Pierre Thomas, II a/k/a Pierre Thomas, Jr. v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-01400-COA

PIERRE THOMAS, II A/K/A PIERRE THOMAS, APPELLANT
JR.

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/20/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL M. TAYLOR
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: DEE BATES
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/05/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Pierre Thomas was found guilty in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Mississippi,

of unlawful possession of at least 250 grams but less than 500 grams of methamphetamine

with the intent to distribute, as charged in Count I of his indictment, and unlawful possession

of at least 10 grams but less than 30 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute, as charged

in Count II. For Count I, Thomas was sentenced to serve a term of twenty-five years in the

custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and, for Count II, to a term

of fifteen years in the custody of the MDOC, with five years suspended and ten years to

serve. Thomas was sentenced as a non-violent habitual offender for both convictions, and the
court ordered the sentences to be served day for day and to run consecutively. He appeals

his convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On July 3, 2021, Reginald Cain was on patrol working for the Brookhaven Police

Department. While out on patrol that day, Cain recognized a Grand Marquis traveling past

his vehicle in the opposite direction. Cain testified at trial that he recognized the vehicle and

identified the driver as Pierre Thomas. Cain testified that he had known Thomas “for a few

years” and, in fact, had initiated a stop on Thomas in the same vehicle just one month before

the date of the current stop. According to Cain, on the date of the prior stop, Thomas pulled

over, locked the vehicle, and fled the scene. Because of this prior encounter, Cain testified

that he turned his patrol car around to follow Thomas. Cain contacted dispatch to verify

ownership of the vehicle and to see if Thomas had any active warrants. Dispatch informed

Cain that the vehicle was registered to Jennell McClendon and that there was an active

warrant for Thomas’ arrest. Based upon this information, Cain activated his blue lights to

initiate a traffic stop.

¶3. Thomas did not immediately stop, and Cain continued to follow Thomas to the local

Moose Lodge parking lot. After making a loop in the parking lot, Thomas exited the vehicle

and started walking away. Despite being instructed over Cain’s patrol car PA system not to

run, Thomas locked the doors to the vehicle and started running into the back yard area of

a nearby house. The dash camera video from Cain’s patrol car, entered into evidence at trial,

showed a man in a white shirt and shorts exit the Grand Marquis and walk out of view, just

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as Cain had testified. Cain identified Thomas as the man in the video and the man he knew

as Pierre Thomas. According to Cain, he followed Thomas into the driveway of the house

where Thomas fled. Cain called for backup and, despite a thorough search of the

surrounding property, Thomas was not apprehended that day.

¶4. Cain was also wearing a body camera on the day of the stop, and the recording was

entered as an exhibit at trial. This video corroborated Cain’s testimony that he searched the

neighboring property but was unable to locate Thomas. After Thomas returned to the parked

Grand Marquis, Jennell McClendon pulled up in another vehicle. McClendon told Cain and

other officers present that she had received a “private call” from a young girl who told her

that her car was in the Moose Lodge parking lot. According to McClendon, she did not

know the identity of the caller. When Cain questioned McClendon about the driver of the

vehicle that day, she indicated that she did not know who was in the car on that particular

day. However, McClendon stated that she was in the process of selling the car to Thomas

and that she had been letting him drive it. McClendon also stated that she did not have any

spare keys to the car. Cain advised McClendon that the car was going to be towed and held

until Thomas reported to the police station. Cain’s interaction with McClendon was also

captured on his body-cam video that was introduced at trial.

¶5. The Grand Marquis was towed to the police station, and a search warrant for the

vehicle was executed. Cain’s body camera recorded the vehicle search and was entered into

evidence at trial. Several items of interest were found in the vehicle during the search. What

appeared to be a “cookie” of cocaine was found between the front driver’s seat and

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passenger’s seat. A bag was found on the back passenger side floorboard containing what

appeared to be different types of narcotics in pill form, a green leafy substance, and other

white powdery and crystal substances. There was also a small set of scales and a box of

ammunition found in the vehicle. Further, the officers found an invoice dated May 28, 2021,

made out to “Pierra” Thomas for repair work that was done on the vehicle. The evidence

was delivered to the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory to be tested for controlled substances.

Evidence at trial showed that the crime lab tested the items submitted and found 284.83

grams of methamphetamine and 11.75 grams of cocaine. Thomas was indicted by the grand

jury on July 19, 2022.

¶6. At trial, Thomas denied that he was the individual shown in Cain’s dash-cam video.

Thomas testified that he had been a drug dealer in the past but had not been involved with

drugs since approximately 2015. Thomas also stated that while he previously had possession

of McClendon’s Grand Marquis, he had returned the vehicle to McClendon prior to the

incident in question. Thomas claimed that despite trying to fix the car, as evidenced by the

receipt found in the glove box, the car had additional problems. Thomas claimed that he did

not want to invest any more time or money into the car and that this was the reason for him

giving the vehicle back to McClendon.

