In Re The Aaron Stapp Living Trust: Troy Stapp v. Amy Stapp

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-CA-01282-COA

IN RE THE AARON STAPP LIVING TRUST: APPELLANT
TROY STAPP

v.

AMY STAPP APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/03/2020
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MITCHELL M. LUNDY JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PANOLA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TAYLOR D. BUNTIN III
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: A. E. (RUSTY) HARLOW JR.
KATHI CRESTMAN WILSON
MORGAN KAY JACKSON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/31/2022
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Aaron Stapp operated a successful cattle farm in Panola County for several years. On

December 17, 2009, he and his wife, Bobbie Stapp, created the Stapp Revocable Living Trust

and placed certain assets into the trust. On May 28, 2015, Aaron Stapp then created the

Aaron Stapp Living Trust and, again, placed certain assets into this trust.1 A quitclaim deed,

1
There were no trust documents admitted into evidence in this case. There is no
inventory of assets for either trust and no annual reports for either trust. While there was
some discussion during the trial that the trusts may have been merged, there is no evidence
in the record of that fact.
that was introduced into evidence at trial, indicated that the farmland at issue in this appeal

was first conveyed by Aaron T. Stapp and Bobbie N. Stapp to Aaron Stapp and Bobbie Stapp

as Trustees of the Stapp Revocable Living Trust on December 17, 2009. The farmland was

then conveyed by Aaron Stapp as Trustee of the Stapp Revocable Living Trust to Aaron

Stapp as Trustee of the Aaron Stapp Living Trust on May 28, 2015. It would appear that

Bobbie Stapp was deceased at the time of the latter conveyance, although there is no specific

reference to her death in the record on appeal.

¶2. Aaron Stapp died on October 21, 2016. His last will and testament was probated, and

his estate was opened on January 17, 2017, with Amy Stapp and Troy Stapp, his only

children and the parties here, serving as co-executors. Amy and Troy also became trustees

of both trusts at some point after their father’s death. The estate was closed on November

30, 2018. On July 10, 2019, Troy was removed as a trustee of the two trusts, leaving Amy

as the sole trustee. On September 27, 2019, Amy was removed as trustee, and attorney John

T. Lamar was appointed as trustee by the chancery court.2

2
The agreed order appointing Lamar as the trustee for “both trusts,” stated in part:

The Honorable John Lamar is hereby appointed as sole Trustee for both Trusts
in this action. As it is the desire of both beneficiaries of the Trust to do so,
the Trustee, in addition to any other duties and responsibilities, shall evaluate
the propriety and potential for dissolving both Trusts pursuant to their
terms.

(Emphasis added). Lamar was not a named party in this action, nor did he testify at trial.
We have no record or other account of actions he may have taken as trustee. We have no
evidence of Lamar’s opinion as to whether the continuance of the trust was necessary to
achieve any material purpose of the trusts. See Miss. Code Ann. § 91-8-411(b) (Rev. 2018).
That being said, Lamar was clearly aware of the litigation because his invoice for services
rendered to the trusts was admitted into evidence at trial. Considering the direction he was

2
¶3. On April 20, 2020, Amy filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Panola County,

Mississippi, asking the court to divide the corpus of the Aaron Stapp Living Trust or, in the

alternative, to make a distribution to the beneficiaries. The petition alleges that Amy and her

brother, Troy, are the only beneficiaries of the trust.3 Troy filed an answer and a counter-

petition on June 1, 2020. In his answer, Troy denied that the relief Amy requested should

be granted. In his counter-petition, Troy claimed that he should be reimbursed for certain

expenses he incurred on behalf of the trust and that Amy should be required to reimburse the

trust for her use of trust assets for her own benefit and for expenses the trust had incurred or

the income it had lost as a result of Amy’s use of trust assets. While Troy agreed that the

brokerage accounts should be divided after being adjusted as suggested in his counter-

petition, he argued that the farmland should not be sold, and should remain a trust asset.

