David Moody v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00407-COA

DAVID MOODY APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/01/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JON MARK WEATHERS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PERRY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL T. DAWKINS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/26/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2000, David Moody was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life

imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) without

eligibility for parole. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Moody was granted leave to file a motion to vacate his

sentence. In November 2015, Moody filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the

Perry County Circuit Court pursuant to Miller. In February 2024, the circuit court conducted

a Miller hearing for Moody. Ultimately, the court denied Moody’s PCR motion and affirmed

his sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. Aggrieved, Moody appeals.

Finding no error, this Court affirms.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Initial Conviction and Sentence

¶2. In the interest of maintaining a uniform series of events across cases, we recount this

Court’s prior factual history leading to the murders of Robbie Bond and William Hatcher.

Though there may be some dispute in the evidence as to the details of
these crimes, the larger picture of what transpired on the evening of May 14,
1995, is essentially undisputed. David Moody, then fourteen years old, and his
cousin, Kenneth Moody, discovered a young couple alone in a relatively
deserted area of Perry County. The two Moodys, acting to carry out a plan to
engage in sexual relations with the female half of the couple, Robbie Bond,
approached the couple and Kenneth proceeded to beat and stab her male
companion, William Hatcher, until he was unable to resist. Bond was also
beaten and thrown into the floorboard of the truck driven by the Moodys. After
throwing Hatcher’s body into the back of the truck, the Moodys transported the
couple to Kenneth Moody’s trailer where they dug a deep pit to dispose of
Hatcher’s apparently lifeless body. Kenneth then proceeded to accomplish his
original purpose by raping Bond. According to the State, David Moody also
raped Bond at that time; however, David Moody testified that he was being
coerced by his cousin at that point and that he merely simulated the act of
sexual intercourse in order to satisfy his cousin’s demands. To some extent,
this claim is corroborated by the fact that DNA testing on bodily fluids
recovered from the body of Bond excluded David Moody as the donor of any
fluid samples recovered.
In all events, the cousins subsequently bound Bond and, leaving her at
the trailer, returned to the scene of the original abduction and attempted to
destroy any evidence of what had transpired. After returning to Kenneth
Moody’s trailer, the Moodys forced a running water hose down the young
woman’s throat in a ghastly attempt to kill her by drowning. This attempt was
apparently unsuccessful, since there was testimony that Kenneth Moody
proceeded to violently strike Bond in the head with some object before
throwing her into the same pit holding the body of her companion, William
Hatcher.
David Moody[’s] . . . defense consisted chiefly of the assertion that his
participation was coerced by threats from his cousin that, if he refused to go
along, he would meet the same dismal fate as the young couple. The jury,
apparently unpersuaded by David Moody’s claim of duress, convicted him of
murder in the commission of the felony of rape in the homicide death of
Robbie Bond, and of accessory after the fact of capital murder in the death of

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William Hatcher.

Moody v. State, 838 So. 2d 324, 327-28 (¶¶2-5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). David was sentenced

to life imprisonment in the custody of MDOC without eligibility for parole. He appealed his

sentence, and this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal in 2002. Id.

II. Procedural Posture

¶3. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(2012), a landmark decision holding that “mandatory-sentencing schemes” requiring

“children convicted of homicide [to] receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of

parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes”

was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 489; see U.S. Const. amend. VIII. On

December 10, 2014, the Mississippi Supreme Court granted Moody’s request for leave to file

a motion to vacate his sentence.

¶4. On November 30, 2015, Moody filed a PCR motion in the Perry County Circuit Court,

requesting relief pursuant to Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. On March 30, 2016, the State filed a

response to Moody’s PCR motion. The response acknowledged David’s age and the terms

of his sentence. In so stating, the State requested a re-sentencing for David and specifically

recommended his sentence be amended to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole. Over

the course of the next several years, the court granted motions from David to appoint counsel

and authorized funds for him to obtain an expert in psychology and a mitigation investigator.

On February 6, 2024, the successor district attorney filed a response that shifted from the

State’s previous position and advocated for David’s sentence to be upheld and opposed

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parole eligibility.

III. Miller Hearing

¶5. The circuit court conducted a Miller hearing for David from February 12-14, 2024.

At the start of the hearing, the State and the defense stipulated to the introduction of eighty-

one exhibits, including the full trial transcript from 2000, education and medical records, rule

violation reports (RVRs) from MDOC, an affidavit from Kenneth Moody, and various

documents, recordings, and photographs. The hearing also consisted of testimony from

several witnesses.

a. Gloria Graham

¶6. David first called his aunt Gloria Graham to testify. Gloria testified that her sister

Carol (David’s mother) married David Earl Moody (Earl), who was “very abusive” toward

her. Carol began abusing alcohol during her first pregnancy and continued to drink as the

children grew. Gloria testified that before the crimes, David was “happy” and “sweet” but

also “mischievous.” She paid David a sum of money to receive a GED. The State

questioned Gloria on whether she had ever personally observed David being physically

abused by Carol, to which Gloria admitted she had not. She also testified that David

experienced symptoms of attention deficit disorder (ADHD) growing up. Gloria maintained

“[a]s much contact as [she] could” with David after he was incarcerated but was unaware of

his behavior while in prison.

b. Annis Moody

¶7. David’s sister Annis also provided testimony. Annis recalled that their father was “a

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drug addict” but “loved us in his own way.” Following their parents’ divorce, their mother

began seeing a “bunch of men,” and Annis stated most of them were “drunks or abusers[.]”

