Tykevious Durr a/k/a Tykevious Tyrone Durr v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2021-KA-01109-COA

TYKEVIOUS DURR A/K/A TYKEVIOUS APPELLANT
TYRONE DURR

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/01/2021
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JON MARK WEATHERS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN T. COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALEXANDRA ROSENBLATT
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: PATRICIA A. THOMAS BURCHELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/09/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On September 8, 2020, a Forrest County grand jury indicted Tykevious Durr, a/k/a

Tykevious Tyrone Durr, in Count I for conspiracy to commit armed robbery of Tomaka

Jones, in Count II for the capital murder of Tomaka Jones, in Count III for the armed robbery

of Marlena Owens, and in Count IV for the aggravated assault of Marlena Owens. After a

jury trial from June 21 through June 24, 2021, Durr was convicted of all four counts. The

circuit court sentenced Durr for Count I to five years in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections (MDOC), for Count II to life imprisonment in the custody of

MDOC without eligibility for parole, for Count III to twenty-five years in the custody of
MDOC, and for Count IV to twenty years in the custody of MDOC. The sentences were

ordered to run consecutively with one another. Durr appealed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On November 26, 2018, Marlena Owens and her boyfriend, Tomaka Jones, were

living together at 230 Oak Street in Hattiesburg. They contacted Konswaylo Durr

(Konswaylo) and asked her to go with them to Prentiss to buy drugs. They knew Konswaylo

was from that area and knew her way around it. So the three of them, with a male named

Theo, got together and traveled to Prentiss. When they reached their destination, Jones and

Konswaylo got out of the car and approached a male who was standing outside the residence.

Jones bought drugs from the male and got back into the car. Konswaylo followed the

unnamed male into the residence. Owens, Jones, and Theo waited for Konswaylo outside the

residence for twenty to thirty minutes and then decided to return to Hattiesburg without her.

On the trip back, Owens discovered Konswaylo had left her purse in the vehicle. They took

the purse to Konswaylo’s residence at Plantation Apartments and left it with her mother.

Jones then dropped off Owens at their residence and left to take Theo home.

¶3. After discovering that the others had left, Konswaylo called her boyfriend, Andre

Snell, to come get her. Snell had to leave work to drive to Prentiss and take Konswaylo back

to Hattiesburg. Upon their return, they went directly to Owens’s residence to retrieve

Konswaylo’s purse. When they arrived, Jones had not returned to the residence. Konswaylo

was angry because she was left in Prentiss, and they had taken her purse. Snell was angry

because he had to take off work to get Konswaylo. Owens would not open the door to the

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residence, and an argument occurred with Konswaylo and Snell standing outside the

residence. While the argument was ongoing, Owens called Jones and told him to hurry home.

When Konswaylo and Snell realized that Owens was telling them she had left the purse with

Konswaylo’s mother, they left the residence.

¶4. Jones arrived at the residence shortly thereafter. Owens told him what had transpired,

and he called Konswaylo and Snell. Obviously disturbed by the phone call, Konswaylo and

Snell returned to confront Owens and Jones. This time, inside the residence, all four became

engaged in a heated argument. The women were confronting each other, and the men were

confronting each other. Snell demanded gas money from Jones because he had to drive to

Prentiss to get Konswaylo, but Jones refused. According to Snell, Jones pulled a knife on

him, and they left. However, as they were leaving, Snell told Owens and Jones that he would

be back.

¶5. When they got back to Plantation Apartments, Snell discussed the day’s events with

Durr, who is Konswaylo’s son. Snell admitted that he was still mad because Jones had pulled

a knife on him. Snell testified that he and Durr decided to go back that night and rob Jones.

Durr left the apartments for a time and returned with Jordan Woods, a/k/a Jay, and Tomaz

Hinton, a/k/a Bino. Later, Snell, Durr, Hinton, and Woods left Plantation Apartments

together. They dropped off Woods at Eagle Flat Apartments and then, with Durr driving,

proceeded to the residence of Owens and Jones. Snell, Durr, and Hinton parked around the

corner from the house, raised the hood of the car, and turned on the flashers to make it appear

they were having car trouble. While there is conflicting evidence as to what happened next,

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considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,1 all three exited the

vehicle and approached the residence. At that time, Snell had a .380-caliber handgun and

Durr had a 9 mm handgun.

¶6. According to Hinton, once the three approached the residence, he picked up a cinder

block and tried to break the glass on the sliding-glass back door. Although the glass did not

break, it made a loud noise, and he heard a lady scream. He then joined the other two on the

side of the residence. He heard a man come to the door and tell the female to get his gun.

According to Hinton, that is when Durr started shooting at Jones, who was standing outside

the residence on the porch. Hinton testified that Jones then ran back into the house, with Durr

and Snell following him inside. Jones ran into the bathroom area and was in the bathtub when

Hinton saw Durr stand over him and shoot him several more times. Hinton says that Owens

was also in the bathroom and got shot a few times as well. Hinton never saw Snell shoot his

gun, but Hinton did see Snell hit Owens “upside the head with the gun.” Hinton said they

grabbed the cell phones and ran out of the house. After they left, Owens was able to contact

law enforcement for help.

¶7. Owens testified at trial and described the events of the day and the attack she endured

that evening inside her residence. Although she could not identify the shooter, she was able

to state that the shooter had on Adidas pants.

¶8. Testimony from law enforcement and the State’s experts showed that five 9 mm

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“Our role as [an] appellate court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict.” Little v. State 233 So. 3d 288, 289 (¶1) (Miss. 2017). See Williams v. State,
351 So. 482, 489 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (“[A]ny conflicts in the witnesses’ testimony
were ordinary issues of weight and credibility for the jury to decide.”).

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caliber shell casings were found at the residence and that all these casings were fired from

the same weapon. Four bullets were also recovered: two from the body of Jones, one from

the body of Owens, and one from the bathroom floor. All four were identified as 9 mm

caliber and found to have been fired from the same weapon. Jones died as a result of two

lethal gunshot wounds.

¶9. The testimony and video evidence admitted at trial showed that Durr was wearing

Adidas pants on the night of the murder. Further, a video interview of Durr was admitted into

evidence. This lengthy interview took place at the police station soon after the shootings.

Durr repeatedly denied knowing anything about the shootings and denied having ever been

to Owens’s residence. Ultimately, however, Durr gave a written statement during the

interview and explained that he did in fact go to Owens’s residence with Snell and Hinton

to rob Jones. He admitted that he was present when the shootings began but contended he

neither had nor fired a weapon.

¶10. Durr was indicted, tried, and convicted for conspiracy to commit the armed robbery

of Tomaka Jones, for the capital murder of Tomaka Jones, for the armed robbery of Marlena

Owens, and for the aggravated assault of Marlena Owens. Durr appeals and raises two

assignments of error, which we will address separately below.

ANALYSIS

I. Were Durr’s Sixth Amendment rights violated when public
defenders from the same office represented him and his two co-
defendants, who both testified against Durr?

¶11. At trial, Durr was represented by appointed counsel Alex Ignatiev from the Forrest

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County Public Defender’s Office. Even though the State had elected not to seek the death

penalty, Ignatiev filed a motion for the appointment of an additional attorney to represent

Durr. Durr was still facing a possible sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for

parole for the charge of capital murder, and Ignatiev argued that due to the complexity of the

case, an additional attorney was needed to assist in Durr’s defense. Ignatiev explained that

ordinarily another attorney in the public defender’s office would assist him, but all the other

attorneys in the office had been appointed to represent Durr’s co-defendants. Further,

Ignatiev advised the court that Hinton and Snell had both pled guilty and that they were

expected to testify against Durr at trial. At that time, Ignatiev was not sure as to the status of

Konswaylo’s case. Ignatiev advised the circuit court that he had spoken with Joshua Stiglet,

a former Forrest County Public Defender, who indicated that he would be ready, willing, and

able to assist in Durr’s defense. On February 1, 2021, the circuit court entered an order

appointing Stiglet as additional counsel for Durr. Stiglet appeared as counsel for Durr and

participated in Durr’s trial on June 21-24, 2021.

