Christopher Randall v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-00587-COA

CHRISTOPHER RANDALL APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/23/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBRA W. BLACKWELL
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ADAMS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: SHAMECA SHANTE’ COLLINS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/15/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Following a jury trial, Christopher Randall was convicted of aggravated assault and

first-degree murder for shooting his ex-girlfriend, Larhonda Ware, and shooting and killing

Ware’s friend, Christopher White. The court sentenced Randall to serve consecutive terms

in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) of life for first-degree

murder, twenty years for aggravated assault, and five years for a “firearm enhancement,”

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-37(1) (Rev. 2020). On appeal, Randall argues that the trial court

erred by excluding evidence of White’s postmortem toxicology report and by applying the

firearm enhancement. We find no error and affirm Randall’s convictions and sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On the night of September 6, 2019, Ware and White were outside at Ware’s mother’s

home. Ware’s mother, Deloris, asked White to clean out her car, which was parked near the

porch. Later, Deloris heard gunshots, and Ware ran inside the house and said that her ex-

boyfriend, Randall, had shot her. Deloris went outside and found White “slumped over” in

the backseat of her car. Deloris and her other daughter moved White to the ground and

began chest compressions, but White was not breathing. White had been shot at least four

times and was “bleeding bad.”

¶3. Ware testified that she had ended her “[c]ontrolling and toxic” relationship with

Randall just six days before the shooting, but that day, she had made plans to spend time with

Randall. However, between 9 and 10 p.m., Ware decided to cancel her plans with Randall

and “chill” with White instead. Ware and White smoked marijuana while White cleaned

Deloris’s car. Randall called Ware “five or six” times, and she spoke to him “[m]aybe two

or three times.” Randall also called White looking for Ware. At 10:55 p.m., Randall sent

Ware a text message that stated, “Just know u did this luv.” About thirty minutes later, Ware

saw Randall in the yard next to Deloris’s car, and Randall “start[ed] shooting.” Ware stated

that she did not witness a confrontation between White and Randall or any aggressive

behavior by White prior to the shooting. After Randall shot White three or four times, he

turned to Ware and began shooting her. Ware was shot in her chin, leg, and upper thigh.

¶4. An ambulance transported Ware to a hospital, where Adams County Deputy Sheriff

Dandridge Brooks later interviewed her. Ware told Brooks that she saw White reach for his

2
gun before she heard Randall’s gunfire. However, Ware testified at trial that she did not see

White reach for a gun and that she did not remember anything that happened at the hospital

because she “was doped up.”

¶5. Carla Dunn, an investigator and “crime scene tech” with the Adams County Sheriff’s

Office, was dispatched to the crime scene. Dunn testified that White was lying on the ground

outside Deloris’s car with five 9mm shell casings around him, which Dunn collected. Dunn

found a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson handgun still in White’s waistband. She did not find

any .40-caliber casings at the scene. The gun’s magazine or “clip” had a thirteen-round

capacity. There were thirteen live rounds in the clip and one in the gun’s chamber. Some

marijuana, a digital scale, and cash were also found on White’s person. About twenty-five

days after the shooting, Deloris found two more 9mm shell casings in the driveway and a

projectile inside her car, which she turned over to the sheriff’s office.

¶6. Major Frank Smith, the head of the Criminal Investigations Division of the Adams

County Sheriff’s Office, arrived at the crime scene before Dunn. Smith acknowledged that

there was “some time period” before law enforcement arrived when White’s gun could have

been moved, but Smith testified that there was no evidence that anyone moved White’s gun.

Smith also acknowledged that the drugs, cash, and scale found on White were indicative of

narcotics sales. In addition, Smith testified that a container with two bags of a white crystal

substance, “presumably cocaine,” was found in White’s back pocket. Smith testified that

Randall later turned himself in to police.

¶7. Mark Boackle, a forensic scientist at the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory, testified

3
as an expert in firearms and tool-marks. Boackle testified that the bullet found at the crime

scene and the bullets recovered from White’s body during his autopsy were all 9mm bullets

and were all fired from the same gun.

