
rulings must be in compliance with “‘special requirements
of § 29-2315.01’”); State v. Steinbach, 11 Neb. App. 468,
472, 652 N.W.2d 632, 635 (2002) (because State’s right “to
appeal from a county court’s final order in a criminal case is
limited by the express provisions of § 29-2317, the State’s
failure to comply with § 29-2317 . . . prevented the district
court from having jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
State’s exception”).
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
no interpretation is needed, and a court is without author-
ity to change such language. State v. Johnson, supra. In my
opinion, the language of § 29-2317 is straightforward as to
what is required of the State to take exception to any ruling
or decision of the county court and seek review in the district
court. Because § 29-2317 is jurisdictional and nothing in
that statute requires the State to pay a docket fee, I conclude
that this court has jurisdiction over the present appeal filed
by Graham.