Darryl Randall Stasher Sr. v. Shirley A. Stasher

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-01302-COA

DARRYL RANDALL STASHER SR. APPELLANT

v.

SHIRLEY A. STASHER APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/21/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CYNTHIA L. BREWER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RICK D. PATT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: E. CHARLENE STIMLEY PRIESTER
MELVIN VINCENT PRIESTER JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/14/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Shirley and Darryl Stasher were married for approximately thirty years before

separating. Shirley filed a petition for divorce in the Madison County Chancery Court,

alleging adultery and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor granted Shirley’s

petition on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and conducted an equitable

distribution of the couple’s marital property. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s decision, Darryl

appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶2. Shirley and Darryl married on August 12, 1989, in Jackson, Mississippi. For the

duration of their marriage, the couple had two children, both of whom were adults at the time
of these proceedings. The couple separated on September 4, 2021,1 when Shirley left the

marital home alleging she was “in fear [for] her safety.”

¶3. On September 14, 2021, Shirley filed a petition for divorce in the Madison County

Chancery Court. Her petition alleged habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery or,

in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. She also requested alimony and temporary

restraining orders. The chancellor granted a motion for continuance filed by Darryl on

October 1, 2021. A hearing regarding Shirley’s motion for temporary relief was conducted

on November 9, 2021, and a temporary order was entered the same day. Of note, the

temporary order kept both parties “from disposing of any marital asset without court

approval” and ordered that an appraisal be conducted as to the couple’s real property. Darryl

filed his answer to Shirley’s complaint on November 19, 2021.

¶4. On December 10, 2021, Shirley filed a motion to appoint appraisers for the marital

property as directed in the chancellor’s temporary order. The chancellor granted her motion

on December 14, 2021. On January 5, 2022, Shirley filed a motion for contempt that alleged

Darryl had not complied with instructions to have the property appraised and had, in fact,

prevented appraisals from being conducted. Approximately one month later, she filed a

motion to compel Darryl to answer discovery.

¶5. On November 29, 2022, the chancellor conducted a hearing, first acknowledging,

“The parties have been unsuccessful in determining whether they are in agreement to the end

of the marriage.” Shirley testified first:

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The date of separation is denoted as both September 4 and September 7, but Shirley
testified that she left on September 4.

2
The first year of my marriage a child was conceived during our marriage.
Darryl came to me crying saying that a woman was taking him to court for
child support, and so he said the child was not his because the lady told him
that she could not get pregnant.

He told me that he was being, you know, taken to court for child support for
a child, and he said the child was not his. So paternity was done, and it was
determined that it was his child.

When asked why she stayed with Darryl after this, Shirley explained that they were “in a

wedge” and that she “was trying to hold this marriage together.” For twenty-one years,

Darryl “pa[id] [$]175 a month” in child support to this woman.

¶6. Shirley then stated that on a Sunday morning in or around 1994, Darryl told her he

was “going to U-Haul.” She “didn’t believe him” based on “what had happened before.”

So I got dressed, went to U-Haul. When I got there he was not there. I looked
across the street, and as I was leaving I saw his car parked in front of a hotel.
. . . I identified what room he was in. I went up to the room, knocked on the
door. He came to the window [naked], opened - - looked right in my face and
then closed the curtain. I continued to knock on the door. He did not answer
anymore. I went downstairs. I sat in my car. I saw him peeping out of the
window, but he never came out.

On the topic of adultery, Shirley also stated:

Throughout the marriage he was always on the phone talking to females. . . .
I would walk in, he’s having conversations, “What are you wearing?” I caught
him sneaking back into the house at night. One night he went out and he
wrecked my car.

¶7. In addition, Shirley testified that in August 2016:

When he was working for [Jackson Police Department, or,] JPD he came home
one evening. He came home early, so I knew something was wrong. He started
telling my daughter and I about, [‘]There is a video out there, but it’s not
true. . . .[’] He found the video somehow, and he showed it to my daughter.
Then my daughter shared it with me. He was soliciting sex from a 17-year-old.
. . . He said [‘]This is not true. It’s not me. They’re setting me up.[’] But it was

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clearly his voice.