given by the court in the order appointing him as trustee, it is significant to note that Lamar,
as trustee, did not interpose any objection to the modification or termination of the trusts and
did not notify the chancellor of any additional beneficiaries or interested parties. In fact,
Lamar signed the chancery court’s final order distributing the assets to the two beneficiaries
of the trust, Amy and Troy.
3
The dissent questions how the chancellor could determine who the beneficiaries of
the trust were without having the trust documents. First, the parties agreed in the pleadings
that they were the only beneficiaries of the trust. Second, we agree with the dissent that the
trustee had a fiduciary duty to make the court aware of and protect the interest of any other
beneficiary of the trust. However, as noted above, Lamar did not identify any other
beneficiary. Third, the chancellor here is the same chancellor that presided over the probate
of the estate of Aaron Stapp. The record is clear that the chancellor was familiar with the
trust documents. In an agreed order from the estate file that was introduced as an exhibit,
the chancellor quoted “Section 6.01 of the Living Trust.” That section ordered the
distribution of a house in Cordova, Mississippi, to Amy Stapp and further provided, “If Amy
Stapp is deceased, my Trustee shall distribute this property to Amy Stapp’s descendants, per
stirpes.” This provision related to a specific asset and was not merely a general reference
to the remainder of the trust assets. Obviously, Amy Stapp was not deceased, and there are
no other beneficiaries of the trust other than Troy.

3
¶4. These matters went to trial on June 24, 2020. Subsequently, the chancery court

entered an order on August 3, 2020, resolving the matters presented. On August 12, 2020,

Troy filed a “Motion to Amend and/or Clarify Judgment.” On August 13, 2020, Amy also

filed a “Motion to Clarify, Amend, and Reconsider.” After considering both motions, the

chancery court entered an additional order on October 28, 2020, which clarified that “all

liquid assets shall be divided between the two beneficiaries prior to the auction of the

remaining assets of the trust.” All the additional requests contained in Amy’s and Troy’s

motions were denied. The chancellor did not order that the farmland and houses be sold, and

they remain assets of the trust. Aggrieved by portions of the chancellor’s ruling, Troy

appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. “This Court employs a limited standard of review on appeals from chancery court.”

In re Est. of Baumgardner, 82 So. 3d 592, 598 (¶15) (Miss. 2012).

[T]his Court “will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when
supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion,
was manifestly wrong, [or his findings were clearly erroneous[,] or [he]
applied an erroneous legal standard.”

Id. (quoting Biglane v. Under the Hill Corp., 949 So. 2d 9, 13-14 (¶17) (Miss. 2007)).

“Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Corp. Mgmt. Inc. v. Greene County,

23 So. 3d 454, 459 (¶11) (Miss. 2009)).

ANALYSIS

¶6. Troy raises several issues on appeal regarding the chancery court’s order to sell and

divide certain trust assets, as well as the disposition and reimbursement of other specific trust

4
assets and expenses. Troy argues that the chancellor’s ruling was not supported by

substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence and was against the overwhelming weight of

the evidence.

¶7. The chancellor’s authority to modify or terminate a trust is established by statute.

More specifically, Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-8-105 (a)-(b) (Rev. 2018) states

in part:

Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this chapter governs the
duties and powers of a trustee or any other fiduciary under this chapter,
relations among trustees and such other fiduciaries, and the rights and interests
of a beneficiary. . . . The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this
chapter except: . . . (4) The power of the court to modify or terminate a
trust under Sections 91-8-410 through 91-8-416[.]

(Emphasis added). Further, Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-8-411 states in part:

(b) Following the settlor’s death, a noncharitable irrevocable trust may be
terminated upon consent of all the qualified beneficiaries if the court
concludes that continuance of the trust is not necessary to achieve any
material purpose of the trust. . . .

(c) Upon termination of a trust under subsection (a) or (b), the trustee shall
distribute the trust property as agreed by the qualified beneficiaries.

(d) If not all of the qualified beneficiaries consent to a proposed
modification or termination of the trust under subsection (a) or (b), the
modification or termination may be approved by the court if the court is
satisfied that:

(1) If all of the qualified beneficiaries had consented, the trust
could have been modified or terminated under this section; and

(2) The interests of a qualified beneficiary who does not consent
will be adequately protected.

5
(Emphasis added).4

¶8. In this case, the chancery court did not issue written findings of fact or conclusions

of law. Neither Amy nor Troy requested before trial, after trial, or after the chancellor’s

ruling that the chancellor issue written findings of fact or conclusions of law. In Thomas v.