¶8. Dr. Mark LeVaughn from the State Medical Examiner’s Office performed White’s

autopsy. LeVaughn determined that White had six entry wounds, that he died as a result of

multiple gunshot wounds, and that the manner of death was homicide.

¶9. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Randall testified. He stated that he and Ware

had an “on and off” relationship that ended the day before the shooting. He also stated that

he and White knew each other and got along. However, Randall testified that the night

before the shooting, he “bumped into White” at a convenience store, and White “drew his

gun out.” Randall and Ware had plans for the evening of September 6, but Randall testified

that Ware stopped answering his phone calls. Eventually, Randall spoke to White on the

phone, and they “had words.” Randall testified that White told him to “walk lightly and stuff

like that.” According to Randall, as he walked into Deloris’s yard that evening, “the door

[swung] open,” and White threatened to kill him. Randall testified, “When he reached for

his gun, I just drew mine before he drew his. Because I’m scared. . . . I pulled my gun out

and I started shooting. I closed my eyes and started shooting.” Randall denied that he aimed

his gun at Ware. Randall ran from the scene and threw his gun in the “nearest bayou.”

¶10. During Randall’s cross-examination, a video of his statement to law enforcement was

admitted into evidence and played for the jury. In the interview, Randall stated that prior to

the shooting, White pulled a gun on him at Randall’s grandmother’s house rather than at a

4
convenience store, as he testified at trial. Randall also told officers that when he encountered

White at Deloris’s house, White actually “pulled a gun on [him]” rather than just “reached

for his gun,” as he testified at trial. In the interview, Randall denied shooting Ware.

¶11. An incident statement written by Captain Tony Nichols of the Adams County Sheriff’s

Office was also admitted into evidence. The incident statement purported to memorialize

additional statements that Randall made while he was being held in the Adams County jail.

According to Nichols, Randall admitted that “he shot [Ware] because he felt she betrayed

him and set him up to be killed.” However, Randall also told Nichols that when he arrived

at Deloris’s house, White “began to approach him screaming and threatening to do bodily

harm to him” and that once Randall “saw a firearm, he became fright[ened] and pulled his

gun and began firing.” After the incident statement was admitted into evidence, Randall

again denied that he shot Ware intentionally.

¶12. The jury found Randall guilty of first-degree murder and aggravated assault. The

court sentenced Randall to serve consecutive terms of life imprisonment for first-degree

murder, twenty years for aggravated assault, and five years for a “firearm enhancement,”

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-37(1). Randall filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict or a new trial, which was denied, and a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶13. On appeal, Randall argues that (1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of

White’s postmortem toxicology results, and (2) his additional five-year sentence for using

a firearm is illegal.

5
I. White’s Toxicology Results

¶14. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of or reference

to White’s postmortem toxicology report. The State noted that the report “showed the

presence of recreational drugs in the system of [White] at the time of his death.” The State

argued that such evidence was inadmissible “unless and until the [d]efendant claims that the

victim was the initial aggressor.” In his response to the State’s motion, Randall argued that

the evidence was relevant because “the fact that White had marijuana and promethazine in

his system makes it more likely he would have initiated aggression due to his intoxicated

state of mind.”

¶15. At a pretrial hearing on the motion, the prosecutor stated that White’s “autopsy results

had a toxicology report stapled to show he was positive for cocaine, I believe.” The

prosecutor then argued,

[The toxicology report would] be irrelevant and prejudicial unless, of course,
[Randall] gets far enough in his presentation of evidence to fall under the
benefit of a self defense argument. If he starts presenting evidence in the
record that’s going to justify self-defense at that time, those toxicology results
become admissible under the law in Mississippi. But until that time, they
shouldn’t be talked about and they shouldn’t be admitted.

After hearing arguments, the trial court stated that the evidence of “what was on [White’s]

person” (including marijuana and cocaine) would “all come in.” But the court stated, “Now,

the toxicology report, I think that’s not relevant. It’s more prejudicial than probative, the fact

that he was under the influence. So the Court’s not going to let the toxicology report in.”

