TA29868, TA29869.doc

NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

I.C. NO. TA-29868, Carole Lightfoot-Healy, as Administrator of the ESTATE OF Russell Lee Lightfoot, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.

I.C. NO. TA-29869, Joshua Campbell, as Administrator of the ESTATE OF Sabrina Perry Lightfoot, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.  

DECISION AND ORDER for the Full Commission by JAMES C. GILLEN, Commissioner

Filed:  August 4, 2026

This case was heard before the Full Commission on 21 October 2025, upon appeal of Plaintiffs from a Decision and Order filed by Senior Deputy Commissioner Robert J. Harris on 12 May 2025.  
A P P E A R A N C E S
Plaintiffs:	Lewis & Roberts, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina; Matthew D. Quinn and James A. Roberts, III, appearing.  

Defendant:	North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina; David D. Larson, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, appearing.  

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The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Decision and Order based upon the record of the proceedings before Senior Deputy Commissioner Harris, the Form 44 Application for Review, and the briefs and arguments of the parties.  The Full Commission hereby enters the following Decision and Order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-292:
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The Full Commission addresses the following: 
ISSUE
Did Defendant, through an employee or agent, breach a duty of care owed to Russell and Sabrina Lightfoot that proximately resulted in injury to them?
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The following documents were accepted into evidence by the Deputy Commissioner as Exhibits:
STIPULATED EXHIBITS
Exhibit #1:  Executed Pre-Trial Agreement;
Exhibit #2:  Public records request to NCDOT;
Exhibit #3:  Email re: public records request;
Exhibit #4:  Email re: public records request;
Exhibit #5:  DMV-349 crash report for subject incident;
Exhibit #8:  Aerial photograph of subject intersection;
Exhibit #11:  Notice to Proceed to Stantec 7/1/19;
Exhibit #33:  Guidelines for Investigation of Fatal Crashes;
Exhibit #38:  Photographs of subject intersection from Mann inspection;
Exhibit #39:  Highway Patrol photographs of subject incident scene;
Exhibit #40:  Video of subject incident from auto shop surveillance camera;
Exhibit #50:  CV of John Flanagan;
Exhibit #51:  Flanagan's contract with NCDOJ;
Exhibit #66:  Defendant's designation of Flanagan as expert witness;
Exhibit #67:  CV of Stephanie Borzendowski;
Exhibit #68:  CV of Daren Morceau;
Exhibit #69:  Toxicology report;
Exhibit #70:  Report of medical examiner for Russell Lightfoot;
Exhibit #71:  EMS report for Russell Lightfoot;
Exhibit #72:  Certificate of Death for Russell Lightfoot;
Exhibit #73:  Granville Health System emergency department record for Russell Lightfoot;
Exhibit #74:  Letters of Administration re: Russell Lightfoot;
Exhibit #75:  Certificate of Death for Sabrina Lightfoot;
Exhibit #76:  Duke Health Discharge Summary for Sabrina Lightfoot;
Exhibit #77:  Letters of Administration re: Sabrina Lightfoot;
Exhibit #78:  Google Map of route from Lightfoots' residence to their grandson's residence;
Exhibit #79:  Key for NC DMV-349 crash reports; and
Exhibit #80:  Photographs of Lightfoot family.
PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS
Exhibit #6:  Article on all-way stops (not received in evidence - submitted as offer of proof);
Exhibit #9:  Intersection analysis report 5/20/20 (not received in evidence - submitted as offer of proof);
Exhibit #10:  Potentially hazardous intersection locations in Granville County 5/16/19 (not received in evidence - submitted as offer of proof);
Exhibit #12:  Crash diagram by Stantec 5/22/20 (not received in evidence - submitted as offer of proof);
Exhibit #28:  Emails from 7/15/20 to 5/3/21 re: Granville County concerns;
Exhibit #34:  Response form - intersection investigation (not received in evidence - submitted as offer of proof);
Exhibit #35:  Field investigation notes -- intersection investigation (not received in evidence - submitted as offer of proof);
Exhibit #36:  NC Highway Patrol Collision Investigation packet;
Exhibit #37A-37JJ:  Historical crash reports from subject intersection;
Exhibit #41:  Emails from 3/5/21 re: expired deadline for seeking spot funding (only Page 2 received in evidence);
Exhibit #47:  NC Highway Patrol's request for investigation of subject intersection (only Pages 4 and 5 received in evidence);
Exhibit #81:  Marceau's report;
Exhibit #84:  Advisory speed limit/intersection ahead sign;
Exhibit #85:  Compilation of historical crash reports from subject intersection;
Exhibit #86:  Illustration for Borzendowski;
Exhibit #87:  Recent aerial photograph for Flanagan; and
Exhibit #88:  Older aerial photograph for Flanagan.
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS
Exhibit #1:  8 photographs for Flanagan;
Exhibit #2:  2019 HSIP overview (not received in evidence - submitted as offer of proof).
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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which the parties entered into as:
STIPULATIONS
    Russell and Sabrina Lightfoot were killed on 19 June 2020 as the result of a collision with a tractor-trailer in Granville County, North Carolina, near Creedmoor, at the intersection of U.S. 15 and Hester Road (the "Incident").