Darryl’s employment was subsequently terminated with JPD.

¶8. Shirley testified that in August 2021:

[A]s I came in to set up my computer to start working he approached me, and
he said that, The check writing account with Ameriprise, I have closed that
account. He was walking away. He started calling me all kind of Bs out of my
name as he was walking away. At that time, I asked him, Why don’t you just
leave? We don’t want you here. He said, This is my MFing house. You can
leave. He said, If you keep talking to me, I will end your life. He came over.
I was setting up to do my work. He knocked all of my supplies off of the table,
my glasses, my pens, my folders. . . . I feared for my life. He told me, I will
end your life.

Shirley stated that after this, she began having panic attacks.

¶9. Shirley stated that the following incident occurred soon after the previous incident.

He knocked on the door upstairs, talked to [her] friends. He came down and
asked me who were those people upstairs. I told him those were friends of
Jasmine’s. They couldn’t check into their hotel room. They were scheduled to
go to a wedding and they came here to get dressed. . . . [Darryl] went upstairs,
took a shower, put his gun around his waist, came downstairs, and as they were
leaving he motioned me to our bedroom. He said, I don’t want anybody in this
MFing house. He said When Jasmine gets married she cannot live here, and on
Monday I am changing all the locks, all the codes, and she just won’t be
allowed to be here. . . . At that point, he was in my face. I was scared. I didn’t
say anything. I feared for my life. And when he left the room and her friends
left, I went and I started packing. I packed a bag. I waited for him to leave. He
put the gun on around 1:00. He did not leave the house until 5:00. I went in.
I packed a bag. When he left, I told Jasmine and DJ, it is not safe here. We’ve
got to leave.

Shirley explained that Darryl did not typically walk around the house with his gun on him

and that this was his first time doing so.

¶10. Due to an emergency weather alert, the chancellor ended the hearing in the middle of

Shirley’s cross-examination and continued the hearing. The chancellor verbally ordered

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“both parties to participate in meaningful settlement negotiations” and ordered “the attorneys

to pick a mediator to be paid from marital funds[.]”

¶11. On March 17, 2023, the parties reconvened after being “unable to mediate the

matter[.]” The proceedings resumed in the middle of Shirley’s cross-examination. Shirley

testified that Darryl “never denied anything” but “never mentioned a daughter” to Shirley.

She also stated that Darryl had another child out of wedlock. Shirley and Darryl stopped

having sexual relations “after the video came out” in which “he was soliciting sex from a 17-

year-old.” She additionally noted that “Darryl was always angry about anything.”

¶12. Jasmine Jackson, the couple’s adult daughter, was then called to testify. She

recounted the events of the August 2021 incident, stating that she and Shirley had been at

home that day. Jasmine was “upstairs” and “heard a lot of commotion coming from

downstairs.” She left her room and was able to “see down and hear everything,” and she

heard Darryl call Shirley “a bitch and all of - - and out of her name over and over again.”

She also heard Darryl state he would “burn this . . . house down.” Jasmine went downstairs

and found her mother’s work material “scattered everywhere and she was picking up things

and [Darryl] was, like, walking back and forth[.]” Jasmine took Shirley “to her room and we

locked the door, and we . . . stayed in there until [Darryl] left.” Jasmine stated that her

mother

was upset. She was crying. She was shaking. Like, she was trying - - even
when she was trying to pick her papers and all that up and get it together, it
was just like a glaze like she wasn’t there. . . . She wasn’t even together. My
mom isn’t a person that loses her cool like that.

Jasmine also testified that Darryl was “in passing just . . . very critical of [Shirley], even like,

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the way you dress sometimes.” She had also “heard him tell [Shirley] stop bitching.”

¶13. In 2016, JPD released a video of Darryl and a minor “in the car giving her his number

and saying he could take care of her and go back to a room or whatever.” Jasmine “saw him

watching the video and so - - because I saw the screen, I could pull it up on my phone, and

I looked it up for myself and I showed it to my mom and she asked him about it and he was

just, like, [‘]That is not me. You’re supposed to believe me over everybody. These are lies.

