Debbie Alfred Pierre v. U.S. Agency for International Development

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
DEBBIE ALFRED PIERRE,
Appellant,
v.
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT,
Agency.
DOCKET NUMBER
DC-0351-26-0836-I-1
DATE: October 13, 2026
THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1
Christopher H. Dorn, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.
John M. Breland, Deion A. Kathawa, Alex Roberson, and Allison
Kidd-Miller, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
BEFORE
James J. Woodruff II, Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman
REMAND ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her appeal of her separation from Federal service based on a reduction
in force (RIF) as untimely filed without good cause. For the reasons discussed
below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the
administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to show good cause for
1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

the untimeliness of her appeal, and REMAND the case to the Washington
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2025, the agency notified the appellant of its decision to
separate her from Federal service based on a RIF action. Initial Appeal File
(IAF), Tab 1 at 6-12. The letter notified the appellant of her right to appeal the
decision to the Board within 30 calendar days of the effective date of the RIF
action. Id. at 8. The appellant’s RIF separation became effective on
September 2, 2025. Id. at 13. The appellant filed this appeal challenging her RIF
separation on December 11, 2025. Id. at 1. In his initial decision, the
administrative judge found that the appellant was required to file her appeal to the
Board by October 2, 2025; however, because the Board extended the filing
deadline by 43 days for the Government shutdown, her appeal was due by
November 14, 2025. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. Because the
appellant did not file her appeal until December 11, 2025, he found that it was
26 days late. ID at 2-4.
The administrative judge ordered the appellant to submit evidence and
argument showing that her appeal was timely filed or that good cause existed for
the delay in filing. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant responded and submitted medical
documentation from her obstetrician and gynecologist (OB-GYN) and hospital,
stating that she experienced a high-risk pregnancy and delivery on September 7,
2025. IAF, Tab 4 at 4-10. She also certified that she suffered post-partum
complications that required continued medical care and recovery, which
interfered with her ability to file her appeal and request an extension. Id. at 3-4.
Because the administrative judge found the appellant’s response insufficient, he
instructed the appellant to file additional evidence to support her argument that
there was good cause for her untimeliness. IAF, Tab 5. In response, the
appellant explained that she suffered post-partum depression from approximately
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September 7, 2025, to December 7, 2025, which impacted her ability to sleep,
focus, and manage basic, daily responsibilities, including filing her appeal. IAF,
Tab 6 at 3-5. She also submitted medical documentation showing that her
OB-GYN prescribed her an anti-depressant on October 20, 2025. Id. at 6. She
further certified that although it took some time for the medication to become
effective, she promptly filed her appeal once she was medically able to do so. Id.
at 3-5.
Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
dismissed the appeal as untimely filed without a showing of good cause. IAF,
Tab 1 at 1; ID at 1, 7. He reasoned that the appellant had not provided sufficient
evidence that her alleged medical conditions prevented her from filing her appeal
during the entirety of the filing period and the period of delay. ID at 5-7.
The appellant has filed a petition for review, renewing the good cause
arguments she raised below. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 7-8. The
agency has responded and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 5-6.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
We reverse the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not show
good cause for her filing delay.
To establish good cause for an untimely filing, a party must show that she
exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances
of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980).
The Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse
and her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether
she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control
that affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty
or misfortune, which similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to
timely file her petition. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60,
62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).
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On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
she did not establish good cause for her untimeliness based on her medical
conditions because she did not provide sufficient evidence that her medical
conditions prevented her from filing her appeal during the entire filing period,
i.e., between the September 2, 2025 effective date of her RIF separation and her
November 14, 2025 filing deadline, as well as during the 27-day delay period
from her deadline until she filed her appeal on December 11, 2025. 2 ID at 4-7;
PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-8. For the following reasons, we reverse the administrative
judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show good cause for her untimeliness.
To establish that an untimely filing was the result of a physical or mental
condition, an appellant must: (1) identify the time period during which she
suffered from the physical or mental condition; (2) submit any evidence she may
have, including medical reports, showing that she suffered from the alleged
physical or mental condition during that time period; and (3) explain how the
physical or mental condition prevented her from timely filing her appeal or a
request for an extension of time. Lacy v. Department of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R.