Thomas, 281 So. 3d 1191, 1213 (¶79) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), this Court held that “when there

are no specific findings of fact, this Court will assume that the trial court made

determinations of fact sufficient to support its judgment.” We must then assume that the

chancellor made the necessary findings, pursuant to the above statutes, that gave him the

authority to modify the trusts.

¶9. The chancery court was not provided with sufficient evidence that would allow the

court to make an in-kind distribution of the trust’s real property. Amy and Troy had differing

opinions as to how the real property should or could be equitably divided. Troy did testify,

however, that he believed an equitable in-kind distribution could be reached after all other

issues were resolved. In turn, the chancery court left the real property in the trust while

ruling on the disposition, management, and reimbursement of the remaining trust assets.

Troy’s arguments asserted on appeal stem from the chancery court’s ruling on the

disposition, management, and reimbursement of those remaining trust assets.

I. Did the chancery court err in requiring that all the farm equipment
be auctioned?

4
These statutes are part of the Mississippi Uniform Trust Code, which was enacted
by the Legislature and became effective on July 1, 2014. While the dissent may be rightly
concerned with the absence of the trust documents, the language in the trust documents
could not have limited the chancellor’s authority to modify or terminate the trusts pursuant
to these statutes.

6
¶10. Troy argues on appeal that the chancellor “afforded no reason for the sale of the

[farm] equipment and the facts do not justify that decision.” Troy further argues that neither

he nor Amy requested that the farm be sold. Troy asserts that the cattle farm was once

profitable for his father, and it was capable of being profitable in the future; he suggested a

future plan of “backgrounding steers,” rather than calves. Finally, Troy argues that even if

the farming operation were discontinued, the equipment is necessary for the upkeep and

maintenance of the property.

¶11. We will first address Troy’s assertion that neither he nor Amy requested that the farm

be sold. In paragraph 1 of Amy’s petition, she stated that “[t]he Aaron Stapp Living Trust

was created by Aaron Stapp on or about May 28, 2015.” Paragraph 3 of her petition states

that “[t]he parties have been unable to reach an amicable resolution.” Paragraph 4 of the

petition requests “that this Court divide the corpus of the Trust, or in the alternative, make

a distribution to the beneficiaries.” Amy’s petition clearly requests a division of the entire

corpus of the trust and more specifically the corpus of the trust created on May 28, 2015. As

shown by the quitclaim deed mentioned above, Troy agreed that the farmland was part of the

corpus of the 2015 trust. Amy’s petition undoubtedly placed the matter of the disposition of

the farm property before the chancery court.

¶12. While Troy argues that the farm had been profitable for his father and could be

profitable in the future, the testimony showed that the farm had not made a profit since Aaron

Stapp’s death. Since their father’s death, the trust had benefitted from the sale of several

cows; however, up to fifteen cows died due to neglect. Both Amy and Troy had been

7
afforded the opportunity to manage the farm for periods of more than a year each, but they

were not really successful in maintaining a working farm. From the testimony, it did not

appear that either Amy or Troy had the time, ability, or inclination to manage a working farm

on a daily basis. Prior to trial, no efforts had been made by anyone to rent the land to a third

party.

¶13. In In re Hart’s Estate, 260 Miss. 498, 40 So. 2d 263, 265 (1949), the supreme court

held that

[a] court of equity will not order the sale of trust property and the
reinvestment of its proceeds merely for the purpose of increasing the value of
the trust estate, but will order such a sale and reinvestment when so to do is
necessary in order to effectuate the purpose for which the trust was created or
to prevent the loss or destruction of the trust estate.

(Emphasis added). “Courts of equity have inherent power to protect trusts and may order

a sale of part of the trust property, if such action is necessary for execution of the trust

purposes.” Hengen v. Perpetual Care Cemeteries Inc., 230 So. 2d 795, 798 (Miss. 1970)

(emphasis added). In the case at hand, the chancery court stated in its opinion:

As this [c]ourt has seen numerous times in the past [t]rusts such as this often
are “real world” unworkable and end up being a constant drain on the assets
of the trust as well as a constant source of aggravation for the [b]eneficiaries
as well as costly (i.e. attorney’s fees and trustee fees).

In summary, Troy and Amy showed that they were unable to work together or separately to

run the farm. Further, the farm had not been profitable since their father’s death, and up to

fifteen cows had died in the interim. Therefore, this Court finds no error in the chancery

court’s decision that the cattle and all the farm equipment would be sold at auction.

