Jason Deangelo Days a/k/a Jason Days v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00920-COA

JASON DEANGELO DAYS A/K/A JASON DAYS APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/31/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KATHY KING JACKSON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JONATHAN MATTHEW EICHELBERGER
MADELINE MARCANTEL ILES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: INDIA MARIAH SPRINKLE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ANGEL MYERS McILRATH
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/02/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A Jackson County Circuit Court jury found Jason Days guilty of one count of

possession of 4.9 grams of methamphetamine under Mississippi Code Annotated section

41-29-139(c)(1)(C) (Rev. 2018)1 with a firearm enhancement (Count I) and of one count of

1
Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(c)(1)(C) provides:

A person shall be charged and sentenced as follows for a violation of this
subsection with respect to:

(1) A controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II, except marijuana and
synthetic cannabinoids:
....
(C) If two (2) or more grams or ten (10) or more dosage units, but less
possession of a firearm as a felon under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-5 (Rev.

2020)2 (Count II). For Count I, the trial court sentenced Days to sixteen years in the custody

of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with twelve years to serve and the remaining

four years on post-release supervision. For Count II, the trial court sentenced Days to serve

ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, set to run concurrently

with his sentence for Count I. After the court denied his motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a new trial, Days appeals and

requests we reverse and remand for a new trial, contending that (1) his assistance of counsel

was inadequate for numerous reasons, including counsel’s failure to prepare him for his plea

hearing and failure to object to the admission of critical evidence, and (2) the court erred in

admitting illegally obtained evidence and denying his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence.

than ten (10) grams or twenty (20) dosage units, by imprisonment for not more
than eight (8) years or a fine of not more than Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($250,000.00), or both.
2
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-5 provides in part:

(1) It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a
felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or of the United States to
possess any firearm or any bowie knife, dirk knife, butcher knife, switchblade
knife, metallic knuckles, blackjack, or any muffler or silencer for any firearm
unless such person has received a pardon for such felony, has received a relief
from disability pursuant to Section 925(c) of Title 18 of the United States
Code, or has received a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to subsection (3)
of this section.
(2) Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00), or committed to the custody of the State Department of
Corrections for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years, or
both.

2
Having reviewed the record and the arguments of counsel, we affirm Days’ convictions and

sentences.

FACTS

The Traffic Stop

¶2. On Saturday, November 28, 2020, Jackson County Sheriff’s Deputy Jonathan Rayner

stopped Jason Days, a thirty-five-year-old resident of Mobile, Alabama, for an obstructed

license plate. Rayner approached the vehicle, informed Days of the reason for the stop, and

asked for his license, registration, and insurance information. Rayner stated that he

immediately detected the odor of marijuana and observed that Days appeared “extremely

nervous” and avoided eye contact, and his hands were shaking. When Rayner initially asked

Days whether he had any weapons in the vehicle, Days avoided the question. Rayner

repeated the question, and after looking down, Days “mumbled something to the effect of

no.”

¶3. Rayner then returned to his vehicle and verified Days’ license and insurance, which

revealed no issues. Rayner walked back to Days’ vehicle and asked him to step out,

intending to conduct a vehicle search based on the marijuana odor. As Days exited his

vehicle, Rayner noticed a bulge on Days’ right hip, which he suspected was a firearm.

Rayner escorted Days to the front of the patrol vehicle, told him to spread his legs, and began

to prepare him for a body pat-down. While conducting the pat-down, Days told Rayner that

he was carrying a knife. Days then removed the knife and his phone from his pockets and

placed them on the hood of the patrol car. Rayner responded, “That’s cool, man. Do you

3
have a gun on you?” Days replied, “No, sir.”

¶4. Rayner then discovered an empty gun holster on Days’ hip. Rayner asked, “Where’s

the gun at, man?” When Days did not respond, Rayner repeated the question. Still, Days did

not tell Rayner that he had a gun. Rayner then handcuffed Days and told him, “[Y]ou’re

being detained, not arrested.” With Days handcuffed and standing at the patrol car, Rayner

told Days he was being “finicky” and asked, “Who carries a holster without a gun?” Again,

Rayner asked Days where the gun was, and Days repeated that he did not have a gun in the

car. Rayner responded, “[B]e straight with me. It’s a simple traffic stop—illegal tag—no

big deal. I’ll give you a verbal warning for that.”

