James Mhoon v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00674-COA

JAMES MHOON APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/22/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOSEPH H. LOPER JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ATTALA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JACOB WAYNE HOWARD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/02/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On February 2, 2015, James Mhoon filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR)

in the Circuit Court of Attala County, Mississippi. After conducting an evidentiary hearing,

the circuit court entered an order denying Mhoon’s request for relief. This appeal followed.

After full consideration of the matters presented on appeal, we affirm the circuit court’s

denial of Mhoon’s PCR motion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In January 1983, a Grenada County grand jury returned three separate indictments

charging Mhoon with capital murder as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code

Annotated section 99-19-81. The indictments charged that Mhoon killed William Denton
Lawson, Charles Kenwright Jr., and Betty Lawson while he was engaged in the commission

of an armed robbery. The venue for trial was changed to Attala County. On the day of trial,

after the jury had been empaneled, Mhoon pled guilty to capital murder in the killing of

William Denton Lawson. The case then proceeded for the jury to determine whether Mhoon

should receive the death penalty. In September 1983, the jury returned its verdict finding that

Mhoon should be sentenced to death. On appeal, the death sentence was reversed, and the

matter was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. See Mhoon v. State, 464 So. 2d 77 (Miss.

1985).

¶3. In September 1985, at the new sentencing hearing, the jury could not agree upon a

sentence. After conducting a separate sentencing hearing where the State presented proof of

Mhoon’s prior convictions, the circuit court sentenced Mhoon to serve a term of life

imprisonment without eligibility for parole as a habitual offender pursuant to section 99-19-

81.

¶4. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that

mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time

of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishments. The Supreme Court stated:

Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his
chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents
taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and
from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including
the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been

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charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated
with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own
attorneys. See, e.g., Graham [v. Florida], 560 U.S. [48,] 78, 130 S. Ct. [2011,]
2032 [(2010)] (“[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put
them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings”); J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2400-2401, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310
(2011) (discussing children’s responses to interrogation). And finally, this
mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when
the circumstances most suggest it.

Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78. This holding required that before a defendant below the age of

eighteen can be sentenced to life without parole, the sentencing authority must consider the

so-called “Miller factors” discussed above. In Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 703 (¶18)

(Miss. 2013), our Mississippi Supreme Court stated, “We are of the opinion that Miller

created a new, substantive rule which should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral

review.”

¶5. Based upon the Miller decision, Mhoon filed an application for leave to file a motion

to vacate his sentence with the Mississippi Supreme Court on May 24, 2013. Mhoon claimed

that since he was only sixteen years old at the time of his crime, his mandatory sentence of

life imprisonment without parole eligibility should be vacated and the matter remanded to

Attala County Circuit Court for re-sentencing. In the alternative, Mhoon sought permission

from the supreme court to file a PCR motion in circuit court. By order entered on November

5, 2014, the supreme court granted Mhoon leave to file his PCR motion in the Attala County

Circuit Court regarding his claim for relief under Miller.

¶6. As noted above, Mhoon filed his PCR motion in the circuit court on February 2, 2015.

In this motion, Mhoon contended that he was entitled to relief from his mandatory life

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sentence because “[s]ection 99-19-81 is unconstitutional as applied to him, he must be re-

sentenced to life with parole pursuant to the versions of the capital murder sentencing statutes

that controlled at the time of his crime. Any greater sentence would violate the ex post facto

clauses of the state and federal constitutions.” In his motion, Mhoon contended that a new

sentencing hearing was not necessary in his case and that he must be sentenced to life with

eligibility for parole after having served ten years of his sentence, based upon the applicable

statutes. In the event the circuit court found that a new sentencing hearing was necessary,

Mhoon contended in subsequent pleadings that he had a constitutional right to be sentenced

by a jury. The State’s position before the circuit court was that a hearing should be conducted

for the court to determine whether Mhoon should be sentenced to life without parole

eligibility as a habitual offender under section 99-19-81.