II. Did the chancery court err in requiring that $50,000 be maintained

8
in an account for unforeseen expenses, taxes, and insurance?

¶14. Troy argues that the chancery court’s requirement for $50,000 to be maintained in an

account for unforeseen expenses, taxes, and insurance on the farm property was not

necessary in light of the court’s requirement that Amy be responsible for all expenses, taxes,

and insurance on the same property. While Troy argues that these two provisions are

duplicative, there is a key distinction between the two. While the court stated that Amy

should be responsible for expenses, taxes, and insurance associated with the farmhouse, the

court also stated that the $50,000 should be maintained to cover any unforeseen expenses,

taxes, and insurance. Understandably, Amy should be required to pay for expenses, taxes,

and insurance associated with the farmhouse while she is enjoying the day-to-day use of the

home. However, the $50,000 set aside by the chancery court seemed to be set up for a

different category of expenses outside of the day-to-day variety. While the real property

remains in the trust, we find no error in the chancery court’s order regarding the maintenance

of an account containing $50,000 for unforeseen expenses related to the farm property.5

III. Did the chancery court err in failing to require Amy to reimburse
the trust for rent and increased utility costs during her occupancy
of the farmhouse, and did the chancery court err in allowing Amy
to remain living in the farmhouse indefinitely?

¶15. Troy argues on appeal that the chancery court erred by not determining a fair rent

5
The dissent raises several questions concerning this ruling by the chancellor. It is
important to understand that the chancellor did not terminate the trusts. While the
chancellor’s order modifies the trusts by distributing some of the trusts’ assets, the land and
houses remain in the trusts, along with any other assets not distributed by the court’s order.
This $50,000 remains in the trust account. Lamar remains the trustee and is responsible for
the continued administration of the trusts and trust assets.

9
amount for the farmhouse and failing to require Amy to reimburse the trust for rent and

utility costs for the time that she lived there. He further argues that the chancery court erred

in allowing Amy to remain living in the farmhouse rent-free for an indefinite period. Troy

combined his argument of these two issues in his brief, and therefore this Court will address

them together. Troy argues that he has been denied fair use of the trust property since Amy

has been living in the farmhouse and will continue to be denied use as long as she is allowed

to remain there.

¶16. It is clear, however, that after his father’s death, Troy never lived on the farm. During

the approximately seventeen-month period Troy claims he was regularly working the farm,

he commuted from his home (about 128 miles roundtrip). Again, after Aaron Stapp’s death,

no one attempted to rent the land to earn income for the trust. While there is some

discrepancy between the parties as to when Amy moved into the farmhouse full-time, she had

been living there at least since July 2018. As of the date of the trial, Amy, along with a

friend and her children, were still living in the farmhouse.

¶17. In Reedy v. Johnson’s Estate, 200 Miss. 205, 26 So. 2d 685, 687 (1946), the

Mississippi Supreme Court held:

A court, in determining whether or not it will authorize a departure from the
terms of the trust . . . [,] will emphasize the ultimate intention of the trustor
rather than the interests of the beneficiaries, and the prime consideration is
the necessity for the preservation of the estate, and not merely the
administration of the trust in a way to produce a greater benefit for the
beneficiaries.

(Emphasis added). There is no indication that the farmhouse property was ever intended to

or used to generate rental income; however, Amy’s use of the farm is not unfettered. The

10
chancery court put conditions on Amy remaining in the farmhouse in furtherance of

preserving the trust asset. The chancery court stated, “Amy may continue to live in the

farmhouse as long as all expenses are paid and the farmhouse is kept in good condition and

she shall pay all the taxes and insurance thereon.” Clearly, the chancery court ordered these

conditions be met to preserve the trust asset, and if not fulfilled by Amy, provided an avenue

for her removal from the property. Although the chancery court order allowed Amy to

remain living on the farm, the court did not exclude Troy from enjoying the property as well.

If Amy fulfilled all the conditions the court set associated with remaining in the farmhouse,

it certainly would benefit the trust and ultimately both beneficiaries. We find no error in the

chancellor’s ruling.