    At the time of the Incident, Sabrina Lightfoot ("Sabrina") was operating a 2019 Nissan Sentra, and Russell Lightfoot ("Russell") was sitting in the passenger seat.
  At the time of the Incident, Sabrina and Russell (collectively, the "Lightfoots") were traveling westbound on Hester Road (S.R. 1129), and the referenced tractor-trailer was traveling southbound on U.S. 15.
    On 29 September 2020, the Clerk of Court for Wake County, North Carolina duly appointed Carole Lightfoot-Healy to serve as Administrator of the Estate of Russell Lightfoot.
    On 3 June 2021, the Clerk of Court for Wake County, North Carolina duly appointed Joshua Campbell as Administrator of the Estate of Sabrina Lightfoot.
     At all relevant times, Hester Road (S.R. 1129) and U.S. 15, including the Intersection, were State-maintained roads under the jurisdiction and responsibility of Defendant.
      Sabrina and Russell were lawfully married at the time of their deaths.
      At the time of their deaths, Sabrina and Russell resided at 7029 Dayton Ridge Drive, Apex, North Carolina.
      Sabrina's date of birth was 15 January 1968.
      At the time of Sabrina's death, her heirs were her three (3) sons, namely Joshua Campbell, Bradley Campbell, and Ryan Knight.
      Russell's date of birth was 18 November 1965.
      At the time of Russell's death, his heir was his father, James Russell Lightfoot.  At present, Russell is survived by his sisters, namely Carole Lightfoot-Healy and Linda Ann Lightfoot.
      With the consent of all parties, the above-captioned actions were properly consolidated for discovery and trial on 11 March 2022. 
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Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, the Full Commission makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Hester Road is a two-lane road in Granville County, north of Creedmoor, that runs essentially east and west between N.C. Highway 56 and Interstate 85.  Hester Road intersects with U.S. Highway 15 (the "Intersection") in a rural setting approximately three miles north of Creedmoor.  At the Intersection, U.S. 15 is a two-lane highway that runs essentially north and south.  
At the Intersection, Hester Road and U.S. 15 do not form right angles.  Rather, from the point of view of facing west on Hester Road at the Intersection, U.S. 15 from the north forms an acute angle with Hester Road, substantially less than 90 degrees.  The same is true when facing east on Hester Road in relation to U.S. 15 from the south.  This condition will be referred to herein as the "skew." 
On the date of the Incident, there were stop signs at the Intersection on both westbound and eastbound Hester Road.  On the date of the Incident, there were no stop signs on U.S. 15 at the Intersection, such that traffic on U.S. 15 was free-flowing through the Intersection.  The posted speed limit for U.S. 15 was 55 miles per hour.  On southbound U.S. 15, on approach to the Intersection, there was a diamond-shaped yellow warning sign on the right side of the road indicating that motorists were approaching an intersection, with a smaller square-shaped yellow advisory speed sign on the same pole beneath the warning sign showing an advisory speed limit of 45 miles per hour. 
At the Intersection, when driving west on Hester Road and crossing U.S. 15, there is an offset in the westbound lane on the west side of U.S. 15, such that, in order to stay in the westbound lane of Hester Road, it is necessary to jog left while crossing U.S. 15 in order to keep the vehicle in the lane (and failure to do so would mean running off the right side of Hester Road, onto a gravel pull-out area, on the west side of U.S. 15).  An equivalent offset is present when crossing the Intersection on Hester Road from west to east.  The magnitude of the offset is approximately a lane's width, meaning that it is necessary to steer left about the width of a lane on Hester Road while crossing U.S. 15. 
The Intersection is located somewhat on a plateau on U.S. 15.  This plateau is more pronounced on the north side of Hester Road, such that there is a dip on U.S. 15 looking north from Hester Road at the Intersection.  This dip is located several hundred feet north of the Intersection, with U.S. 15 being basically flat and straight looking north from Hester Road until the dip begins. 
The skew, the offset, and the dip were all conditions that had been present at the Intersection for many years before the Incident. 
At the time of the Incident, the weather was clear and dry.  The Incident occurred shortly after 12 noon, with the sun high in the sky and not in either driver's eyes.  The Lightfoot vehicle, with Mrs. Lightfoot driving and Mr. Lightfoot in the front passenger seat, approached the Intersection on Hester Road from the east, intending to cross U.S. 15 and continue westbound on Hester Road.  The Lightfoots were travelling from Apex, where they lived, on their way to visit their grandchild in Stem, which is northwest of Creedmoor. 
Mrs. Lightfoot came to a full stop at the stop sign at the Intersection.  She then failed to yield the right of way and pulled out into the Intersection, directly into the path of the tractor-trailer that was traveling southbound on U.S. 15.  Prior to braking, the tractor-trailer was traveling at a speed of approximately 45 to 51 miles per hour as it approached the Intersection.  There was insufficient time and distance for the tractor-trailer's driver to take any evasive action other than braking.  The tractor-trailer struck the Lightfoot vehicle as it was crossing the southbound lane of U.S. 15, mortally injuring both of the Lightfoots.  Mr. Lightfoot died at the scene.  Mrs. Lightfoot died later that day in the hospital. 