¶12. At no point was an issue raised by the circuit judge, Durr, or either of his counsel as

to whether Ignatiev could effectively represent Durr. It is clear that they all knew well in

advance of trial that other attorneys from the public defender’s office were representing

Durr’s co-defendants and that at least two of the co-defendants would likely appear at trial

to testify against him. For the first time on appeal, new appellate counsel from the Office of

State Public Defender, Indigent Appeals Division, contends that because Ignatiev had an

“actual” conflict of interest, his representation of Durr under these circumstances was a

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violation of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct and a violation of Durr’s right to

effective assistance of counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

¶13. The analysis required in reviewing “conflict of interest” claims was recently addressed

by this Court in Magee v. State, 349 So. 3d 734, 742-43 (¶¶17-18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022),

where we explained:

“Conflict-of-interest claims involving attorneys in criminal cases are a
species of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.”
Galloway v. State, 298 So. 3d 966, 974 (¶43) (Miss. 2020) (citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Counsel’s function is to assist the
defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid
conflicts of interest.”)). “Such claims are evaluated under one of two separate
standards: the Strickland standard or the standard from Cuyler [v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335 (1980)].” Id. (citing Crawford v. State, 192 So. 3d 905, 917-18 (Miss.
2015)). The Strickland standard requires a showing that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The Cuyler
standard is less burdensome and presumes prejudice when a claimant shows
an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance.
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 345-50.

“When the accused is represented by an attorney with an actual conflict
of interest, the accused has received ineffective assistance of counsel as a
matter of law, and ‘reversal is automatic irrespective of a showing of prejudice
unless the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right
to conflict-free representation.’” Kiker v. State, 55 So. 3d 1060, 1066 (¶16)
(Miss. 2011) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 573 So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Miss.
1990)). “Thus, the standard set out in Strickland . . . is inapplicable to cases
when the defendant’s attorney “actively represented conflicting interests.” Id.
(citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)). When the trial judge is
aware of an actual conflict of interest, “the trial judge should affirmatively
participate in the waiver decision by eliciting a statement in narrative form
from the defendant in indicating that he fully understands the nature of the
situation and has knowingly and intelligently made the decision to proceed
with the challenged counsel.” Littlejohn v. State, 593 So. 2d 20, 25 (Miss.
1992). “Mere assent in response to a series of questions from the bench may
in some circumstances constitute an adequate waiver, but the court should

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nonetheless endeavor to have each defendant personally articulate in detail his
intent to forego this significant constitutional protection.” United States v.
Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir.1975) abrogated on other grounds by
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 & n.2 (1984). Moreover,
“[r]ecord[ing] of the waiver colloquy between defendant and judge will also
serve the government’s interest by assisting in shielding any potential
conviction from collateral attack, either on Sixth Amendment grounds or on
a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment ‘fundamental fairness’ basis.” Id.

¶14. The question presented here is whether, as Durr alleges, Ignatiev had an “actual”

conflict of interest. The definition for an “actual conflict” is set out in Gregory v. State, 96

So. 3d 54, 57 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012):

Mississippi has applied the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s definition of
“actual conflict”:

If a defense attorney owes duties to a party whose interests are
adverse to those of the defendant, then an actual conflict exists.
The interests of the other client and the defendant are
sufficiently adverse if it is shown that the attorney owes a duty
to the defendant to take some action that could be detrimental to
his other client.

Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1144 (N.D. Miss.1981) (citing Zuck v.
Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 1979)) . . . . Throughout Gregory’s brief,
he refers to the conflict of interest as an actual conflict. Yet, Gregory does not
explain why the conflict should be labeled an actual conflict.

¶15. Unlike the defendant in Gregory, Durr cites a series of rules and cases to support his

conclusion that an “actual” conflict of interest existed under the facts of this case. First, Durr

contends that the Forrest County Public Defender’s Office falls within the definition of a

“firm” found in the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, which states:

“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a partnership, professional
corporation, professional association, professional limited liability company,
sole proprietorship, governmental agency, or other association whose members
are authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services

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organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.

Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10 cmt. He then points to the prohibition found in Rule 1.10(a):

While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent
a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing
so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.4.[2]

Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a). As a result, Durr argues that the public defender’s office

should have represented only one of the co-defendants in this case. Because the record does

not reflect that he gave “knowing and informed consent after consultation” as required by

Rule 1.7(b) and because the trial court failed to address the obvious “actual” conflict of

interest on the record as suggested by Magee, Durr argues his convictions should be

“automatically” reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

¶16. The Mississippi cases Durr cites in support of his argument are factually dissimilar.

In Stringer v. State, 485 So. 2d 274 (Miss. 1986), Stringer retained the same attorney to

represent himself, his girlfriend, and his son. Id. at 274. They were all charged with capital

murder arising out of the same incident. Id. Stringer was tried first, and the co-defendants

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Rule 1.10 is styled: Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. The comment to
Rule 1.10 states in part: “Definition of ‘firm.’ “For purposes of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the term “firm” includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers employed in the
legal department of a corporation or other organization. Whether two or more lawyers
constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts . . . . The terms of any
formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are
a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to confidential information concerning the
clients they serve.” Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10 cmt. It should be noted Durr cites no
Mississippi case where we have ruled that a public defender’s office constitutes a “firm”
pursuant to these rules. As noted above, there is no information in the record to detail the
organization and structure of this particular public defender’s office, the relationship
between the various attorneys, or any internal operating procedures that may be in place to
deal with situations such as the ones in this case.

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testified for the defense. Id. at 275. The trial court found that Stringer failed to show that

there had been an “actual” conflict of interest or that Stringer had been prejudiced by his

attorney’s joint representation of all three defendants. Id. In the present case, Ignatiev did not

represent any of the co-defendants. There was no joint representation as there was in

Stringer.

¶17. Durr also cites Armstrong v. State, 573 So. 2d 1329 (Miss. 1990), in which Armstrong

and his co-defendant were both charged with armed robbery. Id. at 1331. They were both

represented by the same public defender. Id. They both pled guilty. Id. After Armstrong was

denied post-conviction relief, the trial court found that an actual conflict existed which

resulted in prejudice to Armstrong. Id. at 1335. The trial court found that “the public

defender neither said nor did anything in mitigation at the sentencing hearing in behalf of

either Armstrong or Madkins.” Id. at 1333. The supreme court held that the trial court erred

by appointing the same attorney to represent both defendants “without first disclosing to

them the potential dangers of joint representation by counsel laboring under a conflict”

and without making an inquiry as to whether Armstrong had made a “knowing and voluntary

waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel.” Id. at 1334 (emphasis added). The supreme

court found this violated Armstrong’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel and reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 1335. Again, the

present case is dissimilar because Ignatiev represented only Durr.

¶18. Durr also points to another case from the same circuit court district as this case

involving the same public defender. In Hinton v. State, 311 So. 3d 1213, 1214 (¶1) (Miss.

