Demonte Levelle Williams a/k/a Demonte L. Williams a/k/a Demonte Williams v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00257-COA

DEMONTE LEVELLE WILLIAMS A/K/A APPELLANT
DEMONTE L. WILLIAMS A/K/A DEMONTE
WILLIAMS

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/16/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MADELINE MARCANTEL ILES
JONATHAN MATTHEW EICHELBERGER
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JULIANNE KAY BAILEY
KATY TAYLOR SARVER
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: W. CROSBY PARKER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/04/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WESTBROOKS, P.J., McDONALD AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Demonte Williams was indicted and tried for first-degree murder in the shooting death

of Brent Jones. Following a jury trial, Williams was convicted of the lesser-included offense

of manslaughter and sentenced to serve twenty years in custody. On direct appeal, Williams

argues that the trial court erred in limiting evidence related to the character of the victim.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Arguments between the Victim and Williams Before the Day of the Shooting

¶2. Williams shares two children with Tatayana Badon, who was engaged to Brent Jones

at the time he was killed. According to Williams, approximately two months before the

shooting, Brent displayed a gun during a custody exchange and told Williams to stop coming

to pick up the kids because “the kids are not my kids, they’re his kids.” Following this

encounter, Williams bought a gun and kept it with him at all times. On Friday, June 11, 2021,

Williams and Tatayana had an argument over the phone about co-parenting. Brent, who was

present with Tatayana, joined in the argument. Following the argument, Tatayana made a

Facebook post directed at Williams “about being more present in his children’s life.”

Williams and Brent then exchanged a series of escalating threatening comments.

¶3. One of the comments made from the Facebook account associated with Brent stated,

“On six yo momma gonna get slapped and come show me you stated told you but you ain’t

can’t dish it stop talkin show me show me.” Other comments from that account stated,

“Demonte Williams boy they know u ain’t but nun of that just left yo moma house,” and

“Demonte Williams WHAT THE F*** THEY GON DO BESIDES SIT BY YO GRAVE

SITE.” Williams lived with his mother, Greatta Hodges. Greatta was extremely concerned

about the threats from Brent, and because the threats referenced her and because Brent stated

he had come by her house, Greatta filed a report with the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office.

Shooting at O’Reilly’s Auto Parts

¶4. The following Monday morning, on June 14, 2021, Brent took Tatayana’s car to

O’Reilly’s Auto Parts in Gulfport to have the check engine light diagnosed. Parts salesman

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Bruce Simmons was in the parking lot with Brent examining Tatayana’s car when, as shown

by surveillance video from a nearby church, Williams drove past the business and then made

a U-turn to return to the store. According to Williams, he came to O’Reilly’s because he

specifically wanted to buy Meguiar’s Tire Shine, and the first store he went to did not have

that brand in stock. He was distracted on his phone and missed the entrance to the parking

lot, which is why he had to make a U-turn. Assistant manager Tristan Krohn testified that

Williams browsed cleaning products and asked Krohn for a recommendation. Krohn

recommended the Meguiar’s brand. According to Krohn, Williams did not ask for a specific

item. Williams was at the third register from the door paying for his purchase when Simmons

and Brent returned from the parking lot. According to Simmons, Brent stopped in the

doorway when he noticed Williams standing about twenty feet away and became agitated.

Brent and Williams were never closer than that distance from each other during the course

of events.

¶5. According to Williams, Brent entered O’Reilly’s and “told me to call my mom, to tell

her to have my headstone ready because somebody is not going to leave this parking lot.”

Brent then went outside and paced back and forth. Williams testified that after Brent made

these comments, he (Williams) called his mother to come pick him up because he could not

leave with Brent between him and his car. Williams testified that Brent came back into the

store “with tears in his eyes crying saying – you know, saying come on outside, that he put

that on his dead brother that somebody has got to die today, you know. Like, he specifically

told me that, that somebody is not about to leave the parking lot alive. That specifically came

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from out his mouth.” Williams also testified that while making these statements, Brent raised

his shirt up twice to intimate that he had a gun.