I can’t believe you don’t believe me[.’]” After the JPD incident, “[f]rom then it was just - -

it was just worse after then. It was more hostile. The name calling, the - - basically, like, you

don’t question anything I do. And he had always kind of been like that, but it was just - - it

was worse after that.”

¶14. In September 2021, Jasmine was with friends at her family’s home. Her friends went

upstairs and “were up there a little while” before coming back downstairs. Downstairs,

Jasmine “could see that he was in [Shirley’s] face.” Jasmine said, “I had never seen him, like

point his fingers in her face, like, very close. He had put his belt on, and that belt had a gun

on it and he was, like, yelling at her.” Jasmine recounted that she

hurried [her] friends out the door and I kind of just, like - - by the time they
were able to get out, they had separated, and next thing I know my mom was,
like, you need to get a bag, like, We’re about to go. So I packed a bag, my
brother p[a]cked a bag, and we left that day and we just didn’t come back.

¶15. Linda Allen Thigpen, Shirley’s sister, also testified. Shirley began living with her

sister in September 2021 and was “very distraught” after leaving the marital home. Linda

also stated that she had witnessed Darryl becoming “upset” and “yell and . . . scream” over

board games in the past.

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¶16. Finally, Darryl was called to testify as an adverse witness. Darryl acknowledged that

he had a child out of wedlock but stated that he did not use marital funds to pay child support

for the child. Instead, the funds for child support “came from friends and family that allowed

me to manage their money that I did things for and they did things for me to keep it out of

my wife’s face of that, you know, mistake that I made.” Darryl alleged that these funds from

family and friends were not gifts but also that he did not do any “work for any friends and

family.” When asked to explain this, Darryl stated that he “did things for people and they let

me manage their money,” which involved “writing checks and keeping things from wherever

they wanted them to be at.” This was essentially the extent of Darryl’s answers on the topic.

Additionally, Darryl contested the video from JPD and claimed it was not him. He also

stated that the attorney he hired in that action was not paid from marital funds but, again,

“[f]riends and family.” Shirley presented exhibits detailing deposits and withdrawals from

multiple accounts. Many of Darryl’s statements explaining funds were contradictory to one

another and, as before, ultimately unclear as to where certain monies had come from.

¶17. Darryl testified that Shirley had actually left the house after he closed a joint

investment account because Shirley “was stealing money from it.” He stated:

That is why she got mad. That is why she left the house. I never threatened her.
I’m emotional, so, you know, wouldn’t sound happy, I’m sure, when I told her
that, yeah. I asked her where the money went.

Continuing, Darryl called Shirley’s claim that he threatened to end her life a

[t]otal fabrication. Never have I ever, ever, threatened or been aggressive
towards my wife, not one day. She tried to bait me into a couple of things
before, I mean, on several occasions. I stayed cool, slept on the couch. Never
ever have I threatened her. I have the capabilities of, you know, doing

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whatever I want to do as far as physically, but I have never ever.

Darryl also testified that he would “wear a gun every day” and that Jasmine had previously

“physically attacked him[.]”

¶18. At the close of Shirley’s case, Darryl moved for a dismissal. The chancellor denied

the motion. Darryl’s first witness was himself. He stated that he was still married to Shirley,

“want[ed] her to come back home and go to counseling[,]” and did not want a divorce.

Additionally, Darryl asserted that he never committed adultery during his marriage after

fathering a child outside the marriage. He also explained his current job responsibilities of

carrying a gun to and from his home. Particularly of note, Darryl never submitted a Rule

8.05 financial statement to the chancery court. UCCR 8.05.

