Jesse Lee Robinson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00797-COA

JESSE LEE ROBINSON APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/14/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KELLY LEE MIMS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PRENTISS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JASON D. HERRING
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/14/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND EMFINGER, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jesse Lee Robinson was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine (Count I)

and possession of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) (Count II) by a Prentiss County jury.

The trial court sentenced him to serve three years for Count I and eight years for Count II,

set to run consecutively in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

Robinson appeals, arguing the search and seizure of the drugs was illegal and that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress this evidence. Finding no error, we

affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2. On June 25, 2020, law enforcement from the Prentiss County Sheriff’s Department

responded to a 911 call. A woman had emerged from the woods near the caller’s residence

in distress, covered with bruises, cuts, and scratch marks. When law enforcement arrived

at the residence, the woman said Robinson had assaulted her. The officers knew that

Robinson worked with his father, Bryan, at a nearby vehicle repair shop that his father

owned.

¶3. Robinson worked from a metal desk in the shop where he kept his vehicle dealer

paperwork. The desk was situated in the open between two bay doors; it was not in an

office. Bryan testified that Robinson did not own the desk but “leased [the desk] basically.”1

Bryan never used the desk or stored items in it. Bryan also testified the injured woman was

Robinson’s girlfriend who had been living with him and Robinson.

¶4. Several officers drove to the shop to speak with Robinson about the alleged assault.

Bryan had just arrived in the parking lot and was met by the officers. Robinson was already

inside the shop. Bryan testified that only he and his son worked at the shop—Bryan worked

on vehicles, and Robinson sold vehicles.

¶5. The officers asked Bryan if they could talk to Robinson, and Bryan agreed, letting the

officers inside the shop while he stayed outside. Deputy Aaron Stolz testified that when he

and Investigator Torie Jumper entered, Robinson said, “Don’t come in, don’t come in!”

Both officers testified that Robinson then ran towards his desk, and with one arm, strewed

a powder-like substance across the top of the desk. Deputy Stolz grabbed Robinson and

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Investigator Jumper, however, testified that based on her investigation, Robinson
owned the desk.

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patted him down for weapons. Robinson, who was agitated, refused to cooperate, and

exclaimed, “I didn’t do nothing,” referring to his girlfriend, and said she was “crazy.” Then,

Robinson admitted that he and his girlfriend had had an altercation. Deputy Stolz placed

Robinson in handcuffs, charging him with misdemeanor “family disturbance.”

¶6. During the arrest, officers saw on the desk what they described as a “powder-like”

or “crystal-like” substance that Robinson had strewn across it, which they suspected was

methamphetamine. They also saw on the desk, in plain view, duct tape and several glass

pipes, as well as a rifle propped behind the desk and against the wall. The officers then

exited the building, taking Robinson outside where his father was. Nobody else was inside

the building.

¶7. Wanting to investigate the premises further for drugs, Investigator Jumper contacted

a justice court judge about obtaining a search warrant. The judge advised her to obtain

consent from Bryan to search the shop instead of a warrant. Bryan agreed to the search and

signed a “Permission to Search Form,” allowing the officers to search the shop.2 After

obtaining consent, Deputy Stolz, Investigator Jumper, and another officer reentered the shop

and conducted their search. They began searching around the desk area, collecting the

“crystal-like substance” off the top of the desk. Deputy Stolz also found a clear container

with a magnet attached to the desk’s bottom corner. A powdery residue was inside it. Drug

paraphernalia was also collected from the top of the desk—several glass “meth pipes” (one

2
At trial, however, Bryan claimed he had a “verbal agreement” with Investigator
Jumper to limit the search to the desk area only. Bryan testified that the officers complied
and focused their search to the desk.

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clean and several used), the clear magnetic container, an earbud case holding several

probable marijuana joints, Ziploc bags, zip ties, two sets of scales, and a vacuum-sealing

machine.

¶8. There was also a busted cell phone lying on the desk. Investigator Jumper testified

that she picked it up, felt it, and took off the phone’s case. She testified that “[i]nside[,]

between the case and the phone[,] was a $100 bill” and a piece of aluminum foil neatly

folded up. Investigator Jumper carefully opened it to find a sheet of “little squares,” which

was thought to be a blotter sheet of LSD.

¶9. Robinson was transported to the Prentiss County jail for the family disturbance

charge, with a “hold” placed on him for the possible drug charges. When Investigator

Jumper returned to the station, she gave the alleged methamphetamine and LSD blotter sheet

to Officer Joey Clark, a narcotics officer, who took over the investigation. He performed

a field test on one of the sheet’s fourteen square stamps, which tested positive for LSD.