Plaintiffs contend that, well prior to the Incident, Defendant had been on notice of the unreasonably dangerous condition of the Intersection but had nonetheless negligently maintained the Intersection in that condition for years.  Plaintiffs contend that, specifically, Defendant's employees Tommy Mann and John Grant were negligent.  
As of the day of the Incident, for several years Mr. Mann and Mr. Grant had both been regional traffic safety engineers for Defendant in its Capital Region, which covered Divisions 5 and 8 (a total of 15 counties).  The Intersection is in Division 5, and the Intersection was thus under Mr. Mann's and Mr. Grant's purview.  The primary duty of Mr. Mann and Mr. Grant was to address safety concerns on the roadways within their region, and, as part of their job duties, they were responsible for investigating and making recommendations for remedying potentially hazardous conditions at intersections when these conditions and intersections were brought to their attention.  Mr. Grant was Mr. Mann's direct supervisor in the years up to and including the day of the Incident. 
Defendant can become aware of potential roadway safety issues in three ways (1) through an internal program that identifies potentially hazardous locations, (2) subsequent to a fatality through an automatically triggered fatal investigation program, and (3) through direct notifications from outside entities such as from the public and/or public officials, from a municipality or other local government entity, or from first responders and/or law enforcement.  The only way that Defendant's traffic safety engineers would receive a crash-based notice that would trigger them to investigate a particular intersection would be if the crash involved one or more fatalities. 
A traffic safety engineer for Defendant typically performs about 100 safety investigations in a year.  An investigation typically involves an analysis in the office, which includes reviewing crash data and other data, reviewing Google Maps, and then visiting the site. 
Mitchell Allen is a volunteer firefighter and former member of the planning board for the Town of Creedmoor who resides near the Intersection.  Mr. Allen has driven through the intersection countless times and has also responded to crashes there.  He had been concerned about the safety of the Intersection for years prior to the Incident, in particular because of the skew that decreased sight distances for those on Hester Road looking north or south on U.S. 15.  Allen testified that the crashes that he responded to at the Intersection were usually severe.  The Incident spurred Mr. Allen to contact a transportation planner for Granville County to request that a safety study be done on the Intersection.  However, prior to the Incident, Mr. Allen had never contacted Defendant about the Intersection in any fashion.  
Kenneth Smith, another longtime local resident who resides on Hester Road, had also been concerned about the safety of the Intersection prior to the Incident.  Mr. Smith believed that the Intersection should have had an all-way stop prior to the Incident.  Mr. Smith testified that a relative of his wife had been injured in an motor vehicle accident there, in which the other driver had run a stop sign on Hester Road, and Mr. Smith believed that, if an all-way stop had been in place, that wreck likely would not have occurred.  Mr. Smith testified that after that accident, he telephoned Defendant and spoke with a man about Mr. Smith's concerns that the Intersection was dangerous and that the man told Smith that an all-way stop was being considered for the Intersection, but that it was a long process.  However, Mr. Smith did not know to whom he spoke, nor how long before the Incident this conversation had occurred (Mr. Smith's testimony was somewhat vague and confusing, but it appears that his phone conversation with the unknown man probably occurred before the Incident).  During his testimony, Mr. Smith confirmed that he did not make any written notification to Defendant at any time. 
Justin Egitto, who works at the auto shop located on the northwest corner of the Intersection (from which surveillance video showing the Incident was obtained), has driven through the Intersection routinely for years.  He believed that, before the installation of an all-way stop, there had been accidents at the Intersection about once a month, and that the installation of the all-way stop had decreased the number of crashes.  Prior to the Incident, Mr. Egitto never contacted Defendant in any fashion about the Intersection. 
Trooper B.L. Michael investigated the Incident.  Trooper Michael had been with the State Highway Patrol for approximately 19 years at the time of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner.  Trooper Michael testified that he had investigated numerous severe crashes at the Intersection, that his main concern with the Intersection was the high speeds at which vehicles would approach and enter it while travelling on U.S. 15, and that he did not focus on the skew, offset, or dip as being particularly dangerous.  As part of the investigation packet he compiled consequent of the Incident, Trooper Michael requested that Defendant look at the Intersection to determine whether any measures could be taken to make it safer for motorists.  However, prior to the Incident, Trooper Michael had never contacted Defendant in any fashion about the Intersection.  As for Trooper Michael's testimony that he had investigated numerous severe accidents at the Intersection, the crash reports in evidence involving the Intersection for the 10 years prior to the Incident show that, during that period, Trooper Michael investigated four accidents at the Intersection, and only one of them involved serious injuries.   
Other than the somewhat vague and confusing testimony of Mr. Smith, there is no evidence of record that Defendant had received any actual notice at any time from an outside entity prior to the Incident that the Intersection was unreasonably dangerous for motorists who used it in a proper manner.  There is no evidence of record of any accident at the Intersection involving a fatality prior to the Incident, and thus there is no evidence of any fatality investigation ever having been triggered for the Intersection prior to the Incident.  Prior to the Incident, neither Mr. Mann nor Mr. Grant received any actual notice from any outside person or entity of any safety concerns with the Intersection, nor did either of them have any specific involvement with the Intersection before the Incident.    
