Earene Williams v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00830-COA

EARENE WILLIAMS APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/25/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES E. WEBSTER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: BOLIVAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JULIANNE KAY BAILEY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BRENDA FAY MITCHELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/21/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. After showing up armed at the home of his girlfriend’s cousin, a man was charged

with shooting the cousin with a firearm. He was convicted of aggravated assault. On appeal,

he claims the evidence was insufficient to convict him, as he did not intend to shoot the

cousin, but someone else. He also contends the jury should not have been instructed on the

doctrine of transferred intent. Finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶2. Earene Williams was living at a house with his girlfriend. Their electricity bill was in

her cousin LeSarah Branch’s name. At some point, LeSarah contacted the electric company
and had the power shut off at Williams’ house.

¶3. Williams was angry and sent LeSarah messages over Facebook arguing with her about

the lights being cut off. LeSarah would later testify that Williams “threatened my life. He

told me he didn’t care if I put on pants or a dress for my funeral.”

¶4. After LeSarah got off work later that day, she drove to her sister Devarshay Branch’s

house. When she arrived, Devarshay was sitting on the porch with her friend Cedrick and his

boyfriend. LeSarah started talking to Devarshay and telling her about the Facebook messages

from Williams.

¶5. As the pair were talking in the front yard, Williams walked out from the side of

Devarshay’s house. When he came around the corner, he was holding a gun and shouting at

LeSarah. LeSarah walked towards Devarshay’s front door, but Williams followed her. As

Devarshay stepped in between them attempting to get Williams to leave, he reached over her

and punched LeSarah in the head. LeSarah stumbled across the threshold of the front door

into the house. Testimony would later show she grabbed her gun and said, “I’m fixing to kill

this b****.”

¶6. Williams heard LeSarah’s comment and saw her reach for her gun. He fired his gun

three or four times in the direction of the front door, near where LeSarah and Devarshay were

standing. According to LeSarah, when she stepped back out onto the porch to return fire,

Devarshay was standing to her left, and Williams had ducked behind the neighbor’s fence

to her right. Devarshay had been shot in the leg during this sequence of events. She crawled

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toward the parking lot, and LeSarah took her to the hospital.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶7. A grand jury later indicted Williams for one count of aggravated assault against

Devarshay, with a firearm enhancement, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.

The trial court later issued an order to nolle prosequi the charge for possessing a firearm.

¶8. At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from several witnesses, including

Cedrick, LeSarah, and Devarshay.1

¶9. Cedrick explained how he saw Williams first punch one sister and then shoot the

other.

[Cedrick]: I see [LeSarah] coming through the doorway, and I see Earene
hit her. . . . But once he hit her with his fist, I just hear her say,
‘I’m about to kill this b**** a** n****.’
....
[Cedrick]: So, like, by the time she got her gun up to turn around, you
know, he instantly started letting his shots off.
....
[State]: Were there any gunshots before that time?
[Cedrick]: No, ma’am.

The witness likewise explained how he believed Devarshay was trying to de-escalate the

situation.

[Cedrick]: Now, to my knowledge, Devarshay at this point was in between
them, you know, because she was after he hit her, like she tried
to get between them to stop them from fighting and shooting, or
whatever. . . . So when he hit her sister, you know, she moved,

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The State also presented testimony from the responding officer, an investigator with
the police department, and a cousin of Williams.

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was escalating. She was just trying to get in the middle of them
to keep from escalating more.

¶10. LeSarah testified that when Williams came around the corner, she heard him “saying,

‘Here I go, b****,’” and saw that “he ha[d] a silver gun with a black handle in his hand

already.” She “threw [her] hands up” and said to him, “I’m not fixing to play with you with

no gun.” LeSarah explained, “[A]s I’m saying that, I’m still walking toward my sister[’s]

door,” meanwhile Devarshay “is telling him to go on” and leave. She stated Williams then

“reaches over [Devarshay] and hit me in the left side of my head with the gun.”

¶11. LeSarah testified, “I stumbled, and I catch her door, her doorknob. He knocked my

glasses off. So as I’m getting up, I pull my gun from my side. I hear three, four shots come

off.”

¶12. The jury heard Devarshay testify that Williams shot her.

[State]: Ms. Devarshay, being that you’ve testified that Earene
[Williams] was shooting and that your sister was shooting, do
you know which one shot you?
[Devarshay]: Yes, ma’am.
[State]: Which one shot you?
[Devarshay]: Earene.
[State]: And how do you know that it was Earene that shot you?
[Devarshay]: Because he was the only one shooting at the time.
....
[Devarshay]: . . . When he hear her [LeSarah] say that she’s fixing to kill this
b**** [Williams], that’s when he got to shooting. He seen her
pull her gun from off the side of her. That’s when he got to start
shooting. . . .