Annis testified that David was her “protector” and “safe point” within the family and was “a

good big brother[.]” She recalled attending school with David where she assumed

“everybody loved him.” He treated her and the girls he was around “respectful[ly]” and

“didn’t like bullies.” She recalled that David received checks after being “diagnosed with

schizophrenia[.]” She stated that her mother lost custody of them after one of her boyfriend’s

molested her. Annis was aware of David talking about wanting to kill that man. Kenneth

Moody was Annis’s cousin, and she was afraid of him, stating that he had “scary sides to

him” and that Kenneth had a habit of huffing gasoline. She also recalled that “[d]uring

Davey’s trial, Perry County allowed Perry County high school, the whole senior class” to sit

in the balcony to watch. She stated that she witnessed Kenneth threaten and fight David “all

the time.” But overall, she knew that her brother “could have never hurt someone like that

for no reason whatsoever” and that he had to have been acting “in fear for his life and he

might have done stuff Kenneth told him to do.”

c. William Robinson

¶8. David then called his uncle William Robinson to testify. William recounted that his

and David’s mother, Carol, had alcoholic parents but were “very lovable.” William moved

out of their shared family home when he was eight years old. William testified that he

“believe[d] with all my heart and soul” that Carol loved her kids but that she also struggled

with alcohol problems. Carol and Earl’s children “had a rough life coming up,” and he

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observed drugs and alcohol when he visited. Carol and Earl would “melt these pain pills

down and shoot them, inject them[,]” calling it “the bathtub.” William stated that it was

“unbelievable” how Earl would act when he ran out of drugs, and he witnessed Earl

physically abuse Carol once as a result. “He was a good guy as long as he had his dope” but

also made Carol “go get a tooth pulled to get drugs.” He recalled that David and his siblings

grew up in a “horrible” environment and “slept on a mattress on the floor.” But overall he

had “very little” contact with David. Regarding the murders, William thought David “was

eleven years old when all this went down” and only recently discovered he was actually

fourteen at the time. He described David as “a little bitty fellow.” William also mentioned

Michael Lee, whom Kenneth had “killed . . . prior to the two kids on the bridge[.]” William

stated that at the time of the double murders, “nobody knew about the Michael Lee boy that

was killed prior.” William was with the fire department searching the river when the search

was “called off” after David “finally got away from somebody and went and told what

happened.”

d. Michael Joe Robinson

¶9. Michael Joe Robinson, David’s half-brother, also provided testimony. He testified

that their mother, Carol, “chose other things over her children every day” such as alcohol and

men. Michael Joe lived with Kenneth and Doug (Kenneth’s father) for certain periods of

time. He stated that “everybody knew [Kenneth] was dangerous.” He continued,

“[e]verybody was afraid of Kenneth,” but he was their only source of transportation. David

only hung around with him because “he didn’t have nowhere else to hang out.” Michael Joe

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testified that Kenneth made lewd comments about women and “would always brag about

being able to do whatever he wanted to do.” He discussed sexually assaulting women.

Michael Joe testified that David told him about the murders one night but expressed he was

afraid to tell “[b]ecause Kenneth told him that if he told anybody, [Kenneth] was going to kill

him . . . [k]ill whoever it was.” Michael Joe and David rode to Forrest County with their aunt

BJ (who was also Michael Lee’s sister-in-law), and David admitted Kenneth committed both

murders on the bridge and had previously killed Michael Lee. David cried when he told

Michael Joe and was very scared. When he, David, and BJ arrived in Hattiesburg, they saw

a police car in the parking lot and immediately went to inform the officer what happened.

Michael Joe stated that he had been told the events of the murder by multiple people, but

“nobody sa[id] he was an active participant” in what happened. He also stated that David

told him that Kenneth “tried to make” David rape the female victim, but “he couldn’t rape

her.” On cross-examination, the State suggested that David had a few days before he told

Michael Joe in which he could have told someone else what happened. Michael Joe stated

that David just did not know what to do and was scared of Kenneth.

e. Sheriff Billy McGee

¶10. Former Forrest County Sheriff Billy McGee also provided testimony. He recalled

meeting David in the parking lot of the police department when David approached him.

Sheriff McGee stated that he had a woman with him and a boy “a little bit older” who “kept

screaming at him, ‘You don’t have to tell him a damn thing. You don’t have to talk to him.’”

David still spoke with Sheriff McGee and told him he “kn[e]w something about that incident

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on the bridge.” Sheriff McGee testified that he was not actually aware of the crime at the

time but allowed David to continue speaking. Regarding David’s demeanor, McGee recalled

that “[h]e was a wreck[,] . . . trembling and crying.” Sheriff McGee testified the following:

[H]e related the story of being with his older cousin I think. They had been to
a family function, I think, and then they had left riding around together and
drinking beer. And they went across the Mahned bridge and they saw a couple
on the bridge. And he stopped and offered them beer, which they refused, so
he went on down the bridge and then turned around and stopped. And David
-- I mean the older cousin told him, “I want some -- I’m going to get some of
that.” They started back by and he said when we were almost even with the
two kids on the bridge, that he bailed out of the truck and started beating the
fire out of the male and stabbing him. And she jumped up and ran, so he went
to her at that point and I think he beat her into submission and came back.
[David] didn’t get out of the truck until he was ordered to get out of the truck
and sit with the female. They loaded them up in a vehicle and I think one was
in the back of the truck and maybe put one in the floor board. Anyway, they
went to his uncle's house and unloaded them. The male appeared to be dead
according to David. But the female was still moaning and groaning. At that
time [Kenneth] told her, “If you’ll make it good to me, I’ll take you to the
doctor.” And then he raped her and he told David, “You've got to rape her.”
. . . [H]e got on top of Robbie because he knew that the older cousin would
kill him if he didn’t. But he was so afraid that he couldn't have any kind of
penetration.

Sheriff McGee testified that he believed then, and at the time of his testimony, that David

was telling the truth about the events. He also recounted David saying, “Every time I close

my eyes, I see that lady and I can’t stand it.” Once David finished his account to McGee, he

had him go inside and talk to Detective Danny Rigel. David signed a Miranda waiver1 and

told his story to the police knowingly and voluntarily.

¶11. As for his own thoughts, Sheriff McGee called the case:

the biggest injustice of any case. A travesty of justice of any case I worked in

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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my 44-year career. And I told everybody prior to the trial that had anything to
do with the trial once he was charged, that I thought it was horrible. No more
actual physical part that he played in it other than sitting by somebody and
ordered by the older guy to help load them in and ordered unload them. In my
mind, he had nothing to do with the killing of anybody.

Sheriff McGee also recounted informing David,

I believe the story that you’ve told. But I want you to know that if you raped
that woman, there is a test that they can do. And if your semen is in that
woman, nobody is going to believe another thing that you say about this case.”
And [David] said, “I promise I didn’t rape that woman.”