¶6. Simmons heard Brent say something about a brother and the phrase “we can handle

this right now.” While Simmons did not hear Brent explicitly threaten Williams, he testified

that Brent was the one being confrontational. Krohn also heard Brent make a reference to his

“brother.” Neither observed Brent raising his shirt. Simmons observed Brent returning to the

parking lot and pacing between his car and Williams’ car. Then, Brent went to Williams’ car

and snatched the locked car door open, breaking the handle. Krohn heard Williams ask,

“[D]id he just get in my truck?” Williams then kicked the store door open and fired four

shots. Williams was crossing the threshold of the door when the first shot was fired. Williams

said that he saw Brent on the phone, which made Williams “afraid that he was calling his

people,” and that this made him feel “scared for my life because I already had done went to

the cops. You know, my mom already had went to go try and make a police report.”

¶7. The medical examiner testified that the two bullets that struck Brent went through the

back of his left leg and the back left side of his head. According to Simmons, when the shots

were fired, Brent had the door to Williams’ car open and was facing toward the inside of the

car. According to Krohn, Brent had gotten in the car and was in the process of getting back

out of the car and turning back to face the inside of the car as the shooting began. He testified

that at the moment of the first shot, Brent was facing the inside of the truck. According to

Williams, shortly before the shots were fired, Brent was facing him, getting out of the car

with one foot in and one foot out. He saw Brent making a flinching motion like he was about

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to shoot, so Williams closed his eyes and began shooting. Williams acknowledged that while

he believed Brent had a gun, he did not actually see a gun. No firearms were discovered near

the victim.

¶8. Greatta testified that Williams called her from the store to tell her that Brent was

threatening him, and the line was active during most of the encounter. Phone records show

multiple short calls between her and Williams during this time, including brief FaceTime

calls because Greatta was trying to witness what was happening. Greatta left her home and

began driving toward O’Reilly’s. Williams discarded his gun over a fence at a business

across the street. Using her share location app, Greatta found Williams in a nearby residential

area and drove him over two hours away to Tylertown to stay with her sister while Greatta

could find an attorney for Williams. Accompanied by his attorney, Williams turned himself

in to the police later that day.

State’s Motion in Limine

¶9. Before trial, the circuit court heard the State’s motion in limine to exclude character

evidence of the victim. The State said that it would not object to Williams testifying about

direct threats Brent made to Williams if a proper foundation was laid. But the State sought

to exclude “generalized statements such as the victim was a gang member or he had

committed a specific act of violence against a specific person that is not a party to this case

until an overt act is established . . . .” The State also argued that only “once an overt act of

aggression is established, defense may call other witnesses to testify about threats of violence

by the victim against them or any other bad acts with which those witnesses have actual

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personal knowledge of.” The court ruled that generalized evidence of Brent’s gang affiliation

and criminal history would not be admissible, but prior bad acts, such as threats, could come

in through the direct testimony of the defendant if the defense presented evidence of an overt

act of aggression by the victim.

Tatayana’s Trial Testimony about Threats Between the Victim and Williams

¶10. At trial, Tatayana was asked on direct examination about the back-and-forth

comments Brent and Williams made on her Facebook post. She said that the comments

included threats. When asked what type of threats were made, she said that Williams told

Brent that “he’s going to put him where his [deceased] brother is” and tagged family

members. Tatayana deleted this particular comment from her post. When asked on cross-

examination if she agreed that Williams had made threats to Brent, she responded, “Both

ways. Yes.” And she said that “[t]hey both [were] threatening to kill each other.” The defense

sought to enter screenshots of the Facebook comments to Tatayana’s post. Tatayana

confirmed the name of Brent’s Facebook account. The court did not permit screenshots of

the comments to be admitted through Tatayana, agreeing with the State’s argument that she

did not have personal knowledge of the threats.1

Williams’ Trial Testimony about Brent’s Character

¶11. The court did permit Williams to testify before the jury about the content of Facebook

threats, including the comment that “On six yo momma gonna get slapped . . . ” and

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Many of the Facebook comments had been deleted, in places creating the
appearance that Brent was having a conversation with himself. The State argued that the
screenshots were more prejudicial than probative and that they would confuse the jury
because it was an incomplete conversation that could not be properly authenticated.