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Ct. App. 2020), Shannon Hinton and Natalie Lett were each charged, in separate indictments,

with sex crimes against Hinton’s niece. Attorneys from the Forrest County Public Defender’s

Office were appointed to represent the defendants. Id. Ignatiev was appointed to represent

Hinton, and Andrew Williams was appointed to represent Lett. Id. at (¶4). Prior to trial, Lett

entered a guilty plea and was sentenced. Id. at (¶6). Part of her plea agreement required her

to testify against Hinton. Id. at (¶1). Although Hinton knew this information before trial,

Hinton raised no issue concerning Ignatiev continuing to represent her at trial. Id. at (¶5). She

was convicted at trial and appealed her conviction. Id. at (¶¶1-2).

¶19. On direct appeal, for the first time, Hinton argued that she had been denied her

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. This Court ruled as follows:

Hinton contends, for the first time on appeal, that she was denied her
Constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. However,

when a party claims ineffective assistance of counsel for the first
time on direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated
that “the proper resolution is to deny relief without prejudice to
the defendant’s right to assert the same claim in a
post-conviction relief proceeding,” because there is usually
inadequate evidence in the trial record to support the claim.

Colburn v. State, 990 So. 2d 206, 214 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
Willis v. State, 811 So. 2d 450, 454 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). Additionally,
we would decide such an issue on direct appeal only if

(1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of
constitutional dimensions, or (2) the parties stipulate that the
record is adequate to allow the appellate court to make the
finding without consideration of the findings of fact of the trial
judge.

Colenburg v. State, 735 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

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In this case, the parties have not stipulated that the record is adequate
to allow the appellate court to make a finding on Hinton’s constitutional claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, our review of the record as it
stands before us does not affirmatively show that Hinton’s representation was
ineffective. However, Hinton ought to be given the opportunity to make a
record on this issue in a properly filed application for leave to file a motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-7
(Rev. 2015), if she so chooses.

Hinton, 311 So. 3d at 1215 (¶¶9-10) (paragraph numbering omitted).

¶20. Like Hinton, Durr has raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first

time on appeal. The State, in its brief, does not stipulate that the record is sufficient to decide

this issue on direct appeal. Durr’s appellate counsel recognizes that the record does not

indicate whether Durr was informed of any potential prejudice he might suffer as a result of

attorneys from the same public defender’s office representing him and the other three co-

defendants, or whether he waived any such conflict. However, Durr’s counsel makes a

preemptive argument that there is no need for the record to be more fully developed through

a motion for post-conviction collateral relief, as discussed in Hinton because there was an

obvious “actual” conflict of interest in this case that the circuit judge failed to address on the

record. He argues automatic reversal is required.

¶21. Just as in Hinton, we find that the record is inadequate for this Court to decide this

issue on direct appeal. Clearly this is not a familiar case where an “actual” conflict of interest

exists because one attorney represents multiple defendants with conflicting interests, as

suggested by the definition in Gregory, 96 So. 3d at 57 (¶11). Instead, Durr relies upon an

“Imputed Disqualification” pursuant to Rule 1.10 to contend that the public defenders’ office

should have represented only one of the co-defendants in this case. This, Durr argues, created

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an “actual” conflict of interest. However, the comment to that rule itself provides that a

determination of the application of the rule depends upon “specific facts of the situation.”

Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10 cmt.

¶22. As indicated above, we know nothing about the organization and structure of the

Forrest County Public Defenders’ Office. We know nothing about the relationship between

the various attorneys within the office. We know nothing of the internal operating

procedures. We do not know if the various public defenders have a financial interest in cases

assigned to another public defender. We do not know if confidential client information is

shared among the attorneys. This appears to be a case of first impression as to whether Rule

1.10’s imputed disqualification applies to a public defender’s office in the same way as it

would to members of a private law firm. Further, as noted by Durr in his brief, the record is

silent as to whether Durr was informed of any potential, actual, or imputed conflict of

interest, or whether he knowingly waived any such conflict. Because we do not have enough

of the “specific facts of the situation,” we are unable to determine whether Ignatiev had an

“actual” conflict of interest by representing Durr under the facts of this case.

¶23. In an attempt to supply this missing factual information, the dissent relies upon

information contained in a report prepared by The Sixth Amendment Center (6AC), a non-

partisan, non-profit organization that provides “technical assistance and evaluation services

to policymakers and criminal justice stakeholders.” Sixth Amendment Center, The Right to

Counsel in Mississippi: Evaluation of Adult Felony Trial Level

I n d i g e n t D e f e n s e S e r v i c e s ( M a r c h 2 0 1 8 ) ,

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https://www.ospd.ms.gov/6AC_mississippi_report_2018%20(Final%20for%20Release).pdf,

(last visited May 5, 2023). The record cannot be properly supplemented in this manner. In

any event, there are several problems with the information presented in this report.

¶24. First, Mississippi does not have a statewide public defender system, and there are no

individual “branches” of such an organization. Instead, each county is responsible to bear the

expenses of criminal prosecutions, which includes the payment for attorneys to represent

indigent defendants. See Miss. Const. art. 14, § 261 (1890); Bd. of Sup’rs of George Cnty.

v. Bailey, 236 So. 2d 420, 421-22 (Miss. 1970). Bailey was decided on June 8, 1970. In that

case, the supreme court stated the provisions of section 261 were not “self-executing,” and

“it requires legislative implementation for the determination of what constitutes proper

expenses, the amounts thereof or a method of making such determination, and to whom [the]

same should be paid.” Id. Then, in what appears to be the next legislative session, Mississippi

Code Annotated sections 99-15-15, 99-15-17, and 99-15-21 were enacted to take effect on

April 5, 1971. 1971 Miss. Laws, ch. 490, §§ 2-4. These sections authorized judges to appoint

and pay private attorneys to represent indigent defendants on a case-by-case basis.

¶25. During its 1979 session, the Legislature enacted what became Mississippi Code

Annotated sections 25-32-1 through 25-32-19 (effective from and after October 1, 1979).

1979 Miss. Laws, ch. 509, § 1. While not mandatory, these sections provided for the creation

of an “office of public defender” in the discretion of the boards of supervisors of the various

counties. Miss. Code Ann. § 25-32-1 (Rev. 2018). This office could include a public

defender and assistant public defender. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 25-32-1 to -3 (Rev. 2018). These

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positions could be either full-time or part-time, as should be specified in the order of the

board of supervisors which creates the position(s). Miss. Code Ann. § 25-32-1.

¶26. Both of these statutory schemes for the appointment of attorneys to represent indigent

defendants are still in effect. As for Forrest County and the attorneys in the present case, no

order from the Board of Supervisors is a part of the record, and there is no testimony or

affidavit to provide the details of the establishment of a public defender’s office and whether

the positions are full-time or part-time. As noted above, there is simply insufficient evidence

in the appellate record concerning the organizational structure and the operational policies

of the office for this Court to decide the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct

appeal. The hearsay comments from some public defender to the effect that the office would

use the “Chinese wall” process to protect against possible conflicts in representation are not

properly before this Court.

¶27. Further, the report is quoted by the dissent as stating, “Forrest County does not have

a policy about providing counsel in the event that the . . . public defender office has a

conflict.” This statement is contradicted by the record in this case. If we assume for the sake

of argument that Forrest County has established a public defender’s office, the same statute

that provided for the court to appoint Durr an additional attorney from outside the public

defender’s office also covers the situation where all of the public defenders have a conflict.

Section 25-32-13, titled “Appointment of counsel by court in conflict of interest cases;

appointment of additional counsel where necessary,” provides as follows:

(1) If the court finds that indigent defendants have such conflicts of interests
that they all cannot be properly represented by the public defender, or when

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other good cause is shown in the trial court or on appeal, the court shall
appoint separate counsel as provided in Section 99-15-15, Mississippi Code
of 1972. In such cases, the fees allowed appointed counsel in Section
99-15-17, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall apply.