Sheriff McGee noted that the evidence at trial showed the victim had no trace of semen from

David.

f. Sheriff Daniel Harold Rigel

¶12. Present-day Lamar County Sheriff Daniel Harold Rigel testified that he was an officer

with the Hattiesburg Police Department at the time of the crimes. David was brought to

Sheriff Rigel after speaking with Sheriff McGee and informed him he had information on

“what happened to the people on the bridge.” Sheriff Rigel read David his Miranda rights

and asked him multiple times to make sure he was consenting to waive them before signing

the authorization forms. “Initially,” Sheriff Rigel stated David “just talked” and “went

through the whole thing.” Once David gave his account of events, Sheriff Rigel asked him

“just to answer some questions that he didn’t cover.” Sheriff Rigel reiterated that David was

not a suspect at the time of this meeting and only became a suspect after admitting to his

involvement.

¶13. David also gave Sheriff Rigel the location of where the bodies were buried. After the

authorities had trouble finding them based on his statement, David personally showed them

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the location. Sheriff Rigel’s notes indicated that Kenneth “told David if [he] didn’t rape

her, he would bury [David] along with her. David raped her too. Kenneth tied her up with

jumper cables and a chain.” Sheriff Rigel clarified that he did not go over the definition of

rape with David during their conversation. He testified that David showed “[v]ery little

emotion” when relaying his story and did not provide an explanation for why it took him four

days to come forward. A video of this interview was part of the evidence previously

admitted and played during Sheriff Rigel’s testimony.

g. Dana Moore

¶14. Dana Moore, a friend and coworker of victims Bond and Hatcher, became concerned

when Hatcher did not show up for work and Bond did not answer her door. Moore knew the

pair had gone to the bridge the previous evening, so she went with a couple of others to look

for them. Once they arrived, they found Hatcher’s truck and Bond’s necklace near a knife

blade. That evening, Moore and several others went back to the bridge before deciding they

would call the police. While there, Kenneth drove by in his white pickup truck and asked

with “no expression” whose truck had been left on the bridge. Moore added that a “little

smirk came across [Kenneth’s] face” as he asked, and he showed “[n]o real concern,”

appearing “kind of cold and distant.”

¶15. After the bodies were found and the case proceeded to trial, Moore began seeing a

counselor and “found forgiveness” for David and Kenneth. She wrote letters to both David

and Kenneth through the MDOC victim/offender program. Both of them responded to her,

but Kenneth “made it pretty clear he didn’t want anything else.” However, David continued

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to correspond with Moore “over a period of time,” and she would visit him in prison to “ask

him questions that [she] had been carrying around” for years. Moore described David as

“apologetic” and exhibited “no hostility or anything like that.” She stated he also “would

draw pictures for [her,]” and they would talk about “things going on in the world.” Moore

corresponded with David for approximately five years. She asked the circuit court to grant

David parole eligibility.

h. Kelly Hatcher

¶16. Kelly Hatcher, sister of the victim William Hatcher, also provided testimony. Kelly

recalled that before David came forward, her brother was suspected of killing Bond and fled.

She stated that “had David not confessed, we still to this day would not know where

[Hatcher] or Robbie [were], what happened to them.” The State made a motion to strike

Kelly’s testimony when she concluded because it was “not relevant to why we are here.” The

circuit judge stated that he would take that motion under advisement.2

i. Dr. Beverly Smallwood

¶17. Dr. Beverly Smallwood was tendered as an expert in forensic psychology without

objection. She testified that while there was evidence of malingering—feigning illness—in

David’s file, it did not have an effect on her opinion of his truthfulness when speaking with

her. Smallwood evaluated David in 1995 and again in 2000 before his trial, having multiple

“conversations” and “clinical interviews.” She “experienced some distress when he got life

without parole because he was a young man that had been in a horrific situation.” David had

2
The circuit court did not address the motion again and discussed Kelly’s testimony
only very briefly in its final judgment.

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“most certainly experienced trauma in his family and childhood growing up,” and “this crime

and the experiences around that were traumatic as well.” In her initial evaluation, she

described David as “high on anxiety[,]” “tended to be more than the average person

dependent on the influence or the approval of others.” She stated, “[O]n a sadistic scale and

on the sociopathy” scale, David was “low” in both evaluations she conducted. Smallwood

noticed from her 1995 evaluation and the 2000 evaluation, David’s “dependency scale was

down,” and he “had made a personal determination never to let anybody control him again.”

In compiling her report, she also viewed David’s records from school and a mental health

institution. This process involved “interview[ing] people who have the ability to verify

whether what he had said about his family was true” and speaking with law enforcement,

taking “into account that David had voluntarily gone to law enforcement with the story.”

Smallwood also attempted to testify about the DNA evidence and how it related to her report,

but an objection by the State was sustained.

¶18. She visited David more recently and testified that “he was in pretty good shape” as

compared to other people she spoke with who were in prison for multiple years. David was

“pretty stable” and “had optimism[,]” reporting “that he had found ways to try to do some

good where he was.” He also informed her that Kenneth “had written a letter that said that

he had forced him to do what he did.” The factual representations between 1995 and 2023

were “consistent.” Smallwood noted that Dr. Lott’s report was “excellent,” except she would

have added that David had a “tumultuous family situation basically all of his life” and “had

been using drugs and alcohol since [being] basically a toddler.” David “was not taught how

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to make choices” and “did not have healthy role models at all[.]” She also stated that the

video of David’s interview with Sheriff Rigel demonstrated a lack of emotions, but there

were multiple explanations for that, such as the “emotion becom[ing] overwhelming.”

Smallwood concluded that at the time of the crimes, David was “very immature” and “did

not have the maturity then even [of] the average fourteen-year-old.” Smallwood also

testified, over an objection from the State, that she believed David suffered from “post-

traumatic stress disorder.” The judge acknowledged the objection and would consider it in

making his decision.

¶19. Smallwood testified that when she interviewed David in 1995, he was “distraught[,]”

both “[c]rying” and “shaking[,]” showing “physiological[] . . . signs of anxiety and grief.”