¶5. Then, Rayner shifted the topic from the location of a firearm to the possession of

marijuana. Rayner told Days that he could “smell the marijuana” and asked him “how much

weed is in the vehicle.” Days admitted that he had a “blunt in the ashtray.” Rayner

continued questioning Days, again telling him to “be straight with [me]” and warning Days

that if he lied and anything illegal besides marijuana was found on him, Rayner would take

him to jail.

¶6. Once again, Rayner questioned Days about the location of the gun. Rayner told Days

that it was legal to have a gun “if [he wasn’t] a convicted felon and it ain’t hot.”3 After

Rayner asked Days if the gun was under the seat, Days admitted that it was. Days went on

to explain that the gun was not stolen, saying, “I just ain’t really supposed to have it. I got

3
A “hot” weapon is one that has been illegally obtained through theft or other means,
or one that is sought after by law enforcement because of use in another crime.

4
in a little trouble about fifteen years ago when I was a teenager, sir. And I haven’t gotten

cleared for it.” Rayner furthered his questioning, clarifying whether Days was a felon. Days

confirmed that he was, but he also explained that although he was “convicted,” he had “only

been to jail—never been to prison—hadn’t been to jail in years, not on probation,” and that

[he] had legally purchased the firearm in his own name at a gun show with no issue. Rayner

asked dispatch to run a “Triple I”4 to confirm if Days was a felon. His stated reason was “for

officer safety” because Days said that he was a felon. However, dispatch would not complete

this check. Days remained handcuffed as Rayner went to Days’ vehicle to retrieve the

handgun, which had been placed under the passenger seat. After finding the weapon, Rayner

placed a follow-up call to the sheriff’s department to ask why dispatch would not run the

Triple I for officer safety.

¶7. Rayner returned to Days and asked, “Where’s the weed at,” and “[D]id you say it’s

just a blunt in the ashtray?” Days asked Rayner, “Am I going to jail, sir?” Rayner replied,

“Not at this time man. You’re still being detained.” Again, Rayner patted-down Days and

requested consent to search the car. Days denied consent. Rayner walked away from Days

and toward Days’ vehicle, stating into his radio that he had probable cause. Rayner

proceeded to the driver’s side of the vehicle and started searching the door storage pocket.

Days was able to retrieve his cell phone and make a phone call to inform another party of the

stop by police, though he remained handcuffed. Days told the person on the phone, “I’m in

Mississippi. They finna lock me up.” Rayner continued to search the vehicle, next checking

4
Triple I stands for Interstate Identification Index.

5
the center console, where he found a clear plastic bag containing a “white powdery

substance.” Rayner returned to Days, who remained handcuffed, and asked him what was

the substance inside the bag. Days told the caller, “[L]et me call you right back,” and he

responded to Rayner that it was ecstasy.5 Days remained on the call, and after seeing the

baggie, he stated to the caller, “[T]hese folks are about to take me to jail.”

¶8. Rayner asked Days if he had anything else on him, stating that additional items

(contraband) on him would result in additional charges. Days stated that he did not have

anything else on him, but he asked Rayner to get everything from his pockets. Rayner further

searched Days’ person, confiscated his cell phone, and placed Days in the back of the patrol

vehicle.

¶9. Rayner continued to search Days’ vehicle, ultimately recovering less than an ounce

of what appeared to be marijuana and some pills.6

¶10. Rayner charged Days with possession of a weapon by a felon, possession of a

controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and an improper tag violation.

Rayner then transported Days to the Jackson County Adult Detention Center in Pascagoula,

Mississippi.

The Interview

5
Rayner conducted a field test on the white powdery substance, which indicated the
substance was heroin and fentanyl. However, the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory’s
analysis determined that the white powdery substance was 4.9 grams of methamphetamine.
6
At the time of the search, Days believed the pills were ecstasy pills. The
Mississippi Forensics Laboratory’s analysis would later determine that these pills were
actually caffeine pills.

