James Johnson a/k/a James Nathaniel Johnson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2025-KA-00549-COA

JAMES JOHNSON A/K/A JAMES NATHANIEL APPELLANT
JOHNSON

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/29/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEWEY KEY ARTHUR
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: INDIA MARIAH SPRINKLE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN K. BRAMLETT JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/21/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND WEDDLE, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. James Johnson appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s re-sentencing order

in which the court, following a Miller v. Alabama1 hearing, sentenced Johnson to serve a

term of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections

(MDOC) without eligibility for parole. On appeal, Johnson argues that the court

misinterpreted the facts and misapplied the law. Having considered the record, arguments

of counsel, and relevant precedent, we find no error and affirm the circuit court’s order and

1
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Johnson’s sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

¶2. In 2001, sixteen-year-old Johnson and his older half-brother, James Howard, robbed

a convenience store in Madison County. A jury determined that during the robbery, Johnson

shot and killed the store clerk. Johnson was convicted of capital murder in August 2005 and

given the only sentence available under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-21 (Rev.

2000) in effect at the time—life imprisonment without parole.2 Johnson appealed, and this

2
Section 97-3-21, “Homicide; penalty for first- or second-degree murder or capital
murder,” now provides:

(1) Except as otherwise provided for a juvenile offender in subsection (2) of
this section, every person who is:
....
(c) Convicted of capital murder shall be sentenced

(i) to death;
(ii) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary without
parole; or
(iii) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary with
eligibility for parole as provided in Section 47-7-3(1)(c)(iii).
....

(2)(a) For the purposes of this section, “juvenile offender” means a person
who had not reached the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense.
(b) A juvenile offender who is convicted of first-degree murder after July
1, 2024, may be sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the
Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury. If the jury
fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment, the court shall fix the penalty at
not less than twenty (20) nor more than forty (40) years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections.
(c) A juvenile offender who is convicted of capital murder after July 1,
2024, may be sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department
of Corrections or life imprisonment without eligibility for parole in the
custody of the Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the

2
Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in Johnson v. State, 956 So. 2d 358, 360, 369

(¶1, 27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

¶3. According to the facts as stated in that reported opinion, after the victim was found

dead, police discovered a trash can containing three cash drawers similar to those missing

from the convenience store. Id. at 361 (¶3). A fingerprint on one matched Johnson’s, and

he was arrested and indicted for capital murder. Id. at (¶¶3-4). This fingerprint was the only

physical evidence linking Johnson to the crime. Id. at (¶5). But the State also presented

witnesses who testified that Johnson and Howard had talked about committing the robbery

and that Johnson had confessed to killing the store clerk. Id. On appeal, we found no error

by the circuit court in giving the jury instructions or in allowing testimony from witnesses.

Id. at 369 (¶26). We affirmed the court’s judgment and Johnson’s sentence of life

imprisonment in the custody of MDOC. Id. at (¶27).

¶4. During his incarceration between 2005 and 2016, Johnson was repeatedly cited for

violations of prison rules, including threatening an officer and possessing gang paraphernalia

and other contraband. He received thirty citations for such behavior over an eleven-year

period.

jury. If the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment or life
imprisonment without parole, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than
twenty-five (25) nor more than fifty (50) years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections.
(d) For a juvenile offender who was convicted of first-degree murder or
capital murder prior to July 1, 2024, and who is entitled to a hearing under this
subsection, the judge who presided over the trial, or a judge appointed by the
senior circuit judge, if the presiding judge is unavailable, shall fix the penalty.

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Supp. 2024).

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¶5. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that

mandatory sentencing of juveniles to lifetime incarceration without the possibility of parole

violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Miller, 567 U.S. at

479. However, the Supreme Court stated, “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty

for a class of offenders or type of crime . . . . [I]t mandates only that a sentencer follow a

certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before

imposing a particular penalty.” Id. at 483. The factors included in a Miller analysis, which

are found in Dotson v. State, 328 So. 3d 659, 667 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), include:

(1) “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) “family and
home environment that surrounds [the defendant]”; (3) “circumstances of the
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him”; (4) “that he might
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth”; and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation.”

Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78).

¶6. Seeing some chance at freedom because of Miller, on January 23, 2013, Johnson filed

a motion to obtain the record and transcript of his criminal trial. He later filed a motion to

vacate his sentence and requested a re-sentencing hearing because he had committed his

crime when he was a juvenile, and he was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing statute

as was the defendant in Miller. The circuit court granted Johnson’s petition and vacated his

sentence on April 25, 2016. The re-sentencing hearing was set for July 25, 2016, but was

subsequently continued several times between that date and one in October 2019.

¶7. In October 2019, Johnson filed a motion for additional time to file a motion for funds

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to hire two experts, one in psychology and one in mitigation investigation. The court granted

his motion. Johnson also filed a motion for jury sentencing pursuant to this Court’s decision

in Wharton v. State, 334 So. 3d 136, 140-41 (¶¶14-15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), which held that

a Miller re-sentencing hearing could be conducted before a jury. The Mississippi Supreme

Court later reversed our decision in Wharton v. State, 298 So. 3d 921, 925 (¶19) (Miss.

2019), and held that a defendant had no constitutional right to have the Miller factors decided

by a jury. Johnson later withdrew his motion for jury sentencing.

¶8. On July 27, 2021, Johnson filed a motion for funds to hire Dr. Criss Lott, a

psychologist, to evaluate him and testify at his Miller hearing. On October 21, 2021, the

court granted Johnson’s motion. Dr. Lott’s January 2025 report was filed with the court on

February 13, 2025. With the court’s permission, the parties stipulated to the admission of

Dr. Lott’s report without the need for Lott to appear at the re-sentencing hearing that was

held on April 16, 2025.

A. Testimony and Evidence Presented by the State

¶9. The hearing began with the court’s admission of Dr. Lott’s report into evidence. The

State pointed out that Dr. Lott detailed the numerous “Rules Violation Reports” (RVRs) that

Johnson had accumulated and for which he had been disciplined by the Mississippi

Department of Corrections. Thirty RVRs were listed from 2006 through November 2016,

including refusal to obey authority and possession of a sharpened object, marijuana, and

cigarettes. One time Johnson flooded his cell. The State also asked the court to take judicial

notice of a judgment entered on August 23, 2021, in Madison County Circuit Court Cause

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No. 2020-0444, where Johnson pled guilty and was convicted of possessing a cell phone in

a correctional facility, possession of a controlled substance, and conspiracy to furnish a cell

phone in a correctional facility. Johnson was sentenced to serve three years for each

conviction. The court’s order on these convictions was entered into evidence.

¶10. The State called Joshua Fish, an investigator with the Madison County Sheriff’s

Department, who testified about Johnson’s latest conviction. Fish stated that in 2019, jail

staff contacted his office because they had found contraband in Johnson’s cell. Fish

investigated and found multiple little bundles of Spice (a blend of dried plant material that

is laced with a synthetic cannabinoid) wrapped in paper and a cell phone in the middle of a

hollowed-out tortilla container. Johnson also had numerous Ramen noodle packets in which

Fish found methamphetamine and Spice. Fish learned that Johnson’s girlfriend and sister

were supplying Johnson with this contraband and that they were running a statewide,

multiple-jail operation.

¶11. The State then directed the court to our May 2007 opinion in Johnson’s appeal of his

original conviction. The State pointed out that this Court rejected Johnson’s argument that

he was influenced by his half-brother. The State also referred to a portion of the opinion

where a witness at Johnson’s original trial had testified that Johnson told her, “I killed the

MF [store clerk] and I’ll kill him again.”