In 2000, David acted in “[t]he same way.” On cross-examination, the State suggested

Smallwood’s report to be “very personal[,]” and she stated that although the case “stir[red]

emotions” in her, “the things that [she] put in [her] report came on observation and

validation.” Smallwood clarified again that she did not conduct a Miller-type evaluation

because Dr. Lott had already done so. She agreed that David knew “right from wrong” at all

times throughout the crime. Smallwood stated that she was aware David had “a lot of RVRs”

but did not know the specifics of any of them. However, she did not believe any of the

violations affected his ability to be rehabilitated “[b]ecause rule violations in a prison culture

are not uncommon at all.”

j. Emmitt Sparkman

¶20. Emmitt Sparkman, a corrections officer, superintendent, and deputy commissioner at

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Parchman for several years of his career, also offered testimony. Following a voir dire

conducted by the State, Sparkman was accepted as a corrections expert. Sparkman stated he

“wasn’t familiar” with David and did not view him as a problem inmate. He interviewed

David on two occasions, once in April 2019 and again in May 2022. Sparkman noted that

while there was evidence of David’s involvement with a gang in prison, approximately “30%

of the individuals” in the system were also affiliated with gangs. Sparkman detailed the

reasons inmates might want to join a gang and pressure they might face should they choose

not to join. It was his opinion that David was “one of the individuals that get manipulated

into joining a gang.” David was categorized as a “low level affiliate” with gang activity.

¶21. Officially, David was within the “medium custody range” meaning he was contained

in general population and posed a “medium risk.” He was initially identified as a “close

custody” inmate but was “promoted” to “medium custody” because of his “positive

adjustment in the prison system[.]” Of his twenty-four years incarcerated, David spent

twenty-two of them in general population. Sparkman testified that it appeared David was

identified as having mental health needs, but at one point he had been taken off his

medication by the prison psychiatrist and transferred out of the facility typically housing

inmates with mental health concerns. After reviewing his record in 2022, Sparkman

requested MDOC perform an assessment, which led to David being moved back to the

facility for individuals with mental health issues.

¶22. On cross-examination, the court heard that David’s RVRs involved “inappropriate

demonstration of sexual behavior,” such as “masturbating on [his] cell bars” and threatening

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an officer, “B***h, if I had a knife, I’d chop your motherf*****g head off.” David also was

noted to have had cellular devices and approximately twelve shanks in his possession

“throughout his tenure” in prison. Sparkman testified that he did not believe David to be an

inmate incapable of rehabilitation.

k. Patricia Taylor

¶23. Patricia Taylor was called as David’s next witness, and the State objected to her

testimony due to hearsay. The court allowed Taylor to testify but acknowledged that any sort

of hearsay would not be admissible. Taylor stated that her son was a cellmate with David,

and David’s positive influence and behavior “gave her back her son” over the past few

months. Taylor credited David for her own son’s desire to get clean. She also noted that she

was not asked to testify at the hearing but did so voluntarily.

l. Dr. William Chriss Lott

¶24. Dr. William Chriss Lott was, by stipulation, certified as an expert in clinical and

forensic psychology. Dr. Lott evaluated David utilizing the Miller factors, which involved

reviewing “a large body of records[,]” such as discovery, information “pertaining to the

arrest[,]” “mental health records,” “educational records,” “legal records and . . . correctional

records.” Following this review, Dr. Lott conducted a “clinical interview” with David,

reviewing his background and performing “basic personality testing and intellectual

testing[,]” evaluating his current mental status, and, afterwards, “attempt[ing] to contact

collateral sources” with information.

¶25. Dr. Lott met with David three times, twice in 2019 and once in early 2024 before the

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hearing, spending “12 to 16 hours” with him. Dr. Lott testified that David was diagnosed

with ADHD. David scored in the “average to above average range in the intellectual

assessment” and in the “average to high average range” for reading comprehension. As for

David’s personality tests, “he responded consistently” and “presented himself in a somewhat

overly negative manner” compared to other takers who “tend to present overly positively.”

David had “significant elevations on the scales assessing anxiety and depression and some

thought dysfunction[,]” seeming to be “very anxious” and “very paranoid times” at times.

Additionally, David evidenced “significant elevations” in hostility and “had difficulties with

interpersonal relationships.” Dr. Lott continued with his Miller evaluation as detailed

below.3 His report was also introduced into evidence.

i. Chronological Age

¶26. Dr. Lott explained the first factor, chronological age, involved considering the

correlation between adolescents and “problems with impulsivity, impetuosity, [and] risk

taking.” In addition, the factor requires taking into account the “significant differences in

brain development for adolescents[,]” which “puts adolescents at much greater risk” for

behavior like impulsivity and overreacting. Dr. Lott testified that David’s chronological age

of fourteen years old was a “huge factor[,]” as the age is a “very critical . . . very influential

or malleable period as an adolescent.” David was especially impulsive due to circumstances

out of his control, such as his family life and ADHD.

ii. Family and Home Environment

3
Dr. Lott did not explicitly address the fourth Miller factor. See infra ¶37.

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¶27. Dr. Lott quoted from research, “It is clear that adverse childhood experiences have a

profound, proportionate and long-lasting effect” on one’s “emotional state[.]” Dr. Lott listed

several instances of adverse childhood experiences David endured, such as his parents’

substance abuse and incarceration of “several” family members. David was “clearly

neglected both physically and emotionally by both parents[.]” He lacked safety and security

as a consequence and did not have a figure in his life he “could trust consistently.”

iii. Circumstances of the Offense

¶28. As for the circumstances of the crimes, Dr. Lott opined that “David was no different”

than other adolescents of his age in that he was “heavily peer invested” and tended to “do

things to get approval.” At the age of fourteen, David “idolized” Kenneth, gearing his “basic

self-esteem or self-concept” toward Kenneth’s approval.

iv. Possibility of Rehabilitation

¶29. Dr. Lott then addressed David’s potential for rehabilitation. He noted that David had

“the intellectual capacity to get out and function in any number of jobs” and to continue his

education to “function in any number of professional activities.” David had served as a tutor

in the prison system and had held various other positions. As for areas of concern, Dr. Lott

referenced David’s rule violations while incarcerated “reflect[ed] some issues with

impulsivity and immaturity” and his “longstanding history of substance abuse” within the

prison system. The risk, Dr. Lott opined, was high “for needing treatment” at some point for

a relapse of substance abuse, and David would require a “significant level of support” if

released. David rested his case at the close of Dr. Lott’s testimony.