(2) If the court finds that an indigent is a defendant in a case of such a nature
that he cannot be properly represented by the public defender alone, the court
shall appoint additional counsel to assist the public defender as provided in
Section 99-15-15, Mississippi Code of 1972. In such cases, the fees allowed
appointed counsel in Section 99-15-17, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall apply.

Miss. Code Ann. § 25-32-13 (Rev. 2018). Subparagraph (2) was used in this case to appoint

additional counsel for Durr. It is clear that had Durr, his counsel, or the circuit court felt that

outside counsel should have been appointed for Durr at the outset, this statute provides the

authority for that appointment. There was some conversation concerning the other public

defenders having a conflict. With Ignatiev having obtained outside co-counsel due to the

conflict of interest with other public defenders, it is reasonable to believe that he had

discussed the possible conflict of interest with Durr concerning his own representation in this

case. As we stated above, and the dissent acknowledges, the record is silent as to whether

Durr waived any conflict that Ignatiev may have had in this case.

¶28. Finally, the dissent points to this Court’s decision in Hinton where we stated that the

question of ineffective assistance of counsel (based upon the exact type of conflict suggested

in the present case in the same public defender’s office) should be addressed in a motion for

post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) so that the record could be more fully developed.

Hinton, 311 So. 3d at 1215 (¶10). The dissent notes that Hinton subsequently filed a motion

with the Mississippi Supreme Court seeking permission to file a PCR motion in the circuit

court. The dissent also notes that the supreme court denied the motion to proceed in the trial

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court because Hinton had not shown she suffered any prejudice as a result of her counsel’s

possible conflict. Order, Hinton v. State, 2021-M-00086 (Miss. 2021). This weighs heavily

against Durr’s contention that an “actual” conflict of interest exists in this situation. Had the

supreme court believed that an “actual” conflict exists, there would have been no need for

Hinton to have to show she suffered prejudice. See Kiker, 55 So. 3d at 1066 (¶16).

¶29. Just as in Hinton, we find that this issue should be dismissed without prejudice to

provide Durr the opportunity to later raise the issue in a motion for post-conviction collateral

relief.

II. Did the trial court err by admitting Andre Snell’s affidavit as
substantive evidence?

¶30. The State called Andre Snell, one of the co-defendants, to testify at trial against Durr.

During direct examination by the State, Snell gave testimony that was inconsistent with his

prior affidavit. The State sought to impeach Snell by admitting the affidavit into evidence.

The State asked that the affidavit be admitted “as a prior inconsistent statement.” The only

objection raised by the defense at trial was that the affidavit was hearsay. However, defense

counsel seemed to withdraw his objection by stating, “But if they are impeaching him, I think

they are entitled to have an exam.” In any event, appellate counsel argues for the first time

on appeal that the circuit court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction as required by

Mississippi Rule of Evidence 105 and by failing to follow the process to properly admit the

affidavit pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 613(b). We will address these issues

separately.

A. Did the trial court err by failing to give a limiting

17
instruction pursuant to Rule 105?

¶31. Durr’s trial counsel did not request a limiting instruction at the time the affidavit was

admitted or during the jury instruction conference. Further, the issue was not raised in the

motion for a new trial. We have previously addressed the failure to give a limiting instruction

in Lowe v. State, 333 So. 3d 626, 633 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022):

Lowe also asserts that “the jury was not provided a limiting instruction
explaining the proper and improper purposes for which it may consider the
evidence.” Mississippi Rule of Evidence 105 states:

If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or
for a purpose—but not against another party or for another
purpose—the court, unless expressly waived or rebutted, shall
restrict the evidence to its proper scope, contemporaneously
instruct the jury accordingly, and give a written instruction if
requested.

However, “Rule 105 only requires the judge to offer a limiting instruction,
which the defendant is free to ‘waive.’” Curry v. State, 202 So. 3d 294, 299
(¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing MRE 105). In this instance, defense
counsel did not request a written limiting instruction. Further, when the
trial judge failed to instruct the jury contemporaneously with the
admission of the statement, defense counsel did not call the matter to the
judge’s attention. Had he done so, any error could have been rectified at
that time. “A trial judge cannot be put in error on a matter which was not
presented to him for decision.” Reynolds v. State, 913 So. 2d 290, 300 (¶37)
(Miss. 2005). We further find the absence of any limiting instruction by the
court did not deprive Lowe of a fair trial. See Curry, 202 So. 3d at 299 (¶16)
(recognizing “that the erroneous denial of a limiting instruction is
harmless error unless it deprives the defendant of a fair trial”) (citing
Robinson v. State, 940 So. 2d 235, 239 (¶11) (Miss. 2006)). Therefore, we find
this argument is without merit.

(Emphasis added). The circuit court, as requested by the State, admitted Snell’s affidavit for

impeachment purposes pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 613(b). As a result,

pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 105, Durr would have been entitled to an

18
instruction limiting the jury’s use of the affidavit to impeachment purposes only. However,

as in Lowe, Durr made no request for a limiting instruction concerning Snell’s affidavit. As

a result, this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. However, we will address this

matter in a plain-error analysis below.

B. Was Snell’s affidavit properly admitted pursuant to
Rule 613(b)?

¶32. Durr’s trial counsel did not object to Snell’s affidavit being admitted for impeachment

purposes pursuant to Rule 613(b). Accordingly, this issue is not properly before the Court

on appeal. In any event, citing Portis v. State, 245 So. 3d 457, 470-71 (¶32) (Miss. 2018),

appellate counsel argues that before Snell’s affidavit could be properly admitted, the trial

court should have first determined whether the prior statement was inconsistent with Snell’s

trial testimony. The record is clear that the circuit judge read the affidavit and found that it

was inconsistent with Snell’s testimony before admitting the affidavit as a prior inconsistent

statement pursuant to Rule 613(b).

¶33. Next, Durr argues on appeal that the trial court should have conducted a “balancing

test” pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 before admitting the affidavit. Again,

however, trial counsel did not request that the circuit court consider Rule 403. In Thames v.

State, 310 So. 3d 1163, 1170 (¶35) (Miss. 2021), the supreme court held:

Because Thames did not object at trial to the State’s use of Lofton’s prior
inconsistent statements (sworn or unsworn) or request a Rule 105 limiting
instruction or a Rule 403 balancing test, the issue is barred from review
absent plain error. Roby v. State, 183 So. 3d 857, 870-71 [(¶55)] (Miss.
2016). “To preserve an issue for appeal, a contemporaneous objection must be
made.” Walker v. State, 913 So. 2d 198, 238 (Miss. 2005) (citing Ratliff v.
State, 313 So. 2d 386 (Miss. 1975)); see also Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216,

19
238-39 (Miss. 2010) (failure to raise a Rule 403 objection at trial bars the issue
from review) . . . .

(Emphasis added). While these issues have not been properly preserved for appellate

consideration, we will consider the issues below under a plain-error analysis.

C. Did the trial court commit plain error by admitting
Snell’s affidavit pursuant to Rule 613(b) without sua
sponte conducting a balancing test pursuant to Rule
403 and without sua sponte giving a limiting
instruction pursuant to Rule 105?