Sometime between 2009 and 2012, Defendant installed the yellow warning sign with the advisory 45-mile-per-hour speed limit just north of the Intersection on southbound U.S. 15.  
Also, just six days before the Incident, Defendant's personnel installed a new stop sign at the Intersection.  There is no record of any notation having been made about any potential hazard or any action being taken in follow-up after the installation of the new stop sign.    
In addition to accident fatalities triggering an automatic review and investigation, Defendant also has an internal process that identifies intersections as "potentially hazardous" through statistical analysis of crash reports.  Other ways that Defendant's traffic safety engineers could investigate an intersection would involve pulling crash reports and evaluating any crash patterns, going on-site, reaching out to the local division level (Division 5 in this case) for any concerns they might have, or reaching out to local law enforcement, first responders, and/or local governments for their concerns.  But all of these methods, other than the internal systemic process, pre-suppose that an intersection had been brought to the attention of the traffic safety engineers through some actual notice in order to trigger the investigation.  As Mr. Grant testified, Defendant's traffic safety engineers would not investigate an intersection absent some triggering notice to them that there were concerns that the intersection was unreasonably dangerous for motorists who used it in a proper manner, and the traffic safety engineers would not reach out to stakeholders looking for concerns. 
By early 2019, Defendant's internal process identified the Intersection as "potentially hazardous."  As a result of the systemic identification of the Intersection as "potentially hazardous," when Defendant contracted in July 2019 with an outside engineering firm (Stantec) to perform crash analyses for approximately 200 intersections in North Carolina, the Intersection was included on that list.  As part of that contract, Stantec was also to include the Intersection as one of 12 intersections for which it provided "collision diagrams."   
As a result of Defendant's internal identification of the Intersection as "potentially hazardous" and Defendant's follow-up on that identification, beginning in late 2019 and ongoing as of the date of the Incident, Defendant was in the process of arranging for the installation of an all-way stop at the Intersection and securing the funding for it.  The installation of a roundabout was determined to be the long-term solution.  
An all-way stop typically costs approximately $15,000.00, takes approximately one day to install, and can be installed by Defendant's own personnel.  However, all-way stop installations can present a big adjustment for motorists in the area to process, and that concern was made more acute in this situation because the affected roadway was a U.S. highway.  As a result, and consistent with the usual process for consideration of an all-way stop at any intersection, there was deliberation and community outreach, as well as input from stakeholders that had to be considered.  The Intersection was also among many other statewide locations that were being proposed for safety upgrades at the same time, and, as Mr. Grant testified that because of limitations in resources and manpower, Defendant cannot get to every location that is being proposed at any given time: "[w]e'll never get through the . . . entire list.  That . . . never happens." 
Once an intersection is identified as "potentially hazardous," Defendant's regional safety engineers make recommendations about what measures, if any, to take to try to remedy the situation, and those recommendations are then taken up for discussion at the division level at monthly meetings.  These discussions can spill over from month to month, extending a potential project significantly.  Mr. Grant testified: "Months and months we could take to . . . actually get to a determination of what we're going to do, what does it cost, that project submittal, that selection, a board of transportation approval, that selection, a board of transportation approval, and then the division, once the money is set up, has to schedule their time to . . . implement that."  Further, the division may disagree with the safety engineers, based on a range of factors.  It is generally the division's decision as to whether to agree to install the recommended measures.  When and if it is resolved that measures will be taken, the projects are prioritized by being submitted quarterly to compete with other projects statewide for funding.  Not all projects are or can be selected for funding, and a proposed project can get kicked forward for multiple quarters before it is undertaken. 
Further, the placement by Defendant of an all-way stop can be expedited through a spot-safety funding process, through which locations are submitted on a quarterly basis and compete for limited funding and manpower, and, if a location is selected, it goes before the state Board of Transportation for a vote within three months.  There is also an emergency fund that can be tapped if needed, which bypasses both the regular and spot-safety selection and funding processes, if immediate placement of a safety mechanism is needed.  The emergency fund is typically used for roadway conditions that are classified as "serious hazards," such as when existing signs have been knocked down or destroyed. 
As discussed above, as of the date of the Incident, Mr. Grant and Mr. Mann had already recommended the installation of an all-way stop at the Intersection (with the ultimate goal being the installation of a roundabout) and had provided that recommendation to Division 5, but the Division had initially been reluctant to install an all-way stop on a U.S. highway. 
After the Incident, because it involved fatalities, Mr. Mann was assigned and performed a field investigation of the Intersection, and he reiterated his recommendation that an all-way stop be placed there as an intermediate measure, with a roundabout recommended as the ultimate solution.  Defendant installed an all-way stop at the Intersection on July 21, 2021, at a cost of approximately $16,000.00.  
Both before and after the Incident, the Intersection went through Defendant's normal processes for the evaluation, recommendation, selection, funding, and placement of an all-way stop, not any expedited or emergency process.  As Mr. Grant testified, if a funding request for an all-way stop had been made in 2019, then it is possible that the all-way stop could have been in place before the Incident occurred on 19 June 2020. 