6
¶11. Days remained in custody over the weekend without a bond. On Monday, November

30, 2020, Deputy Henry Frank, a narcotics agent and member of the South Mississippi Metro

Enforcement Team, took the lead on the investigation and interviewed Days. Frank read

Days his Miranda7 rights. Days verbally confirmed that he understood his rights and agreed

to continue speaking with law enforcement without counsel present. Days explained that he

had traveled across the Alabama state line to place a new sports-betting slip at the IP Casino

in Biloxi. Further, Days explained that he owned the confiscated gun, that he had legally

purchased the gun from a gun show in Alabama, and that it was registered in his name. Days

explained that his youthful-offender status application concerning his previous crimes in

Alabama had been denied. He then discussed his criminal history in Alabama, his purchase

of the firearm, and how he acquired the white powdery substance he believed to be crushed

ecstasy pills.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶12. A Jackson County grand jury indicted Days on October 20, 2022, on one count of

possession of a controlled substance with a firearm enhancement and one count of unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon. During this time, Days’ initial attorney, Jarrett Cox,

withdrew after Days sent a letter to the circuit court clerk expressing that he felt as though

he was being wrongfully indicted and that he had a letter from an Alabama judge that could

prove his claims. Days retained another attorney, J.D. Taylor, and the case was continued

numerous times.

7
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

7
Status and Guilty Plea Hearing

¶13. On May 28, 2024, at a status hearing, the State and the defense informed the court that

they were prepared to proceed with the trial the following morning. The next day, they told

the court that Days wanted to plead guilty. Days’ counsel informed the court that he had

submitted plea petitions that still needed completion and that he needed to speak with Days.

The court questioned defense counsel to understand why he had not already conferred with

his client regarding the plea. After an off-the-record discussion, the court called the case

again.

¶14. Days indicated his desire to plead guilty. But as the court began reviewing the plea

petition, the court noticed that it was incomplete, lacking nearly all of Days’ personal

information and his signature. The trial court, in an attempt to move the proceedings along

and complete the missing information, stated, “Well, I’m going to ask you the questions that

Mr. Taylor [(the attorney)] should have, but I’m going to do it for him; okay?” When the

court asked Days if he understood Count II, felon in possession of a firearm, Days stated,

“Yes ma’am. But it’s inaccurate.” He explained, “I was a teenager at the time, and the

program that I finished, it was supposed to be dismissed, ma’am. That’s why there’s been

a delay in this whole ordeal.” The State represented that it possessed certified copies of

records from Alabama indicating that Days had applied for youthful offender status but was

denied. The Court asked Days why he wanted to plead guilty if he was not a felon. Defense

counsel responded and stated that pleading guilty was in Days’ best interest.

¶15. When the court asked Days directly whether he wanted to plead guilty, he stated that

8
he did. However, when the questioning resumed, Days again contested his status as a felon,

stating, “I have information showing that I’m not a convicted felon.” The court advised Days

of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty, and Days confirmed his understanding and

described what led to the charges. The court accepted the plea, finding it was entered freely,

voluntarily, and with a full understanding of his constitutional rights and consequences.

¶16. Defense counsel requested that the court defer sentencing to give him some time to

gather mitigation evidence and for Days to remain out of jail until that time. The State

objected, and the court denied the request. As the court explained its intent to proceed

immediately with sentencing, Days stated, “Just go to trial.” However, the court continued

with the sentencing and allowed Days’ fiancée, Marquita Lockhart, to speak on Days’ behalf

for sentencing purposes.

¶17. Lockhart did not offer mitigating evidence. Instead, she restarted the discussion that

Days was not a felon and that she had hired an investigator to prove Days was not a felon and

an Alabama attorney who could speak to the state’s procedural standards. The court

interjected that her information was “not even relevant right now. He’s pled guilty to two

felonies.” Yet, Lockhart continued speaking to the court:

[Lockhart]: Jason has not been convicted of those charges that are placed
against him. Jason had a deferred prosecution that was issued by a Judge
Herman Thomas, which was 20 years ago. Jason was given a five-year
probation. Jason completed the five-year probation, and his case was
dismissed.