Devarshay was adamant that it was Williams who shot first and who shot her.

[State]: At what point did you get shot? . . . .

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[Devarshay]: When he started shooting, it was probably like the third or fourth
bullet when he was shooting, that’s when I had got hit.
When . . . LeSarah fixing to get ready to come back out, she was
like, ‘Move.’ I’m like, ‘I’m shot,’ or whatnot.
....
[State]: So at the point that your sister came out and started shooting
toward him, toward your neighbor’s apartment, had you already
been shot?
[Devarshay]: I was already shot. Yes, ma’am.

¶13. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Williams moved for a directed verdict arguing

the investigator “just testified that there’s no evidence of what bullet or what gun passed

through Devarshay Branch’s leg. They simply do not know who shot her . . . and the evidence

is not there on that.” (Emphasis added). Given the testimony at trial, the court denied the

motion.

¶14. Williams then testified in his own defense. His core theory was that he did not shoot

first and did not shoot the victim. Indeed, Williams testified he was merely “defending

himself.” His belief was that Devershay “gets in between” him and LeSarah.

[Williams]: Me and LeSarah still arguing. She’s standing at the doorway. As
she was getting ready to lift her gun like she was fixing to shoot
me, my reaction just I struck her. I hit her in the head.
....
[Williams]: . . . Devarshay was pushing me. She started pushing me, like,
‘Get out in front of my house. You wrong.’
....
[Williams]: . . . And I’m like, ‘No. Tell her to give me my money.’ Next
thing I know, pow, pow, pow, pow, pow, pow. She starts
shooting. Me and Devarshay still standing there. She starts
shooting.
[Defense]: Who?
[Williams]: LeSarah, she starts shooting. . . .

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The defendant emphasized his story that LeSarah shot first.

[Williams]: LeSarah come back out the house, boom, boom, boom, boom,
boom, boom, boom. That’s when I first fired my gun. I shot
three times. The gun jammed up. She kept shooting, running
behind me.
....
[Williams]: I shot at her after she shot at me. I was defending myself.
....
[Williams]: . . . She was shot. I knew I hadn’t shot my gun. The only reason
my gun was fired . . . I shot back. I was defending myself. I shot
three or four times.

¶15. Both parties rested their case. The jury convicted Williams of aggravated assault. The

trial court sentenced Williams to twelve years in custody, with four years suspended and

eight years to serve. The trial court denied Williams’ motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict or a new trial, and Williams appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶16. On appeal, Williams raises three issues. Two are focused on a jury instruction on the

doctrine of transferred intent. He also claims there was insufficient evidence to support the

conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.

I. The jury instruction on transferred intent was not improper.

¶17. Williams takes issue with a jury instruction on transferred intent. He argues

Instruction C-12 “erroneously” stated the law and constructively amended his indictment.

Further, he claims that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to his case, so it was

error for the trial court to give the instruction.

¶18. “Jury instructions are generally within the discretion of the trial court, and the settled

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standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Robinson v. State, 324 So. 3d 1137, 1143 (¶19)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Johnson v. State, 252 So. 3d 597, 599 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.

2017)). For this Court “[t]o determine ‘whether error lies in granting or refusing a jury

instruction, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole and in context.’” Arnold

v. State, 393 So. 3d 1096, 1104 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Clark v. State, 343 So.

3d 943, 985-86 (¶183) (Miss. 2022)). “If the instructions fairly announce the law of the case

and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Tutwiler v. State, 197 So. 3d 418,

425 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Lawrence v. State, 3 So. 3d 754, 758 (¶19) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2008)).

¶19. Williams argues Instruction C-12 was “confusing and contradictory” based on its use

of the phrase “not in necessary self-defense.” More specifically, he claims this language

instructed the jury to consider self-defense only as to Devarshay and not as to LeSarah,

arguing he was defending himself against LeSarah.

¶20. The State contends that Williams “never objected, however, to the language being

confusing or contradictory,” and “[b]ecause he failed to make that specific objection, it is

barred from appellate review.” During the jury instruction conference, Williams’ attorney

made an objection to the giving of a transferred intent instruction, stating, “As for the

language of it, is it an accurate statement of the law or the State of Mississippi? I don’t

know.”

¶21. In turn, the trial court noted, “I understand you object in general to a transferred intent

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instruction.” But the court stated, “I’m going to give a transferred intent instruction,” finding

that “it’s applicable here. And I don’t think it has to be spelled out in the Indictment.”

