Myles Flint Johnson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-01348-COA

MYLES FLINT JOHNSON APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/06/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEWEY KEY ARTHUR
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: INDIA MARIAH SPRINKLE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN K. BRAMLETT JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/17/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Law enforcement was dispatched to a house after receiving a call from a man stating

that his wife had been shot. After arriving, the man told law enforcement that the couple had

gotten into an argument, and the gun he had retrieved accidentally went off. The man was

indicted for first-degree murder but found guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-

degree murder.

¶2. On appeal, he claims that evidence was improperly admitted, that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction of the lesser-included offense. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS

¶3. One Tuesday morning in January 2024, officers from the Canton Police Department

were dispatched to a house after receiving a call from a man informing them that his “wife

ha[d] been shot” and that she was not “doing too well.” After arriving at the scene within

moments of one another, Myles Johnson ushered Officers Edgar Esco, Cameron Plummer,

and Jeremy Gooden inside and led them towards the back of the house.

¶4. As they entered through the front of the house, the officers observed that the living

room was “in disarray,” noting the plastic-covered floor and drops of blood scattered

throughout the room. Officers moved from the living room towards the kitchen area, where

they saw “Clorox cleaning supplies” and what appeared to be a “bloody sponge” lying in the

sink. Across from the kitchen was Johnson’s bedroom, where officers found his wife, Kristi

Johnson, lying in bed with the covers bundled up to her neck. Upon entering the bedroom,

“the unique smell of decomposition” filled the air, and the officers immediately noticed

“there was blood everywhere,” saturating “the floor[,] . . . the mattress[,] . . . the cover that

was use[d] to wrap Mrs. Johnson up[,] . . . [and] the wall over by Mrs. Johnson.”

¶5. After Officer Esco asked Johnson what happened, Johnson explained that he and his

wife “were drinking” the night before and got “in[to] an argument.” Claiming that Kristi

“wanted to kill herself” and “grabbed a gun,” Johnson directed the officers to a .22-caliber

pistol located on the kitchen counter directly across from the bedroom. He told all three

officers that he “tried to get [the gun] away from” his wife—that he “pushed her to get her

away”—but then the firearm “went off.”

2
¶6. Officer Plummer asked Johnson whether he called the police to report the incident

when it happened, but Johnson confessed that he did not, explaining that he “freaked out

because she killed herself.” Then, Officer Plummer notified Johnson that he was detaining

him and subsequently handcuffed him. Before removing Johnson from the home, Officer

Plummer disclosed to Officers Esco and Gooden that he was unsure whether Kristi was

deceased, as he had called out to her twice, both times receiving no response. But Johnson

insisted that his wife was “opening her eyes” and still “breathing.”

¶7. Once Johnson was removed from the home, Officers Esco and Gooden continued

examining the crime scene while waiting for Emergency Medical Services to arrive. Next

to a pair of blood-soaked men’s jeans, Officer Gooden noticed a baseball bat “on the right

side of the bed” in the corner of the couple’s bedroom. On the left side of the couple’s

bed—where Kristi was lying—Officer Gooden “discovered a .45[-caliber] shell-casing” on

the floor. And “located in a toolbox at the foot of the bed,” the officer found a loaded

.45-caliber handgun. When Emergency Medical Services arrived to move the victim, officers

observed “what appear[ed] to be bruises on the back as well as the front of her body.”

¶8. Soon after, Johnson was indicted on one count of first-degree murder.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Pretrial Motion

¶9. Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of prior

bad acts. The motion focused on the exclusion of “Johnson’s alleged prior felony

convictions,” as well as his “alleged prior incidents of domestic violence for which [he] was

3
never arrested, charged or tried.” In response, the State disclosed that it did “not intend to

use evidence of [Johnson’s] prior convictions in its case-in-chief.” However, because it did

“intend to call witnesses . . . regarding prior instances of domestic violence between

[Johnson] and the deceased victim Krist[i] Johnson pursuant to MRE 404(b),” the State

requested that the defense’s motion be denied on that ground.

¶10. The trial court addressed the defense’s motion to exclude during a pretrial conference.

The State proffered that Kristi’s biological children would testify about the “firsthand

domestic abuse” they witnessed at the hands of Johnson “towards the victim.” The defense

argued such testimony would not be offered “to show that [Johnson] had motive to kill his

wife,” but instead, was “pure character assassination,” offered solely “to show that he ha[d]

a history of domestic violence in the hopes that the jury will conclude that he acted in

conformity with that character[.]”