[Prosecutor Mobley]: . . . I’ve got a stack of records here certified by the
Circuit Court of Mobile County that not only show that the defendant was
convicted of a prior felony, Judge, and it’s a robbery. He was revoked on the
assault that he was convicted of in Alabama, so it’s not[.]

9
[Court]: So he went to prison?

[Prosecutor Mobley]: . . . [H]e received a probationary sentence, but it was a
felony probation sentence, Your Honor, and he was eventually revoked on that
felony probation[.]

¶18. Then, Days continued to contest his felony status. Days stated that one of the felonies

was not included in his National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) report, and another

charge was nolle prosequied because it was inaccurate. He further added that “they were

supposed to have gotten with the presiding judge to get the information.”

¶19. After this exchange, the court realized that Days was again saying he was not guilty.

The court stated, “Let’s just bring the jury in and try this case. I’m really quite tired of this.”

When asked directly if he wanted a trial, Days responded, “Right now I have no choice

because I’m not trying to get the max on prison time.” The court asked again, “Do you want

a trial?” Days answered, “Yes.” The court quickly brought in the venire and commenced

the trial.

Trial

¶20. Immediately before the venire entered the courtroom, defense counsel said that he had

some pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress.8 The court declined to hear counsel’s

oral motion to suppress, stating, “It’s too late to bring them up now. We’re in the middle of

a trial. . . . You can bring them up as the evidence is attempted to be brought in.” Jury

selection proceeded, and the trial began.

¶21. The State called Deputy Rayner as its first witness. He testified about the traffic stop

8
However, there are no pretrial motions in the record, and the docket indicates none
had been filed.

10
and the subsequent investigation. The State admitted into evidence the handgun, a

photograph of the methamphetamine, and Rayner’s body-camera footage, which captured

Days’ multiple incriminating statements while he was detained. Defense counsel did not

object to the admission of this evidence. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned

Rayner about whether Days was in custody during the roadside questioning. Rayner

ultimately admitted that Days was not free to leave during the questioning because he was

detained; however, Days was not under arrest, meaning he was not going to jail. He also

stated that all of the contraband was found after Days made incriminating statements while

detained.

¶22. The State next called Deputy Henry Frank, who testified about his post-arrest

investigation and interrogation of Days. The State played the video recording of Frank’s

interrogation interview, which was admitted into evidence without objection. The State also

admitted a copy of Days’ conviction and indictment from Alabama. Defense counsel did not

object to the Alabama documents purportedly proving Days’ prior conviction of a felony.

During cross-examination, Frank admitted that although he confirmed that the physical

document offered was from Alabama, he did not specialize in Alabama convictions or court

proceedings.

¶23. As its final witness, the State called Erik Frazure of the Mississippi Forensics

Laboratory, who testified about the drug analysis and confirmed the substance seized was

methamphetamine. The State then rested.

¶24. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict based on a Miranda challenge to the

11
admission of the gun and drugs, which the defense argued should have been excluded as fruit

of the poisonous tree, i.e., the original illegal stop by Rayner. The court questioned whether

a motion to suppress had actually been filed. After further review of his files, defense

counsel confirmed to the court that he had not filed the pretrial motion to suppress. The court

noted that defense counsel did not make a motion to suppress the evidence and that he had

not objected when the evidence was offered, despite the court’s instruction to object. The

court denied the motion for a directed verdict.

¶25. Before presenting its case-in-chief, the defense disclosed to the court the identity of

a potential witness, an attorney from Alabama familiar with the Mobile County court system,

who could testify regarding the Alabama case records. The State objected to the witness due

to lack of notice, and defense counsel acknowledged he had only learned of the witness the

day before. The court initially indicated that the witness could not be called but subsequently

told defense counsel, “You said you might have a witness. . . . So let them object to it and go

from there.” Defense counsel did not attempt to call the witness or make a proffer. When

the jury returned, the defense rested.

¶26. The jury found Days guilty of both counts. The court sentenced Days to sixteen years,

with twelve years to serve and four years of post-release supervision, for possession of

methamphetamine with the firearm enhancement, and ten years to serve for felon in

possession of a firearm, with the sentences set to run concurrently. Days filed a post-trial

motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial. Following a hearing, the court denied the

motion.