Because defense counsel raised his concerns with the instruction and the trial court had an

opportunity to respond, we find Williams sufficiently preserved this issue for appeal. See

Johnson v. State, 290 So. 3d 1232, 1242 (¶46) (Miss. 2020).

¶22. Instruction C-12 stated:

Mississippi recognizes the doctrine of transferred intent. That is, if an
individual has formed the necessary intent to commit an aggravated assault
against one person but in attempting to commit such aggravated assault against
one person but in attempting to commit such aggravated assault mistakenly
injures another, the doctrine of transferred intent applies, and the actor’s intent
is transferred to the injured party. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant, Earene Williams, intended to shoot LeSarah Branch but in
attempting to do so mistakenly shot Devarshay Branch and such shooting was
not in necessary self-defense then the intent to shoot LeSarah Branch is
transferred to Devarshay Branch and you should consider that when
considering the other instructions in this case.

(Emphasis added).

¶23. Transferred intent is based on the idea that our “law transfers the express intent from

the intended victim to the unintended victim.” Rogers v. State, 994 So. 2d 792, 802 (¶40)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2008). Importantly, “[t]he doctrine is applicable to the crime of assault.”

Craig v. State, 201 So. 3d 1108, 1112 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Hitt v. State, 988

So. 2d 939, 942 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). For instance, “if A, intending to strike B,

misses him and strikes C, or if mistaking C for B, he strikes him, he is in either case guilty

of an assault and battery on C.” Id. (quoting Hitt, 988 So. 2d at 942 (¶12)).

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¶24. Contrary to Williams’ assertions, the language used in the instruction properly advised

the jury on the definition of transferred intent, the doctrine’s application to the crime of

aggravated assault, and its exception for necessary self-defense. Therefore, we find that

Instruction C-12 fairly announced the law of transferred intent.

¶25. Furthermore, the instruction also tracked the evidence at trial. To some extent,

Williams argues that “the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply in this case” because

“[he] was acting in reasonable self-defense when he fired shots at LeSarah after LeSarah,

with her hand on her gun, threatened to kill Williams.”

¶26. Under our caselaw, when a defendant “acting in necessary self-defense[] intends to

injure or kill the aggressor only, [and] unintentionally injures an innocent bystander, that

transferred intent does not apply because the law justifies the accused’s actions towards the

aggressor.” Rogers, 994 So. 2d at 802 (¶40) (emphasis added).

¶27. First, the trial court made a ruling that specifically found the transferred intent

doctrine applicable. During the jury instruction conference, the following exchange occurred:

[Court]: I mean, your client has testified he was acting in self-defense.
[Defense]: But not with regard to this victim. She’s already shot.
[Court]: Well, it doesn’t matter. He’s testified he was acting in self
defense.
....
[Court]: . . . Do we need an instruction on transferred intent?
[State]: That’s what I was approaching to have that discussion. It may be
necessary for clarity for the jury . . . .
....
[Defense]: I object to the giving of a transferred intent jury
instruction . . . . [W]e don’t have notice of a transferred intent
State theory of prosecution . . . .

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[Court]: . . . I understand you object in general to a transferred intent
instruction. I’m going to give a transferred intent instruction. I
think it’s applicable here.

¶28. Second, testimony from Devarshay, LeSarah, and another eyewitness supports finding

Williams was the aggressor and fired his gun first. Therefore, the trial court did not err by

including a transferred intent instruction.

II. The indictment was not constructively amended by the jury
instruction on transferred intent.

¶29. Next, Williams claims Instruction C-12 constructively amended his indictment. He

alleges the instruction on transferred intent “effectively eliminated the language of ‘purposely

or knowingly’ in the indictment.” Essentially, Williams alleges this “allow[ed] the jury to

convict Williams of aggravated assault of Devarshay Branch under a theory of transferred

intent” instead of “purposely or knowingly.”

¶30. “A jury instruction constructively amends an indictment if it ‘broadens the grounds

upon which the defendant may be found guilty of the offense charged so that the defendant

may be convicted without proof of the elements alleged by the grand jury in its indictment.”

Clark, 343 So. 3d at 999 (¶267) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell v. State, 725 So. 2d 836, 855

(Miss. 1998)).

¶31. Williams’ indictment charged that he “did unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, purposely

or knowingly cause bodily injury to Devarshay Branch with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a

firearm, by shooting her[.]”