B. Testimony and Evidence Presented by Johnson

¶12. Latasha Johnson, Johnson’s older sister, testified that James Howard was her and

Johnson’s older half-brother. They first met Howard when Howard was brought to their

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father’s funeral in handcuffs because he was incarcerated in California at the time.3 When

Howard was finally released, he returned to Mississippi and took Johnson, who was then

fifteen, “under his wing.” Latasha told Johnson to stay away from Howard, who was eight

years older than him, but Johnson looked up to him. Latasha told the court that Johnson had

gone through different situations in prison, and he has “awakened in a way only God could

do.” However, on cross-examination, Latasha admitted that she was part of the criminal drug

and cell phone conspiracy that led to Johnson’s conviction in 2020, and she said that no one

forced Johnson to participate in those crimes.

¶13. Clara Thompson, Johnson’s mother, testified that she had only known Howard a few

years before he got out of prison and moved to Mississippi. Howard was a child of

Johnson’s father by another woman. Thompson told Howard to stay away from her house

because he sold drugs and “was underhanded, undermining other young men, even his own

siblings.” She also warned Johnson to stay away from Howard.

¶14. Johnson then testified and presented the court with several certificates he had earned

while in prison, including one showing completion on July 5, 2016, of a program offered by

the facility called, “The Resolution for Men.” Others included a completion certificate of

the “Fundamentals of Faith Bible Study” conducted by Mt. Nebo Prison Ministry (undated),

another for completing a twelve-week “Spiritual Growth” class on May 20, 2023, and a

certificate for completing a “30-Day Fast Track MRT-Moral Reconation Therapy”4 and drug

3
Johnson was eight years old when his father died.
4
Reconation is a type of therapy aimed at helping individuals develop moral
reasoning skills and make better decisions.

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rehabilitation on January 26, 2024. On February 9, 2024, Johnson completed a fifteen-

session, thirty-hour course in the facility’s re-entry academy. Johnson said he decided to take

those classes when he learned of the Miller v. Alabama case, which gave him a sense of

direction and purpose to get his life back together. Johnson explained that since 2016, he had

only four RVRs, and those were all dismissed because MDOC cited the wrong person.

¶15. Johnson testified that he had a close relationship with his father, who was his first role

model. Johnson said that when his father died, he was mentally broken. He started rejecting

his mother and things that were positive and began smoking marijuana and breaking into

houses. He was in and out of training school. He looked for a substitute father figure, which

Howard presented. Although his family told him to stay away from Howard, Johnson said

he just wanted to be around Howard and looked up to him. Johnson said Howard gave him

a gun and drugs to sell.

¶16. Johnson said that Howard talked about robbing a liquor store but changed his mind

and robbed the convenience store instead. According to Johnson, Howard went inside the

store while he stayed outside, and Johnson only went in when he heard gunshots. Johnson

saw the clerk’s body on the floor and helped Howard move it. Howard then told Johnson to

meet him at an abandoned house, but they got caught. Even in jail, Howard told Johnson not

to talk to people and that they had a lawyer. Howard told Johnson not to take an open plea

because then the judge could sentence him to anything. When Johnson got another plea

offer, he showed it to Howard, and they talked about it. Johnson rejected three plea offers

on Howard’s advice. However, Johnson said that after Howard talked to other witnesses,

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they all put the blame on Johnson because he was younger. When Howard took a plea and

left him to be tried on his own, Johnson realized Howard had “bamboozled” him.

¶17. Johnson admitted to his bad conduct in prison, saying that he was a troubled child with

an attitude problem. Basically, he was trying to live in a corrupted environment. About his

last conviction for possession of contraband in a correctional facility, Johnson said he

admitted to the guards that he had brought contraband into the prison because he did not want

anyone else to take the fall. Since 2015, he has been trying to change. Johnson said he was

reliable, would not lie, and was a rehabilitated person. He has renounced gangs and started

a reentry program to learn skills like carpentry and gardening. If he could change one thing,

it would be to not have been around his half-brother.

¶18. On cross-examination, Johnson agreed that he was not a model prisoner prior to the

Miller case. Johnson said he was responsible, but “as a person who has been manipulated.”