Officer Clark then turned the drugs over to the local crime lab for further testing. Those

tests confirmed the square stamps were fourteen dosage units of LSD, a Schedule I drug, and

the crystal-like substance was .18 grams of methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug.

¶10. Before trial and against the advice of defense counsel, Robinson, pro se, made an ore

tenus motion to suppress the drugs found at Bryan’s shop. Robinson contended that the

officers never asked for consent to enter the shop initially. He also claimed that Investigator

Jumper told him because the officers did not have a search warrant to enter the building, the

evidence obtained was inadmissible. In response, the State presented the testimony of

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Investigator Jumper and Bryan, detailed above. Robinson concluded his argument by stating

the evidence was not seized incident to his arrest for misdemeanor family disturbance but

was seized after his arrest and departure from the building; so any consent that was given

for the officers to reenter and search the building needed to be in relation to the domestic

crime and not the possible narcotics crime. The trial judge denied Robinson’s motion,

finding the officers had obtained proper consent from Bryan to enter the building initially,

and Investigator Jumper properly obtained consent to reenter the building through the

consent-to-search form after seeing the drugs in plain view on the desk. No mention was

made by either party or the trial court specifically about the search of the cell phone case and

the LSD seized.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Suppress Evidence

¶11. Robinson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drugs

found during the search of his desk and cell phone case. He contends that the warrantless

search of his desk and cell phone was improper because there was no applicable exception

to the warrant requirement. Specifically, he claims there was no valid consent to search the

desk; the plain-view doctrine does not apply; the search was not incident to a valid arrest;

and there were no exigent circumstances. Robinson argues that the cell phone was a closed

container, and while in plain view, there was nothing inherently incriminating to justify

dismantling the cell phone. Thus, he claims his convictions should be reversed and

rendered.

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¶12. We find the search of the desk was valid because Bryan gave valid consent to search

the shop and its property. Because a valid consent resolves Robinson’s other issues, we will

not discuss them. Regarding the search of the cell phone, Robinson’s pro se motion to

suppress evidence, made against the advice of counsel, never mentioned it specifically, nor

did Robinson mention it during the hearing. Further, the trial court based its ruling on the

propriety of the consent-to-search form and the seizure of the drugs in plain view on the

desk. Now, on appeal, Robinson’s counsel argues that the cell phone was a closed container

that was improperly dismantled to find the LSD. It is well settled that “[i]ssues not brought

before the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 296 (¶16) (Miss. 2008) (quoting Tate v. State, 912 So. 2d

919, 928 (¶27) (Miss. 2005)). Because Robinson did not raise the issue of the search of the

cell phone before the trial court, the issue is waived.

¶13. The Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted a mixed standard of review for the denial

of a motion to suppress involving the Fourth Amendment. Dies v. State, 926 So. 2d 910,

917 (¶20) (Miss. 2006). “Determinations of . . . probable cause should be reviewed de

novo.” Id. “However, [the reviewing court is] bound by the trial judge’s findings as to the

underlying ‘historical facts’ unless those findings are ‘clearly erroneous.’” Holloway v.

State, 282 So. 3d 537, 541-42 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Dies, 926 So. 2d at 917

(¶20)). The admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Gillett v. State, 56 So. 3d 469, 482 (¶21) (Miss. 2010).

¶14. Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an individual has the

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right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures “of their persons, houses, papers,

and effects.” Eaddy v. State, 63 So. 3d 1209, 1212-13 (¶12) (Miss. 2011); U.S. Const.

amend. IV; accord Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23. Warrantless searches are generally considered

unreasonable and prohibited unless “a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions” apply. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Galloway v. State, 122

So. 3d 614, 669 (¶182) (Miss. 2013). These exceptions to the warrant requirement include

a consensual search, a search incident to arrest, a search under exigent circumstances if

probable cause exists, and the plain-view doctrine, among others. Galloway, 122 So. 3d at

669 (¶182); Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858, 863 (¶22) (Miss. 1997). “The State bears the

burden to show that a warrantless search comes within an exception for evidence seized

thereupon to be admissible.” Galloway, 122 So. 3d at 669 (¶182) (citing Jackson v. State,

418 So. 2d 827, 829 (Miss. 1982)).

¶15. Robinson argues that Bryan’s consent to search the shop by signing the permission

form was invalid. Robinson contends that because Bryan testified that Robinson “leased

[the desk,] basically,” the issue is whether the landlord, Bryan, had authority to consent to

search the tenant Robinson’s area and property, which would include the desk. Robinson

concludes that Bryan did not have such authority. We disagree.

¶16. “A voluntary consent to a search eliminates an officer’s need to obtain a search

warrant.” Graves, 708 So. 2d at 863 (¶23). The prosecution “is not limited to proof that

consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained

from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to

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the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Hudson v. State, 475 So. 2d 156, 158 (Miss.