434, 437 (1998). There is no general incapacitation requirement; rather, the
appellant only is required to explain why her alleged illness impaired her ability
to meet the Board’s filing deadline or seek an extension of time. Lacy,
78 M.S.P.R. at 437 n.*. Although medical evidence is preferable in supporting a
claim of good cause for the delay, supporting evidence is not limited to medical
evidence alone if the appellant explains why the medical evidence is unavailable.
Jerusalem v. Department of the Air Force, 107 M.S.P.R. 660, ¶ 7 (citing Lacy,
78 M.S.P.R. at 437 n.*), aff’d per curiam, 280 F. App’x 973 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Here, the pro se appellant asserted that from September to December 2025
she suffered medical issues, including a high-risk pregnancy and delivery and
2 On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that her
appeal was untimely filed. ID at 3-4. Because we find it supported by the record, we
decline to disturb it; however, we clarify that the appeal was untimely filed by 27 days,
not 26 days.
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post-partum depression, which directly caused her delay in filing her appeal.
IAF, Tab 4 at 4, Tab 6 at 4-5. Specifically, the appellant submitted a medical
note from her OBGYN, dated July 23, 2025, stating that the appellant had
experienced pregnancy complications and that her pregnancy was high-risk. IAF,
Tab 4 at 10. Her doctor explained that during the remainder of the appellant’s
third trimester until at least 2 months following her delivery, the appellant
required assistance from her mother in order to care for her newborn and perform
basic daily living activities. Id. The appellant also explained that her pregnancy
was classified as high-risk because she had previously suffered a pregnancy loss
in her second trimester and that she had to have surgery and ongoing monitoring,
which caused her substantial physical and emotional strain. IAF, Tab 6 at 3-4.
She also submitted medical documentation from her hospital showing that she
was hospitalized and delivered her baby on September 6 and 7, 2025, and that she
had a history of pregnancy complications. IAF, Tab 4 at 5-8.
The appellant also certified that, immediately after the birth of her child on
September 7, 2025, until approximately December 7, 2025, she suffered
post-partum depression, which she explained impacted her ability to sleep, focus,
and manage basic, daily responsibilities, including filing her appeal and
requesting an extension. IAF, Tab 6 at 3-5. In support of her claim, she
submitted medical documentation, showing that on October 20, 2025, her
OB-GYN prescribed her an anti-depressant to help manage her post-partum
depression. Id. at 6. She further certified that it took some time for the
medication to “reach therapeutic effectiveness” and that once she had the capacity
to resume normal daily functioning in early December, she promptly filed her
appeal on December 11, 2025. Id. at 3-5. Upon reviewing the appellant’s
medical documentation, we find that it sufficiently corroborates her assertion that
her medical conditions impaired her ability to file her Board appeal and request
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an extension of time until approximately early December 2025, at which time she
promptly filed her appeal.3
Under the particular circumstances of this case, we find the appellant has
provided sufficient cause, supported by corroborating medical evidence,
explaining how her medical condition prevented her from timely filing her
appeal. See Lacy, 78 M.S.P.R. at 437-38. Moreover, the agency has presented no
evidence or argument suggesting that it would be prejudiced by a waiver of the
filing time limit. See Moorman, 68 M.S.P.R. at 63 (explaining that, once good
cause has been demonstrated, the Board must determine whether the agency has
shown that it would be prejudiced by a waiver of the time limit). Thus, we find
that the appellant has established good cause for the untimely filing of her appeal.
ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
3 For the first time on review, the appellant alleges that her health insurance coverage
lapsed from October 31, 2025, to December 1, 2025, which prevented her from
obtaining additional medical treatment and documentation during that period. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 6-10. She also submits insurance documentation, dated around that time, to
support her claim. Id. at 15-22. The Board generally will not consider evidence or
legal argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it
was not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. See 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115(d). Because the appellant has not made such a showing, we have not
considered this evidence and argument on review.
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