As Grant further testified, as of 2019 and early 2020, the condition of the Intersection was not classified in Defendant's system as a "serious hazard," and as such it had not triggered emergent action by Defendant.  
There is no evidence of record to suggest that, at any relevant time, the Intersection was not in compliance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, which is a set of federal regulations that defines the standards used by road managers nationwide to install and maintain traffic control devices on all public roadways.  Compliance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices is a statutory requirement in North Carolina. 
In the 10 years prior to the Incident, there were a total of 36 accidents at the Intersection for which DMV-349 crash reports were generated.  Of those 36, 24 were "angle collisions," meaning that they primarily involved one vehicle impacting the side of another vehicle (as opposed to other types of collisions, such as head-on collisions or rear-end collisions).  Of the 24 angle collisions, 12 involved vehicles that were travelling in the same directions as the two vehicles in the Incident (one heading westbound on Hester Road and the other heading southbound on U.S. 15).  Despite the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses that there had been numerous severe crashes at the Intersection before the Incident, the reports show that, in the 10 years before the Incident, of the 24 angle collisions at the Intersection, only two involved serious injuries (on 18 April 2019 and on 19 February 2020).  None of the 36 crashes at the Intersection in the 10 years before the Incident involved a fatality.  In none of the DMV-349 crash reports did the investigating officer note that roadway conditions were a factor in the crash.  
At the Deputy Commissioner hearing, when shown Plaintiffs' own analysis of the DMV-349 crash reports for the 10-year period prior to the Incident, Mr. Mann and Mr. Grant both agreed that said reports showed a "pattern" of angle collisions at the Intersection, and they also agreed that, prior to the Incident, Defendant was aware of this pattern, through its own internal system as evidenced by the 2019 identification of the Intersection as "potentially hazardous." 
Daren Morceau was tendered by Plaintiffs as an expert in forensic engineering related to crash investigation and reconstruction, traffic engineering, and human factors, and he was accepted as such.  
Mr. Morceau testified that the sight distance for a motorist stopped at the stop sign on Hester Road facing west, looking to the right/north on U.S. 15, was insufficient even if motorists coming southbound on U.S. 15 toward the Intersection adhered to the 45-mile-per-hour advisory speed sign.  Morceau testified that, because of the skew in the Intersection, the north-looking sight distance was limited to 200 feet, which, in his opinion, was insufficient for spotting and avoiding vehicles that were approaching at speeds of 45 to 55 miles per hour.  
Mr. Morceau did not perform any accident reconstruction for the Incident, but he did visit the Intersection and take measurements, and he also reviewed the documentary, photographic, and video evidence.  He testified that, at 55 miles per hour, a vehicle is moving at 80 feet per second, and that, as such, if it were three seconds from the time Mrs. Lightfoot began to pull forward from the stop sign until impact, the tractor-trailer was likely outside of a 200-foot sight distance at the moment she began pulling out. 
Mr. Morceau acknowledged that, as an expert in road design questions, an all-way stop would not have been his "first choice" for U.S. 15, given that it is a heavily travelled U.S. highway route, but he noted that, if safety requires it, it nonetheless may have to be implemented.  Mr. Morceau agreed that implementation of an all-way stop on a U.S. highway route could lead to an increase in rear-end crashes at an intersection, as well as adding undesirable delays.  Mr. Morceau also agreed that it is not uncommon for intersections to be skewed and that drivers frequently encounter irregular conditions that must be taken into account.  Mr. Morceau also agreed that a driver has a duty to make sure he or she can see far enough to make an informed decision to pull out safely, that there is nearly always a B-pillar in a vehicle.  Regarding sight obstructions at skewed intersections, Mr. Morceau testified that the B-pillar has to be accounted for by a driver, and that there is also sometimes a front-seat passenger present.  
Mr. Morceau's calculation of the 200-foot sight distance was done for a driver with their back flush with the seat and did not take into account how the sight distance might be lengthened if the driver were to lean forward while looking to the right.  Mr. Morceau also agreed that it is an accepted rule of the road that, if a driver stops at a stop sign and is unable, from that position, to see down the crossing road the necessary distance to make an informed decision about the safety of pulling out, it is incumbent on the driver to then inch forward toward the intersection, without entering the intersection, in order to make a reasonable attempt to see better.  
Mr. Allen testified that a driver heading west on Hester Road has to pull a car length or so in front of the stop sign in order to get a good view to check for traffic coming from the north on U.S. 15.  As Mr. Allen also testified, when he is at the Intersection facing west on Hester Road, he makes it a practice to angle his vehicle to the right at the stop sign so he can get a better view to the north along U.S. 15.  
Although Mr. Morceau testified that he had never seen so many angle crashes in one location as had occurred at the Intersection.  He did not provide testimony from which the Full Commission can find that Defendant was unreasonable.  For example, he did not provide data about the number of accidents at other intersections compared to this one.
Dr. Stephanie Borzendowski was tendered by Plaintiffs as an expert in the field of human factors as it relates to traffic accidents and accepted as such.  She has a doctorate in human factors psychology.  Dr. Borzendowski is not an accident reconstructionist.