He admitted he sold drugs in prison, but he “was just in prison surviving.” Johnson said he

was in a gang to try to change it from the inside, not to corrupt other members’ minds. He

had run-ins with the guards because he was “anti-social.” Johnson gave his side of the story

on two RVRs—one concerning a female guard who had thrown away his breakfast tray, and

another where he was charged with assaulting a guard—but he was merely wrestling with

the guard over a phone that Johnson was trying to flush down the toilet.

¶19. Johnson’s attorney pointed out that Johnson had pled guilty to recent charges even

though he knew it would affect his chances at the Miller hearing. Johnson’s attorney also

asked the court to note that there were fifteen to twenty people present in the hearing room,

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showing the support that Johnson has in the community.

C. Court Ruling

¶20. After hearing the State and Johnson’s closing arguments, the court ruled on each of

the Miller factors. The court weighed the first—Johnson’s age at the time of the crime and

hallmark characteristics of youth—against Johnson. The court found that Johnson was

sixteen years and eleven months old at the time of the crime, but he had experience with the

criminal justice system, having been in and out of training school. Moreover, the robbery

resulting in Johnson’s conviction was planned and not a crime of impetuosity.

¶21. The court also weighed the second Miller factor—family and home

environment—against Johnson. Usually, in such cases, the judge said, he would see children

who had been subject to abuse or violence inflicted by their parents. But here, Johnson’s

mother was “a lovely, God-fearing woman.” Even Johnson admitted that he came from a

good home, and the court noted Johnson had community support, as shown by the number

of people at the hearing. The third Miller factor the court considered was the circumstances

of the crime. The court noted that Johnson tried to diminish his involvement in the robbery,

but there was also proof that Johnson helped plan it, and his fingerprint was on the cash

register drawer. Thus, the court concluded that Howard’s influence over Johnson was not

the only factor that caused the robbery and eventual homicide.

¶22. The fourth Miller factor was whether Johnson might have been charged and convicted

of a lesser offense if not for the incompetencies of youth. The judge said the crime was not

the result of a youthful error and was serious, as shown by the forty-year sentence Howard

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received when he pled guilty. The crime that occurred had nothing to do with youthful

tendencies. Finally, the court considered the last Miller factor, the possibility of

rehabilitation. The court weighed this factor “heavily” against Johnson because of Johnson’s

recent conviction of introducing contraband into the prison. Also, the court noted that Dr.

Lott, Johnson’s expert, stated in his report that Johnson “remained a risk for oppositional and

defiant behavior in the future, given his history before and during prison.” The court found

that the original sentence was the appropriate sentence and re-sentenced Johnson to life in

prison without eligibility for parole.

¶23. Johnson appealed and argues that the circuit court misinterpreted the facts and

misapplied the law when it re-sentenced him to life imprisonment without eligibility for

parole.

Standard of Review

¶24. In Dampier v. State, 396 So. 3d 313, 322 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), aff’d, 375 So.

3d 1149 (Miss. 2023), we set out the standard of review to be used in cases such as

Johnson’s, stating:

“There are two applicable standards of review in a Miller case. First, whether
the trial court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law subject to
de novo review.” Dotson v. State, 328 So. 3d 659, 665 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App.
2021) (quoting Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 68 (¶7) (Miss. 2018)), cert.
denied, 329 So. 3d 1200 (Miss. 2021). Second, “[i]f the trial court applied the
proper legal standard, its sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Id.

In Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 113 (2021), the United States Supreme Court stated

“unequivocally” that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required

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before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a murderer under age eighteen.

See also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016) (holding that Miller does not

require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding an offender’s incorrigibility);

Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 926 (¶25) (citing Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 69 (Miss. 2018))

(holding that a finding of incorrigibility is not required). Moreover, there is no rebuttable

presumption in favor of parole eligibility for juvenile homicide offenders. Chandler, 242 So.

3d at 69 (¶15). The offender has the burden of proving he is parole-eligible under Miller.

Dotson, 328 So. 3d at 667 (¶29).

Discussion

I. Whether the circuit court applied the correct legal standard.

¶25. In Jones, the Supreme Court reiterated that Miller allowed life-without-parole

sentences for juvenile offenders, “but only so long as the sentence is not mandatory—that is,

only so long as the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and

impose a lesser punishment.” Jones, 593 U.S. at 106 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). “In a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed

a homicide, a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and

constitutionally sufficient.” Id. at 105.