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“Demonte Williams what the f*** they gon do besides sit by yo grave site” and that Brent

“just left yo moma house.” However, the court restricted the defense witnesses from any

reference to gang affiliation, denying Williams’ request to testify that the expression “on six”

was gang slang meaning that Brent would be kicked out of the gang if he did not go through

with the threat. When asked what he took the slapping comment to mean, Williams said, “I

know that he deals with guns . . . so from him saying ‘slap’ – like, hit her with a gun or try

to, you know, like hurt her. That’s a threat.” When asked what Brent meant by referencing

a tombstone, Williams said that “the only way to have a tombstone is if you deceased.” And

when asked about Brent’s comment that he had been to Greatta’s house, Williams said

“[T]hat’s a deadly threat. He was going to try to do something then, but I wasn’t at home.”

¶12. Williams also testified that in the months before the shooting, at custody exchanges,

Brent displayed a gun and made “deadly” threats to him and his mother, and Williams said,

“I took them seriously to where I was scared for my life.” He believed that Brent was the

kind of person who would act on the threats. He testified that his mother filed the police

report on their behalf. He described his recollection of the day of the shooting, including that

Brent “told me to call my mom, to tell her to have my headstone ready because somebody is

not going to leave this parking lot” and that Brent “put it on his dead brother that somebody

is about to die today right here.”

¶13. Williams testified that he went outside the store because, in addition to Brent forcibly

opening Williams’ car door, Williams saw Brent on his phone. Following the court’s

instructions to not use the word “gang,” he testified, “I was afraid that he was calling his

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people . . . that had me scared—you know, scared for my life because I already had done

went to the cops . . . . [T]hat’s when I was calling my mom to come help me, to come pick

me up, you know, because I didn’t want, you know, nothing to happen.” He got his gun out

because his “plan was to try to scare him so I could leave because I couldn’t leave.” Then

he thought Brent was reaching for a gun, so Williams closed his eyes and began shooting.

Greatta’s Trial Testimony about Brent’s Character

¶14. Greatta testified that in the months before the shooting, “we were receiving numerous

threats about what was going to happen as soon as [Brent] saw us.” The Facebook message

about Brent coming to her house “scared me . . . and I went to the police, and I showed them

on my phone, and I told them that I was scared.” She stated further that over the weekend

between the Facebook threats and the day of the shooting, “We was very afraid. We was

afraid for our life. We was scared, very scared. I couldn’t even—I couldn’t hardly even

sleep.” She testified that on the day of the shooting, when Williams called her from the store,

she put her phone on speaker phone so her husband could also hear, and Williams told her

that Brent was in the store. Williams said, “[H]e’s trippin’. He’s telling me to call my family,

to have my momma to get my headstone together because one of us not gonna leave here

alive.” And a little later she heard him say, “No, man, please don’t do this. Please don’t do

this.” Then she heard a gunshot.

¶15. When asked why she drove Williams to Tylertown, she explained that she wanted to

get him to “safety.” When asked what she meant by safety, she said, following the court’s

instructions to not use the word “gang,” “Brent and his associates already knew where I

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lived, so I knew it wasn’t safe to be there to even wait to get him turned in . . . . I never tried

to elude the police. I only tried to get my son to safety to get him turned in . . . . There’s a lot

of associates, and we were scared. We wanted to go in with counsel.”

Greatta’s Rejected Proffer of Brent’s Gang Affiliation

¶16. Outside of the presence of the jury, the court heard Greatta’s proffered testimony that

Brent was in a gang and that she and Williams were afraid of retaliation. She proffered in

part:

WITNESS: He’s in a gang. He was in a gang, and we were very afraid of
them, and he made it very clear to us that he was high-ranked in
the gang. Tatayana also always told us what they would do to us.
So I was scared.

The court rejected the proffer as inadmissible evidence.