1985) (citing Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d 697, 700 (Miss. 1978)).

¶17. Here, Bryan first gave oral consent to Deputy Stolz and Investigator Jumper to go into

the shop and speak with Robinson. Once inside the shop, the officers saw Robinson run

towards the desk and strew a powder-like substance, in plain-view, across the top of it. They

also saw on the desk, in plain view, drug paraphernalia and a rifle. Officers then arrested

Robinson and took him outside because he was noticeably agitated and refusing to

cooperate.

¶18. The second consent Bryan gave, at issue here, occurred when the officers wanted to

reenter the shop to take a second look inside based upon what they had seen in plain view

while arresting Robinson. Investigator Jumper called a justice court judge about obtaining

a search warrant, but the judge advised her to have Bryan, as owner of the shop, sign a

“Permission to Search” form, which he did. The form allowed the officers “to conduct a

search of the premises and property, including all buildings and vehicles both inside and

outside of the property” without a search warrant. Additionally, the form gave the officers

permission to seize “any letters, papers, materials or any other property or things which they

desire as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case . . . under investigation.” The officers

then reentered the shop and searched around the desk area. They seized the powder-like

substance from the top of the desk, the clear container with powder residue attached to the

desk by a magnet, glass pipes, and other various drug paraphernalia. The trial court based

its denial of Robinson’s pro se motion to suppress on finding the officers obtained proper

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consent both to enter the shop initially and later to reenter the building to search because the

drugs were in plain view on the desk.

¶19. Robinson now claims the consent form did not apply to the desk. Robinson bases his

argument on an alleged landlord-tenant relationship between him and Bryan regarding the

search of the desk. He cites Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 612-15 (1961), for

the proposition that the search of a rented premises without a warrant, or the presence of the

tenant, based upon consent obtained only from the landlord, is unlawful, and the evidence

seized is inadmissible. Additionally, Robinson cites for support Scott v. State, 266 So. 2d

567, 569 (Miss. 1972), which held that when a person rents or possesses a room or an

apartment, it makes such a person the owner of the premises “for the time being,” who is

entitled to protections from illegal search and seizures.

¶20. Robinson maintains that he was a tenant leasing the desk from Bryan; thus, he would

be considered an “owner” of the desk and had control of the desk during the time of the

search. As owner of the desk at the time, because he did not consent, the search of the desk

was illegal in his view. Robinson also contends that since the desk was not shared, but one

he used exclusively, there was no co-tenancy arrangement, and Bryan could not give consent

to search the desk.

¶21. Bryan’s consent to search the premises, including the desk, was voluntary and valid.

Bryan was the undisputable owner of the shop and the land upon which it was situated.

There was conflicting testimony about whether Bryan or Robinson owned the desk—Bryan

testified that Robinson did not own the desk but leased it, while Investigator Jumper testified

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that she believed Robinson owned the desk. Regardless, there was no evidence presented

of a lease agreement for the desk between Bryan and Robinson, only Bryan’s vague

testimony that Robinson “basically leased” the desk. Further, the form that Bryan signed

gave officers consent to search the shop and all personal property within it.

¶22. The cases Robinson cites, Chapman and Scott, are distinguishable because they deal

with rented premises, not rented personal property, as alleged here. Bryan’s written

permission to search the building would have included the desk. Further, the powdery

substance on the desk was in plain view along with drug paraphernalia. There is no

evidence that the officers searched inside the desk’s drawers. Bryan had the authority to

consent to the search of the desk, and the officers did not exceed that scope.

¶23. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinson’s pro se motion to

suppress the evidence based upon a valid consent and plain view. Because valid consent of

the search is dispositive, we decline to address Robinson’s other arguments related to the

search of the desk.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶24. Robinson argues his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file

a motion to suppress the drugs seized without a warrant. He claims if his counsel had filed

his own motion, the trial court would have granted it and suppressed the evidence.

¶25. Whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel is a two-part

inquiry: first, “the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and

“[s]econd, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”

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Taylor v. State, 167 So. 3d 1143, 1146 (¶5) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “There is ‘a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ and that ‘the challenged action

might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Burford v. State, 320 So. 3d 502, 510 (¶13)

(Miss. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

¶26. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be addressed on direct appeal when “(1)

the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or (2) the parties

stipulate that the record is adequate to allow the appellate court to make the finding without

consideration of the findings of fact of the trial judge.” Colenburg v. State, 735 So. 2d

1099, 1101 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 841 (Miss.