¶26. Mississippi’s discretionary system now includes a separate sentencing hearing for

offenders covered by Miller and an examination by the sentencing court of the Miller factors.

Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987, 995 (¶19) (Miss. 2013) (“The Miller court identified several

factors that must be considered by the sentencing authority.”); see also Chandler, 242 So. 3d

12
at 69 (¶11) (citing Parker’s holding). Thus, consideration of the Miller factors became the

legal standard for sentencing courts sentencing juvenile homicide offenders in Mississippi.

¶27. In its bench ruling at the end of Johnson’s Miller hearing, the circuit court reviewed

each of the Miller factors and determined from the evidence presented whether that factor

weighed in Johnson’s favor (i.e., weighed for or against a life-without-parole sentence) and

made its decision. Clearly, the circuit court applied the correct legal standard.

II. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in re-sentencing
Johnson to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole.

¶28. Johnson disagrees with the circuit court’s analysis of the evidence presented on the

Miller factors and contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in its findings.

However, “[a]buse of discretion is an appellate court’s most deferential standard of review.”

Longino v. State, 424 So. 3d 884, 889 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Owens v. State,

383 So. 3d 305, 309 (¶19) (Miss. 2024)). “The reviewing court should not reverse a

discretionary finding by the lower court unless it comes to a definite and firm conviction that

the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon

weighing of relevant factors.” Chamblee v. State, 426 So. 3d 352, 369 (¶49) (Miss. Ct. App.

2025) (quoting Tisdale v. S. Cent. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 411 So. 3d 227, 231 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App.

2024)). “[I]n applying the applicable abuse-of-discretion standard of review, this Court may

not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Id.

A. Age and its Hallmark Features

¶29. The circuit court recognized that Johnson was sixteen years and eleven months old at

the time of the convenience store murder. Johnson and his sister testified to his vulnerability

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after his father died and the influence Howard exerted over him as a substitute role model

to be involved in the crime. However, the circuit court noted that Johnson had his own

personal experience with crime even before Howard came home from prison. Dr. Lott

documented this experience in his report, including a four-month stay at Oakley Training

School for burglary of a home when Johnson was thirteen, a six-month stay for bringing a

gun to school when he was fourteen, and then another six months when he refused to attend

school.

¶30. The circuit court also noted that the convenience store robbery and ultimate shooting

was not an impetuous, spur-of-the-moment act by Johnson, but rather, the robbery was

planned a week earlier. Dr. Lott’s report confirmed that Johnson told him that he and

Howard had planned a robbery, albeit of a liquor store at first. Johnson told Lott that when

the plan changed from robbing a liquor store to robbing the convenience store, “we had to

get a watchout man . . . and we came back.” Further, in our opinion in Johnson’s direct

appeal of his conviction, we noted another witness, Shonda McCoy, who testified that she

overheard Johnson, Howard, and an unidentified individual planning the robbery one week

before. Johnson, 956 So. 2d at 368 (¶22).

¶31. We note that although Dr. Lott cites numerous studies and research findings about the

development of the adolescent mind, Lott rendered no opinion on how these findings applied

to Johnson. From our review, we find that the record supports the circuit court’s finding on

this factor, and the court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factor against Johnson.

B. Family and Home Environment

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¶32. In his report, Dr. Lott felt that Johnson was exposed as a child to “criminogenic

behavior” in his father’s home,5 which Lott opined had “a major adverse impact on his

[Johnson’s] future behavior and judgment.” However, Dr. Lott did not explain the nature or

extent of the “major adverse impact.” Offsetting this, the circuit court found that Johnson

was raised by a “lovely, God-fearing mother,” and he did not suffer any physical or mental

abuse as the court had seen in other cases. Johnson admitted he came from a good home, and

at the time of the hearing, he had the support of family and friends. In light of the evidence

presented, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the Miller

family-and-home-environment factor against Johnson. See Dampier, 396 So. 3d at 335 (¶89)

(citing Shoemake v. State, 323 So. 3d 1093, 1103 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (finding no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment of the home environment Miller factor

where the court recognized that “by all accounts, [the defendant] comes from a stable and

caring family” in comparison to the defendants in Miller and Jackson who “did not have the

benefit of such stability” and ultimately concluded that Shoemake should be sentenced to life

without parole)).