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m. Kenneth Moody

¶30. After David rested his case, the State called Kenneth Moody as a witness.

Immediately upon taking the stand, Kenneth invoked his Fifth Amendment right and refused

to testify. The circuit judge admonished Kenneth to answer to no avail. The court declared

Kenneth an unavailable witness pursuant to Rule 804 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.

n. Andy Davis

¶31. The court permitted the State to call Investigator Andy Davis with the Forrest and

Perry County district attorney’s office for testimony as a result of Kenneth’s refusal to testify.

Davis recently accompanied the State to a meeting in the Forrest County jail with Kenneth.

He agreed that the questions Kenneth had been asked on direct examination were of the same

nature as the questions that he answered in the meeting. Davis prepared a written

memorandum following the meeting with Kenneth, effectively summarizing “everything”

that had been discussed. The memo was entered into evidence for identification purposes

only. Davis stated that Kenneth “explained that he had had a run-in with some Gangster

Disciples while he was in prison and . . . was in fear [for] his life.” Kenneth also stated that

his contraband cell phone had died, and he did not have a charger. Kenneth asked David for

his charger, and David allegedly told Kenneth he “would have to write an affidavit trying to

exonerate him in this case” in exchange for the charger. Kenneth agreed.

¶32. At the meeting with the State in the jail, Kenneth stated that his affidavit “was not

true.” He said that “he did not threaten David” during the commission of the crimes but

“could see where David might have felt threatened.” However, David made comments

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“about doing some things” when they initially approached the bridge and saw Robbie and

Hatcher. Kenneth stated that while he was “handling [Hatcher,]” David “chased Robbie

down and held her on the bridge.” As for the rape of Robbie, Kenneth stated “that he didn’t

know that David actually penetrated Robbie,” but “he was on top of her going through the

motions.” He also claimed, “David was the one that actually hit Robbie in the head with a

sledgehammer” after the water hose torture occurred. Kenneth recounted that on the day

following their commission of the crimes, David was “bragging to his brother Michael Joe

about what they had done the night before.” Kenneth also commented that the crimes would

not have occurred “but for David.”4 Following Davis’s testimony, the State rested, and

David did not call any witnesses in rebuttal, concluding the hearing.

IV. Final Sentencing and Appeal

¶33. On March 1, 2024, the circuit court entered its final judgment. The court’s decision

noted that only one Miller factor weighed in favor of parole eligibility (family and home

environment); one was neutral (incompetencies of youth); and the other three weighed

against parole eligibility (chronological age, circumstances of the offense, and possibility of

rehabilitation). We discuss the three factors that weighed against parole eligibility in the

discussion portion of this opinion. The circuit court concluded,

[T]his was not a spur of the moment event, like the classic example of a
shooting involved robbery at a convenience store. This was a sustained series
of heinous crimes over the course of several hours involving brutalization,
rape, torture and the murder of two people. David Moody actively participated
in these crimes and failed to report them during the hours when Robbie Bond

4
The court noted in its final judgment that it did not consider Davis’s testimony in
reaching its determination.

19
could have been saved. Instead, he waited four days after her death to contact
law enforcement.

Again, the court noted it did not consider the hearsay testimony given by Investigator Davis

when making his decision. David’s PCR motion was ultimately denied. He appealed on

March 29, 2024.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶34. “[T]here are two applicable standards of review in a Miller case.” Chandler v. State,

242 So. 3d 65, 68 (¶7) (Miss. 2018). “First, whether the trial court applied the correct legal

standard is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Id. (citing Smothers v. State, 741

So. 2d 205, 206 (Miss. 1999)). “If the trial court applied the proper legal standard, its

sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Hampton v. State, 148

So. 3d 992, 998 (¶16) (Miss. 2014)).

DISCUSSION

¶35. David argues that the circuit court erred in its consideration of the Miller factors by

denying his PCR motion. In addition, he contends that his sentence is unconstitutional

because he “did not plan, intend, or commit the act of murder” of the victims. We address

these arguments in turn.

I. Miller Factors

¶36. Again, Miller is a Supreme Court decision which held that “mandatory-sentencing

schemes” requiring “children convicted of homicide [to] receive lifetime incarceration

without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the

nature of their crimes” are a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489;

20
see U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The crux of David’s appeal before this Court rests upon the

Miller holding, which was adopted by our state supreme court in Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d

987 (Miss. 2013). And while Miller did bring an end to juveniles being sentenced under a

statutorily mandated term of “life without parole,” the decision “does not prohibit sentences

of life without parole for juvenile offenders.” Parker, 119 So. 3d at 995 (¶19). “Rather, it

requires the sentencing authority to take into account how children are different, and how

those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id.

(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480).

¶37. To reach this decision, the United States Supreme Court identified five factors the

sentencing authority must consider. Those five factors were later adopted by the Mississippi

Supreme Court in Parker.5 Those factors include:

(1) chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) family and
home environment that surrounds the defendant; (3) circumstances of the
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him; (4) that he might
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation.

Dotson v. State, 328 So. 3d 659, 667 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at

477-78; Parker, 119 So. 3d at 995-96, 998 (¶¶19, 26)). David calls attention to three factors

in particular: chronological age, circumstances of the crime committed, and possibility of

rehabilitation. He argues the circuit court judge erred when he weighed those factors and

ultimately ruled against parole eligibility.

