Dylan Chase Davis a/k/a Dylan Davis v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-00811-COA

DYLAN CHASE DAVIS A/K/A DYLAN DAVIS APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/01/2023
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ROBERT R. MORRIS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/10/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Dylan Chase Davis was indicted by a DeSoto County grand jury on a charge of being

a felon in possession of a firearm. Before trial, Davis moved to suppress the firearm he was

charged with carrying, claiming it was the fruit of an unlawful seizure. The trial court denied

the motion, a jury convicted Davis as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to a

suspended five-year term of incarceration and placed Davis on five years of post-release

supervision. Davis moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a

new trial, specifically raising the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress as an issue.

The trial court denied the post-trial motion, and Davis appeals, arguing that the trial court
erred in failing to suppress the firearm as evidence when Davis was personally detained,

allegedly in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. After reviewing the record, the

parties’ arguments, and relevant precedent, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On the morning of June 27, 2021, around 3:00 a.m., Officer Vaughn, who was parked

in the highway median, noticed Davis walking on Interstate 55 (I-55). Vaughn observed

Davis was sweating and saw that Davis had a knife in his waistband. Vaughn asked Davis

where he was going, and Davis responded but kept walking. Vaughn instructed Davis to

stop, and noticing a bulge in Davis’s pocket, Vaughn asked if Davis had a gun. Davis said

he did and consented to Vaughn removing it. When Vaughn learned that Davis was a felon,

Vaughn subsequently took Davis into custody and charged Davis with being a felon in

possession of a firearm.

Motion to Suppress and Hearing

¶3. Prior to trial, Davis filed a motion to suppress the firearm, arguing that Vaughn

violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, Davis contended that Vaughn

lacked reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop.1

Consequently, Davis argued that the evidence from Davis’s unlawful stop and subsequent

search should have been suppressed under the exclusionary rule. In its response, the State

argued that Davis’s consent was voluntary because Davis was being “generally cooperative.”

Alternatively, the State contended that the seizure was valid as a community caretaking

1
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2
function, although Davis contended that Vaughn never inquired about Davis’s safety.

¶4. At the suppression hearing, Vaughn testified that during his patrol, he saw Davis

walking northbound in the southbound lane of traffic on I-55. Vaughn stated that he noticed

Davis “walking in the lane of travel, but close to the white line.”2 Vaughn also noticed that

Davis was “sweating profusely” and was carrying “what appeared to be a large knife in his

pocket.” Vaughn waited for Davis to get closer, and as Davis was walking past the patrol

vehicle, Vaughn testified that he felt the need to check on Davis’s welfare, stating:

I got out of my patrol vehicle. And as he was walking past my vehicle, I asked
him where he was headed. He advised he was headed to Illinois, and he
continued walking. I advised him to stop, come over in the median, and talk
to me.

¶5. When Davis reached the median, Vaughn asked him if he (Vaughn) could remove the

knife. Vaughn also asked Davis for his identification and noticed a bulge in the front of

Davis’s pants. Vaughn asked Davis if the bulge was a firearm, and Davis said “yes.”

According to Vaughn, Davis consented to Vaughn’s taking possession of the gun. After

removing the firearm, Vaughn asked Davis if he was a convicted felon, to which Davis

answered that he was not. When Vaughn checked for Davis’s criminal history, he learned

that Davis had been convicted of a felony.3 Vaughn took Davis into custody, and Davis was

subsequently indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon.

2
There are conflicting accounts of where Davis was physically positioned in the
roadway when Vaughn saw him. Davis testified that he walked in the shoulder, off the road,
and only stepped in the middle of the road because he had to walk around Vaughn’s patrol
vehicle.
3
Davis was previously convicted of attempted burglary of a habitation with intent
to commit theft in Bexar County, Texas, and sentenced on June 3, 2013.

3
¶6. Vaughn stated that he spoke to Davis out of concern for Davis’s safety:

Q: And why did you advise him to come to the median?

A: Because where he was walking was – you’re either in the road or you’re
in the grass, and he was – the particular area he was in, the traffic is
coming downhill. So he would be walking uphill. So it wouldn’t take
anything for a vehicle to hit him where he was at.

Q: And you weren’t going to talk to him in the road, were you?

A: Absolutely not.