C. Circumstances of the Murder

¶33. The circuit court held that the circumstances of the crime weighed against Johnson

because it was the robbery that elevated the crime from a homicide to capital murder, and

Johnson was obviously involved in the robbery because his fingerprint was found on the cash

5
Johnson’s parents never married, and he was raised by his mother. However,
because his father lived in the same town, Johnson saw his father almost daily until his father
died in 1992 when Johnson was eight.

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register tray. The circuit court also noted that there was testimony at the criminal trial that

Johnson had participated in planning the crime. Johnson’s statements to Dr. Lott in 2025

about the specifics of the crime confirmed this. Further, according to a witness at the

criminal trial, Johnson admitted that he had killed the clerk and would do it again. Although

Johnson denied saying this at the sentencing hearing, the record nevertheless supports the

circuit court’s finding that Johnson was a willing participant. There was no evidence of

coercion or significant influence by Howard that forced Johnson to be involved. See

Dampier, 396 So. 3d at 335 (¶90) (holding that the circuit court considered the circumstances

of the crime, “including the extent of [Dampier’s] participation in the conduct” and any peer

pressure that may have affected him). We find that the circuit court’s decision to weigh this

factor against Johnson was supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion.

D. Incompetencies of Youth

¶34. On appeal, Johnson does not take issue with the fourth Miller factor—whether

Johnson might have been charged or convicted of a lesser offense if not for the

incompetencies associated with youth. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit

court’s finding that this factor did not weigh in Johnson’s favor.

E. Possibility of Rehabilitation

¶35. Johnson argues that the issue is not whether Johnson has already been rehabilitated,

but whether “the possibility of rehabilitation” exists. Miller, 567 U.S. at 478. We agree and

find that in this case, the circuit judge correctly considered the issue as well, specifically

saying, “And finally, the possibility of rehabilitation.” Johnson further argues that his pursuit

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of classes and participation in positive programs in recent years “demonstrated a clear

trajectory of growth and maturity inconsistent with ‘irreparable corruption.’” However, in

the court’s estimation, this evidence was outweighed by Johnson’s recent conviction of

contraband smuggling, which occurred while Johnson was waiting for his Miller hearing.

The court noted that Dr. Lott, Johnson’s own expert, stated in his report under the section

entitled, “The Prospect for Rehabilitation,” that “given his history of oppositional and defiant

behavior before and during prison, it is my opinion that he would remain at risk for this type

of behavior going forward.”

¶36. As noted earlier, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine de novo whether

Johnson can possibly be rehabilitated. We must determine whether the circuit court abused

its discretion in weighing the factor against Johnson. In light of the evidence presented, we

cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion or erred in its conclusion concerning

this factor.

¶37. In sum, we find that the circuit court properly considered all the Miller factors and did

not abuse its discretion in sentencing Johnson to life imprisonment without parole eligibility.

Conclusion

¶38. In Johnson’s case, the circuit court conducted a Miller hearing and considered the

evidence presented on each Miller factor. As the Mississippi Supreme Court stated in

Chandler,

[a]lthough the trial court had the authority to sentence Chandler to life in
prison with the possibility of parole, it chose to sentence Chandler to life in
prison, which was also within its authority. Because the trial court satisfied its
obligation under Miller and Parker, and we cannot say the trial court abused

17
its discretion in sentencing Chandler to life in prison, we affirm.

Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 70-71 (¶22). Similarly, in this case, the record reflects that the

circuit court fulfilled its obligation under Miller, and we find no abuse of discretion in the

court’s re-sentencing Johnson to life in prison without parole eligibility.

¶39. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.
EMFINGER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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