IV. Did the chancery court err in failing to require Amy to reimburse
the trust for the funds she received from the cattle sales, and did
the chancery court err in failing to order that Troy be reimbursed
for alleged expenses incurred associated with the management of
the cattle?

¶18. Troy argues on appeal that Amy should have been ordered to reimburse the trust for

cattle sale proceeds not placed in the trust account but rather placed in her personal account

for her own use. Amy sold the cattle on three separate occasions: March 28, 2018; October

17, 2018; and January 9, 2019. The disposition of the proceeds from the first cattle sale is

not disputed. Troy claimed that Amy did not deposit the full amount of the sale proceeds

from the second sale in the trust account, and he further claimed that Amy did not deposit any

of the sale proceeds from the third sale in the trust account. Amy testified at trial that she

believed she had deposited the full amount of the proceeds from the second sale, but the

11
evidence at trial showed that there was a $1,500 discrepancy in the amount that was paid at

the sale and the amount that was deposited in the trust account. Amy claimed that she put

all the proceeds from the third sale, $2,852.92, in her personal account. According to Amy,

she used the money to reimburse herself for feed, vet bills, fuel, bailing string, protein cubes,

minerals, and other repairs that needed to be made around the farm. Similarly, Troy testified

at trial that he also wrote checks to reimburse himself from trust funds to cover expenses

from a tractor supply store and a co-op. Troy admitted that he wrote checks from trust

accounts to pay multiple individuals to help him with the work that needed to be done around

the farm.

¶19. Additionally, Troy argues on appeal that he should have been reimbursed for certain

expenses that he incurred during an approximate seventeen-month time period while he was

taking care of the cattle farm. More specifically, he argues that the chancery court erred in

denying his claim for reimbursement for travel expenses from his home in Walls,

Mississippi, to Batesville, Mississippi, in the amount of $6,180 after the court took judicial

notice of the standard IRS mileage reimbursement rate. On the same token, Amy testified

that she also commuted back and forth between her home in Memphis, Tennessee, and the

farm in Batesville, Mississippi. As a result of her commuting and personal finances spent

on the farm, Amy testified that she lost her Memphis home to foreclosure. It is clear to this

Court that at least some of the reimbursements for which Troy requested arose out of

transactions that occurred while Troy and Amy’s father’s estate was still open. That being

said, it is unclear what actions Troy and Amy took while acting as co-executors of their

12
father’s estate and which actions they took while acting as co-trustees of the Aaron Stapp

Living Trust.

¶20. In Shelby v. White, 158 Miss. 880, 131 So. 343, 346 (1930), the Mississippi Supreme

Court stated that “when [the trustee] pays claims for the benefit of the trust estate, which he

is authorized by the trust instrument to incur, he may be reimbursed out of the estate.”

(Emphasis added). In this case, this Court is not privy to the applicable trust instruments or

any of the provisions. It is unclear to this Court whether Amy or Troy, when acting as co-

trustees, had any authority granted within the trust instrument to make certain expenditures

for which they requested reimbursement or for which they unilaterally reimbursed themselves

without consulting the other. Notably, even after all the expenditures for which Troy

requested reimbursement, it is undisputed by the parties that the farm generated absolutely

no income after their father’s death. In fact, just the opposite occurred, and cattle died under

the care of the co-trustees. Both parties admitted to reimbursing themselves for expenses

they claim they made for the benefit of the farm. Both parties also claim that they incurred

traveling expenses while trying to maintain the farm. In its ruling, the chancery court

pointedly acknowledged both parties’ claims and stated such in its order. More specifically

the order stated, “[B]oth parties have taken their turn at operating the farm and its cattle and

hay operation. Neither party shall be reimbursed for any expenses they claim they incurred

while so operating.” Given the limited information in the record regarding the authority to

make expenditures on behalf of the trust, this Court finds no error in the chancery court’s

decision denying Troy’s request that Amy reimburse the trust for cattle-sale proceeds and

13
reimbursement for his travel expenses to and from the farm.

CONCLUSION

¶21. We find that the chancellor’s rulings are supported by substantial evidence, that he did

not abuse his discretion, and that his findings were not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.

Further, he did not apply an erroneous legal standard.

¶22. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR.
McCARTY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

McCARTY, J., DISSENTING:

¶23. The trial court modified the two trusts without having the actual terms of the trusts or

knowing the settlor’s intent. It was therefore manifest error to rule in the absence of the trust

documents, so the only solution is to reverse and render.