12
¶27. Days appealed, contending that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel prior

to or during his trial and that the trial court erred when it refused to consider his pretrial

motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶28. “The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo.”

McDowell v. State, 311 So. 3d 1252, 1260 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). “To prevail on an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must prove that counsel’s performance

was both deficient and prejudicial.” Id.

¶29. “The standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse of discretion.” Debrow

v. State, 972 So. 2d 550, 552 (¶6) (Miss. 2007). “However, when a question of law is raised,

the applicable standard of review is de novo.” Id. “An appellate court may exercise its

discretion to review an issue for plain error ‘only where the error is clear or obvious and

affects the party’s substantial rights.’” Brown v. State, 402 So. 3d 765, 774 (¶50) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2024).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Days received ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶30. Days contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in multiple ways, that

these deficiencies were evident throughout the court proceedings, and that consequently he

was severely prejudiced and should be granted a new trial. These deficiencies include

counsel failing to: (1) adequately prepare Days for his guilty plea, (2) file a pretrial motion

to suppress, (3) object to any of the evidence he sought to suppress, (4) object to the State’s

13
flawed proof of the prior conviction, and (5) attempt to call a beneficial witness or make a

proffer.

¶31. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Days must

demonstrate both prongs of Strickland: (1) “that his trial attorney’s performance was

deficient” and (2) that this deficiency was prejudicial to his defense. McDowell, 311 So. 3d

at 1266 (¶44) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “If either prong

is not met, the claim fails.” Rasberry v. State, 405 So. 3d 1281, 1289 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App.

2025).

¶32. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) requires that issues be raised on direct

appeal or they may be considered waived in subsequent proceedings:

Issues which may be raised in post-conviction proceedings may also be raised
on direct appeal if such issues are based on facts fully apparent from the
record. Where the appellant is represented by counsel who did not represent
the appellant at trial, the failure to raise such issues on direct appeal shall
constitute a waiver barring consideration of the issues in post-conviction
proceedings.

Because Days is represented on appeal by counsel different from trial counsel, under Rule

22(b), Days must raise any issues on direct appeal that are based on facts fully apparent from

the record or waive those issues for purposes of any subsequent post-conviction relief

proceeding, Branch v. State, 882 So. 2d 36, 49 (¶18) (Miss. 2004), including claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶33. Despite the requirement of Rule 22(b) that appellate counsel raise issues that are

apparent from the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “[o]rdinarily, claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel are not addressed on direct appeal.” Owens v. State, 269

14
So. 3d 1280, 1288 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Further, the Supreme Court stated that “there

is usually insufficient evidence within the record to evaluate the claim.”9 Id. “Generally,”

such “claims are more appropriately brought during post-conviction proceedings.” Rasberry,

405 So. 3d at 1289 (¶28).

¶34. After reviewing the record, we decline to address the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim at this time. Although Days stipulated that the record is sufficient, the State did not,

and the record is not sufficiently developed to permit this Court to resolve the issue without

additional findings of fact by the trial court. Nor does the record before us affirmatively

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we find that the claim is more

appropriately raised in a motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR), and we decline

to consider it on direct appeal. McDowell, 311 So. 3d at 1267 (¶47).

¶35. Days’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are dismissed without prejudice to

allow him to raise those issues in a properly filed PCR motion.

II. Whether Days waived his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of
his motion to suppress.

¶36. Days next contends that the trial court erred when it refused to hear his pretrial motion

to suppress, which he attempted to raise ore tenus at the beginning of trial. Days further

argues that the statements captured on Rayner’s body-camera footage were illegally obtained

9
“This Court will address such claims on direct appeal when [1] the record
affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or [2] the parties stipulate
that the record is adequate and the Court determines that the findings of fact by a trial judge
able to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc., are not needed.” Rasberry, 405 So. 3d at
1289 (¶28). “In addition, we may address such claims on direct appeal when the record
affirmatively shows that the claims are without merit.” Id. (quotation mark omitted).