In response, defense counsel argued that the evidence would be relevant and admissible once

Randall introduced evidence of self-defense, and the prosecutor indicated he agreed. The

6
following exchange then occurred:

Defense: What I would ask, Your Honor, instead of make a ruling now,
wait until you hear what comes into evidence and we can take
it up then maybe.

Court: Until such time as you established a self-defense claim?

Defense: Yes, Your Honor. That’s what I would ask for.

State: That makes sense to me, Your Honor.

The court then took a brief recess before moving on to jury selection. After jury selection

and just before the trial began, the court stated in passing, “I made a ruling about the

evidence on his body and the toxicology,” before quickly moving on to other matters.

¶16. On appeal, Randall argues the trial court erred by excluding evidence of White’s

toxicology results, thus preventing Randall from fully presenting his theory of self-defense

to the jury.1 The State argues that Randall failed to preserve this issue because he failed to

obtain a definitive ruling from the trial court and failed to make an offer of proof.

¶17. “This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an

abuse of discretion standard of review.” Deeds v. State, 27 So. 3d 1135, 1140-41 (¶15)

(Miss. 2009) (quoting Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 295 (¶12) (Miss. 2008)). We “will

affirm the trial court’s ruling unless we can safely say that the trial court abused its judicial

discretion in allowing or disallowing evidence so as to prejudice . . . the accused in a criminal

1
See Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 72-73 (¶¶14-17) (Miss. 2010) (holding that
because the defendant offered evidence that he acted in self-defense and that the victim was
the aggressor, the victim’s “toxicology results were relevant to show all the circumstances
under which the fatal difficulty occurred, and which would in any manner indicate the
mental state of the deceased” (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).

7
case.” Id. at 1141 (¶15) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

¶18. We agree with the State that Randall failed to preserve this issue for appeal because

he failed to offer the evidence at trial, failed to obtain a definitive ruling, and failed to make

an offer of proof. “Once the court rules definitively on the record either before or at trial,”

“a party need not renew an . . . offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal . . . .”

MRE 103(c)(1) (emphasis added). However, “[i]t [is] incumbent on . . . the party asserting

error[] to obtain ‘a definitive, on-the-record ruling’” in order to preserve the issue for appeal.

Daniels v. State, 348 So. 3d 1055, 1069 (¶60) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Walker v. State,

299 So. 3d 759, 765 (¶21) (Miss. 2020)).

¶19. Here, as set out above, Randall never obtained a definitive ruling on the admissibility

of the toxicology report. Prior to trial, the State agreed that the evidence would be admissible

if Randall presented evidence of self-defense. And although the trial court initially stated

that it would exclude the toxicology report, the court later indicated, and the State agreed,

that the issue could be revisited during trial if Randall presented evidence to support a claim

of self-defense. Nonetheless, Randall did not attempt to introduce the toxicology report at

any point during the trial. Because Randall failed to obtain a definitive ruling on the

admissibility of the evidence, the issue is procedurally barred on appeal.

¶20. In addition, to preserve a claim that the trial court erred by excluding evidence, the

proponent of the evidence must “inform[] the court of its substance . . . , unless the substance

was apparent from the context.” MRE 103(a)(2). This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the

need to make a proffer of evidence that has been excluded, stating:

8
Generally, when a party seeks to offer evidence which in turn is excluded by
the trial court, before we will consider the matter on appeal the party must
have somehow placed in the record the nature and substance of the proffered
evidence for our consideration. When testimony is excluded at trial, a record
must be made of the proffered testimony in order to preserve the point for
appeal.

Evans v. State, 294 So. 3d 664, 667 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Harrell v. State,

179 So. 3d 16, 21 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Barron v. State, 130 So. 3d 531, 539-

40 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013))).

¶21. Here, Randall failed to proffer the toxicology report, and the report’s substance is not

apparent from the record. Although Randall argues on appeal that the report would have

“revealed the presence of cocaine in [White’s] system,” that is far from clear. As discussed

above, during a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor stated that he “believe[d]” the report showed

that White tested positive for cocaine, but that statement may not have been accurate.