Dr. Borzendowski testified that "gap acceptance judgment" is a well-recognized concept in traffic-related human factors evaluation.  The "gap" is an opening in traffic flow that either does or does not afford room for a driving maneuver to be completed.  "Gap acceptance judgment" is a driver's appreciation of whether the gap affords the opportunity to make the planned maneuver.  Dr. Borzendowski visited the Intersection, and based on her visit and her review of the documentary evidence, testified that the circumstances of the Intersection impaired Mrs. Lightfoot's ability to perform an accurate gap acceptance judgment. 
Dr. Borzendowski testified that, when a driver's attentional abilities are overtaxed by the surrounding environment, that driver's ability to gather and focus on the relevant information is impaired, which causes gap acceptance judgment to suffer.  Dr. Borzendowski further testified that the complications present at the Intersection - the skew, the offset, the dip looking northbound, and having to cross a heavily travelled highway with a relatively high speed limit with no stop control on it - made the Intersection a relatively complex intersection for a driver to navigate from a human factors perspective.  Dr. Borzendowski testified that all of these factors combined to distract Mrs. Lightfoot's attention from the task of accurately judging the gap.
Dr. Borzendowski agreed that, from a human factors perspective, it is reasonable that, if a driver has limited sight distance, he or she will take measures, such as changing positions by leaning forward, to try to improve the sight distance.  However, she clarified that, generally, the goal in road design is to take reasonable steps to make the environment as safe as reasonably possible and not to unreasonably put the onus on the driver to overcome shortcomings in the road design. 
John Flanagan is a consulting forensic engineer tendered by Defendant and accepted as an expert in accident reconstruction.  Flanagan has investigated and/or reconstructed over 3,000 motor vehicle accidents.  Mr. Flanagan completed an accident reconstruction of the Incident.  In performing the accident reconstruction, Mr. Flanagan visited the site twice, considered the measurements from the State Highway Patrol investigation and the data from the Lightfoot vehicle's event data recorder, viewed the auto shop surveillance video, flew a drone, and consulted other resources to reconstruct the Incident. 
Data from the Lightfoot vehicle's crash data retrieval system revealed information about the vehicle's movements for the five-second period immediately prior to impact.  Using this information along with Trooper Michael's field measurements, Mr. Flangan was able to calculate exactly where Mrs. Lightfoot had stopped the vehicle on Hester Road at the Intersection before pulling out.  
This data, as well as the surveillance video, show that the Lightfoot vehicle came to a complete stop and remained stopped for approximately one full second before pulling forward.  The data show that the vehicle then moved 30 feet forward in approximately 3.5 seconds from the stopped position to the impact location, jogging to the left as Mrs. Lightfoot steered to account for the offset.  Mr. Flanagan measured 30 feet back from the impact location (which yielded a plausible spot for Mrs. Lightfoot to have stopped in relation to the stop sign), placed a vehicle of the same make, year and model as the Lightfoots' vehicle in that spot, had a driver who was approximately the same height as Mrs. Lightfoot wear a "go pro" camera on her forehead just above eye level, and sat in the front passenger seat himself (Mr. Flanagan is 6 feet, 2 inches tall, and Mr. Lightfoot was 6 feet, 1 inch).  Flanagan had the seats adjusted to approximately the same positions as reflected in the photographs of the Lightfoot vehicle taken by the trooper on the date of the Incident.  Mr. Flanagan then took photographs that depict essentially what Mrs. Lightfoot could see immediately before the Incident.  
Based on Trooper Michael's field measurements of the skid and impact marks, Flanagan calculated that the tractor-trailer was traveling at approximately 51 miles per hour as it approached the Intersection, before any braking.  At that speed, the front grille of the tractor-trailer was located approximately 325 feet north of the Intersection at 4.5 seconds before impact, which was the moment of the beginning of Mrs. Lightfoot's full stop at the stop sign.  The front of the tractor-trailer was approximately 250 feet from the intersection at 3.5 seconds before impact, which was when Mrs. Lightfoot began pulling forward.  
Mr. Flanagan's photographs show that, if Mrs. Lightfoot had solely turned her head to the right from the spot at which the Lightfoot vehicle stopped, the sight distance looking north up U.S. 15 was limited to only about 100 feet due to the skew, and the vehicle's B-pillar and front seat passenger obstructing the view.  However, the photographs also clearly show that, if the driver leaned forward a reasonable amount in order to mitigate the obvious sight distance limitation and overcome the obstructions and then looked right, the effect was to increase the driver's sight distance to the point that she could see well past the spot where the front grille of the tractor trailer was located at 4.5 seconds before impact, with the B-pillar and the front seat passenger no longer being visual obstructions and the effect of the skew being mitigated. 
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that the lowest point of the dip from the Intersection, as measured by Mr. Flanagan, is some 870 feet away, therefore the dip had no effect on the Incident.  If Mrs. Lightfoot's view of the tractor-trailer had been obscured by the dip, at the speed that the tractor trailer was moving, the Lightfoots would have made it safely across the Intersection with room to spare.  As it was, during the Incident the tractor trailer was well past the dip and was in the flat straightaway leading to the Intersection when the Lightfoot vehicle was stopped.  
Based on his measurements and investigation, Mr. Flanagan testified to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, and the Full Commission finds, that if Mrs. Lightfoot had leaned forward and looked to the right while she was stopped, the tractor-trailer would have been in her field of view. 