1983)). The general rule, however, is that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

more appropriately raised in post-conviction collateral proceedings. Burford, 320 So. 3d at

510 (¶15). Here, even though both parties stipulate that the record is adequate for appellate

review of the issue, we find the claim would be more properly raised in post-conviction

relief proceedings regarding the search (dismantling) of the cell phone without a warrant.

Accordingly, we decline to address this part of the claim without prejudice to Robinson’s

ability to raise the argument concerning counsel’s not seeking to suppress the evidence of

LSD in the cell phone case in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief. As

previously found, though, there was no error in the trial court’s failing to suppress the

methamphetamine found on the desk; accordingly, we find no prejudice in trial counsel’s

failure to file a separate motion to suppress that evidence.

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CONCLUSION

¶27. The trial court did not err in denying Robinson’s pro se motion to suppress the drugs.

Further, Robinson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding LSD found in the

dismantled cell phone is denied without prejudice. Therefore, we affirm Robinson’s

convictions and sentences.

¶28. AFFIRMED.

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER
AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND
IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS,
J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY
McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ. WEDDLE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

WESTBROOKS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:

¶29. I concur with the majority that Robinson’s challenge to the constitutionality of the

search of his phone was not preserved for direct appeal, and I concur that his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is preserved without prejudice to his right to raise this issue

in a motion for post-conviction relief.3 I write separately to discuss briefly why the search

of the phone and discovery of the LSD was constitutionally suspect. Without a search

warrant, the officer at the scene seized Robinson’s personal phone on his desk and removed

the phone case. Inside the phone case was a $100 bill and a blotter sheet of LSD. Robinson

was ultimately convicted of possession of LSD and, for that count, sentenced to eight years

to be served consecutively to his three-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine.

The building owner’s consent to search the premises did not extend to the contents of the

3
See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(a)-(j) (Rev. 2020).

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phone case.4 And, unlike the methamphetamine residue on the desk, the contents of the

phone case were not in plain view to excuse a warrantless search and seizure.

¶30. Under the plain view doctrine, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they

view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have

a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Turnage v. State,

389 So. 3d 1073, 1080 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Walker v. State, 881 So. 2d 820,

827 (¶19) (Miss. 2024)). But “the plain view doctrine does not eliminate the requirement

that seizure of contraband discovered while in plain view must comply with the Fourth

Amendment requirements and in the absence of exigent circumstances be based on a valid

warrant.” Isaacks v. State, 350 So. 2d 1340, 1345 (Miss. 1977) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, the phone on Robinson’s desk was not apparently incriminating (unlike the

methamphetamine residue). Additionally, even when probable cause exists for obtaining a

search warrant, “probable cause does not justify a warrantless search . . . .” Id.; see also

Joyce v. State, 227 Miss. 854, 87 So. 2d 92 (1956); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.

443 (1971).

¶31. The consent of the building owner to search the premises cannot, under our

precedent, reasonably extend to the physical contents of Robinson’s phone case. Consent

to search premises may be provided by someone with common authority or co-tenancy over

the area. Hudson v. State, 475 So. 2d 156, 158-59 (Miss. 1985). But the scope of authority

for third persons to grant consent is subject to limits under an objectively reasonable

4
Robinson also maintains that probable cause did not exist to search the phone.

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standard. May v. State, 222 So. 3d 1074, 1080 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing

O’Donnell v. State, 173 So. 3d 907, 914 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)). In May, this Court

reversed a conviction after concluding that a reasonable person could not have considered

a request to remove an individual’s shoes to operate as a request to search the contents of

closed containers in the shoes. Id. Similarly, here, the building owner’s consent to search the

premises does not reasonably extend to removing the case from Robinson’s personal phone.

¶32. While the trial court did not cite the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant

requirement, the State argues on appeal that this exception would also apply to justify the

removal of the phone case. This argument is unconvincing given that “[i]n the case of a

search incident to arrest, the exception to the warrant requirement is founded upon the

reasonable concern that the arrestee might have a weapon on his person or within reach, and

that he may attempt to destroy evidence which is within his grasp.” Ferrell v. State, 649 So.

2d 831, 832-34 (Miss. 1995) (reversing and rendering a conviction of possession of illegal

substance where search of arrestee’s car occurred when arrestee was secured and handcuffed

in police vehicle). Robinson’s situation is parallel to the arrestee in Ferrell, whose

conviction was reversed and rendered because the only evidence supporting the conviction

should have been suppressed.

¶33. Search and seizure provisions are to be construed strictly in favor of the individual

and against the State. Barker v. State, 241 So. 2d 355, 358 (Miss. 1970). The search and

seizure of the evidence that supported Robinson’s conviction of possession of LSD was

constitutionally suspect. However, this issue was not preserved for direct appeal. Therefore,

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I specially concur.

McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

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