¶24. Our record is missing crucial evidence—the documents creating the trusts. It should

go without saying that we can only interpret, review, dissolve, or modify a trust when we

have the language of it before us because, like a will, we have to do what the creator of the

documents wanted. “[I]t is well known that a trust must be administered according to the

intent of the settlor.” Gulf Nat’l Bank v. Sturtevant, 511 So. 2d 936, 937 (Miss. 1987). As

the Supreme Court has explained, the “administration of a trust must accord strictly with the

intent of the settlor and the terms of the trust[.]” In re Est. of Smith v. Boolos, 204 So. 3d

291, 315 (¶58) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Reedy v. Johnson’s Est., 200 Miss. 205, 210-11, 26 So.

2d 685, 687 (1946)). This general rule is so strong that “ordinarily even a court of equity has

14
no authority to authorize the trustee to depart therefrom, and will do all within its power to

see that the trust is executed in accordance with its terms[.]” Id. (emphasis added).

¶25. We also cannot approve a modification or dissolution of a trust when doing so would

harm a beneficiary: “The interests of the beneficiaries are paramount, and nothing should be

done that would diminish their rights under the terms of the agreement and granted by law.”

Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 106 So. 3d 360, 371 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added).

¶26. For decades upon decades, our review was grounded strictly in what the trust

documents said and in what the settlor intended. This case departs from our approach

spanning nearly a century.

¶27. This case did not begin with a request to sell all of the cattle and farm equipment. The

only relief Amy Stapp asked for in the very first filing was to remove the trustees over the

Aaron Stapp Living Trust. Amy argued “the current trustees should be removed, as a lack

of cooperation among the cotrustees is substantially impairing the administration of the

trust.” In the alternative, she alleged “that because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent

failure of the trustees to administer the trust effectively, the court should determine that

removal of the trustees best serves the interests of the beneficiaries.” Amy alleged she and

her brother Troy were the beneficiaries.

¶28. Yet Amy did not attach a copy of the trust documents. Without these papers, we lack

crucial details regarding the intent of the settlor, such as the requirements their father set and

perhaps meant to span generations.6

6
There was at least one other possible beneficiary—Amy’s daughter Alisa, who
signed a waiver of her rights under the trusts. However, without the trust documents we do

15
¶29. After the suit began, a lawyer was “appointed as sole Trustee for both Trusts in this

action.” He was also appointed to “evaluate the propriety and potential for dissolving both

Trusts pursuant to their terms.”

¶30. While this order repeatedly uses the plural form for describing the trusts—whatever

they might be—it bears repeating that there are no documents in the record to fully describe

what is contained by the trusts in terms of property—real or chattel.

¶31. Amy then petitioned the trial court to divide the trust—singular—alleging that the

Aaron Stapp Living Trust was created in 2015 and, again, that she and her brother were the

only beneficiaries.

¶32. In a counter-petition, Troy alleged that he and Amy were “the beneficiaries of the

Stapp Revocable Living Trust dated December 17, 2009 and the Aaron Stapp Living Trust

dated May 28, 2015[.]” He explained the siblings were co-trustees.7 According to Troy, the

Aaron Stapp Living Trust contained a residence in Cordova, Tennessee, which was given to

Amy for her use. Troy maintained that the trusts—plural—owned a cattle farming operation

in Panola County.8

not know if there were other beneficiaries.
7
At trial a question was posed to Troy that assumed there was “a little over a million
dollars in this Trust,” with another assumption that “[t]he two Trust[s] in effect have been
consolidated.” But there was no actual proof of the assets or that there had been a
consolidation. Additionally, these were only statements made by a lawyer in the course of
questioning an adverse witness. Troy ultimately answered that he wanted the assets “to
remain in a trust,” while he wanted his sister “to have her money.”
8
It was not clear at trial how many cattle were still alive. Troy believed there were
fifty-seven, but that was just what he counted.

16
¶33. The conflicting testimony between the brother and sister and the overall vagueness

in this case is concerning. Normally we have wills, deeds, trusts, or contracts, which spell

out explicitly and at length what the goal of a document is, who is to benefit, what is at stake,

and how long it lasts. Yet in this odd case, we know nothing of what is really possessed by

the trusts, who is involved, what rights they have as determined by their father, the settlor,

or any of the necessary details. What we have is a sketch, and what we are missing is the

blueprint. Without a blueprint, our review is simply frustrated.