¶7. Ultimately, after multiple filings and a mental health evaluation, on March 20, 2024,

an evidentiary hearing was conducted. Before the hearing began, Mhoon’s counsel argued

that under Miller, Mhoon’s sentence should be vacated, and the “Miller hearing” should be

conducted as a criminal proceeding under the original case number and not as a civil

proceeding relative to his PCR motion. The State argued that the Mississippi Supreme Court

had ruled that the original sentence should not be automatically vacated and that the Miller

hearing should be conducted as a part of the civil post-conviction hearing. The circuit court

judge agreed with the State, noting, “I am not in the habit of intentionally overruling the

Mississippi Supreme Court, so I feel like since they have addressed these issues, I have to

follow the procedures that have been laid out by the Mississippi Supreme Court until they

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change the law if they choose to at some later point.”

¶8. After the court’s ruling, the evidentiary hearing was conducted, giving Mhoon the

opportunity to present evidence related to the Miller factors to show that the mandatory

sentence to life without parole eligibility was unconstitutional as applied to him in this case.

Several exhibits were admitted into evidence by agreement of both sides before any

witnesses were called to testify. Mhoon then called four witnesses and introduced several

exhibits in support of his motion. The State cross-examined Mhoon’s witnesses but did not

call any additional witnesses on its behalf. After hearing the evidence and the arguments of

counsel, the court took the matter under advisement.

¶9. The court issued its ruling on May 22, 2024. In its thirteen-page opinion, the court

discussed its findings of fact as to each of the Miller factors that the court was required to

consider. The court found that Mhoon had failed to meet his burden of proof to show that he

was entitled to relief and denied his motion.

ANALYSIS

¶10. Mhoon raises three issues on appeal. In the first two issues, he contends that the

circuit court erred by failing to set aside his unconstitutional sentence and by conducting the

Miller hearing as part of the civil post-conviction collateral proceeding. Mhoon also contends

that the circuit court’s factual findings concerning the Miller factors are clearly erroneous.

We must first address the holding in Miller and the process established by the Mississippi

Supreme Court for the consideration of the Miller factors. In Clemons v. State, 384 So. 3d

560, 564-65 (¶¶8-9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), this Court explained:

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As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Miller, the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for defendants who are under the age of eighteen
at the time of their crimes. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. However, Miller and its
progeny “allow [] discretionary life-without-parole sentences for those
offenders.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 103.The Supreme Court has “mandated only
that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and
attendant characteristic—before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.” Id.
at 108 (quotation marks omitted). “[T]o separate those juveniles who may be
sentenced to life without parole from those who may not,” the court must
afford the defendant “[a] hearing where youth and its attendant characteristics
are considered as sentencing factors[.]” Id. at 111 (quoting Montgomery, 577
U.S. at 210). Following that hearing, the sentencer should consider the
“Miller factors,” which include (1) the defendant’s “chronological age and
the hallmark features among that age”; (2) the defendant’s “family and
home environment”; (3) the “circumstances of the offense”; (4) the
defendant’s “ability to deal with the legal system” (i.e., whether “he might
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for
incompetencies associated with youth”); and (5) the “possibility of
rehabilitation.” Alexander v. State, 333 So. 3d 19, 23 (¶17) & n.3 (Miss.
2022). However, Miller and its progeny do “not impose a formal fact
finding requirement,” Jones, 593 U.S. at 112 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S.
at 211), and “sentencers are afforded ‘wide discretion in determining the
weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence.’” Alexander, 333 So. 3d at
27 (¶33) (other quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 108).
And while the sentencer must consider the Miller factors and the evidence
relevant to those factors, “the burden rests with the juvenile offender to
convince the [sentencer] that Miller considerations are sufficient to
prohibit a sentence of life without parole.” Wharton v. State, 298 So. 3d
921, 927 (¶25) (Miss. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).