¶11. Noting that Rule “404(b) does not require a conviction for the prior offense,” the trial

court denied the defense’s motion “as it relates to the allegations of domestic abuse” and

instructed that such evidence may “only be offered to show [Johnson’s] motive, his intent,

absence of mistake, accident and other matters.” The court further instructed that Johnson

would “be entitled to an instruction” explaining that the evidence “is not offered to prove that

he is . . . guilty in this case[.]”

Opening Statements

¶12. During opening statements, the State submitted to the jury that by the close of trial

they would find that Johnson “did deliberately and intentionally kill Kristi Johnson,”

4
furthering its theory of first-degree murder. Through counsel, Johnson countered the State’s

theory and put forth his own, conceding that Kristi “died by [his] hands” but claiming that

“his level of culpability” was lesser than what the State suggested. During his opening

statement, counsel for Johnson announced to the jury that the firearm “didn’t go off

magically.” Instead, he explained that the evidence would show that Johnson was “being

reckless with the gun, trigger-riding it, and it [went] off and it kill[ed] her.”

The State’s Proof

¶13. Multiple witnesses were called to testify on behalf of the State, including all three

responding officers. Much of their testimony focused largely on their observations of the

crime scene as well as their interactions with Johnson during that time. The body-cam

footage of Officers Esco and Plummer was entered into evidence with no objection and

played for the jury.

¶14. Dr. Bryan Platt, a staff pathologist for the Walter Reed National Military Medical

Center, also testified for the State. Explaining his connection to Mississippi, Dr. Platt

disclosed that he participates in “off-duty employment” and acts as a “traveling doctor” to

“help[] complete the backlog of unwritten autopsy cases.” However, he also helped perform

“autopsies . . . at the office in Pearl,” including Kristi Johnson’s autopsy. He was accepted

as an expert in the field of medicine with a specialty in forensic pathology by the trial court.

¶15. Dr. Platt testified that during the examination, his “initial first impression” of Kristi

was that “she had multiple examples of decomposition present.” Further explaining to the

jury that “there w[ere] areas of skin discoloration” on “her chest and . . . back,” the

5
pathologist testified that he noticed the skin “starting to slip and . . . de-glove.” He also

detailed that the victim sustained “multiple blunt force injuries and one gunshot wound.” Dr.

Platt’s examination revealed that the lethal bullet entered through the victim’s “mid-back,”

shattering one of her ribs, then puncturing her left lung, and heart before “exiting out [of] the

neck.”

¶16. The pathologist observed multiple “blunt force injuries consisting of abrasions and

contusions” as well as “a blunt force injury to the back of her head,” all of which were

unrelated to the gunshot wound. He also disclosed that he noticed bruising on the victim’s

wrist, thighs, chest, and shoulder, also unrelated to the gunshot wound. When asked about

the manner of the victim’s death, the State elicited the following testimony:

The State: You had the opportunity to say it was an accident. Do you want
to change it to accident?

Dr. Platt: There is no evidence to suggest that.

The State: Do you have any evidence of a suicide?

Dr. Platt: There’s no evidence this was a suicide.

The State: Shot in the back. Correct?

Dr. Platt: (Indicating affirmative response.)

Based on his autopsy of the victim, Dr. Platt testified that he ultimately ruled the victim’s

manner of death was homicide.

¶17. Alyssa Jones, Johnson’s daughter, testified next. After identifying Johnson in the

courtroom, Jones testified that “[a]t one point in time,” she and her father had a close

relationship. She explained that in January 2024, the two spoke “off and on,” and Jones

6
recounted receiving an odd text message from Johnson on the evening of Sunday, January

28:

I know [now’s] not the time but I made a big mistake and [I] don’t know how
I’m going to pay for [it.] I’m so sorry. I didn’t mean it if I did it would have
been planned. I love you just know and remember that please. I’ll come to
you if you want. But know I’m a dead man. [I’m] so sorry. I’m not going
back to prison alive. Love you always and forever.

¶18. Days later—on the following Thursday—Jones testified that her mother told her “that

Kristi was shot,” causing her to reflect on the message she previously received from her

father. Jones disclosed that based on her knowledge, she “called around to police stations

. . . trying to find out where [Johnson] was located” so she could “let them know what [she]

had.” She then sent the text message she received from her father to law enforcement.