¶34. We discussed the standard to be used in a plain-error analysis in Bridges v. State, 301

So. 3d 689, 694 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020):

The plain-error doctrine allows our appellate courts to “recognize obvious
error which was not properly raised by the defendant on appeal, and which
affects a defendant’s ‘fundamental, substantive right.’” Smith v. State, 986 So.
2d 290, 294 (¶10) (Miss. 2008) (quoting Debrow v. State, 972 So. 2d 550, 553
(¶10) (Miss. 2007)). “For the plain-error doctrine to apply, there must have
been an error that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Hall v. State, 201 So. 3d 424, 428 (¶12) (Miss. 2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[I]n order to determine if plain error has occurred, we must
determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal rule, whether that
error is plain, clear, or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the
outcome of the trial.” Pinter v. State, 221 So. 3d 378, 384 (¶12) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2017) (quoting Green v. State, 183 So. 3d 28, 31 (¶6) (Miss. 2016)).

(Emphasis added). Therefore, we will review each of the three prerequisites to a finding of

plain error.

i. Did the trial court deviate from a legal rule?

¶35. The trial court admitted Snell’s affidavit for impeachment purposes pursuant to Rule

613(b). Because the court admitted the affidavit for this limited purpose, a limiting

instruction would have been appropriate under Rule 105, which states:

20
If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a
purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court,
unless expressly waived or rebutted, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope, contemporaneously instruct the jury accordingly, and give a written
instruction if requested.

MRE 105. Although Durr did not request a limiting instruction, there is nothing in the record

to suggest that he “expressly waived” the giving of such an instruction. It is fair to say that

the trial court’s failure to give a proper limiting instruction did deviate from a legal rule in

this regard.

¶36. Durr also contends that before Snell’s affidavit was admitted into evidence, the circuit

court should have conducted a “balancing test” under Rule 403 which provides:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

(Emphasis added). Rule 403 does not place the burden upon the circuit court to sua sponte

conduct the balancing test. Instead, in Middleton v. State, 281 So. 3d 858, 862 (¶14) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2019), this Court reasoned:

Further, Middleton never requested a Rule 403 balancing test, and it is his duty
to do so. “[T]he onus [is] on the parties” to request the trial court perform the
test “with regard to relevant evidence which may otherwise be excluded . . . .”
McLaurin v. State, 31 So. 3d 1263, 1270 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

We find that the trial court did not deviate from the requirements of Rule 403 by failing to

sua sponte perform an “on the record” balancing test. The plain-error analysis of this

contention stops here.

ii. Was the trial court’s failure to sua sponte give

21
a limiting instruction pursuant to Rule 105 a
“plain, clear or obvious” error?

¶37. While we noted above that Rule 105 places upon the trial judge the responsibility to

give a limiting instruction in the appropriate circumstances, absent an express waiver of the

instruction, a trial court’s failure to do so is not always “plain, clear or obvious” error. In

Curry, 202 So. 3d at 301 (¶24), this Court explained:

We presume that counsel’s decision not to request a limiting instruction was
within the ambit of trial strategy. See, e.g., Herrington v. State, 102 So. 3d
1241, 1246 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). This presumption is appropriate given
that, as discussed above, such an instruction has the potential to do the
defendant more harm than good. See id.

Trial counsel’s decision not to draw any more attention to Snell’s affidavit by requesting a

limiting instruction would have been undercut had the circuit court, sua sponte, given such

an instruction. We cannot say that the circuit court’s decision not to give the limiting

instruction without a specific request by Durr’s counsel was obvious error.

iii. Did the trial court’s failure to sua sponte give
a limiting instruction pursuant to Rule 105
prejudice the outcome of the trial?

¶38. The State argues on appeal that Durr suffered no prejudice as a result of the failure

to give a limiting instruction regarding Snell’s affidavit. The State points out that both Snell

and Hinton’s testimony at trial, as well as Durr’s pre-trial statement to law enforcement that

was admitted into evidence at trial, all confirm that all three of them knowingly went to the

residence of Owens and Jones for the purpose of robbing them. The evidence shows that

Snell and Durr were armed and that Jones died from gunshot wounds inflicted during the

robbery, and that Owens was also wounded during the robbery. In Robinson, 940 So. 2d at

22
239 (¶11), the supreme court held that the failure to give a limiting instruction concerning

a statement that should have been admitted for impeachment purposes was harmless only

when there was other evidence of the matters contained in the statement.

¶39. We find that there was substantial evidence to support Durr’s convictions without

consideration of Snell’s affidavit and that Durr was not prejudiced by the failure of the trial

court to sua sponte give a limiting instruction concerning Snell’s affidavit.3

CONCLUSION

¶40. We affirm Durr’s convictions and sentences, and we dismiss Durr’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice to his opportunity to raise it in a motion

for post-conviction collateral relief.

¶41. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTS WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McDONALD, J.

WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTING:

¶42. Tykevious Durr argues on appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel was violated when public defenders from the same county’s office

3
While it is clear that the State offered the affidavit into evidence as a prior
inconsistent statement and that the circuit court admitted the affidavit as such for the purpose
of impeachment, the affidavit may well have been admissible as substantive evidence
pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A). The record shows that Snell verified
under oath at his guilty plea hearing that the affidavit was true and correct and Snell was
available for cross-examination about the affidavit at trial. Had the affidavit been admitted
under this provision, it would not have been hearsay, and no limiting instruction pursuant
to Rule 105 would have been required.

23
represented both him and his two co-defendants who testified against him in a criminal

matter. Because I disagree with the majority’s contention that this matter should be resolved

through post-conviction collateral relief proceedings and instead would resolve Durr’s claim

on direct appeal, I must respectfully dissent.

FACTS

¶43. In September 2020, Durr and two co-defendants (Andre Snell and Tomaz Hinton),

were indicted for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, capital murder, armed robbery, and

aggravated assault. The charges stemmed from an altercation between two groups of people

that later escalated into deadly violence. According to testimony, late in the evening or in

the early morning hours of November 26-27, 2018, Durr, Hinton, and Snell returned to a

residence where a prior altercation took place and opened fire on the victims. Tomaka Jones

was fatally shot, and Marlena Owens was seriously injured. Owens later testified that she

saw a person stand over Jones after he had fallen into a bathtub and shoot Jones. She could

not identify which person was the shooter but noticed that he was wearing striped Adidas

pants. The culprits took Owens’ cell phone before leaving. At approximately 1:45 on the

morning of November 27, 2018, Durr was arrested while wearing striped Adidas pants. A

pair of black and white striped Adidas pants was found in the car Snell was arrested in.4

Hinton’s arrest photo shows him attired in a black and white striped Adidas tracksuit jacket.

His pants are not photographed. Hinton and Durr each placed the blame on the other for

shooting Jones in the bathtub.

4
Specifically, Snell was found “half in and out of the vehicle” “standing in between
the open driver’s door and the seal of the front driver’s door.”

24
¶44. Durr, Hinton, and Snell were each appointed one of Forrest County’s four full-time

public defenders. Hinton and Snell each pled guilty to lesser charges5 and testified against

Durr at trial. Both co-defendants pointed to Durr as Jones’ shooter. The jury convicted Durr

of all four charges. Durr was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole

for capital murder, twenty-five years for armed robbery, twenty years for aggravated assault,

and five years for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The sentences were set to run

consecutively. After the denial of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Durr

timely appealed. On appeal, Durr claims for the first time that his Sixth Amendment right

was violated when public defenders from the same office represented both him and his co-

defendants (Hinton and Snell) who ultimately testified against him.6 I agree and under plain

error review would reverse the judgment and remand Durr’s case for a new trial with

conflict-free counsel.

DISCUSSION

¶45. Durr asks the appellate court to review for the first time on appeal that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Durr contends that

Durr, Snell, and Hinton’s representation by the Forrest County Public Defender’s office runs

afoul of “the most basic principle of fairness.”