Q: So would you consider that you were checking on his welfare?

A: Absolutely.

Q: And for safety reasons you asked him to step into the median?

A: Correct.

¶7. Vaughn also stated that based on his past experiences with motor vehicle deaths on

the interstate, Davis’s walking in the middle of the interstate was “definitely a danger to him”

(Davis). Vaughn testified that it would not take long for a vehicle to hit him. Vaughn

continued that the entire encounter lasted no longer than thirty minutes. Vaughn also

testified that Davis voluntarily spoke to him and cooperated with his requests. Lastly,

Vaughn testified that “welfare checks” were commonly undertaken by officers who observed

people walking on the interstate for many different reasons.

¶8. On cross-examination, Vaughn was asked about the specific timing of his

conversation with Davis:

Q: Because the timing is crucial. He walked past your car and kept
walking, according to your report, and you ordered him to come back
to you, to stop and come back?

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A: Well, I said “Stop. Come to the median and talk to me,” yes sir.

Q: So would a reasonable person believe that he needed to stop and come
back?

A: It’s possible, yes –

Q: I mean, if an officer gives you a directive, don’t you think a reasonable
person is going to do what they asked you to do?

A: I would say that a reasonable person would stop and come back.

Vaughn also testified that the “welfare check” ended when he observed the bulge in Davis’s

pants, asked Davis what it was, and asked Davis if he could remove it. Lastly, Vaughn stated

that he did not have reasonable suspicion that Davis had committed any crime prior to

speaking with Davis and that if Davis decided to walk away, he would not have charged

Davis with additional crimes.

¶9. At the close of the hearing, the State argued that just because Vaughn asked Davis to

come to the median did not mean Davis was detained. Vaughn was “simply doing his job”

by conducting a “welfare check.” Davis, however, argued that Vaughn’s command to come

to the median was a seizure (i.e., detention) because a reasonable person would be afraid to

leave. He further argued that the detention violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights

because, at that point, Vaughn had no reasonable suspicion to detain Davis. Davis also

contended that his voluntary consent to the search was “illusory” because he did not know

that he could leave. After hearing both arguments, the court denied Davis’s motion to

suppress, ruling from the bench that Vaughn was justified in making the stop, the knife was

in plain view of the officer, and at the “lawful orders of the officer, the weapon was

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produced.” The trial court entered an order denying Davis’s motion to suppress. The court

specifically held:

Considering the totality of the circumstances, particularly that the Defendant
was visibly armed and posed a significant safety risk to himself and others
while walking in the lanes of traffic of an interstate at night in a fairly remote
area, the Defendant’s activity was ambiguous at the very least and justified the
officer’s brief investigatory stop. The Defendant’s voluntary disclosure to the
officer that he was carrying a concealed firearm, coupled with his overall
demeanor and ambiguous actions, justified further inquiry by the officer into
whether the Defendant had been or was about to be engaged in criminal
conduct. Once it was discovered by identification of the Defendant that he
was a previously convicted felon, probable cause supported the Defendant’s
arrest for felony possession of a firearm.

Trial

¶10. At trial, Davis, his wife Tracy Lawless, and Vaughn testified. The State called

Vaughn as the only witness in its case. Vaughn’s testimony was essentially the same as his

testimony during the hearing on the motion to suppress. He gave more specific details about

his concern for Davis: “I was concerned for his safety. We’ve worked a lot of MVA deaths

on the interstate, and with the location that he was actually at, he was walking – he was about

to be walking up a hill, so traffic would be coming over that hill, and it was a very dangerous

area to be walking in the roadway.” On cross-examination, Davis’s counsel asked Vaughn

about Davis’s need to walk in the middle of the road to get around him. Vaughn added that

Davis could have walked in the grass or the gravel before walking on the side of the road.

¶11. Lawless testified that earlier that morning she, Davis, and her two boys decided to

travel eight hours to Illinois to see Davis’s mom. Sometime during the trip, Lawless and

Davis began arguing. The two “bickered” back and forth, and Lawless ultimately pulled over

6
and she asked Davis to exit the vehicle.