¶19. On January 3, 2024, the chancellor entered an opinion granting Shirley a divorce:

The [c]ourt heard clear and convincing evidence at trial to establish Darryl is
guilty of both uncondoned adultery and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.
The [c]ourt must determine the cause of the deterioration of the marital
relationship. In addition to the testimony and evidence presented, the [c]ourt
considers . . . [that Shirley] asserts she “left the marital home in fear for her
safety.” While Shirley met the burden of proving uncondoned adultery, the
[c]ourt finds Darryl’s habitual cruel and inhuman treatment caused the ultimate
deterioration of the marital relationship. The [c]ourt . . . grants a full, final,
and absolute divorce to Shirley on the grounds of habitual cruel and
inhuman treatment[.]

(Emphasis added). Following an analysis of the Ferguson factors,2 the chancellor held that

the parties’ assets would be split 60/40, with 60% being allocated to Shirley and 40% being

allocated to Darryl. The chancellor also reserved ruling on Darryl’s military accounts until

more evidence was brought before the court.

2
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).

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¶20. On March 13, 2024, the chancellor held a hearing with both parties to discuss the

additional evidence covering Darryl’s military retirement accounts. Darryl was called

adversely to testify further on details of those accounts. On June 24, 2024, the chancellor

entered an order requiring both Shirley and Darryl to submit their proposed findings of fact

to the court. Both parties submitted those approximately one month later. On October 21,

2024, the chancellor’s final judgment of divorce was entered, along with a supplemental

opinion. The final judgment indicated that the military retirement accounts were 79% marital

property and that this amount would be split evenly between Shirley and Darryl. The final

judgment also granted Shirley’s previous motion for contempt and ordered Darryl to

reimburse her for the associated legal fees. On November 19, 2024, Darryl appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶21. “In domestic-relations cases, our standard of review is limited.” Dogan v. Dogan, 98

So. 3d 1115, 1122 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing In re Dissolution of Marriage of

Wood, 35 So. 3d 507, 512 (¶8) (Miss. 2010)). “We review a chancellor’s decree of divorce

for manifest or clear error as to law or fact.” Peters v. Peters, 906 So. 2d 64, 68 (¶12) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2004) (citing Southerland v. Southerland, 875 So. 2d 204, 206 (¶5) (Miss. 2004)).3

“This Court views the facts of a divorce decree in a light most favorable to the appellee,

and may not disturb the chancery decision unless this Court finds it manifestly wrong or

unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Rawson v. Buta, 609

3
See also Fisher v. Fisher, 771 So. 2d 364, 367 (¶8) (Miss. 2000); Kilpatrick v.
Kilpatrick, 732 So. 2d 876, 880 (¶13) (Miss. 1999); Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So. 2d 850,
859 (Miss. 1994).

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So. 2d 426, 429 (Miss. 1992)).

ANALYSIS

¶22. On appeal, Darryl raises three issues: (1) whether the chancellor erred by granting

Shirley a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment; (2) whether the

chancellor erred by finding Darryl engaged in uncondoned adultery; and (3) whether the

chancellor’s equitable distribution was erroneous.

I. Habitual Cruel and Inhuman Treatment

¶23. Shirley was granted a fault-based divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman

treatment. “Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment is conduct that either: (1) endangers life,

limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger and renders the

relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or (2) is so unnatural and infamous as to

render the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse, making it impossible to carry out

the duties of the marriage, therefore destroying the basis for its continuance.” Heimert v.

Heimert, 101 So. 3d 181, 184 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Mitchell

v. Mitchell, 767 So. 2d 1037, 1041 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)).

¶24. In making a determination, the chancellor must look to “1) the conduct of the

offending spouse and 2) the impact of that conduct upon the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis

added) (quoting Fisher, 771 So. 2d at 367 (¶10) (Miss. 2000)). Shirley provided testimony

detailing both Darryl’s conduct and the impact it had on her. She stated that he was “always

angry about anything.” Darryl had threatened to “end [her] life” and gotten in her face. He

had become angry when Jasmine’s friends came over and yelled at and threatened Shirley.

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In the same instance, Darryl had put his gun on his hip and walked around the house to

further his threat. Jasmine also testified that Darryl had always been “very critical” of her

mother. She had heard him once threatening Shirley that he would “burn” the “house down.”