5
Hinton pled guilty to armed robbery. The court entered an order to nolle prosequi
Hinton’s remaining charges of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, capital murder, and
aggravated assault. Snell testified that he pled guilty to second-degree murder and that part
of his plea required him to testify.
6
Although Durr brings two issues on appeal, I address only the first because I find
it is dispositive.

25
¶46. “When a defendant’s substantive or fundamental rights are affected, this Court will

notice a plain error not identified or distinctly specified.” Pace v. State, 242 So. 3d 107, 115

(¶20) (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3); Foster v.

State, 148 So. 3d 1012, 1018 (¶20) (Miss. 2014)). “When an error impacts a fundamental

right of the defendant, ‘procedural rules give way to prevent a miscarriage of justice,’

requiring this Court to address issues on plain-error review and correct any fundamental

violations.” Stevenson v. State, 320 So. 3d 1225, 1229 (¶12) (Miss. 2021) (citing Cozart v.

State, 226 So. 3d 574, 581 (¶22) (Miss. 2017)). “For the plain-error doctrine to apply, there

must have been an error that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affects

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Garcia v. State, 300 So.

3d 945, 976 (¶104) (Miss. 2020) (citing Ambrose v. State, 254 So. 3d 77, 136 (Miss. 2018)).

¶47. Both our constitution and the United States Constitution guarantee a right to effective

assistance of counsel in criminal trials. Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26; U.S. Const. amend. VI &

XIV; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). “The Sixth Amendment right to

counsel protects a defendant’s ‘fundamental right to a fair trial.’” Galloway v. State, 298 So.

3d 966, 978 (¶62) (Miss. 2020) (Kitchens, P.J., dissenting) (citing Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984)). “The ‘right to counsel, conflict free, is attendant to the Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Id. (quoting Armstrong v. State, 573

So. 2d 1329, 1334 (Miss. 1990)). Additionally, our Supreme Court has previously analyzed

ineffective assistance of counsel claims under plain error review on direct appeal in the past.

Morrow v. State, 275 So. 3d 77, 81, 83-85 (¶¶15, 23-28) (Miss. 2019). Under a plain error

26
analysis, it is evident from the record in this case that a grave miscarriage of justice has

occurred.

I. Constitutional Framework

¶48. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a

criminal trial the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const.

amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment makes this guarantee because the assistance of counsel

is “necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. The Supreme Court

has further explained that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of

counsel.” Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, (1970)). And

the right to conflict-free representation is encompassed by the right to effective assistance

of counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees. Stringer v. State, 485 So. 2d 274, 275

(Miss. 1986) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 (1942), superseded on other

grounds as recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)). This right applies

against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,

340, 345 (1963).

¶49. “Effective representation is lacking, however, if counsel, unknown to the accused and

without his knowledgeable assent, is in a duplicitous position where his full talents as a

vigorous advocate having the single aim of acquittal by all means fair and honorable are

hobbled or fettered or restrained by commitments to others.” United States v. Alvarez, 580

F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir.

1962)). “Undivided loyalty and fidelity of commitment is therefore the guiding principle in

27
this important area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. An attorney’s duty of loyalty

to a client is “perhaps the most basic” responsibility of counsel, but “it is difficult to measure

the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.

¶50. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is typically analyzed under the two prongs

of Strickland, which instructs that “[t]he test to be applied in cases involving alleged

ineffectiveness of counsel is whether counsel’s over-all performance was (1) deficient and

if so, (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” McQuarter v. State,

574 So. 2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). But “the standard set

out in Strickland . . . is inapplicable to cases when the defendant’s attorney ‘actively

represented conflicting interests.’” Kiker v. State, 55 So. 3d 1060, 1066 (¶16) (Miss. 2011)

(quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)). In analyzing an ineffective

assistance claim that presents a conflict of interest, we do not apply the Strickland

two-pronged test but rather a more lenient standard that does not require a showing of

prejudice. See id.; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978); Glasser, 315 U.S.

at 75-76; Galloway, 298 So. 3d at 975 (¶¶44-46). In Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court created

an automatic-reversal rule “where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over

[a co-defendant’s] timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no

conflict.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488). But in cases where

no objection to the conflict of interest stemming from multiple representation was raised, the

28
Supreme Court has established the Cuyler standard.7 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348

(1980). The Cuyler standard states that “[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth

Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual

conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id.8

II. Mississippi Law

¶51. With this Constitutional framework in place, I turn to Mississippi law. In Stringer,

our Supreme Court acknowledged that it “readily recognizes the rule that effective assistance

of counsel encompasses the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe

conflicting duties to other defendants as set forth in Glasser v. [United States]. . . .” Stringer,

485 So. 2d at 275. The Supreme Court has noted that “adept representation encompasses two

broad principles: minimum competence and loyal assistance.” Armstrong, 573 So. 2d at

1331. We have noted that “guarantees of due process of law require undivided loyalty of

defense counsel” and that “[u]nder our system of jurisprudence, if a lawyer is not one

hundred percent loyal to his client, he flunks.” Littlejohn v. State, 593 So. 2d 20, 22-23

(Miss. 1992).

7
Some courts refer to the case as the Sullivan (instead of the Cuyler) standard. See
Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168; Russeau v. Stephens, 559 F. App’x 342, 357 (5th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished).
8
Federal courts have limited the Cuyler standard to apply solely to cases that have
conflicts of interest resulting from multiple representations of criminal defendants, not cases
that involve counsel’s personal conflicts. See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1268, 1270-71
(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Caston, No. 3:05cr153-TSL-JSC, 2007 WL 9724360, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 29, 2007);
Jordan v. Epps, No. 3:09cv544-DPJ-FKB, 2012 WL 5997024, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 30,
2012).

29
¶52. Mississippi has readily adopted the Cuyler standard as an alternative to Strickland

when “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Galloway,

298 So. 3d at 974-75 (¶¶43-45). In addition, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Kiker has

added an additional protection to Cuyler’s lowered bar. Kiker, 55 So. 3d at 1066 (¶16). In

that case, the Supreme Court stated, “When the accused is represented by an attorney with

an actual conflict of interest, the accused has received ineffective assistance of counsel as a

matter of law, and ‘reversal is automatic irrespective of a showing of prejudice unless [the

accused] knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to conflict free

representation.’” Id. (quoting Armstrong, 573 So. 2d at 1335). According to Justice

Kitchens, who authored Kiker, this means that when an actual (as opposed to potential)

conflict has been shown, “[u]nlike Cuyler, our standard, as set out in Kiker, does not require

a showing that the attorney’s performance was adversely affected by the conflict of interest,

but it requires only a showing that an actual conflict of interest exists.” Galloway, 298 So.

3d at 979 (¶64) (Kitchens, J., dissenting).

¶53. Mississippi has created multiple professional rules of conduct designed to prevent

conflicts of interest. First, Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b)9 states:

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably
believes:
(1) the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client has given knowing and informed consent after

9
The comments to Rule 1.7 state that “[s]imultaneous representation of parties
whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed
by paragraph (b).” Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt.

30
consultation. The consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the representation and the advantages and risks
involved.

The comments to this rule state that “[a]n impermissible conflict may exist by reason of

substantial discrepancy in the parties’ testimony, [or] incompatibility in positions in relation

to an opposing party.” Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt.

¶54. “It is well-settled that requiring or permitting one attorney to represent co-defendants,

commonly referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of the constitutional

guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.” Armstrong, 573 So. 2d at 1333 (citing Burger

v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987)). But the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit has explained that “a conflict of interest is present whenever one defendant stands to

gain significantly by counsel adducing probative evidence or advancing plausible arguments

that are damaging to the cause of a codefendant whom counsel is also representing.”

Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1076, 1080 (5th Cir. 1975). And according to our

rules, “[t]he potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal

case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one

co-defendant.” Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt. “Moreover, ‘[s]uch representation not only

constitutes a breach of professional ethics, it also invites disrespect for the integrity of the

Court.’” Armstrong, 573 So. 2d at 1332-33 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,

162 (1988)).

¶55. Next, Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a) imputes the aforementioned

conflicts to firms:

31
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent
a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing
so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.4.

Thus, the first key to this issue is answering the question of whether an individual county’s

public defender’s office constitutes a “firm” for the purposes of the conflicts of interest rules.

III. A “firm” may exist within Mississippi’s public defender system.

¶56. As the majority states, Mississippi has not yet answered the question of whether an

individual county’s public defender’s office constitutes a “firm.” Ante at ¶22. Many other

states have already grappled with this decision. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 628 P.2d 950

(Ariz. 1981); Nelson v. State, 440 P. 3d 240 (Alaska 2019); Duvall v. State, 923 A.2d 81, 95

(Md. 2007); Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003); State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525 (N.J. 1982).

The comments to the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct define a “firm” as “lawyers

in a private firm, and lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other

organization.” Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10 cmt. The comments note that whether two or

more lawyers constitute a firm can depend on specific facts and that the purpose of the rule

must be considered when determining whether a firm exists. Id. “A group of lawyers could

be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent

opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that

information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.” Id. While silent on the

classification of public defender’s offices, the comments specifically note that “[l]awyers

employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not

necessarily those employed in separate units.” Id.

32
¶57. As the majority states, information about the organization and structure and

composition of public defenders’ offices can be difficult to find. Ante at ¶22. One excellent

resource is a 2018 report published by the Mississippi Office of State Public Defender on its

website.10 This report gives us some insight into how public defender offices across the state

operated at the time of the report. The majority mistakenly suggests that we offer this report

as a supplement to the record. Ante at ¶23. This is not the case. Instead, we offer this report

as a secondary source as part of our research and analysis. This report gives some

background information into the structure of public defender offices in Mississippi that was

not otherwise supplied by the majority.

¶58. According to the Sixth Amendment Center, as of 2018, seven of Mississippi’s eighty-

two counties have established a public defender’s office: Forrest, Harrison, Hinds, Jackson,

Lamar, Pearl River, and Washington Counties. The Right to Counsel In Mississippi, supra

¶57 n.10, at 19 n.73.11 In the counties that have established public defender offices, an

attorney is selected to serve as the public defender, and that attorney is responsible for hiring

10
Sixth Amendment Center, The Right to Counsel in Mississippi: Evaluation of Adult
Felony Trial Level Indigent Defense Services, at 19 (March 2018),
https://www.ospd.ms.gov/6AC_mississippi_report_2018%20(Final%20for%20Release).pdf
(last visited May 5, 2023).
11
In the remaining counties that have not established a county-funded public defender
office, the circuit court judge appoints an attorney to represent the indigent defendant. Id.
at 23. Attorneys may be appointed at an hourly rate or a fixed fee. Id. In hourly rate
systems, private attorneys are typically paid an hourly rate for their work, plus expenses. Id.
at 24. In an “appointed counsel fixed-fee system” an appointed attorney is paid a fixed
salary to represent an unlimited number of felony defendants. Id. at 25. According to the
Sixth Amendment Center, “appointed counsel fixed fee systems” are colloquially referred
to as a “part-time public defender office.” Id. at 26.

33
assistant public defenders if authorized by the county. Id. The county is required to provide

“office space, secretarial assistance, and all reasonable expenses of operating the office.” Id.

(citing Miss. Code Ann. § 25-32-7 (Supp. 2017)).

¶59. In 2018, Forrest County had a full-time public defender’s office with one full-time

public defender and three full-time assistant public defenders. Id. at 20. According to the

Sixth Amendment Center’s research, Forrest County’s circuit court judges jointly select the

public defender. Id. The public defender, with the approval of the circuit court judges,

makes hiring decisions in the office. Id. The four full-time public defender’s office

attorneys do not engage in private practice. Id. According to the Sixth Amendment Center,

“Forrest County does not have a policy about providing counsel in the event that the . . .

public defender office has a conflict.” Id. The Sixth Amendment Center report states that

“[t]he public defender believes the office attorneys will not be allowed to withdraw from

representing any of the indigent defendants in a multi-defendant case and plans to use a

‘Chinese Wall’ procedure to shield each attorney from having access to the cases of the other

office attorneys.” Id. The report notes that other public defender offices appoint a private

attorney when the public defender office has a conflict. Id. at 21-22.

¶60. Durr asks us on direct appeal to answer the legal question of whether individual public

defender offices fall under the definition of a “firm” for the purposes of conflict prevention

as contemplated in the Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10. The Restatement

(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers section 123 (2000) agrees with his position, and so

do I. The Restatement notes that “[w]here a lawyer’s relationship with a client creates an

34
incentive to violate an obligation to another client, an affiliated lawyer will often have [a]

similar incentive to favor one client over the other.” Restatement (3d) of the Law Governing

Lawyers § 123 cmt. (b). The Restatement then specifically lists public-defender offices when

discussing the imputation of a conflict of interest to an affiliated lawyer, explaining that

[i]n a public-defender office, conflict-of-interest questions commonly arise
when the interests of two or more defendants so conflict that lawyers in a
private-practice defense firm could not represent both or all the defendants
(see § 129). The rules on imputed conflicts and screening of this Section apply
to a public-defender organization as they do to a law firm in private practice
in a similar situation.

Id. at cmt. (d)(iv).

¶61. The majority believes that Durr’s issue of ineffective assistance of counsel would be

best heard on a motion for post-conviction collateral relief so that the record in the case can

be more thoroughly developed. Ante at ¶20. Indeed, “generally, ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claims are more appropriately brought during post-conviction proceedings.”

Williams v. State, 228 So. 3d 949, 952 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Dartez v. State,

177 So. 3d 420, 422-23 (¶18) (Miss. 2015)). But this Court will also review such claims on

direct appeal if “(1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional

dimensions, or (2) the parties stipulate that the record is adequate to allow the appellate court

to make the finding without consideration of the findings of fact of the trial judge.’” Id.

Furthermore, “if the defendant is represented by counsel who did not represent him at trial,

and the facts supporting the claim are fully apparent from the appellate record, the Court may

35
address the issue.” Pace, 242 So. 3d at 118 (¶28) (citing M.R.A.P. 22(b)).12 Here, we

clearly have a case that carries questions of constitutional dimensions. We also have a

factual scenario from the record where two co-defendants represented by the same public

defender’s office testify in direct opposition—each stating the other shot the victim—which

is a direct actual conflict. Consequently, this Court can and should address this issue on

direct appeal.

¶62. Furthermore, this Court, at a minimum, can choose to answer the legal question of

whether an individual county’s public defender’s office constitutes a “firm” for purposes of

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel—as many other states have done on direct appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Ibarra, 829 N.W.2d 190, 2013 WL 530558, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013)

(finding on direct appeal that a conflict exits between public defenders within the same

office, although this particular defendant waived any possible conflict on the record); Perkins

v. State, 487 S.E.2d 365, 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding on direct appeal for purposes of

ineffective assistance claims “public defenders in the same office are treated as members of

a law firm”); State v. Mark, 231 P.3d 478, 518 (Haw. 2010) (declining on direct appeal to

impute per se conflicts of interest to lawyers working in the same public defender’s office);

State v. Cook, 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (holding, on direct appeal, that

conflict questions that arise in public defender’s office should be addressed on a “case-by-

case basis”). This question needs to be answered irrespective of the individual outcome of

12
Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) also notes that “[w]here the
appellant is represented by counsel who did not represent the appellant at trial, the failure
to raise such issues on direct appeal shall constitute a waiver barring consideration of the
issues in post-conviction proceedings.”