¶32. To reiterate, Instruction C-12 advised the jury: “If you find beyond a reasonable doubt

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that the defendant, Earene Williams, intended to shoot LeSarah Branch but in attempting to

do so mistakenly shot Devarshay Branch and such shooting was not in necessary self-defense

then the intent to shoot LeSarah Branch is transferred to Devarshay Branch and you should

consider that when considering the other instructions in this case.” (Emphasis added).

¶33. Importantly here, Instruction C-12 is not an elements instruction. This instruction does

not inform the jury of the proof required to find Williams guilty of aggravated assault. The

record shows that a different jury instruction contained the necessary elements of aggravated

assault.

¶34. Specifically, the jury was also given Instruction C-13, which provided the following

explanation:

The defendant, EARENE WILLIAMS, has been charged by an indictment
with the crime of Aggravated Assault. If you find from the evidence in this
case beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. On or about April 18, 2023, within the Second Judicial District of
Bolivar County, Mississippi, the defendant, EARENE WILLIAMS,
2. did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously, and purposely or knowingly
cause bodily injury to Devarshay Branch, with a deadly weapon, to-wit:
a firearm,
3. by shooting the said Devarshay Branch, and not in necessary
self-defense,

then you shall find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault. If the State has
failed to prove any one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you shall find the defendant not guilty.

¶35. We recently discussed a similar issue in Arnold v. State, 393 So. 3d 1096, 1107 (¶26)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2024). In that case, Arnold was indicted for attempted kidnapping. Id. at

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1101 (¶1). At trial, the jury was given “Instruction S-1A” and “Instruction S-2A,” which

“stated the elements of attempted kidnapping,” including: “Arnold unlawfully designed and

endeavored to commit the crime of kidnapping[.]” Id. at 1105 n.3. The trial court also gave

“Instruction S-3A,” which provided: “The Court instructs the Jury that ‘kidnapping’ as used

in these instructions includes the attempt to confine a child under the age of sixteen (16)

years against the will of the child’s parents or legal guardians.” Id. at 1106 n.5.

¶36. Arnold’s complaint on appeal “focuse[d] on two words in the S-3A

instruction—‘attempt’ and ‘confine,’” and he argued “the language complained of in S-3A

constructively amend[ed] his indictment.” Id. at 1106 (¶¶25-26).2

¶37. On review, we noted “the information contained in S-3A is not an elements

instruction informing the jury of the proof required to find Arnold guilty of the crime for

which he was indicted.” Id. at 1107 (¶27) (emphasis added). Rather, “the trial court

characterized the content of S-3A as ‘a legal explanation of those terms of art’ in the essential

elements instructions outlined in S-1A and S-2A.” Id. Consequently, we found that “the

comparison of language in S-3A to the language in Arnold’s indictment [did] not reflect an

actual variance that would constructively amend his indictment.” Id.

¶38. Just as in Arnold, the guidance Instruction C-12 provided to the jury is better

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“Because he was indicted under the ‘attempt’ statute, the elements that must be
proved include ‘(1) a design or endeavor to commit an offense, (2) an overt act toward
commission thereof, and (3) a failure to consummate the act.’” Arnold, 393 So. 3d at 1107
(¶27) (quoting Scott v. State, 231 So. 3d 1024, 1035 (¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)).

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characterized as “a legal explanation of those terms of art” included in the essential elements

outlined in Instruction C-13. Id. at (¶26). Stated differently, Instruction C-12 gave the jury

further guidance on the “purposely or knowingly” component of Williams’ aggravated

assault charge. Therefore, Instruction C-12 “does not reflect an actual variance that

constructively amended his indictment.” Id.

¶39. Furthermore, “[e]ven if this Court were to find that the indictment could be affected

by the contents of [Instruction C-12], ‘not all variances between the indictment and

instructions constitute a constructive amendment.’” Id. at (¶28) (quoting Morton v. State, 246

So. 3d 895, 903 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). “[T]he central question is whether the variance

is such as to substantially alter the elements of proof necessary for a conviction.” Id. (quoting

Clark, 343 So. 3d at 999 (¶268)).

¶40. Williams was indicted for aggravated assault under Mississippi Code Annotated

section 97-3-7(2)(ii) (Rev. 2020). “[T]o prove aggravated assault, in the manner charged

here, the State has to prove two elements—that the defendant (1) attempted to cause or

purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury to another (2) with a deadly weapon.” Duke v.

State, 146 So. 3d 401, 405-06 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-

7(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2013)).