Shirley adamantly stated that she was in fear for her life. It was this fear that spurred her to

move out of the house and separate from Darryl.

¶25. Darryl also claims Shirley did not sufficiently prove that she endured any kind of

physical, verbal, or emotional abuse at his hands. However, “[a]s the finder of fact, the

chancellor is vested with the responsibility to hear the evidence, assess the credibility of

witnesses, and determine ultimately what weight and worth to afford any particular aspect

of the proof.” White v. Miss. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 39 So. 3d 986, 990 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App.

2010) (quoting Tritle v. Tritle, 956 So. 2d 369, 373 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). In other

words, “[w]hen it comes to finding facts, we defer to the chancellor in that we will not

substitute our judgment for the chancellor’s.” Id. Further, “[s]pousal domestic abuse may

be established through the reliable testimony of a single credible witness, who may be the

injured party[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2021) (emphasis added). Again, Shirley

provided testimony detailing the instances of abuse she experienced with Darryl.

Additionally, the couple’s adult daughter testified and corroborated Shirley’s account of

events. The chancellor found their testimony credible and, thus, adequate proof to support

Shirley’s claims. We find substantial evidence in the record to support the chancellor’s

findings and, accordingly, find this issue to be without merit.

II. Adultery

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¶26. Next, Darryl asserts that Shirley did not adequately prove her allegations of adultery

against him. We note that Shirley was not granted a divorce on adultery grounds. Darryl

asserts, however, that we “should reverse and render, or alternatively remand” the

chancellor’s decision that Shirley “would be entitled to a divorce on the ground of adultery

(assuming that the granting of the fault ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment is

also reversed, leaving no fault ground of divorce standing).” Because we affirm the

chancellor’s judgment of divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, this issue

is moot on appeal. See 1st Step Sober Living LLC v. Cleveland, 413 So. 3d 602, 607 (¶15)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2025), cert. denied, 420 So. 3d 923 (Miss. 2025) (stating that appellate courts

typically “dismiss an appeal when no useful purpose could be accomplished by

entertaining it, when so far as concerns any practical ends to be served the decision upon

the legal questions involved would be merely academic” (quoting In re City of Biloxi, 113

So. 3d 565, 572 (¶21) (Miss. 2013))). Because we affirm the grant of divorce on the fault-

based ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, we find this issue moot and decline

to address it.

III. Equitable Distribution

¶27. Finally, Darryl claims that the chancellor’s equitable distribution was an abuse of

discretion and should be reversed. In order to equitably distribute marital property, the

chancellor must first “classify each asset as marital or non-marital.” Dean v. Dean, 304 So.

3d 156, 168 (¶47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Larue v. Larue, 969 So. 2d 99, 104 (¶11)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). “Marital property has been defined as any and all property acquired

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or accumulated during the marriage.” Faerber v. Faerber, 150 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (¶12)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994)).

¶28. Here, the chancellor classified a majority of the parties’ property as marital, including,

but not limited to, the marital home, bank accounts, investment accounts, home furnishings,

and retirement accounts. As Darryl failed to provide the chancery court with a Rule 8.05

statement, much of the valuation was determined by Shirley’s estimates.

¶29. Keeping those principles in mind, the chancellor is tasked with performing a Ferguson

analysis by looking to the following factors:

1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to
be considered in determining contribution are as follows:
a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the
property;
b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and
family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time
spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and
c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment
bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the
assets.
2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or
otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such
assets by agreement, decree or otherwise.
3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to
distribution.
4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the
contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the
marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter
vivos gift by or to an individual spouse;
5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal
consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution;
6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties,
be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources
of future friction between the parties;
7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the
combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and,

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8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered.

Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928.

¶30. We provide a brief summary of the chancellor’s findings for each factor:

1. Substantial Contribution

¶31. The chancellor held, “Both parties contributed to the accumulation of marital property

throughout their long-term marriage and both contributed to the payment of marital

expenses.” Of note, the chancellor took “into consideration” the evidence presented showing

Shirley’s attempts to keep the family together despite Darryl’s conduct. The chancellor

“further consider[ed] the testimony that Darryl stopped paying marital expenses in August

of 2021.”