“[T]here are two applicable standards of review in a Miller case. First, whether
the trial court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law subject to
de novo review.” Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 68 (¶7) (Miss. 2018). “If
the trial court applied the proper legal standard, its sentencing decision is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id.

(Emphasis added). We now address the issues Mhoon raises on appeal.

I. Did the circuit court err by conducting the Miller hearing as a part
of the civil post-conviction proceeding?

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¶11. Mhoon argues that pursuant to Miller, his mandatory sentence of life without parole

eligibility pursuant to section 99-19-81 violates his constitutional rights. His argument is

based solely upon the fact that he was sixteen years old at the time of his crime and that the

sentence was mandatory under the statute. He continues to argue that the sentence should

have been set aside in the civil post-conviction proceeding and that the discretionary

sentencing procedure should have been conducted in the original criminal case. He argues

that a post-conviction evidentiary hearing is not a “sentencing procedure.” Mhoon then points

to several differences between a civil hearing and a criminal sentencing hearing.

¶12. Concerning the process to be followed in Miller cases, the supreme court stated in

Wharton v. State, 298 So. 3d 921, 926-28 (¶¶24, 29) (Miss. 2019):

¶24. The Supreme Court has left to the states the responsibility to
determine how Miller is to be implemented in state-court proceedings and
how to remedy a Miller violation or potential violation. Id. at 735-36.
Montgomery reiterated that, “[w]hen a new substantive rule of constitutional
law is established, this Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant
procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the
States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems.” Id. at 735
(citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed.
2d 335 (1986)). “Miller . . . does not require States to relitigate sentences, let
alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory
life without parole.” Id. at 736.

....

¶29. We point out that, even though the Jones Court found it necessary to
vacate the petitioner’s original sentence and remand for a new sentencing
hearing, it did so before Montgomery. Having examined Montgomery, we
conclude that it is error for our trial courts to vacate a juvenile’s original
life-without-parole sentence (or life sentence) before conducting a Miller
hearing. Neither Miller nor Montgomery mandate this.

(Emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The circuit court in Mhoon’s case conducted the Miller

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evidentiary hearing in the PCR proceeding and did not vacate his sentence. It is clear that the

circuit court followed the procedure required by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Both the

circuit court and this Court are bound to follow the process set forth in Wharton.1 This issue

is without merit.

II. Were the circuit court’s findings of fact concerning the
Miller factors clearly erroneous?

¶13. Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued a thirteen-page opinion

considering the evidence as to each of the Miller factors. On appeal, Mhoon challenges each

of the circuit court’s factual findings on the Miller factors as being clearly erroneous and

argues that the circuit court’s denial of relief should be reversed and his case remanded.

Mhoon contends that the circuit court ignored evidence supporting a life-with-parole-

eligibility sentence and relied on facts that are not in evidence.

¶14. Concerning a circuit court’s consideration of the Miller factors, the cases provide:

1. It is the role of the circuit court to determine the weight of the evidence
presented and the credibility of the testimony from each witness. It is
also for the circuit court to determine the weight that should be given
to each Miller factor. See McGilberry v. State, 292 So. 3d 199, 208-09
(¶¶42-43) (Miss. 2020).

2. There is no rebuttable presumption in favor of parole eligibility for
juvenile homicide offenders. See Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 69-
70 (¶15) (Miss. 2018).

3. The circuit court is given wide discretion in determining the weight to

1
See Moran v. State, 235 So. 3d 101, 103 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“‘This Court,
sitting as an intermediate appellate court, is obligated to follow precedent established by the
Mississippi Supreme Court.’ Kennedy v. State, 766 So. 2d 64, 65 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
‘We . . . do not have the authority to overrule a decision of our Supreme Court.’ Miles v.
State, 864 So. 2d 963, 965-66 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).”).

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be given to relevant evidence of the Miller factors. See Alexander v.
State, 333 So. 3d 19, 27 (¶33) (Miss. 2022).