¶34. Our standard of review compels us to reverse when a “chancellor’s factual findings

are manifestly wrong [or] clearly erroneous,” and “we review questions of law de novo.”

Wilbourn, 106 So. 3d at 370 (¶34). Under the concerning and unusual circumstances of this

case, the factual findings of the trial court cannot be upheld because we have no trust

documents that reveal if the judgment was appropriately guided by the settlor’s intent, and

the limited proof we do have does not support the division as ordered.

¶35. Two specific rulings highlight why we must reverse and render. First, the trial court

set aside $50,000 after the sale of cattle and farm equipment for “unforeseen expenses,

taxes[,] and insurance.” Yet as Troy argues, “[t]he chancellor made no finding” of fact as

to what this number was based upon “and gave no reasons for the amount of the fund.” Nor

does the maintenance of the $50,000 fund have an express end date, and it is unclear who

may tap into it and for what reason. While “taxes and insurance” were listed, the trial court

did not define what might constitute “unforeseen expenses.” No other detail demonstrated

how the $50,000 will be maintained or administered.

17
¶36. With respect to the majority, it approves the set aside of the $50,000 without citation

to law and only after concluding that the money “seemed to be set up for a different category

of expenses outside of the day-to-day variety.” Ante at ¶14 (emphasis added). Yet it is

unclear on what basis we could approve this new sub-account of the trusts, let alone how it

will be administrated, for what purpose, to whom’s benefit, or for how long. This amount

simply has no basis in the record. It may also directly conflict with the language of the trusts

at issue. We cannot approve such a finding of fact.

¶37. Secondly, there is no basis in the record for the trial court’s refusal to refund the trusts

for Amy’s sales of cattle when she admitted she pocketed some of the amounts that belonged

to the trusts. She testified she only did it because she wanted to:

Q: We just discussed the proper thing to do is put [the money from the
cattle sales] in the trust account. But you decided [. . .] not to put that
in the Trust account?

A. That’s correct.

Q. You made this decision on your own?

A. Yes, sir.

....

Q. Did you have any advice from anyone to do that or was that your
decision?

A. I made that on my own.

Q. Knowing the proper thing to do was to put it in the Trust account, you
put it in the personal account?

A. Yes, sir.

18
¶38. Given Amy’s admitted testimony that she sold the property of the trusts, which as far

as we can tell was meant for the benefit of both her and her brother, and given that she then

personally kept the money from the sale, we simply cannot affirm. Further, the trial court’s

denial of Troy’s request for reimbursement here is not based on the record, and is therefore

manifest error.9

¶39. Presented before us is a dispute that explicitly lacks the terms of the trusts—a situation

I have never seen before. The trial court was without authority to modify these terms since

by doing so, it may have violated an express desire of the settlor. We do not know, as the

daughter failed to introduce the documents. The only conclusion is that the trial court’s

judgment did not follow the Supreme Court’s mandate to interpret a trust to “accord strictly

with the intent of the settlor and the terms of the trust[.]” Est. of Smith, 204 So. 3d at 315

(¶58) (quoting Reedy, 200 Miss. at 210-11, 26 So. 3d at 687)).

¶40. For these reasons, the only resolution of this appeal is to reverse and render.

9
Furthermore, it is concerning that the appointed trustee was not present at trial and
did not testify. This absence deprived the trial court of critical, and perhaps jurisdictional,
information. “In disputes concerning the amount disbursed under trusts, courts are very
deferential to the trustee’s judgment.” Gulf Nat’l Bank, 511 So. 2d at 937. The trustee has
“the duty of complete loyalty” in the administration of a trust, and a fiduciary duty to each
beneficiary. Wilbourn, 106 So. 3d at 370 (¶33); Cassibry v. Cassibry, 217 So. 3d 698, 707
(¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). The trustee in this case could have been a key source of
testimony regarding the settlor’s intent and how the trusts could have been modified, altered,
or dissolved to best serve the interests of the two beneficiaries.
The majority correctly points out there is no proof that the trustee objected to the end
result, but this does not alleviate the lack of evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment.

19