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, The Full Commission finds that the surveillance video is consistent with Mr. Flanagan's conclusions. 
The Full Commission gives greater weight to the opinions of Mr. Flanagan than to those of Mr. Morceau and Dr. Borzendowski.  The Full Commission finds that Mr. Flanagan's opinions are based on hard data and measurements as well as photographs from an accident reconstruction, whereas the opinions of Mr. Morceau and Dr. Borzendowski are more speculative and are not supported by the greater weight of the evidence of record.
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Defendant, reasonably and with ordinary care, monitored the Intersection and was aware that the Intersection was identified as "potentially hazardous" according to Defendant's own internal flagging process in 2019, and that Defendant, subsequent to the Intersection being flagged internally and prior to the Incident, demonstrated ordinary care in conducting a reasonable investigation and taking reasonable steps to install a four-way stop at the Intersection in due course.
  Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Defendant, prior to the Incident, did not have actual or constructive notice that the Intersection was unreasonably dangerous for motorists who used it in a proper manner such that a faster transition to a four-way stop was reasonably necessary.
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that the Intersection was not unreasonably dangerous for motorists who used it in a proper manner such that a faster transition to a four-way stop was reasonably necessary.
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Mrs. Lightfoot did not take reasonable measures, such as leaning forward in her seat and inching her car forward in order to mitigate the obvious sight distance limitation and overcome the passenger and B-pillar obstructions prior to pulling into the Intersection, and that therefore she did not complete the actions that a reasonably prudent person would have under the circumstances, and that her unreasonable actions contributed to her damages.  
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that any human factors complications at the Intersection such as the skew, offset, and plateau, were not so distracting that it was reasonably foreseeable to Defendant that they would cause a driver to not take reasonable measures, such as leaning forward, to increase the distance of the field of vision looking north or south on U.S. 15 to a reasonable length prior to pulling into the Intersection.   
* * * * * * * * * * *
Based upon the foregoing Stipulations and Findings of Fact, the Full Commission makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The State Tort Claims Act provides for claims against the State which arise
as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291(a) (2025).  Such claims are heard and decided by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.  Id.
2.	Under the Tort Claims Act, negligence is determined by the same rules applicable to private parties.  Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 321 N.C. 706, 709, 365 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1988).  A claimant must prove (1) the existence of a duty; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant (the named employees thereof in a tort claim); (3) an injury sustained; (4) as a proximate result of the breach of that duty.  Gibson v. Ussery, 196 N.C. App. 140, 143, 675 S.E.2d 666, 668 (2009) (internal citation omitted).  "[U]nder the Tort Claims Act: 'the burden of proof as to negligence is on the plaintiff.'"  Drewry v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 168 N.C. App. 332, 337, 607 S.E.2d 342, 346 (2005), review denied, 359 N.C. 410, 612 S.E.2d 318 (2005) (quoting Bailey v. N.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 2 N.C. App. 645, 651, 163 S.E.2d 652 (1968)).  "[T]he plaintiff must affirmatively, and by the greater weight of the evidence, prove that the defendant was negligent and that it proximately caused him injury."  Miller v. Henry, 270 N.C. 97, 99, 153 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1967).
3. 	In this case, the existence of a duty is established by statute: "[t]he general purpose of the Department of Transportation is to provide for the necessary planning, construction, maintenance, and operation of an integrated statewide transportation system for the economical and safe transportation of people and goods as provided for by law."  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-346 (2023).  Consistent with this statute, the Department of Transportation's "duty to the general public is to plan, design, locate, construct and maintain the public highways in the State of North Carolina, with reasonable care."  Phillips v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 200 N.C. App. 550, 560, 684 S.E.2d 725, 732 (2009).  Although Defendant "is not an insurer of the safety of travelers" on the State's public highways, it has the duty
of exercising ordinary care to maintain [the public highways] in a condition reasonably safe for those who use them in a proper manner.  Liability arises only for a negligent breach of duty, and for this reason it is necessary for a complaining party to show more than the existence of a defect in the street . . . and the injury; he must also show that the [defendant] . . . knew, or by ordinary diligence, might have known of the defect, and the character of the defect was such that injuries to travellers using its street . . . in a proper manner might reasonably be foreseen.

Smith v. City of Hickory, 252 N.C. 316, 318, 113 S.E.2d 557, 558-59 (1960).  
4.	Given the facts of this case and the applicable law, the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff has failed to prove that Defendant breached its duty of exercising ordinary care to maintain the Intersection in a reasonably safe condition for motorists who used it in a proper manner.  In reaching this conclusion, the Full Commission finds that (1) Defendant's decisions and actions prior to the Incident regarding the monitoring and maintenance of the Intersection were reasonable and demonstrated ordinary care, that (2) the process leading to and the pace of the previously-planned transition to a four-way stop at the Intersection to address the "potentially hazardous" condition of the Intersection that its own internal process had flagged in 2019, demonstrated reasonable steps and ordinary care, and was based on reasonable investigation, and that (3) Defendant, prior to the Incident, did not have actual or constructive notice that the Intersection was unreasonably dangerous for motorists who used it in a proper manner such that a faster transition to a four-way stop was reasonably necessary.  Smith, 252 N.C. 316, 318, 113 S.E.2d 557, 558-59; Phillips, 200 N.C. App. at 560, 684 S.E.2d at 732.  Furthermore, the Full Commission concludes that any human factors complications at the Intersection such as the skew, offset, and dip, were not so distracting that it was reasonably foreseeable to Defendant that a driver would not take reasonable measures, such as leaning forward in the seat or inching the car forward, to increase the distance of the field of vision looking north or south on U.S. 15 to a reasonable length prior to pulling into the Intersection.  Smith, 252 N.C. at 318, 113 S.E.2d at 558-59.