¶12. Davis testified that he stepped out of Lawless’s car and retrieved some of his

belongings from the trunk. While Davis was gathering his things, several of Lawless’s items

fell out of the car—pillows, jumper cables, blankets, et cetera. As Lawless drove away,

Davis noticed that one of the items was Lawless’s handgun. Feeling obligated to return the

gun to Lawless, and because he did not want to leave a gun unattended on the side of the

road, Davis put the gun in his pocket and began walking on the shoulder of the interstate

against the flow of traffic. Davis testified that as he was walking, he called Lawless thirty-

six times to come back and pick him up.

¶13. The jury ultimately found Davis guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon. In his

subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, Davis contended

that the court had erred by denying his motion to suppress. The court denied his post-trial

motion at Davis’s sentencing hearing and sentenced him to five years in the custody of the

Mississippi Department of Corrections, with all five years suspended pending good behavior.

The court also placed Davis on five years of post-release supervision (two years reporting

and three years non-reporting).

¶14. On appeal, Davis argues that the gun should have been suppressed because it was

obtained during what Davis contends was an unreasonable and unlawful stop (seizure).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15. Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article III, Section

23 of the Mississippi Constitution protect an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable

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searches and seizures. Scruggs v. State, 313 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)

(quoting Cole v. State, 242 So. 3d 31, 38 (¶12) (Miss. 2018)). “Unreasonable-search-and-

seizure claims require a mixed standard of review.” Buford v. State, 323 So. 3d 500, 504

(¶11) (Miss. 2021) (quoting Eaddy v. State, 63, So. 3d 1209, 1212 (¶11) (Miss. 2011)).

“Whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists is subject to a de novo review. But

the Court limits the de novo review of the trial court’s determination to ‘historical facts

reviewed under the substantial evidence or clearly erroneous standards.’” Id. (quoting

Eaddy, 63 So. 3d at 1212 (¶11)). In determining whether evidence should be suppressed, a

trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal absent a finding the trial court

“applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary

to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” McCollum v. State, 372 So. 3d 980, 985 (¶14)

(Miss. 2023) (quoting Crawford v. State, 192 So. 3d 905, 923 (¶78) (Miss. 2015)). “In

reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we must determine whether the trial court’s

findings, considering the totality of the circumstances, are supported by substantial credible

evidence.” Buford, 323 So. 3d at 504 (¶11) (quoting Moore v. State, 933 So. 2d 910, 914

(¶9) (Miss. 2006)).

DISCUSSION

¶16. Davis’s only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress the

firearm that was obtained, he contends, when he was detained in violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights. Specifically, Davis argues that Vaughn seized Davis by ordering him to

stop and come to the median without reasonable suspicion that Davis had committed, was

8
committing, or was going to commit a crime. The State contends that Davis was not

unlawfully detained and that Davis’s actions were consensual and voluntary while Vaughn

performed a welfare check.

¶17. “The Mississippi Supreme Court has divided ‘[p]olice activity in preventing crime,

detecting violations, making identifications, and apprehending criminals’ into three types of

action: (1) voluntary conversations, (2) investigative stops and temporary detentions, and (3)

arrests.” Harrell v. State, 109 So. 3d 604, 606 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Singletary

v. State, 318 So. 2d, 873, 876 (Miss. 1975)). “In an investigatory stop, an officer may ‘stop

and detain a person to resolve an ambiguous situation without having sufficient knowledge

to justify an arrest[.]’” Stewart v. State, 367 So. 3d 985, 987 (¶7) (Miss. 2023) (quoting

Singletary, 318 So. 2d at 876). Under appropriate circumstances, a law enforcement officer

may be fully justified in providing assistance without needing any reasonable basis to suspect

criminal activity. Trejo v. State, 76 So. 3d 684, 689 (¶14) (Miss. 2011) (quoting State v.

Brown, 509 N.W. 2d 69, 71 (N.D. 1993)). This is known as the community caretaking

function. Id.

¶18. The State argues that Vaughn’s actions were justified as part of his community

caretaking function.4 Specifically, the State argues that under the totality of the

4
Normally “[a]n investigative stop is permitted as long as an officer has some
objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity.” Wright v. State, 334 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (¶8) (Miss. 2021). But here Vaughn
admitted that he had no reason to believe that Davis had or was committing a crime, and the
trial court denied Davis’s motion to suppress based on Vaughn’s community care-taker
function authority, so we need not engage in a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
analysis.