¶17. The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, self-defense, and manslaughter (both

heat-of-passion and imperfect self-defense). The jury found Williams guilty of manslaughter.

¶18. Williams now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶19. We review the trial judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion, but we apply de novo review to a trial judge’s analysis and application of the law.

Richardson v. State, 147 So. 3d 838, 841 (¶13) (Miss. 2014).

DISCUSSION

¶20. Williams’ arguments on appeal center on an assertion that the circuit court unduly

limited evidence of the victim’s prior bad acts and propensity for violence, preventing

Williams from presenting necessary evidence of his state of mind at the time of the shooting.

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In particular, Williams argues that the court erred in announcing that evidence of “an overt

act” of aggression is required before such evidence is admissible and that evidence of Brent’s

gang affiliation should have been admitted. Generally, under Mississippi Rule of Evidence

404(a)(1), “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” However,

exceptions apply. Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(B), “a defendant may offer

evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor

may offer evidence to rebut it[.]” And Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

¶21. A claim of self-defense “not only allows, but requires evidence of the defendant’s

state of mind at the time of the killing.” Richardson v. State, 147 So. 3d 838, 842 (¶17)

(Miss. 2014); see also Bell v. State, 303 So. 3d 22, 27 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). In

Richardson, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a first-degree murder conviction

because the trial court improperly excluded the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s violent

criminal history. Id. at 844 (¶24). The defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s violent criminal

history “was critical to his defense and was necessary for the jury to assess the

reasonableness of his actions on the night of the shooting.” Id. at 840 (¶7). The victim had

been recently released from prison after serving sentences for murder and armed robbery. Id.

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at 839 (¶3). Richardson permitted the victim to temporarily stay at his family’s house, but the

victim refused to leave, bragged about his violent past, and used threats to remain in the

home. Id. at (¶3). Richardson shot the victim after he announced his desire to sleep with

Richardson’s wife and advanced on Richardson while pretending to hide a weapon behind

his back. Id. at 839-40 (¶4). The court held that “Richardson clearly and forcefully attempted

to use the prior criminal history, not to show propensity, but to show his state of mind, that

is, that at the time of the shooting, he feared [the victim], and that his fear was reasonable.”

Id. at 842 (¶16).

¶22. Richardson discussed the long-standing requirement that the defendant show an “overt

act by the victim that could be construed as aggression” before allowing evidence of the

victim’s character. Before the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, “[s]elf-defense

was not considered to have been at issue until the defendant produced some evidence of an

overt act by the victim that could be construed as aggression.” Id. at 842 (¶18). However,

Richardson states that “[t]oday, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Mississippi

Rules of Evidence, which include no specific requirement of an overt act.” Id. at 842 (¶19).

But the opinion also held that on the facts of that case, “there was ample evidence for the jury

to find” an overt act and reversed the conviction. Id. at 842-43.2

¶23. The State argues that the “overt act” requirement has not been clearly abrogated and

that, regardless, the relevancy requirement is still applicable before a victim’s character is

admissible. The mere presence of a victim about whom the defendant has knowledge of prior

2
On retrial, Richardson was found not guilty.

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bad acts does not operate to justify preemptive self-defense. Moreover, the State argues that

in Williams’ case, the jury ended up largely hearing the substance of the character evidence

despite the restrictions imposed by the circuit court, and therefore any incorrect statements

of law announced by the court and accompanying limitations on evidence did not result in

an unfair trial or have a prejudicial impact on Williams’ ability to present evidence of his

state of mind.

¶24. It may still be unclear post-Richardson whether the “overt act” requirement has been

formally abrogated by and subsumed in the function of the Rules of Evidence. See

Richardson, 147 So. 3d at 842 (¶18) (“These [overt act] holdings were designed to

accomplish today’s Rule 401 and 404 purposes.”). This Court has described the requirement

as “relaxed.” Dille v. State, 334 So. 3d 1162, 1187 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021); see also Jordan

v. State, 211 So. 3d 713, 717 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he supreme court has recently

suggested that the requirement has been abrogated by the adoption of the Rules of

Evidence.”).3 The comments to the Rules of Evidence still refer to the overt act requirement.