5
Parker, 119 So. 3d at 995-96, 998 (¶¶19, 26).

21
¶38. Before addressing those factors individually, this Court notes that David’s argument

partly involves an assertion that the circuit court utilized “the wrong legal standard” in terms

of its review of his chronological age. In reality, David’s argument asserts the circuit court

inappropriately weighed the chronological-age factor. In Parker, the Mississippi Supreme

Court instructed, “the sentencing judge must conduct a hearing and consider the several

factors that the Miller opinion identified as relevant to the sentencing decision.” Chandler,

242 So. 3d at 68 (¶¶8-9). David was allowed to hire a mitigation expert who testified at the

Miller hearing at the taxpayers’ expense. The circuit court held a Miller hearing over the

course of three days, see supra ¶¶5-32. The Miller factors were explicitly referred to in the

attorneys’ examinations of expert witnesses and served as the groundwork for the entire

proceeding. Finally, the circuit court issued a written decision discussing the Miller factors

and their application to the case.6

a. Chronological Age

¶39. David first argues that the judge erred by disregarding the mitigating significance of

the first Miller factor after finding David was of an average intelligence level. The final

judgment indeed stated that “David’s age was not a significant factor in his ability to

distinguish between right and wrong due to the factual circumstances of this case.” But that

6
Trial courts are only required to “take into account and consider the factors
identified in Miller before sentencing.” Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 68 (¶9) (citing Miller, 567
U.S. at 480; Parker, 119 So. 3d at 995, 998 (¶¶19, 26)). “[N]othing in Miller or Parker
requires trial courts to issue findings on each factor or limits trial courts to considerations
strictly personal to the juvenile offender.” Id. This Court notes, then, that the circuit court
here absolutely “exceeded the minimum requirements of Miller and Parker by specifically
identifying every Miller factor in its order” and took the additional step of providing a
detailed analysis as to each factor. See id. at 70 (¶16).

22
statement is backed up and followed by approximately three pages of the court’s reasoning

for that finding.

¶40. The court recognized that David’s participation was “lengthy” and “over an extended

period of time[,]” rather than, “for example, a snap decision to take the life of an individual

in a high-pressured situation.” The court noted that David had “at least two periods of time

alone with Robbie[,]” outside of Kenneth and his threats, “where she was still alive.” David

“sat with Robbie to prevent her from leaving the bridge” and assisted Kenneth in binding her,

loading her into Kenneth’s vehicle, and transporting her to the trailer. David assisted

Kenneth in digging graves and burying both bodies, watched and did nothing as Kenneth

forced a water hose down Robbie’s throat and ran the water for several minutes, and

“mounted Robbie” after being instructed to rape her by Kenneth. The judge even discussed

the proximity of approximately nineteen residential homes to the crime scenes and

emphasized David’s failure to flee or attempt to seek help at any of those homes. Robbie

was forced to fight “for her own life by shielding her face and chest with her arms,” and the

court was “not persuaded that a fourteen-year-old with David’s intelligence and the ability

to tell right from wrong would be unmoved by the victim in these terrible circumstances.”

¶41. Nothing in the circuit court’s order suggests that David’s chronological age was

considered any less than the remaining Miller factors. Rather, the circuit judge found the

factor to be insignificant following a thorough analysis recounting numerous details as to

David’s participation in the subject crimes. It is undisputed that David was fourteen years old

at the time the crimes were committed. But that is not enough on its own to weigh in favor

23
of parole eligibility, for “no rebuttable presumption exists in favor of parole eligibility for

juvenile homicide offenders.” Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 69-70 (¶15) (emphasis added). After

reviewing the circuit judge’s analysis of the first factor, this Court finds no evidence of any

abuse of discretion.

b. Circumstances of the Offense

¶42. The horrific circumstances of Hatcher’s death and Robbie’s rape, torture, and death

have been recounted in detail, see supra ¶2. David argues that he was a juvenile “active” in

the crime “but not a willing accomplice,” and his denial of parole eligibility would be the

state’s “first Miller case affirming [life without parole] for someone who did not kill or plan

the murder.” But regardless of David’s story, he was convicted of capital murder. That

verdict was reached by a jury of David’s peers who observed the evidence presented in full.

The circuit judge heard all of David’s Miller hearing testimony and reviewed the evidence.

Overall, the judge was simply “not persuaded that David was a terrified bystander who bears

diminished responsibility for these crimes.”

¶43. After detailing the gruesome facts of the case, the judge concluded that “David

actively participated in [the] crimes by sitting with [Robbie] to prevent her from leaving the

bridge while his cousin Kenneth killed William Hatcher[; by] placing her into the vehicle in

such a manner that she could not flag down any passing vehicle for help; [by] transporting

her to [the] trailer; [by] watching Kenneth beat, rape and torture her with a water hose; [by]

removing his clothes and climbing on top of Robbie Bond; [and by] burying the bodies of

Robbie Bond and William Hatcher and helping hide and/or destroy the evidence of these

24
crimes.”

¶44. The circuit judge did state that David should be “commended” for coming forward

to report the crimes to the police. But in the end, this singular favorable fact was overcome

by David’s “active participa[tion]” and failure to report the crimes when Robbie was still

alive and could have been rescued. This Court recognizes the circuit court’s vast discretion

in sentencing and finds no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s determination that this

Miller factor weighs in favor of life without parole. It is not this Court’s responsibility to

determine whether David was or was not a terrified bystander. Rather, we are tasked with

reviewing the decision made by the circuit court for an abuse of discretion, if any. Owens

v. State, 17 So. 3d 628, 632 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing the circuit court’s

“complete discretion in sentencing” (quoting Vardaman v. State, 966 So. 2d 885, 891 (¶28)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). The court’s decision to weigh this factor against David’s parole

eligibility was not baseless by any means.

c. Possibility of Rehabilitation

¶45. Finally, David asserts that the circuit court erred by determining the rehabilitation

factor did not weigh in favor of parole eligibility. He takes particular issue with the court’s

consideration of his background prior to the commission of the crimes. Indeed, the court

references the incident in which ten-year-old David “was found intending to smother his

mother’s boyfriend with a pillow.” David was also treated “for having ideations of killing

people” in the year before the bridge murders. There is no indication as to whether the

possibility of rehabilitation factor must only be based upon a defendant’s incarcerated

25
behavior only. Further, the circuit court’s decision was not merely based upon David’s

previous ideation of murdering his mother’s boyfriend. The court’s order also heavily

mentioned David’s behavior while in MDOC’s custody.

¶46. The court’s order consisted of a thorough recounting of the evidence presented for this

factor. David “joined the Simon City Royals gang” after being incarcerated. The record on

appeal showed “at least sixty-six rule violations” attributed to David while he has been in

jail. Those violations include violent behavior such as physically striking an officer,

threatening an officer that he would “chop [their] motherf*****g head off,” possessing

approximately twenty shanks over the course of ten years, and possessing at least seven

contraband cell phones. As with the previous factors, the court recognized David’s positive

accomplishments as well, such as tutoring other inmates, completing anger management

programs, and assisting a life skills teacher. However, “these achievements [we]re not

enough to make a determination that David can be rehabilitated.”