15
in violation of his Miranda rights, therefore, the admission of these statements violated his

Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under the federal Constitution, constituting plain error and

requiring reversal. In response, the State argues that Days failed to file a pretrial motion to

suppress, as required by Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(a), that the trial court

was not required to hear the ore tenus motion, and that his counsel failed to make objections

regarding Miranda during trial, therefore waiving this issue on appeal. The State further

argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in enforcing its scheduling order,

declining to further delay the trial proceedings, and noting that Days had agreed to the terms

of the order and signed it.

¶37. A failure to object or file a motion to suppress contraband before the trial court

procedurally bars the issue from being raised on appeal. Sephus v. State, 815 So. 2d 447, 450

(¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Because the defendant neither filed a motion to suppress nor

objected to the admission of the evidence at trial, the issue is procedurally barred absent a

showing of plain error on appeal. See Woods v. State, 175 So. 3d 579, 581 (¶10) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2015). It is well-settled law in Mississippi that failure to make a contemporaneous

objection regarding the admission of evidence at trial waives the argument for purposes of

appeal. Jones v. State, 993 So. 2d 386, 391 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

¶38. Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(a), regarding motion deadlines, states:

At arraignment or thereafter, the court may set a reasonable deadline for the
filing and hearing of all pretrial motions. Pretrial motions shall include, but
are not limited to, motions: to dismiss, to suppress evidence, to request
discovery, for continuance, for severance, for appointment of experts, for
mental examination, or for any other matters which may delay the trial.

16
MRCrP 16.1(a) (emphasis added). Further, the orderly administration of justice dictates that

the trial judge be vested with a considerable amount of discretion with respect to trial

calendaring and docket management. Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 992 (¶41) (Miss. 2007).

Accordingly, a trial court’s decision to enforce its scheduling order will not be overturned

absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

¶39. In the instant case, Days did not file a pretrial motion to suppress to prevent

abandonment on appeal or object to the body-camera footage containing the challenged

statements introduced into evidence. Defense counsel informed the court that he had a

pretrial motion to suppress, and the court, following its scheduling order, stated: “It’s too

late to bring them up now. We’re in the middle of a trial. . . . You can bring them up as the

evidence is attempted to be brought in.” Then, the State began admitting the evidence. This

was Days’ opportunity to preserve the issue on appeal. But Days did not object when this

evidence was admitted. Thus, the court admitted, without objection, the handgun, a

photograph of the methamphetamine, Rayner’s body-camera footage (which captured Days’

multiple incriminating statements), the video recording of Frank’s interrogation interview,

and a copy of Days’ conviction and indictment from Alabama. Days did not object at the

time to any of this evidence being admitted. After defense counsel moved for a directed

verdict on the evidence, the court again questioned whether he had filed a motion to suppress.

Defense counsel reviewed his files and determined that he had not filed a pretrial motion to

suppress.

¶40. Additionally, in this case, Days had signed the scheduling order, agreeing to comply

17
with its terms, including these:

[A]ll pretrial motions be filed as soon as the moving party realizes the motion
is necessary, but require no less than five days[’] notice prior to the date of
hearing. Failure to follow this procedure shall result in denial of the motion.

Although the record reflects that the case was initially set to be resolved through a guilty plea

hearing, during that hearing, Days and his fiancée consistently contested his guilty status.

Then, the court expressly asked Days if he wanted to proceed to trial, and Days responded

that he wanted a jury trial. In response to Days’ request, the court abandoned the plea

hearing and quickly shifted to a jury trial. The trial court still acted within its discretion in

enforcing its scheduling order and declining to consider the motion. MRCrP 16.1(a).

¶41. Accordingly, as Days concedes, his failure to make objections during the trial

proceedings resulted in the argument being abandoned and the issue being waived on appeal.

III. Whether the Court’s admission of evidence against Days was plain
error.

¶42. Days argues that the trial court erred by admitting the body-camera footage, which

contained incriminating statements that he made before he was advised of his Miranda rights,

violating his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Although Days does not dispute that he

waived the issue by failing to file a written motion and by not objecting at trial, he contends

that the admission of the statements constituted plain error requiring reversal. The State

argues that even without the statements obtained prior to giving Days his Miranda warnings,

the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to convict Days of the charges. Further, the

State argues, even if plain error exists, Miranda violations are subject to harmless error

review.