See MRE 404 cmt. (“In order to prove [relevance of the character of victim,] the defendant

must offer evidence of an overt act perpetrated against him by the victim[.]”).

¶25. However, even when the trial court errs in refusing to allow character evidence,

reversal is not warranted “unless it affects a substantial right of a party.” Jordan, 211 So. 3d

3
It is also a closer question in this case than in Richardson that, “assuming our rules
included the requirement of an overt act of aggression, there was ample evidence for the jury
to find one here.” In Richardson, the victim was advancing on the defendant in close
proximity, had his hand behind his back, had just come from a shed that stored axes and
other sharp implements, and refused to stop advancing when the defendant fired a warning
shot.

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at 717 (¶18). “The refusal of evidence of the character of the victim affects the defendant’s

right to a fair trial; and thus reversal is required unless ‘on the whole record, the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Newsom v. State, 629 So. 2d 611, 614

(Miss. 1993)). In Jordan, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault after shooting

his girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend. According to the defendant and his girlfriend, the victim had

been conspicuously carrying a pistol in his waistband and appeared to be preparing to shoot

after getting angry and threatening to kill them. Jordan, 211 So. 3d at 715 (¶4). This Court

reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in excluding the girlfriend’s

testimony that the victim had been abusive, that he had been a “kingpin” of a gang, that she

had told Jordan to leave the scene because she expected the gang to retaliate, and that Jordan

was aware of the victim’s history and afraid of him as a result. Id. at (¶¶1, 8). In analyzing

whether the error in refusing to admit this evidence could be harmless error, we noted that

“the jury was permitted to hear very little of the substance of the proffered testimony”

through other evidence that was admitted, and that the testimony that was presented was

“sharply conflicting.” Id. at 718 (¶19).4

¶26. Here, looking to the question of whether the court’s rulings “[s]ignificantly hampered

[the defendant’s] ability to present a defense[,]” we cannot say that any errors in limiting

evidence of Brent’s character affected Williams’ right to a fair trial warranting reversal of

his manslaughter conviction. See Richardson, 147 So. 3d at 843-44 (¶23). Unlike in Jordan,

in which we stated that “the jury was permitted to hear very little of the substance of the

4
On retrial, Jordan was found not guilty.

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proffered testimony,” the jury heard Williams testify extensively about threats made by Brent

and Williams’ fear of Brent. He testified that two months before the shooting, Brent

displayed a gun at a custody exchange and made “deadly threats.” While the substance of

Brent’s Facebook threats was not admitted through Tatayana, the jury heard Williams discuss

the specific Facebook threats made on the Friday before the shooting, including the comment

that Brent had been to his mother’s house and the threat that his mother would get “slapped”

and that he understood that to be a threat of violence. The jury heard both Williams and

Greatta testify that they filed a police report in response to these threats. They testified

repeatedly that these threats made them afraid and scared for their lives.

¶27. The jury heard Tatayana’s testimony that Williams and Brent were threatening to kill

each other. Williams testified about the specific statements Brent made to him on the

O’Reilly’s premises in the moments before the shooting, including that his mother needed

to get his tombstone ready and that Brent “put it on his dead brother that somebody is about

to die today right here.” He testified that Brent was blocking his access to his vehicle and that

he thought Brent was calling his “people” to come to O’Reilly’s. Greatta testified about her

fear of Brent and his “associates,” and that she was afraid for their lives. She was afraid that

the many “associates” would come to her home.

¶28. The jury heard evidence of Williams’ state of mind and how it was influenced by his

knowledge of Brent’s character, and the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter.

CONCLUSION

¶29. Defendants are entitled to present evidence of their state of mind when presenting a

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claim of self-defense. Here, looking to the “evidence that was admitted” and to “the record

as a whole,” we find that any error in limiting evidence of Brent’s character was harmless in

light of the other evidence that was admitted.

¶30. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY,
WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND
EMFINGER, J., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.

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