¶47. We are not tasked with determining whether rehabilitation is possible for David. We

are evaluating whether the court’s decision that the factor weighed against David was an

abuse of discretion. This Court finds no abuse of discretion because David’s gang activity,

threats, possession of makeshift weapons, “difficulty interacting with authority figures[,]”

and risk for recidivism all support the circuit court’s conclusion. See Booker v. State, 349

So. 3d 756, 768 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (finding substantial evidence to show

rehabilitation was not likely, partly based upon a record evidencing “a series of rules

violations for fighting, possessing and using drugs, refusing to obey orders, and possessing

26
shanks, gang-related material, and other contraband”).

II. Degree of Culpability

¶48. David contends that because he “did not plan, intend, or commit the act of murder”

of the victims, his sentence is unconstitutional. He specifically points to the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), which stated,

“[T]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile

offender who did not commit homicide.” Id. (emphasis added). David argues the jury was

instructed that if the evidence led them to a finding that David “was present and intended to

give any assistance . . . or that he in fact rendered any assistance” to Kenneth, they should

return a verdict of guilty. However, this contention misrepresents Graham and the crimes

for which David was convicted.

¶49. Graham indeed held that sentencing a juvenile “who did not commit homicide” to life

without parole was a constitutional violation. Id. Nonhomicide offenders were described

as “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken” and

“categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.”

Id. at 69 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.

782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).

¶50. In David’s case, Robbie saw two unknown males (one of whom was David) jump out

of a truck that had passed the victims earlier and turned around for the specific purpose of

“get[ting] some of that.” Kenneth immediately attacked Hatcher, and Robbie tried to run

away. David ran after her and restrained her while her companion was murdered. David

27
assisted in moving both her and the body of her recently deceased companion into a vehicle

to be taken to a second location (passing approximately nineteen houses on the way without

making any attempt to get help). He watched Kenneth rape her, and then David got “on top

of her” and either raped or simulated raping her. Next, he was present for and watched as

a water hose was shoved down Robbie’s throat in an effort to drown her. When that was

unsuccessful, he either watched Kenneth kill Robbie with a sledgehammer to the head or

delivered the blow himself.

¶51. We are not deciding in this case whether David was the actual killer. A jury convicted

David of capital murder. He is, as far as the law is concerned, a murderer. That verdict

was based partly upon evidence of David’s own statements made to others and to the

authorities, as well as a video recording of his interview with the police. This is not David’s

chance to relitigate the facts of the offense or attempt to prove his innocence. “[W]hen a

PCR petitioner . . . receives permission to proceed with a Miller-based claim in the trial

court, what is going on is not resentencing.” Id. (citing Wharton v. State, 298 So. 3d 921,

928 (Miss. 2019)). “Rather, the petitioner is being given the opportunity to show that, under

application of the Miller factors, the offender’s life-without-parole sentence is

unconstitutional.” Id.

¶52. In sum, David was not involved in a nonhomicide offense as referenced in Graham.

He was instead involved in a criminal offense in which a jury determined he was guilty of

capital murder and accessory after the fact to capital murder. David cannot be present, help

carry out in full a design to kill, and avoid the consequences or circumvent accountability of

28
the law by arguing he was not the one who delivered the final killing blow. He knew

Kenneth was killing Hatcher when, instead of allowing Robbie to escape, David chased her

down, brought her back to the first murder scene, held her against her will, helped transport

her to another murder scene when Robbie Bond was raped, tortured, and murdered—all with

David’s assistance and participation. The jury convicted him of capital murder. His offense

is not one contemplated under Graham v. Florida; therefore, this issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶53. Our supreme court has held “that no rebuttable presumption exists in favor of parole

eligibility for juvenile homicide offenders.” Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 69-70 (¶15). The

Miller decision instead “explicitly foreclosed imposition of a mandatory sentence of life

without parole on juvenile offenders.” Id. (citing Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (¶10)

(Miss. 2013)). David was not “automatically resentence[d] . . . to life in prison[.]” Id. at 70

(¶22). The circuit court “held a hearing and, after considering all that was presented as well

as the entire court file, sentenced [David] to life in prison.” Id. In other words, the circuit

court “satisfied its obligation under Miller and Parker[.]” Id. at 70-71 (¶22). Therefore, we

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶54. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McCARTY, EMFINGER,
WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., DISSENTS
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTS
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McDONALD, J.

WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTING:

¶55. The United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479

29
(2012), that mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate our

constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In holding that a juvenile

“offender’s youth and attendant characteristics” must be considered, the Court noted that

“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” for many

reasons, including that they “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside

pressures” and that “[t]hey have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the

ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” Id. at 471, 483

(quoting Roper v. State, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). Developmentally, children have

“transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and [an] inability to assess consequences[,]”

“deficiencies” which will be reformed “as the years go by and neurological development

occurs[.]” Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).

¶56. Significantly, even though the Court declined to categorically prohibit life without

parole sentences for juveniles, the Court stated “[W]e think appropriate occasions for

sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Id. at 479.

“[I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” Id. at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72-73). In fact, it is “the rare juvenile offender

whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Roper, 543

U.S. at 573). Despite these pronouncements, Mississippi’s appellate courts have routinely

affirmed the imposition of life without parole sentences on appeals from Miller hearings. See

Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65 (Miss. 2018); Miller v. State, 327 So. 3d 121 (Miss. Ct.

App. 2020); Dotson v. State, 328 So. 3d 659 (Miss. 2021); Shoemake v. State, 323 So. 3d

30
1093 (Miss. 2019); Ealy v. State, 324 So. 3d 306 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

¶57. Miller requires an examination of the following factors: age and its hallmark features,

family and home environment, circumstances of the murder, the incompetencies of youth,

and the possibility of rehabilitation. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78. Here, I would find that the

trial court abused its discretion in weighing these factors to determine that Moody should be

re-sentenced to life in prison without eligibility for parole. The circumstances do not support

a finding that Moody was “the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect

permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 209 (2016). Instead, the

testimony overwhelmingly supports that Moody was caught in a circumstance in which the

characteristics of youth inhibited his capacity to “extricate [himself] from [a] horrific,

crime-producing setting[].” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.