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circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that Davis’s safety was in danger

and that he posed a risk to himself or other individuals on the interstate.

¶19. The concept of the community caretaking function originated in Cady v. Dombrowski,

413 U.S. 433 (1973). In that case, Chicago police officer Dombroski had a single-car

accident, going off the road in Wisconsin. Id. at 435-36. When Wisconsin police met

Dombroski, who was obviously drunk, they discovered that he was a law enforcement officer

who did not have his service revolver on his person. Id. at 436. They checked the glove

compartment and front seat of the vehicle at the scene but did not find it. Id. at 436.

Dombroski was hospitalized, and his vehicle was searched again for the revolver after the

car was towed to a private garage. Id. Officers were concerned that unauthorized persons

could access the gun, and finding the gun was standard operating procedure because

Dombroski did not have it on him. Id. at 437. In their search, Wisconsin police did not find

the revolver but, instead, found various items covered in blood. Id. at 437. This discovery

led to further investigation and ultimately Dombroski was charged with murder. Id. at 434.

Dombroski challenged the admission of those bloody items, arguing that law enforcement

did not have a warrant to search his vehicle. Id. at 439. The trial court admitted the items,

and Dombroski was convicted. Id. at 434. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the

warrantless search of the vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of the bloodied items, was

justified because of law enforcement’s motive “to protect the public from the possibility that

a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.” Id. at 443.

¶20. In describing these law enforcement’s duties, the Supreme Court stated:

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Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also
because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or
involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact
involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact
in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may
believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be
of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability
and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community
care-taking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.

Id. at 441 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court approved, stating that the officer’s

justification for the search, a “concern for the safety of the general public who might be

endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the automobile” was

reasonable. Id. at 447. The Supreme Court further noted that “where, as here, the trunk of

an automobile, which the officer reasonably believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to

intrusion by vandals, we hold that the search was not ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 448.

¶21. Our state Supreme Court adopted the community caretaking function in Floyd v. City

of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 112 (¶4) (Miss. 1999), where an off-duty officer received

a report from a third party who told him that a vehicle was traveling at high speed in a

reckless manner. The officer called in the description of the vehicle, and an on-duty officer

pulled the vehicle over even though that officer had not personally observed any violation

of traffic laws. Id. at (¶5). The officer observed an open bottle of vodka on the seat, id. at

(¶6), and ultimately, Floyd was charged, tried, and convicted of driving under the influence.

Id. at 113 (¶10). The Supreme Court held that there was reasonable cause for the officer’s

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investigatory stop, stating:

Reasonable cause for an investigatory stop may be based on an officer’s
personal observation or on an informant’s tip if it bears indicia of reliability.
Reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of the information
possessed by the detaining officer as well as its degree of reliability. Both
factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the
circumstances.”

Id. at 118 (¶30) (citations omitted). However, the Supreme Court acknowledged the

community caretaking function and emphasized law enforcement’s need to perform

“investigatory activity” to protect the public:

The public concern served by the seizure is evident—a reckless driver poses
a mortal danger to others. There exists in such a situation an absolute
necessity for immediate investigatory activity. The severity of the interference
with individual liberty was minimal—Floyd was required to pull over to the
side of the road. Officer Palmer had a duty to investigate the detailed
complaint given to the police department concerning a driver who may have
been ill, impaired, reckless, or dangerous to the public.

Id. at 117 (¶27).

¶22. In Trejo v. State, 76 So. 3d 684, 688-89 (¶¶12-13) (Miss. 2011), the Supreme Court

acknowledged that it had adopted the community caretaking function in Floyd and discussed

the concept in more detail and how courts should apply it. Id. at 689 (¶14). In that case, a

police officer pulled Trejo over because of his concern that the driver may have been

intoxicated or tired, not because of any traffic violation. Id. at 686 (¶3). Subsequently, law

enforcement discovered cocaine strapped to Trejo’s girlfriend’s body. Id. at (¶5).