¶41. Even if Instruction C-12 resulted in a variance from Williams’ indictment, there was

not a material difference in the terms. The instructions given still required the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury to

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Devarshay with a deadly weapon. See Arnold, 393 So. 3d at 1107 (¶29) (“the essence of the

charged offense remained the same, as the instruction still required the jury to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that Arnold attempted to kidnap N.L., a minor child under the age of

sixteen, against the will of his parents”).

¶42. Consequently, we find that the language of Instruction C-12 did not contain a variance

such that it substantially altered the requisite elements of aggravated assault and

constructively amended his indictment.

III. The evidence was sufficient to support his conviction.

¶43. Next, Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

Specifically, he argues the State failed “to prove the element of intent” required for

aggravated assault. He claims the evidence presented at trial did not show that he “purposely

or knowingly caused bodily injury to Devarshay.” Expanding on his contention, Williams

asserts that “determining who fired the shot that hit Devarshay is all but impossible,” and

because “Williams lacked any intent to bring bodily harm to Devarshay,” “the state’s

evidence was insufficient.” (Emphasis added).

¶44. We review the trial court’s denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo.

Id. at 1108 (¶32). “When addressing the legal sufficiency of a conviction, we must determine

whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt[.]’” Nabors v. State, 409 So. 3d 1190, 1195 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App.

2025) (quoting Potts v. State, 233 So. 3d 782, 790 (¶¶30-31) (Miss. 2017)). “[I]n doing so,

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we assess ‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’” Id. (quoting Potts,

233 So. 3d at 790 (¶¶30-31)). And “[a]ll evidence supporting a guilty verdict is accepted as

true, and the prosecution must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be

reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Arnold, 393 So. 3d at 1108 (¶32) (quoting Sullivan v.

State, 281 So. 3d 1146, 1161 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)).

¶45. Again, for the crime of aggravated assault, “the State has to prove two elements—that

the defendant (1) attempted to cause or purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury to

another (2) with a deadly weapon.” Duke, 146 So. 3d at 405-06 (¶16) (citing Miss. Code

Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2013)).

¶46. “[T]he State need not prove that the defendant had formed the specific purpose of

inflicting bodily injury on his victim in order to convict.” Griffin v. State, 872 So. 2d 90, 91

(¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Instead, “the prosecution must simply show that the blow itself

was purposely inflicted and that the requisite bodily injury resulted.” Id. (emphasis added).3

“The presumption of the law is that each person intends the natural consequences of his

actions.” Shaw v. State, 139 So. 3d 79, 84 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Staten v.

State, 813 So. 2d 775, 777 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)).

¶47. In this case, there is no dispute that Devarshay was shot and injured by a deadly

weapon. The only other element then was whether it was Williams who “purposely or

3
Ultimately, “[t]he jury is free to infer intent from the defendant’s ‘acts coupled with
the surrounding facts and circumstances.’” Arnold, 393 So. 3d at 1108 (¶34) (quoting
Stewart v. State, 839 So. 2d 535, 539 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)).

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knowingly caused” the injury. So the question on appeal is whether sufficient evidence

existed for a rational jury to find that Williams “purposely or knowingly” caused Devarshay’s

gunshot wound.

¶48. Williams’ theory of defense at trial was that LeSarah had shot and injured Devarshay

and that he fired his gun only to defend himself after LeSarah shot at him. Yet, on appeal,

Williams’ arguments seem to shift from this defense theory to him now claiming “it is

unclear whose gun fired the shot that hit Devarshay,” and “determining who fired the sho[t]

that hit Devarshay is all but impossible.”

¶49. First, the victim in this case specifically and unequivocally identified Williams as her

attacker. Next, Devarshay, LeSarah, and Cedrick all testified that Williams was the first

person to fire a gun that day. They each also stated that LeSarah had not fired her gun until

after Williams’ first shots. LeSarah also identified Williams as the shooter, stating he fired

“with his eyes closed. He was shooting like this the whole time. That’s how he end up hitting

my sister.”

¶50. Here, the State had to prove that Williams knowingly caused bodily injury to another

person with a deadly weapon. Devarshay, LeSarah, and Cedrick all testified Williams was

the initial aggressor and shot first. While Williams claimed otherwise, the jury found their

testimonies to be more credible than his testimony. “The fact that competing inferences could

be drawn from the surrounding facts is of no concern when the issue is sufficiency of the

evidence; any conflict is for the jury to resolve.” Winn v. State, 127 So. 3d 289, 292 (¶11)

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(Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 650 (¶97) (Miss. 2009)).

¶51. After review, we find that the State produced sufficient evidence for the jury to

convict Williams of aggravated assault.

CONCLUSION

¶52. For the reasons above, we affirm the judgment of conviction against Williams.

¶53. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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