¶58. Of particular consideration is the circumstance that Moody, who was just fourteen

years old, was acting under the influence and direction of his older cousin Kenneth. Dr.

Beverly Smallwood testified that Moody was “very immature” and that he “did not have the

maturity then even [of] the average fourteen-year-old.” Dr. Lott testified that Moody’s

“chronological age was a huge factor.” Moody’s relatives, including his half-brother

Robinson, testified that “[e]verybody was afraid of Kenneth.” Moreover, the child had

limited options to control the environment. Robinson testified that Moody would hang out

with Kenneth because “he didn’t have nowhere else to hang out. There wasn’t no ride down

there . . . . It wasn’t like now. You don’t have no phone. We were just stuck there. Nobody

had a phone, no way to get away from there. Just stuck.” These facts are distinguishable

31
from, Shoemake, for example, in which we affirmed a sentence of life without parole

eligibility for a juvenile defendant who was “seventeen years and 347 days old when he

committed the crime.” Shoemake, 323 So. 3d at 1102 (¶33). In Shoemake, we also explicitly

contrasted the facts of Miller, observing that “in Miller and its companion case, . . . both

defendants were fourteen years old at the time of the crime in question.” Id.

¶59. As recognized by Miller, children lack the developmental competency we presume

is present when punishing adults. In Miller, examining the behavior of a fourteen-year-old

defendant, the United States Supreme Court stated that the defendant’s choice to continue

participating in the course of events shows that “age could well have affected his calculation

of the risk that posed, as well as his willingness to walk away at that point.” Miller, 567 U.S.

at 478.

¶60. Moody is faulted by the trial court and majority for the delay in contacting the police.

Yet Miller requires consideration of the developmental incompetency and general

inexperience that would limit a fourteen-year-old’s ability to process and respond how an

adult would in similar circumstances. According to Robinson’s testimony, the fourteen-year-

old’s understanding of what his options were during the course of the crime was revealed:

“[h]e said he should have jumped off that bridge or he said he should have let Kenneth just

kill him.” And in contrast to other Miller cases, Moody was not conspiring in criminal

activity at the time Kenneth abruptly decided to target the victims. See Ealy, 324 So. 3d at

309 (¶2) (sixteen-year-old defendant planned and committed armed robbery and crime

escalated to homicide). Moody was simply a passenger in his older cousin’s vehicle.

32
¶61. A fourteen-year-old child is practically dependent on those around him for safety and

transportation. The testimony of Robinson supports that the ongoing fear of Kenneth was a

significant factor in Moody’s delay in making contact with the police. The night Moody told

Robinson what had happened, Robinson said that Moody was watching for Kenneth’s truck

and that “we stayed up looking, crying and looking out the window. We heard Kenneth’s

truck go by. We really thought that Kenneth had told him that if he told me anything, that he

was going to have to kill me too. . . . [H]e said if—like when we heard that truck, he was like

quit crying. Don’t admit I told you anything.”

¶62. Consideration of the circumstances of the crime, while relevant, is not intended to

obviate consideration of the characteristics of youth. In Miller, to support the prohibition on

mandatory life sentences for homicide crimes, the United States Supreme Court noted that

the characteristics of children, “their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits[,] and

environmental vulnerabilities” are not “crime-specific.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473. “Those

features [of youth] are evident in the same way, and to the same degree, when [a non-

homicide crime] turns into a killing.” Id. Certainly, to be guilty of a crime, some level of

active participation is required. But consideration of the circumstances of the crime under

Miller goes not to guilt or innocence, but to permanent incorrigibility.

¶63. A capital murder case never has fragrant facts. I am concerned that the trial court and

the majority misguidedly placed undue weight on this factor (circumstances of the crime),

particularly given the context that the fourteen-year-old juvenile defendant was acting under

the influence of a violent and controlling adult. Our post-Miller jurisprudence more

33
frequently addresses an older juvenile defendant who played a forward role in the violence

of the crime. See Shoemake, 323 So. 3d at 1096 (¶5) (seventeen-year-old defendant strangled

victim with an extension cord); Ealy, 324 So. 3d at 309 (¶2) (sixteen-year-old defendant

planned to commit armed robbery); Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 67 (¶3) (seventeen-year-old

defendant shot victim).

¶64. Concerning the prosecution of Moody, Billy McGee, the sheriff of Forrest County at

the time of the murders, testified that “I think it’s the biggest injustice of any case. A travesty

of justice of any case I worked in my 44-year career. And I told everybody prior to the trial

that had anything to do with the trial once he was charged, that I thought it was horrible. No

more actual physical part that he played in it other than sitting by somebody and ordered by

the older guy to help load them in and ordered unload them. In my mind, he had nothing to

do with the killing of anybody.”

¶65. The consideration of rehabilitation goes also to the rareness of irreparable corruption.

See Young v. State, 294 So. 3d 1238, 1239 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (remanding for new

Miller hearing on finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of

rehabilitation in prison);7 Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 71 (¶24) (Waller, C.J., dissenting). Positive

indicators include Moody’s transfer to medium security, which is less common for someone

serving life without parole. Dr. Smallwood testified that with adequate support, Moody could

successfully function outside prison.8

7
On remand, Young was resentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility in
December 2021, and he was released on June 4, 2025.
8
We should consider as well, and as a matter of fairness, that post-Miller convictions

34
¶66. “The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.” Graham, 560

U.S. at 59. “‘Punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the

offender and the offense.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560)

(emphasis added). Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard, not an insurmountable

standard. If a finding of abuse of discretion is not warranted in this case, then in what case

would it be warranted? I would find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining

that life without eligibility for parole was the appropriate sentence for Moody after

consideration of the Miller factors. I therefore respectfully dissent.

McDONALD, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

apply this factor to juvenile offenders prior to the start of their sentences. Our retroactive
application of Miller should take into consideration the unique survival pressures of a prison
environment. As indicated by the testimony at this hearing, poor behavior in prison is not
necessarily an indicator irreparable corruption in a free life.

35