¶19. The jury also heard from two of Kristi’s work supervisors. They both testified that

she was a punctual employee who was hardworking and reliable. Her direct supervisor

further detailed how Kristi was “real respected around work,” which is why it caught his

attention when she came to work one time with a black eye and nose. Kristi insisted that the

bruising on her face was the result of accidentally hitting the steering wheel after a wasp flew

into her car and she slammed on the brakes. Additionally, a second supervisor recalled a

time at work when he “notice[d] bruising on [Kristi’s] face and arm,” which concerned him.

He testified that he gave the victim a pamphlet detailing the “array of different services”

offered by the company—like counseling—and disclosed it was “all confidential,” should

she ever choose to seek help.

¶20. Kristi’s direct supervisor testified that he found it unusual that “she didn’t show up

7
for work” on Monday, January 29, explaining “she [is] usually going to call.” But the

following morning, he received a text message “from a number on her behalf.” It read:

Hey buddy I’m calling for kj. [W]e are both sick as dogs migraine and getting
sick to her stomach for a second day now. [S]orry and t[hank] y[ou].

Finding the message “curious,” the direct supervisor informed the human resources

department of the situation so that someone could “do a courtesy check on” Kristi. Before

a check could take place, the department was informed of Kristi’s death through her sister.

¶21. The victim’s two children, Shelbi Pepper and Mikel Smith, testified as well. Pepper

disclosed that Johnson and her mother began dating in 2013 and married in 2014. Although

the two met in California, she testified that Johnson and her mother eventually moved to

Kentucky. Pepper recounted receiving a disturbing FaceTime call from her mother a few

years into her marriage with Johnson. Explaining that her mother “was in the hospital”

during the call, Pepper further detailed that “[s]he had stitches across her forehead, no teeth,

and bruises on her face.” Alarmed, Pepper immediately bought her mother a plane ticket and

flew her back to California, where she remained for four years. During that time, Pepper

disclosed that she and her mother were “very close.”

¶22. But that changed when Johnson called “saying that he had some of her [mother’s]

stuff.” Kristi “said she was going to go on a vacation” and left for Mississippi to collect her

items from Johnson. Pepper testified that after her mother left California, she “spoke to her

maybe twice within a whole year time frame.” And by the end of 2023 and the beginning of

2024, Pepper disclosed that she and her mother no longer spoke because her mother’s phone

had been disconnected.

8
¶23. Then, Kristi’s son recounted his experience with his mother and Johnson to the jury.

Smith explained that in 2013, he was living in California with his aunt when the two moved

in with them for “[a]bout a year.” Smith testified that sometime during that year, Johnson

“grabbed [his mother] and picked her up by the neck” when she attempted to “stick[] up for”

him. Once his mother and Johnson moved out, he “lost all contact with [his] mom” until she

moved in with her daughter—his sister—three years later. But Smith testified that he “lost

all contact again” with Kristi when she left California for Mississippi.

¶24. After the State rested its case-in-chief, the defense moved for a directed verdict “based

on the State’s failure to [prove] a prima facie case for first-degree murder.” Specifically, the

defense argued that the State failed to put forth any “evidence of deliberate design” or

“evidence of a scheme or plan to murder the victim.” Viewing all the evidence “in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party,” the trial court found there was “a question of fact

for the jury” and denied the defense’s motion.

The Defense’s Case-in-Chief

¶25. Then, Johnson took the stand in his own defense. He testified that although he and

Kristi did not have any physical altercations during their first couple of years of marriage,

they did have them in the years that followed. However, Johnson insisted that he never hit

Kristi as if she were a man, clarifying that “if [they] got physical at all,” those instances were

“[m]ore like shouting match[es]” or “maybe a little pushing and shoving.”

¶26. Johnson recounted the day of Kristi’s death, detailing to the jury that after the two

woke up, they “started drinking right away” and continued “all day long.” Johnson disclosed

9
that eventually the couple got into an argument because Kristi “found out [he] was talking

to some girls on the Internet.” He claimed that during their argument, his wife “picked up

a baseball bat” and “smash[ed] things around the room” while “screaming at [him].”