2. Use of Assets

¶32. The chancellor considered numerous pieces of information for this factor, such as

Darryl’s actions taken in 2021 when withdrawing from and closing accounts shared by the

parties. The chancellor found he had “dissipated marital assets” concerning those actions.

Darryl alleged that Shirley had dissipated assets as well regarding checks that were penalized

when Darryl closed an account. The chancellor disagreed. Shirley had also asked that

Darryl’s use of marital funds to cover child support for his child born out of wedlock and

legal funds after being terminated from JPD should be grounds for a larger portion of the

estate. However, the chancellor also disagreed with that contention.

3. Market and Emotional Value

¶33. The chancellor acknowledged that the hearing did not yield much in the way of

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emotional value of the assets, but Shirley had testified to the importance of some things to

her, such as family photos and Christmas decorations. Darryl had not testified to such.

4. Separate Estates

¶34. The chancellor was provided with “little evidence” regarding the separate estates of

both parties.

5. Tax and Legal Consequences

¶35. The chancellor noted the possibility of penalties for withdrawal or transferring of

funds in the investment accounts and the couple’s two adult children’s “use and benefit[.]”

6. Alimony

¶36. The chancellor found that an equitable division of the marital property could indeed

“eliminate a deficit between the parties and avoid the need for alimony.”

7. Needs of Each Spouse

¶37. The chancellor recounted that both Darryl and Shirley were presently employed, and

Darryl’s failure to submit a Rule 8.05 statement to the court. Darryl received the marital

home and two vehicles, all unencumbered by debt; therefore, the chancellor held that he “can

maintain his current standard of living without support from Shirley.” Shirley provided

evidence of her present residence at a rental and her need to “secure permanent housing.”

As such, the chancellor “consider[ed] awarding Shirley a greater sum of the marital estate

to account for her needs and to eliminate the need for alimony payments.”

8. Other Factors

¶38. The chancellor did not consider additional factors here.

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¶39. To be clear, our “standard of review regarding property division and distribution in

divorce cases is a limited one.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 67 So. 3d 5, 8 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)

(emphasis added) (citing Oswalt v. Oswalt, 981 So. 2d 993, 996 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App.

2007)). We will uphold a chancellor’s “division and distribution . . . if it is supported by

substantial credible evidence.” Id. Again, equitable distribution “is committed to the

discretion and conscience of the court, having in mind all of the equities and other relevant

facts and circumstances.” Woods v. Woods, 423 So. 3d 720, 731 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025)

(emphasis added) (quoting Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 590 (¶21) (Miss.

2002)).

¶40. After review, this Court finds no indication that the chancellor’s equitable distribution

was an abuse of discretion. Each applicable Ferguson factor was analyzed in her

determination, the most notable being that Darryl would retain the marital home, which

would cause Shirley to remain in her current living situation, i.e., renting property. The

chancellor was quite specific that Shirley’s imminent efforts to secure a new home were

considered in the final distribution of assets. Importantly, “equitable distribution does not

mean equal distribution.” Faerber, 150 So. 3d at 1005 (¶12) (emphasis added) (quoting

Brabham v. Brabham, 950 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). The goal of

equitable distribution is equity: it cannot simply be subject to an instant even split of marital

property without a consideration of each case’s facts and evidence. Here, we find the

chancellor’s decision is backed by substantial credible evidence, such as testimony and

documents. We also note that Darryl never submitted a Rule 8.05 financial statement. We

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find no error in the chancellor’s decision not to award alimony.

CONCLUSION

¶41. This Court finds no manifest or clear error on the chancellor’s part in granting Shirley

a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or in making a finding that Darryl

had engaged in adultery during their marriage. We also find Darryl’s claims concerning

equitable distribution do not show reversible error and are without merit. Therefore, we

affirm the chancery court’s final judgment of divorce.

¶42. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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