18
¶43. The plain error doctrine permits this Court to recognize “obvious error which was not

properly raised by the defendant and which affects a defendant’s ‘fundamental, substantive

right.’” Hollingsworth v. State, 269 So. 3d 456, 458 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting

Burdette v. State, 110 So. 3d 296, 303 (¶23) (Miss. 2013)). “To determine if plain error has

occurred, this Court must look at whether the trial court deviated from a known legal rule,

whether that deviation created an error which was plain, clear, or obvious, and whether the

deviation prejudiced the eventual outcome of the trial.” Starr v. State, 997 So. 2d 262, 266

(¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). Additionally, “[f]or the plain-error doctrine to apply, there must

have been an error that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Hollingsworth, 269 So. 3d

at 458-59 (¶8). The plain error standard is applied “‘only in unusual circumstances’ to

‘prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Brady v. State, 337 So. 3d 218, 227 (¶28) (Miss.

2022) (quoting Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 655 (Miss. 2009)). Moreover, the error is

harmless “if the trial record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the

evidence ‘was without any substantial prejudicial effect under all of the facts and

circumstances of the case.’” Starr, 997 So. 2d at 268 (¶16) (quoting Hopkins v. State, 799

So. 2d 874, 879 (¶10) (Miss. 2001)).

¶44. This Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have previously found that “[n]o legal

rule requires a trial judge to sua sponte stop or strike arguably objectionable testimony.”

Brady, 337 So. 3d at 227 (¶29); Lawson v. State, 292 So. 3d 266, 277 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App.

2019); see also Demorst v. State, 228 So. 3d 323, 328 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“[W]e are

19
aware of no legal rule requiring a trial court to sua sponte suppress evidence.”). Here, as

previously noted in Part II of this opinion, Days signed the trial court’s scheduling order,

which required pretrial motions to be filed before the start of trial, but Days never filed a

written motion before the start of trial. Moreover, after missing the opportunity to file the

pretrial motion to suppress, Days again missed his opportunity to object when the evidence

was being admitted, even though the court had instructed him to object at the time of

presentation of the evidence for admission. Motions to suppress evidence generally must be

filed before trial, and the failure to do so without good cause has been held to constitute not

only a procedural bar, but a waiver of the issue that precludes even plain error review

because the court had no duty to sua sponte exclude the evidence presented in this case. See

Demorst, 228 So. 3d at 328 (¶10).

¶45. Moreover, the obstructed tag gave Rayner probable cause to stop Days’ vehicle. See

Miss. Code Ann. § 27-19-31 (Rev. 2017). Additionally, the odor of marijuana implicated the

plain-smell doctrine, which is recognized in Mississippi, and provided Rayner with probable

cause to search the vehicle. Mason v. State, 42 So. 3d 629, 634 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

(“[T]he Mississippi Supreme Court has correlated ‘plain smell’ to the plain view doctrine,

holding that the sense of smell is no less trustworthy than the sense of sight.”). Even without

Days’ statements, during the vehicle search, Rayner would have discovered the firearm and

the 4.9 grams of methamphetamine. In addition, Days did not challenge the admission or use

of that evidence by not objecting when the evidence was used against him during the trial

proceeding. The evidence secured during the custodial interrogation, i.e., after he was read

20
his Miranda rights, which was presented to the jury, was sufficient to convict Days.10 Thus,

we cannot say that the trial judge deviated from any “obvious” legal rule by not sua sponte

suppressing the body-camera footage containing the alleged incriminating statements.

Accordingly, based on the facts and the record before us, we find Days’ plain-error argument

without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶46. We hold that Days’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is dismissed without

prejudice and can be raised in a properly filed PCR motion. Further, we hold that the trial

court acted within its discretion when it declined to hear Days’ pretrial request to suppress.

Further, Days waived any arguments by failing to timely object to the admission of evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress, and we

affirm Days’ convictions and sentences.

¶47. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.

10
In this case, the better approach by Rayner would have been to give Days his
Miranda rights upon his reasonable suspicion that Days possessed drugs or a gun.

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