Johnson explained that things progressed from screaming to Kristi “chasing [him] through

the house” with the bat. At some point, he fell and realized he had “a piece of glass sticking

out of [his] elbow,” so he pulled it out, which left blood throughout the house as a result.

¶27. Once Kristi was no longer chasing Johnson, he told the jury that he found her in their

bedroom, facing away from him and smoking a cigarette while still holding onto the baseball

bat. Then, Johnson explained that he grabbed “the pistol out of the toolbox” he kept in their

bedroom because he “wanted her to put the bat down” and “not . . . hit [him] no more with”

it. After acknowledging that Kristi “finally put the bat down,” defense counsel elicited the

following testimony from Johnson:

The defense: When she put the bat down, did you put the gun down?

Johnson: No, I didn’t.

The defense: Why on earth not?

Johnson: I don’t know why. I have no idea. I was sitting there, like,
talking with it in my hand. I just -- I have no idea. I just don’t
know why I didn’t put it down. I should have. I wish I would
have.

When asked what happened next, Johnson testified that he tried to “plead [his] case” to

Kristi, begging for her to forgive him. But she continued crying while lying “down on her

side” of the bed with her back turned to him. And then, Johnson told the jury that “the gun

just [went] off,” insisting that he “didn’t cock the gun” but admitting that he “knew it was

10
loaded.”

¶28. Johnson admitted he did not call 911 immediately because he “had all of these

emotions . . . that just overwhelmed [him],” and he “started freaking out.” Explaining how

he was essentially “short-circuiting,” Johnson told the jury that he “couldn’t believe [he] had

just shot [his] wife.” Immediately afterward, he disclosed that he contemplated “commit[ing]

suicide,” but instead, “picked up the bottle” and “continued drinking,” eventually “passing

out” and then waking up unsure “how much time elapsed.”

¶29. On cross-examination, Johnson acknowledged that his version of events had changed

multiple times. He admitted that he lied to officers on the scene about the type of firearm

that killed his wife, conceding that it was actually a .45-caliber gun rather than a .22-caliber

gun. The State then elicited the following testimony:

The State: You’re saying you took the gun out of the toolbox. Correct?

Johnson: Yes.

The State: You walked up to the bed. Correct? You agree with me you
walked up to the bed?

Johnson: Yes.

The State: Her back was turned towards you. Correct?

Johnson: Uh-huh.

....

The State: But you agree with me that the bullet went into her back.
Correct?

Johnson: Yeah, it was after she was [lying] down.

11
The State: Right, because she was in the bed. Right? Facing away from
you. You agree with me. Right?

Johnson: Yes.

He further admitted that he waited at least two days after shooting his wife before he called

the police.

Jury Instructions and Verdict

¶30. After resting its case-in-chief, the defense requested that a jury instruction for the

lesser-included charge of culpable negligence manslaughter also be submitted to the jury.

The trial court agreed and gave the instruction.

¶31. Ultimately, the jury found Johnson guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-

degree murder. He was sentenced to serve forty years in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections. Johnson moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a

new trial, which the trial court denied. Johnson appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶32. On appeal, Johnson raises three assignments of error, namely that the trial court

improperly admitted evidence, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the

evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction.

I. The supervisor’s testimony was properly admitted.

¶33. Johnson first argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence in violation of

Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). Specifically, Johnson asserts that “testimony from

Kristi’s coworkers that she had come to work with bruising on her face” was “in no way

linked to [him],” and admitting such evidence was not only improper under Rule 404(b)(1),

12
but “overly prejudicial under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403.”

¶34. “This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an

abuse of discretion standard of review.” Terry v. State, 412 So. 3d 1274, 1280 (¶26) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Randall v. State, 395 So. 3d 458, 462 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)).

We “will not reverse a trial judge’s decision on the admissibility of testimony offered at trial

unless prejudice amounting to reversible error resulted from such a decision.” Id. (quoting

Dukes v. State, 369 So. 3d 553, 558 (¶13) (Miss. 2023)).

¶35. Generally, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a

person’s character . . . to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance

with the character.” MRE 404(b)(1). However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for

another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” MRE 404(b)(2); see also Bruce v. State,

35 So. 3d 1236, 1239 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing “evidence of another crime . . . if

it sheds light upon the motive”). Indeed, our Supreme Court has held “even though it may

reveal other crimes, evidence or testimony may be given in order to tell a rational and

coherent story of what happened and where it is substantially necessary to present a complete

story.” Bruce, 35 So. 3d at 1239 (¶12) (quoting Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 319 (¶28)

(Miss. 2000)).