¶7. McClendon testified for the defense at trial, and her testimony was inconsistent with

the statements that she had made to law enforcement on the day of the incident. McClendon

testified that Thomas had returned the vehicle to her house prior to the incident in question.

She stated that she had not cleaned out the car and that the car was parked in her front yard.

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According to McClendon, she left her set of keys inside the car, and multiple people had

come by to test drive the vehicle. McClendon testified that Thomas had a set of keys to the

vehicle that he failed to return.

¶8. After a two-day trial, a jury found Thomas guilty of both counts of the indictment.

On appeal, Thomas argues that the verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9. Our standard of review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence has been clearly

announced by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 289 (¶1)

(Miss. 2017):

We granted certiorari to clarify the appellate court’s role when reviewing a
motion for new trial. Despite this Court’s prior language suggesting otherwise,
neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals assumes the role of juror on appeal.
We do not reweigh evidence. We do not assess the witnesses’ credibility. And
we do not resolve conflicts between evidence. Those decisions belong solely
to the jury. Our role as appellate court is to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and disturb the verdict only when it is so contrary to
the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would
sanction an unconscionable injustice.

ANALYSIS

¶10. Thomas’ challenge to the weight of the evidence to support his convictions was

properly preserved for appellate review by filing a motion for a new trial, which was denied

by the trial court. See Manyfield v. State, 296 So. 3d 240, 251-52 (¶40) (Miss. Ct. App.

2020). On appeal Thomas argues:

The weight of the evidence did not support a conclusion, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Thomas was the person allegedly observed leaving the scene of the
traffic stop in the Moose Lodge parking lot. Nor did the weight of evidence
support a conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that even if Thomas was

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identified that he constructively possessed the accused contraband.

We will address Thomas’ claims concerning evidence of identification and constructive

possession separately below.

I. Was the jury’s determination that Thomas was the person driving
the vehicle and fleeing from the vehicle at the time of the traffic
stop against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

¶11. Thomas argues that Cain’s opportunity to observe the driver of the Grand Marquis

was “fleeting.” Thomas suggests that Cain’s identification of Thomas as the driver was

“influenced by his presumption that he initially thought Thomas was driving the same vehicle

from [his] stop of Thomas a month earlier.” That is the extent of his argument regarding the

State’s proof that Thomas was the driver of the vehicle. Thomas simply challenges the

credibility of Cain’s identification of Thomas.

¶12. The State points to Cain’s trial testimony in which he told the jury that he had known

Thomas for a few years. Cain testified that Thomas was the driver of the vehicle and

identified the defendant in the courtroom. No one challenged Cain’s in-court identification

of Thomas.1 Later, when the dash-cam video was played for the jury, Cain, again without

objection, identified Thomas in the videos of the event. See Bennett v. State, 757 So. 2d

1074, 1076 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

¶13. When Thomas testified that he was not driving the Grand Marquis on the date of the

stop, this testimony presented a conflict in the evidence that the jury was required to resolve.

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While the defense filed a pre-trial motion in limine to prevent any other officer
from identifying Thomas based upon their review of the video, the defense specifically
did not seek to prevent Cain from identifying Thomas. At trial, the State did not seek to
have any of its witnesses, other than Cain, identify Thomas.

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In Coleman v. State, 411 So. 3d 137, 145 (¶33) (Miss. 2025), concerning conflicting

testimony, the Supreme Court stated:

The substance of Coleman’s arguments amount to issues regarding the
credibility of the witnesses. “Issues of fact and credibility are the primary
responsibility of the trier of fact. Accordingly, this Court should not reweigh
the facts nor substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder as to credibility
issues.” Williams v. State, 391 So. 3d 1151, 1158 (Miss. 2024) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting McFadden v. Miss. State Bd. of Med.
Licensure, 735 So. 2d 145, 152 (Miss. 1999)). “Conflicting testimony does not
evince overwhelming evidence; ‘[w]here the verdict turns on the credibility of
conflicting testimony and the credibility of the witnesses, it is the jury’s duty
to resolve the conflict.’” Brown [v. State], 995 So. 2d [698, ] 702 [(¶10) (Miss.
2008)] (alteration in original) (quoting Nicholson v. State, 523 So. 2d 68, 71
(Miss. 1988)).

Thomas testified he was not the driver of the Grand Marquis. Cain testified Thomas was the

driver and identified Thomas on the body-cam video. This testimony clearly presented a

conflict in the evidence that the jury was charged with resolving. The jury resolved this

conflict by accepting Cain’s testimony and unanimously finding that Thomas was the driver.