4. The circuit court is not required to make findings as to each Miller
factor. See Johnson v. State, 396 So. 3d 1073, 1082 (¶37) (Miss. 2024).

5. Where the defendant fails to present sufficient credible evidence to
convince the circuit court that the Miller considerations prohibit the
imposition of a life without parole sentence, such a sentence is proper.
See Ealy v. State, 324 So. 3d 306, 316 (¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

As noted above in Clemons, we review the court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of

discretion. We will address the circuit court’s findings as to each of the Miller factors below.

1. The Defendant’s Chronological Age and its Hallmark Features

¶15. The circuit court noted Dr. Lott’s testimony, “in broad generalities,” about issues

relating to adolescent behavior. Dr. Lott discussed “poor decision-making, risk-taking,

inability to assess consequences, impulsiveness, and susceptibility to peer pressure.” Dr. Lott

opined that impulse control is not fully developed until the mid-twenties. Dr. Lott did not

testify that Mhoon’s “chronological age and the hallmark features of adolescence played a

significant role in the commission of the Jiffy Mart murders.” The court also noted that

Mhoon had been certified as an adult when he was fourteen years of age and pled guilty to

two felony burglary charges. Thus, the circuit court found that there had been a judicial

finding that Mhoon “had the knowledge and maturity to be treated as an adult for court

purposes.”

¶16. In making its finding as to this factor, the court stated:

As previously noted, at the time of the murders, Mhoon was 16 years and 9
months of age. He had already been convicted of two previous felonies and
served time in the penitentiary. Additionally, at the time of the murders,

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Mhoon had fathered a child with a 35 year old woman, smoked, drank alcohol,
and used drugs. All of this behavior could suggest that Mhoon was immature
and impulsive at the time the murders were committed. The behavior could
equally suggest that Mhoon was mature for his age and living a life as an adult
at the time of the murders.

Given Mhoon’s prior criminal history, including spending time in the
penitentiary, his planning and masterminding of the plot to commit armed
robbery, his engagement in adult activities, and the fact that he was nearly 17
years of age at the time of the crime, this court finds that Mhoon has failed
to show that his chronological age was a contributing factor in the
commission of the murders.

(Emphasis added).

2. Family and Home Environment

¶17. After hearing the evidence presented at the hearing, the circuit court found that

Mhoon’s family life and home environment were “awful.” The court noted that the State had

conceded that the conditions in which Mhoon was raised were “bad.” The court also noted

that Dr. Lott testified that these conditions “may have contributed to his criminal conduct.”

The court stated that the person with the most insight as to the effect this had on his conduct

would be Mhoon himself, who chose not to testify. The court concluded by stating that it

has no doubt that Mhoon’s family and home environment played a role in his
life’s choices, as did everything else that he had experienced. However, this
court is not convinced that his family and home life is why he ended up at
Lawson’s Jiffy Mart on November 9, 1982.

3. Circumstances of the Offense

¶18. In this section of the circuit court’s opinion, the judge described the sad events of

November 9, 1982. The court described how Mhoon came up with a plan to commit an

armed robbery. At first, Mhoon and Wofford attempted to make masks to wear during the

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robbery, but abandoned that effort. The first location that the pair went to rob had too many

potential witnesses, so they then went to Lawson’s Jiffy Mart. They entered the store, without

concealing their identity, and encountered William Denton Lawson, Betty Lawson, and

Charles Kenwright. Mhoon and Wofford forced these three into a storage room where, as the

victims begged for their lives, all three were executed. Mhoon contends he killed William

Lawson (the victim he pled guilty to killing) and that Wofford killed the other two. Wofford

maintained that Mhoon murdered all three. The pair then made off with their loot: “$169.00

in cash, of which Mhoon received $83.00. Additionally, they stole cigarettes, cigarette

lighters, knives, rings, necklaces and a few other trinkets.” This part of the court’s opinion

concluded by stating:

This court finds that nothing has been offered to show that Mhoon’s
participation in the murders was due to peer or familial pressure. Hence,
considering that fact, and considering all the facts and circumstances, this
court finds nothing about the facts surrounding the murders that would
mitigate against Mhoon’s sentence of life without parole.