¶36. Moreover, “this Court has held that evidence of other violent incidents may be

admissible to show the escalating level of violence[.]” Wallace v. State, 369 So. 3d 83, 90

(¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quotation mark omitted) (quoting Marbra v. State, 904 So. 2d

13
1169, 1175 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)); see also Moss v. State, 727 So. 2d 720, 725 (¶19)

(Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (finding prior instances of domestic abuse admissible “to show the

escalating level of violence, culminating in the crime of the murder”). “In such cases,

testimony regarding prior acts of violence is admissible “not to prove the character of” the

defendant but rather to show “a continuing pattern of violence against the victim that resulted

in her death.” Wallace, 369 So. 3d at 90 (¶21) (quoting Moss, 727 So. 2d at 725 (¶19)).

“Such evidence is relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b) to show the defendant’s motive

and intent.” Id. (quotation mark omitted).

¶37. “Regardless of its origin, before a trial court admits other-acts evidence, it must be

filtered through Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403.” Terry, 412 So. 3d at 1280 (¶29) (quoting

Bowman v. State, 283 So. 3d 154, 165 (¶39) (Miss. 2019)). “Under Rule 403, when

weighing admission of relevant evidence, a trial judge may exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at 1280-81

(¶29). “The weighing and balancing task required by Rule 403 asks only that a judge rely

on his/her own sound judgment.” Id. (quoting Masters v. State, 285 So. 3d 192, 197 (¶16)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2019)).

¶38. At trial, Johnson claimed that although he grabbed the firearm while his wife’s back

was turned to him, he was unsure how it “went off.” Acknowledging that shooting his wife

was a “big mistake,” Johnson asserted that the result was nothing more than a tragic

accident—one he did not intend. Countering his argument, the State called the victim’s

children, who both testified to prior instances where Johnson physically abused their mother.

14
Smith testified that he watched Johnson grab his mother and “pick[] her up by the neck.”

Pepper testified that after receiving an alarming FaceTime call from her bruised and toothless

mother, she bought her a plane ticket so she could leave Johnson. Testimony from the

victim’s supervisors regarding bruising they noticed on her face while at work further

supported not only her children’s testimony, but also the State’s assertion that Johnson had

a history of domestic violence towards Kristi.

¶39. Additionally, although Johnson claims that the admission of the supervisor’s

testimony was “overly prejudicial under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403,” Johnson

admitted that he and Kristi had “physical altercations” during their marriage. Indeed, the jury

heard Johnson testify that he never hit his wife as if she were a man, but there were “shouting

match[es]” and “a little pushing and shoving and whatever.” The jury also heard Johnson

admit that after taking his pistol out of the toolbox, he walked up to the bed and pointed the

gun at his unarmed wife while she was facing away from him. Johnson’s testimony alone

serves to corroborate the State’s contention that his wife’s death was intentional.

¶40. While we note that the State likely did not need testimony from the victim’s

supervisors to prove Johnson’s motive, intent, absence of mistake, or lack of accident given

Johnson’s own testimony, as well as the testimony of Kristi’s children, we cannot say that

the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such evidence.

¶41. The trial court exercised its sound judgment and found the testimony of the victim’s

supervisors admissible “to show [Johnson]’s motive, his intent, absence of mistake, [lack of]

accident,” all of which are permissive uses under Rule 404(b)(2). Therefore, we find no

15
abuse of discretion in the admission.

II. The record is insufficient to address Johnson’s ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal.

¶42. Next, Johnson contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Acknowledging that he “received the benefit of a second-degree murder and culpable

negligence manslaughter instruction,” Johnson contemporaneously claims that his trial

counsel provided “constitutionally ineffective” representation to his “material detriment.”

Specifically, he insists that his trial counsel’s “fail[ure] to seek a jury instruction on

accidental homicide” despite “evidence that [he] claimed Kristi’s homicide was accidental”

constituted ineffective assistance.

¶43. “At the outset, we note that this Court typically preserves ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claims for post-conviction review.” Latham v. State, 299 So. 3d 768, 773 (¶16)

(Miss. 2020). “This is because we are limited to the trial court record in our review of the

claim and there is usually insufficient evidence within the record to evaluate the claim.”