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this case.

¶63. The majority points to Hinton v. State, 311 So. 3d 1213 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020),13 to

support its determination that this issue is best reserved for a post-conviction collateral relief

motion. Hinton is a factually similar case. In that case, attorneys from the same public

defender’s office as in the present case (Forrest County) represented multiple co-defendants

in a criminal matter. Hinton, 311 So. 3d at 1214-15 (¶¶4-7). Just like in Durr’s case,

Hinton’s co-defendant entered a plea and testified against her. Id. at (¶¶6-7). Just like Durr,

Hinton first raised the issue of a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel due to

multiple representations by public defenders from the same office in her appeal. Id. at 1214

(¶1). In Hinton, this Court declined to address Shannon Hinton’s constitutional claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel so that Hinton could be “given the opportunity to make a

record on this issue in a properly filed application for leave to file a motion for post-

conviction relief . . . .” Id. at 1215 (¶10). At the time, I concurred with the decision in

Hinton. But the ultimate outcome of Hinton’s case has convinced me that a different ruling

is necessary.

¶64. As instructed by this Court, Hinton petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for leave

to proceed in the trial court on a motion for post-conviction collateral relief. Motion, Hinton

v. State, No. 2021-M-00086-SCT (Miss. Jan. 25, 2021). Hinton’s request was denied by a

Supreme Court panel, which found “that Hinton has failed to show any prejudice under the

Strickland v. Washington standard and that this claim is without merit.” Order, Hinton v.

13
The appellant in that case is Shannon Hinton, not Tomaz Hinton, who is Durr’s co-
defendant in the present case.

37
State, No. 2021-M-00086-SCT (Miss. Apr. 6, 2021). The majority speculates that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Hinton weighs heavily against Durr’s contention that an

“actual” conflict exists because the Supreme Court would not have required Hinton to show

prejudice had an actual conflict been present. Ante at ¶28. This conjecture is incorrect.

There is no more fundamental “actual” conflict than for one client to testify against the

interests of the first client with information that directly contradicts the first client’s own

testimony. This is the most basic conflict possible. As it stands, Hinton remains incarcerated

to this day with no recourse. I do not believe this outcome is what this Court envisioned

when we determined that Hinton could seek redress in a motion for post-conviction collateral

relief. Because of the end result in Hinton’s case, I do not agree with the majority’s decision

to dismiss this issue without prejudice for Durr to raise the issue in a motion for post-

conviction collateral relief. Ante at ¶29. I would address this issue on direct appeal as

presented.

¶65. Even with “Chinese Wall” safeguards in place, it is not difficult to contemplate what

potential conflicts could arise in a shared office space when all the attorneys present are

representing separate co-defendants. And the demands and requirements of the Sixth

Amendment call for more protection than a metaphorical Chinese Wall. In small office

spaces it can be difficult to operate without overhearing phone calls or conversation, or

seeing the contents of another attorney’s computer screen. Additionally, the Public Defender

manages the handling of cases in his/her office. Any assistant public defender falls under

that person’s authority, which makes a conflict foreseeable. In a hierarchical office structure

38
where hiring, firing, promotion, and discipline matters are at play, these determinations could

impact a public defender’s decisions in a case.14 To avoid a conflict of interest in a firm, the

defendant’s interests must be aligned with his co-defendant’s in order for multiple

representation of co-defendants to pass muster. In the interest of safeguarding the duty of

loyalty constitutionally owed to every defendant, I would hold that each county’s individual

office of the public defender should be considered a “firm” for conflict-of-interest purposes.

IV. An “actual conflict” existed during Durr’s trial.

¶66. In addition to resolving the question of whether a public defender’s office is a “firm”

for conflict-of-interest purposes, I would also find that in Durr’s individual case, an “actual

conflict” existed when multiple public defenders from the Forrest County Public Defender’s

office represented Durr and his co-defendants who pled guilty to lesser charges and testified

against him.15 Because Durr did not object to the conflict of interest at the trial level, his case

would be analyzed under the Cuyler standard, which requires “a defendant who raised no

objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his

lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.

¶67. This Court has defined an “actual conflict” as existing when:

[A] defense attorney owes duties to a party whose interests are adverse to those

14
See generally Lawrence J. Fox & Daniel T. Goyette, National Association for
Public Defense (NAPD) Formal Ethics Opinion 19-1 (May 2020),
https://www.publicdefenders.us/files/NAPD%20Ethics%20Opinion_19-1_FINAL.pdf (last
visited May 5, 2023).
15
Because I believe Durr’s conviction should be reversed and the case remanded due
to the conflict of interest, I do not discuss Durr’s second issue regarding the admission of
Snell’s affidavit.

39
of the defendant, then an actual conflict exists. The interests of the other client
and the defendant are sufficiently adverse if it is shown that the attorney owes
a duty to the defendant to take some action that could be detrimental to his
other client.”

Gregory v. State, 96 So. 3d 54, 57 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Irving v. Hargett, 518

F. Supp. 1127, 1144 (N.D. Miss. 1981)). Mississippi district courts have cited the Fifth

Circuit to say that an actual conflict arises “when the defense attorney places himself in a

situation inherently conducive to divided loyalties.” Irving, 518 F. Supp. at 1143 (quoting

United States v. Kranzthor, 614 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Medel,

592 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining an actual conflict is “some divergence in the

parties’ interests”))). The Fifth Circuit has also stated that “a conflict of interest is present

whenever one defendant stands to gain significantly by counsel adducing probative evidence

or advancing plausible arguments that are damaging to the cause of a codefendant whom

counsel is also representing.” Id. at 1144 (quoting Foxworth, 516 F.2d at 1076).

¶68. In the present case, an “actual conflict” exists because Durr’s co-defendants were

represented by public defenders from the same “firm” as his attorney and testified against

him. There is no doubt that co-defendants testifying against one another represents an actual

conflict because in that scenario, their interests are diametrically opposed. The adverse

effect, of course, was that Durr was convicted based on the testimony of his co-defendants.

But regardless of whether Durr showed an adverse effect, under Kiker “[w]hen the accused

is represented by an attorney with an actual conflict of interest, the accused has received

ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law,” and reversal is automatic unless the

conflict was waived. Kiker, 55 So. 3d at 1066 (¶16). Nothing in the record indicates such

40
a waiver occurred. Because Durr has shown that an actual conflict of interest adversely

affected his lawyer’s performance as required, I would reverse the judgment in Durr’s case

and remand his case for a new trial.

*****

¶69. “[The] difficulty in assessing prejudice resulting from a conflict of interest is due in

part to the fact that the conflict may affect almost any aspect of the lawyer’s preparation and

presentation of the case.” Burger, 483 U.S. at 800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). “Because the

conflict primarily compels the lawyer not to pursue certain arguments or take certain actions,

it is all the more difficult to discern its effect.” Id. In accordance with this reasoning, I

would find that there is no need to await a fact-finding post-conviction hearing to resolve the

issues in this case. I would hold that each individual county’s public defender’s office should

be considered a “firm” for the purpose of conflicts of interest. I would also hold that Durr’s

case, even based on the limited facts before us, demonstrates an actual conflict that adversely

affected his attorney’s performance in violation of Durr’s Sixth Amendment right, requiring

a reversal of the judgment and entitling Durr to a new trial. As a consequence, I must

respectfully dissent.

McDONALD, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

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