5.	The Full Commission rejects Plaintiffs' contention that Mr. Grant and Mr. Mann had a duty to make inquiries to familiarize themselves with what Plaintiffs contend was the dangerous nature of the Intersection and that, had they done so, they could have arranged for the installation of an all-way stop before the Incident occurred and thus prevent it from occurring.  The Full Commission concludes that this contention is flawed on several bases, including: (1) it places an unattainable and inappropriate burden of inquiry on Defendant's employees, (2) it assumes that the Intersection was actually unreasonably dangerous for motorists using it in a proper manner, and (3) it does not take into account the deliberative and competitive process that any non-emergency all-way stop project must go through.
6.	The Full Commission also concludes that this case is distinguishable from the case of Smith v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 156 N.C. App. 92, 101, 576 S.E.2d. 345, 352 (2003).  In Smith, there was evidence that DOT was on actual, specific notice of an unreasonable danger posed by a railroad crossing but had nonetheless removed "low drag risk" warning signs in the direction the plaintiff was traveling (although such signs were still present coming from the other direction).  Smith at 156 N.C. App. 92 at 101, 576 S.E.2d at 352.  Further, in Smith there was evidence that DOT ignored previous accidents, its own engineering safety analysis, and its own internal conclusion that new warning signs were "needed 'ASAP'" three years before the occurrence of the accident. Id.  Similar evidence is not present in the case at bar.
7.	Given the foregoing, the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the burden of showing that Defendant breached a duty which proximately caused injury.    Smith, 156 N.C. App. 92 at 101, 576 S.E.2d at 352; Gibson, 196 N.C. App. at 143, 675 S.E.2d at 668. 
8.	Contributory negligence on the part of a claimant is a defense of the State department, institution, or agency against which the claim is asserted, with the defendant bearing the burden of proof to establish contributory negligence.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-299.1 (2025). The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined contributory negligence and explained its basis as a defense:
Contributory negligence has been defined as the breach of the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care for his own safety in respect of the occurrence about which he complains, and if his failure to exercise due care for his safety is one of the proximate contributing causes of his injury, it will bar recovery.

Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chem. Co., 329 N.C. 446, 455, 406 S.E.2d 856, 861 (1991) (quoting Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking Co., 232 N.C. 623, 61 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court of Appeals of North Carolina has provided the elements of contributory negligence that a defendant must show: "to prove contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) [a] want of due care on the part of the plaintiff; and (2) a proximate causation between the plaintiff's negligence and the injury."  Daisy v. Yost, 250 N.C. App, 530, 532, 794 SE 2d 364, 366 (2016).  In the context of a contributory negligence analysis, a plaintiff's conduct "must be viewed in light of what a reasonable person would have done" under the same or similar circumstances.  Rolan v. N.C. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 233 N.C. App 371, 384, 756 S.E.2d 788, 796 (2014).  The appropriate inquiry is whether a plaintiff took some action "when a person of reasonable care and prudence would not have done so," or failed to take some action "when a reasonabl[e], careful[,] and prudent person would have done so[.]"  Foy v. Bremson, 30 N.C. App. 662, 666, 228 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1976).  The Full Commission concludes, even if Defendant had breached the duty of reasonable care, that Mrs. Lightfoot did not take reasonable measures such as leaning forward in her seat and inching her car forward in response to the obvious sight distance limitation to mitigate the effects of the skew and overcome the passenger and B-pillar obstructions while she was stopped prior to pulling into the Intersection.  Therefore, she was contributorily negligent in that she did not exercise the due care of a reasonable and prudent person and the Full Commission further concludes that there is proximate causation between her negligence and her injury, and that therefore Mrs. Lightfoot's estate would be foreclosed from any recovery because Mrs. Lightfoot's own actions and/or omissions contributed to her damages.  Whisnant v. Herrera, 166 N.C. App. 719, 722, 603 S.E.2d 847, 850 (2004). 
* * * * * * * * * * *
Based upon the foregoing Stipulations, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, the Full Commission enters the following:
O R D E R
These two consolidated tort claims must, both, under the law, be and hereby are, DENIED.
Hearing costs in the amount of $220.00 are hereby assessed, to be paid by Plaintiffs to the Industrial Commission upon receipt of this Order.   

Chair BADDOUR and Commissioner PHILLIPS concur.

 A "B-pillar" is the solid vertical piece running from the car body to the roof at the back of the front passenger door.  
 Human factors is the study of human interaction with the environment.

I.C. NOS.  TA-29868 & TA-29869		Page 1