Ellzey v. State, 412 So. 3d 358, 381 (¶52) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Aguilar v. State,

847 So. 2d 871, 878 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)).

¶44. Nonetheless, “[t]his Court will address such claims on direct appeal when [1] the

record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or [2] the parties

stipulate that the record is adequate and the Court determines that the findings of fact by a

trial judge able to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc., are not needed.” Id. (brackets

omitted) (quoting Ross v. State, 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶29) (Miss. 2020)). “This Court has

also resolved ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal when the record

16
affirmatively shows that the claims are without merit.” Id. “If the record on direct appeal

is insufficient to address the defendant’s ineffective assistance claims, we will ‘dismiss the

claims without prejudice, preserving the defendant’s right to raise the claims later in a

properly filed motion for post-conviction relief.’” Id. (quoting Sandlin v. State, 156 So. 3d

813, 819 (¶20) (Miss. 2013)). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de

novo. Latham, 299 So. 3d at 772 (¶12).

¶45. Here, the State does not stipulate that the record is adequate for this Court to review

Johnson’s ineffective assistance claim. Nor does the record “affirmatively show[]

ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions.” Ellzey, 412 So. 3d at 381 (¶52). After our

review of the record, we conclude that the record is insufficient to address Johnson’s

ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. Therefore, his claim is “dismissed without

prejudice for [him] to raise later in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief.”

Sandlin, 156 So. 3d at 821 (¶35).

III. The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Johnson of
second-degree murder.

¶46. Finally, Johnson attacks the sufficiency of the evidence arguing that “the State failed

to prove [his] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Specifically, he contends that although

“there is evidence that Kristi was shot, no evidence exists as to [his] intent (or lack thereof)

when the shooting occurred,” particularly that “it was done with a depraved heart.”

¶47. “Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence warrant a de novo standard of review.”

Jordan v. State, 413 So. 3d 611, 615 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Haymon v. State,

346 So. 3d 875, 881 (¶14) (Miss. 2022)). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,

17
‘[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether

rational, reasonable fair-minded jurors could have found that the State proved each essential

element of the crime.’” Id. (quoting Poole v. State, 46 So. 3d 290, 293 (¶20) (Miss. 2010)).

¶48. Mississippi law defines second-degree murder as “[t]he killing of a human being

without the authority of law . . . done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to

others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any

premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual[.]” Miss. Code Ann. §

97-3-19(1)(b) (Rev. 2020). Crucially, “under the second-degree murder statute, a finding of

intent to kill is not required.” Jordan, 413 So. 3d at 616 (¶22) (citing McCool v. State, 328

So. 3d 173, 183 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)).

¶49. Johnson admitted at trial that he shot his wife while she was crying in their bed, facing

away from him, and no longer holding the bat—the entire reason he claimed to have grabbed

his firearm in the first place. Indeed, the medical examiner testified that the victim was shot

in the “mid-back” and that he found no evidence to suggest that the victim’s death was an

accident or a suicide. Based on this testimony alone, a rational juror could find that Johnson

committed “an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless

of human life,” which ultimately resulted in Kristi’s death. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b).

¶50. Additionally, we note that any uncertainty regarding the level of credibility of a

witness or piece of evidence presented rests with the jury, and the jury alone. Indeed, it is

well established that jurors “may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject the utterances of any

witness.” Owens v. State, 383 So. 3d 305, 310-11 (¶26) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Gandy v.

18
State, 373 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Miss. 1979)); see also Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 289 (¶1)

(Miss. 2017) (holding decisions regarding weight of evidence, witness credibility, and

conflicts between evidence “belong solely to the jury”). It was the province of the jury to

accept or reject Johnson’s testimony, in whole or in part.

¶51. Accordingly, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove each essential element of

second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION

¶52. For the reasons above, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s admission of the

testimony from the victim’s supervisors, as it was offered for a non-character purpose and

was not overly prejudicial under Rule 403. Additionally, because we find the record

insufficient to evaluate Johnson’s ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, we dismiss

his claim without prejudice, allowing him to raise the claim later in a properly filed motion

for post-conviction collateral relief. We also find there was sufficient evidence to support

Johnson’s conviction for second-degree murder. Therefore, Johnson’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

¶53. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.

19