Viewing the evidence identifying Thomas as the driver of the vehicle at the time of the stop

in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we find that allowing the verdict to stand

would not “sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Little, 233 So. 3d at 292 (¶21).

II. Was the jury’s finding that Thomas was in constructive possession
of the controlled substances found in the Grand Marquis against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

¶14. The State did not contend that controlled substances were found on Thomas’ person

at the time of the traffic stop. In fact, because he fled and was not apprehended that day,

Thomas’ person was not searched. Therefore, Thomas claims, and we agree, that the State

was required to prove constructive possession. Thomas argues that the State failed to prove

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that he was in constructive possession of the controlled substances. Thomas contends that

since he was not the owner of the vehicle, the State’s case lacked the additional incriminating

evidence necessary to connect him, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the contraband found in

the Grand Marquis.

¶15. In a case alleging constructive possession, “there must be sufficient facts to warrant

a finding that [the] defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular

substance and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it.” Curry v. State, 249 So.

2d 414, 416 (Miss. 1971). In Curry, the supreme court stated that “constructive possession

may be shown by establishing that the drug[s] involved [were] subject to his dominion or

control.” Id. “Proximity is usually an essential element, but by itself is not enough in the

absence of other incriminating circumstances.” Gavin v. State, 785 So. 2d 1088, 1093 (¶16)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

¶16. As already discussed above, the jury’s finding that Thomas was the individual driving

the Grand Marquis on July 3, 2021, was not against the overwhelming weight of the

evidence. The question remains whether the jury’s determination that Thomas was guilty of

constructively possessing the contraband discovered in the car was against the overwhelming

weight of the evidence. Thomas argues that he was not the owner of the vehicle and,

further, that there were multiple individuals who had access to the car prior to the discovery

of the contraband. Thomas claims that no additional incriminating facts supported the jury’s

verdict. But Thomas fails to recognize, as discussed above, that the jury was not required to

accept his testimony as the truth.

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¶17. In Glidden v. State, 74 So. 3d 342, 344 (¶5) (Miss. 2011), Glidden testified that he had

borrowed a truck and had been in possession of the truck for only thirty minutes before being

pulled over by law enforcement. During the stop, a bag of marijuana was found on the

floorboard of the truck. Id. Glidden asserted that he was not aware of the presence of the

contraband. Id. The supreme court held that “[t]his was a classic jury case – Glidden’s

testimony versus the State’s testimony and supporting evidence, i.e., the photographs of the

bag of marijuana in the location where the police officers testified the marijuana was found

at the time they stopped the truck Glidden was driving. Unfortunately for Glidden, the jury

resolved these issues adversely to him.” Id. at 349 (¶23). As to constructive possession, the

jury was instructed by the trial court, without objection:

The Court instructs the Jury that to constitute possession as applied to this
case, it is not necessary that the State prove actual physical possession; it is
sufficient if the State establishes that the substance involved was subject to the
defendant’s dominion and control, and that he was aware or reasonably should
have been aware of its presence and character.

Id. at 346 (¶13). The supreme court affirmed Glidden’s conviction of possession of a

controlled substance. Id. at 349-50 (¶24).

¶18. The trial court in the present case instructed the jury, without objection, as to the facts

necessary to find that Thomas was in constructive possession of the controlled substances

found in the vehicle. There was substantial incriminating evidence tying Thomas to this

contraband. At the time of the traffic stop, Thomas was the sole occupant of the vehicle.

Cain testified that when he pulled Thomas over on July 3, 2021, Thomas locked the car doors

and fled the scene despite Cain’s directive to stop running. By Thomas’ own testimony at

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trial, he “used to be a drug dealer.” When officers searched the inside of the vehicle at the

police station, they found a “cookie” of cocaine visibly lodged between the driver’s and

passenger’s seats of the car. Officers found multiple bags of what appeared to be marijuana

and assorted pills and other substances on the floorboard of the passenger’s side backseat.

In addition to the items that were readily visible, officers found a set of scales underneath the

driver’s seat. While Thomas claims that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the

stop, the evidence shows otherwise. The jurors watched body-cam video from the Moose

Lodge parking lot where Jennell McClendon told Cain that she was in the process of selling

the Grand Marquis to Thomas and that she was letting him use the car. Cain testified that

he had pulled Thomas over in the same vehicle during the month prior to the July 3, 2021

stop. Officers also found an auto repair invoice in the glove box of the vehicle that had the

name “Pierra Thomas” at the top. Notably, the receipt was dated May 28, 2021. This is

circumstantial evidence that Thomas had possession and had been driving the vehicle at least

between May 28, 2021, and July 3, 2021. Much like the jury in Glidden, the jury in this case

was tasked to reconcile McClendon’s and Thomas’ testimony versus the State’s testimony

and supporting evidence, and unfortunately for Thomas, the jury resolved these issues

adversely to him.