Randall’s own written response to the State’s motion in limine stated that the report showed

that “White had marijuana and promethazine in his system.” (Emphasis added). This

discrepancy is significant because the jury heard evidence that White was smoking marijuana

at the time of the fatal encounter; thus, a toxicology report showing that he tested positive

for marijuana would have been cumulative and of little value. In addition, the record does

not tell us anything at all about “promethazine,” which is apparently a prescription medicine,

or its effects on a person’s mental state. Without an adequate proffer, this Court has no way

to know what the toxicology report would have shown, whether it was relevant, or whether

its exclusion was harmless or prejudiced Randall’s defense. Therefore, the issue is

procedurally barred on appeal for the additional reason that Randall failed to make an

9
adequate proffer. Evans, 294 So. 3d at 667 (¶12).

II. Firearm Enhancement

¶22. Randall also argues that he should not have received an additional five-year sentence

under the “firearm enhancement,” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-37(1), which states:

Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by
any other provision of law, any person who uses or displays a firearm during
the commission of any felony shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such felony, be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment in the custody
of the Department of Corrections of five (5) years, which sentence shall not be
reduced or suspended.

Id. Randall argues that the firearm enhancement is prohibited in this case because “a greater

minimum sentence is otherwise provided by any other provision of law.” Id. Specifically,

his conviction for first-degree murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. See

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21(1) (Rev. 2020).

¶23. In Davis v. State, 379 So. 3d 312 (Miss. 2024), two defendants were convicted of two

counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 316 (¶10). The trial court

also added firearm enhancements to their sentences, “adding an additional five years for each

count of first-degree murder that would run consecutive to the life sentences and consecutive

to each enhancement.” Id. at 316-17 (¶10). But on appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the

firearm enhancements, explaining:

The mandatory minimum and maximum sentence for first-degree murder is
life. A life sentence is greater than the five years provided for in Section
97-37-37(1). Accordingly, a firearm enhancement under Section 97-37-37(1)
is prohibited because “a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by”
Section 97-3-21(1).

Id. at 318 (¶18) (citation omitted). Citing Davis, the State concedes that the trial court erred

10
by applying the firearm enhancement and sentencing Randall to an additional five years.

¶24. However, Randall and the State fail to recognize that the trial court properly applied

the firearm enhancement to Randall’s aggravated assault conviction. To convict Randall of

aggravated assault, the jury was required to find that he caused serious bodily injury to Ware

“[b]y shooting her in the leg with a firearm, a deadly weapon.” In addition, for Randall’s

aggravated assault conviction, no “greater minimum sentence [was] otherwise provided by

any other provision of law,” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-37(1), because “the [aggravated

assault] statute specifies no minimum sentence.” Vance v. State, 803 So. 2d 1265, 1269

(¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); see Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a) (Rev. 2020). Therefore,

the trial court properly applied the firearm enhancement and added five years to Randall’s

sentence for aggravated assault.

¶25. We note that the firearm enhancement provides that “any person who uses or displays

a firearm during the commission of any felony shall, in addition to the punishment provided

for such felony, be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment [of five years in

MDOC’s] custody.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-37(1) (emphasis added). Thus, where the jury

finds that the defendant used a firearm to commit multiple felonies, the trial court shall add

five years to the sentence for each “such felony.” See, e.g., Wales v. State, 73 So. 3d 1113,

1115-16 (¶1) (Miss. 2011) (noting that the court sentenced the defendant to four additional

five-year terms for four convictions); Washington v. State, 384 So. 3d 513, 518 (¶1) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2023) (noting that the defendant was sentenced to three additional five-year terms

for three convictions), cert. denied, 385 So. 3d 392 (Miss. 2024). The fact that one offense

11
carries “a greater minimum sentence” means that the enhancement does not apply to that

offense, but it does not preclude the enhancement’s application to other offenses that the

defendant committed using a firearm.

CONCLUSION

¶26. We affirm Randall’s conviction and sentences.

¶27. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY,
SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN
RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WEDDLE, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.

12