4. Chance of Lesser Offense if not for Incompetencies Associated
with Youth

¶19. In this part of the opinion, the circuit court found:

It is clear that Capital Murder was the appropriate charge for the crime. The
only other possible charge that he may have potentially faced was the crime of
murder. However, due to Mhoon being a habitual offender, the sentence for
either crime would have been a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
This court finds that the incompetencies associated with his youth did not
cause Mhoon to be charged with the crime of Capital Murder since a charge
to a lesser offense would not have been appropriate given the facts and
circumstances surrounding the crime.

5. Chances of Rehabilitation

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¶20. The circuit court found that Dr. Lott’s testimony as to this factor to be of no value. Dr.

Lott had testified in eleven prior Miller hearings that the inmate was capable of

rehabilitation. The court noted that in all eleven, this testimony had been discounted or

rejected. The court pointed out that although Dr. Lott opined that Mhoon was capable of

rehabilitation, he admitted that he had never performed a psychological evaluation for Miller

proceedings on anyone he found to be incapable of rehabilitation. Further, the court

explained that it found Dr. Lott to be “dismissive” of that fact that Mhoon had around 200

“Rule Violation Reports” while incarcerated, and many were the result of “perverse sexual

behavior.”

¶21. The circuit court gave Mhoon credit for the fact that he had completed many self-

improvement programs during his incarceration; however, many of those were undertaken

after Mhoon filed his PCR motion. The opinion points out that Mhoon had the opportunity

to explain how, as a man fifty-eight years old, he had changed since being a boy of sixteen

years and nine months old; however, Mhoon chose not to do so. Furthermore, Mhoon could

have explained how he would spend the remainder of his life if released on parole.

¶22. The circuit court concluded this section of the opinion as follows:

On the issue of rehabilitation, this court finds itself in much the same situation
as the trial judge in Hudspeth v. State, 179 So. 3d 1226, 1228 (Miss. Ct. App.
2015), who noted that he did “not have the clairvoyance to know if Hudspeth
can, in fact, be rehabilitated.”

The issue as to whether an individual is capable of rehabilitation is perhaps the
most difficult Miller factor to consider because the court must engage in
“speculation, guesswork, and conjecture,” something this court for over 31
years has been instructing juries not to do. As already mentioned, Dr. Lott is
the only person that testified as to Mhoon’s potential for rehabilitation, and his

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opinion, for the reasons already mentioned, was not helpful. This court,
therefore, finds that Mhoon has failed to provide this court with sufficient
proof that he is capable of rehabilitation.

(Footnote omitted).

CONCLUSION

¶23. After a full consideration of the Miller factors, the circuit court concluded that Mhoon

had failed to meet his burden of proof. In Trotter v. State, 353 So. 3d 484, 494-95 (¶43)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2022), concerning what must be shown to obtain relief, this Court stated:

Trotter recognizes that in Wharton v. State, 298 So. 3d 921 (Miss. 2019), our
supreme court held that “[c]onsistent with Miller and Montgomery [v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)], prisoners . . . are entitled to relief under the
[Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief] Act, if they can demonstrate that
their life-without-parole sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. This requires showing that, under application of the Miller
factors . . . , the offender’s life-without-parole sentence is unconstitutional.”
Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 927 (¶¶26-27). . . . In Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698,
702 (¶14) (Miss. 2013), our supreme court held that a sentence of life without
parole “can be applied constitutionally to juveniles who fail to convince the
sentencing authority that Miller considerations are sufficient to prohibit its
application.”

The circuit court found that while the “Family and Home Environment” factor might weigh

in favor of Mhoon’s request for relief, the other four Miller factors did not. The circuit court

found that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility is the appropriate

sentence in Mhoon’s case. We cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion in this

regard.

¶24. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS,
J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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