¶19. Despite the jury’s resolution of the conflicts in the evidence presented at trial, the

dissent is based upon the testimony of McClendon and Thomas. In addition to Glidden, this

Court again stated in Anderson v. State, 427 So. 3d 939, 945 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026):

Anderson’s assertions, at bottom, raise issues regarding the credibility of the
witnesses. But, as stated, “where the verdict turns on the credibility of

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conflicting testimony and the credibility of the witnesses, it is the jury’s duty
to resolve the conflict.” Coleman [v. State], 411 So. 3d [137,] 145 (¶33)
[(Miss. 2025)] (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, both the State and the
defense presented their theory of the case to the jury, and the jury “[was] free
to accept or reject all or some of the testimony given by each witness.” Id. at
146 (¶34). We will neither “reweigh the evidence” nor “make independent
resolutions of conflicting evidence,” as that is the jury’s exclusive domain.
Little, 233 So. 3d at 292 (¶20). “[V]iew[ing] the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict,” Moore [v. State], 348 So. 3d [322,] 327 (¶18) [(Miss.
2022)], as we must, we find that the jury’s verdict is not against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. We further find that affirming
Anderson’s conviction would not sanction an unconscionable justice.
Therefore, we find that Anderson’s weight-of-the-evidence assignment of error
is without merit.

We find the same to be true in the present case.

CONCLUSION

¶20. We find that the verdicts of the jury are not against the overwhelming weight of the

evidence, and allowing these verdicts to stand “would not sanction an unconscionable

injustice.” We therefore affirm his convictions and sentences.

¶21. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY,
WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN
PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED IN PART BY McDONALD, J.

WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

¶22. I agree with the majority that the jury’s determination that Thomas was the person

driving the vehicle and fleeing the vehicle was supported by the evidence presented at trial.

However, I would find that the evidence did not support the jury’s finding that Thomas was

in constructive possession of the controlled substances found in the vehicle. A “defendant’s

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proximity to the drugs is a factor in establishing constructive possession, but it is not

determinative.” Knight v. State, 72 So. 3d 1056, 1063 (¶26) (Miss. 2011). While the owner

of the premises where contraband is found “is rebuttably presumed to be in possession of the

contraband,” this presumption is lacking when the defendant is not the owner. Gavin v. State,

785 So. 2d 1088, 1093 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

¶23. The facts must support “a finding that the defendant was aware of the presence and

character of the [drugs] and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it.” Curry v.

State, 249 So. 2d 414, 416 (Miss. 1971). Here, Thomas was not the owner of the vehicle. See

Fultz v. State, 573 So. 2d 689, 691 (Miss. 1990) (reversing driver’s conviction for

constructive possession of drugs found in trunk of his sister’s car). The two owners of the

vehicle were actively trying to sell it. Multiple people had recently accessed the

vehicle—either to look at it or drive it. To facilitate the access of those interested in

purchasing the vehicle, McClendon stated that she went to work in McComb and left the

keys in the vehicle, which was parked outside. See Hudson v. State, 362 So. 2d 645, 646-47

(Miss. 1978) (reversing conviction where evidence showed driver did not own the car and

multiple people had access to the vehicle). Additionally, the State presented evidence that

there was a crack or rock-like substance and scales tucked between the front seats (Count II),

but much of the contraband—the methamphetamine—was found in black plastic bags in the

back seat (Count I). It was not readily apparent or necessarily under the control of the driver

of the car. See Bates v. State, 952 So. 2d 320, 326 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (showing

evidence that supported constructive possession where drugs were in plain view within arms

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reach of defendant and defendant appeared to attempt to chew and swallow the drugs as

police approached); see also Jones v. State, 693 So. 2d 375, 375-76 (Miss. 1997) (holding

that decisions on constructive possession must establish that when contraband is found on

premises, there must be evidence, in addition to physical proximity, showing that the

defendant consciously exercised control over the contraband, and absent this evidence, a

finding of constructive possession cannot be sustained). The evidence is insufficient to prove

that Thomas consciously exercised control over the contraband. Suspicion does not meet that

burden. In Jones, our Supreme Court reversed and rendered Jones’ conviction, finding that

nothing connected him to marijuana found in a jacket in the backseat of his friend’s car. Id.

at 377. The facts outlined in that case were also that Jones’ friend denied knowledge of the

marijuana and did not know of any connection between Jones and the narcotic in the

backseat. Id.

¶24. In light of this context, I would find that the facts do not support a finding of

constructive possession. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part.

McDONALD, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.

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