¶23. Prior to trial, Trejo challenged the legitimacy of the stop and admission of the drugs

in a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. Id. at 687 (¶6). The trial court found

that Trejo was stopped for “safety reasons,” namely “to check for the impairment of the

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driver, whether it was alcohol or sleep deprivation or what [ever] else[,]” to prevent an

accident. Id. A jury found Trejo guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to sell and the court

sentenced him as a habitual offender. Id. at 687 (¶6). On appeal, this Court reversed, finding

that there was no reasonable basis for the stop and that the trial court had erred in denying

the motion to suppress the evidence. Id. at 687. The Supreme Court granted the State’s

petition for writ of certiorari, explaining the community caretaking function and how courts

should apply it to determine if a detention is lawful:

[W]e conclude that the community caretaking function in Cady may apply in
contexts other than inventory searches, as the police provide many functions
apart from investigating criminal activity. But only under appropriate
circumstances may a law enforcement officer be fully justified in stopping a
vehicle to provide assistance, without needing any reasonable basis to suspect
criminal activity.

Id. at 689 (¶14) (citations omitted). The Court stated that “the ultimate standard is

reasonableness.” Id. (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 439). Reasonableness under this analysis, the

Court stated, is an objective standard:

As with other Fourth Amendment analyses, this Court will not try to determine
the subjective intent of the person making the stop but will examine whether
the stop is objectively reasonable. In doing so, we look to whether the
stopping officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the stop.
The question becomes whether a reasonable person, given the totality of the
circumstances, would believe the individual is in need of help or that the safety
of the public is endangered.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶24. When examining the reasonableness of Trejo’s stop, the Court noted that the facts did

not establish that Trejo was in any need of help. Id. at 690 (¶16). Trejo was driving well

13
above the minimum speed limit of 45 miles per hour and under the maximum speed limit of

70 miles per hour; there was no evidence of erratic driving; no traffic prevented the officer

from passing Trejo in the right lane, and the fact that a failure to change lines “isn’t

necessarily indicative of distress.” Id. The Supreme Court also noted, as this court did, that

Trejo immediately pulled over as the officer flashed his blue lights, suggesting that he was

unaware rather in distress. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme court held that the community

caretaking function did not justify the officer’s initial stop. Id. The Court held that although

the community caretaking function was a viable doctrine, in Trejo’s case, “the facts presented

at the suppression hearing did not justify a reasonable belief that Trejo needed help or that

the public was endangered, and as such, the trial court should have granted Trejo’s motion

to suppress.” Id.

¶25. In the case at hand, considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that

Vaughn’s stopping of Davis was a justified safety stop under the community caretaking

function. Vaughn testified that he saw Davis walking along I-55 at 3:00 a.m. in the darkness

of the morning and felt Davis needed help. In light of the 70-mile-per-hour speed limit,

Vaughn testified that “it wouldn’t take anything” for a vehicle to hit Davis, who was walking

uphill in a lane of traffic heading downhill. Vaughn also relied on his experience as an

officer, noting the many motor vehicle accident deaths he’s worked and noting that the hills

in the area where Davis was walking made it “a very dangerous area to be walking in the

roadway.” Because of these circumstances, Vaughn said he wanted to check on Davis’s

welfare.

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¶26. Vaughn testified that he spotted Davis walking in the middle of the road, “sweating

profusely.” Vaughn waited for Davis to walk by the patrol vehicle and saw a knife in

Davis’s pocket. Vaughn asked Davis where he was going, to which Davis answered,

“Illinois,” and continued walking without further explanation, passing by Vaughn entirely.

At this point, Vaughn felt compelled to inquire about Davis’s safety even further and told

Davis to stop and come to the median and talk to him, to which Davis complied. Considering

the totality of the circumstances—the time of the morning, Davis’s physical appearance, the

hundreds of miles he was attempting to walk along a major interstate, the dangerousness of

the area, and the ambiguous nature of the encounter, it was reasonable for Vaughn to believe

that Davis needed help. The trial court noted all these facts, which are supported by

substantial credible evidence, and, in light of our standard of review, we find no basis to

disturb the trial court’s findings or the denial of Davis’s motion to suppress. McCollum, 372

So. 3d at 985 (¶14).

¶27. We caution, however, that the community caretaking function is not meant to extend

law enforcement’s authority to stop people randomly claiming “safety concerns.” Reiterating

Trejo, we follow our Supreme Court’s instruction to “carefully analyze the totality of the

circumstances, so that the community caretaking function is ‘cautiously and narrowly applied

in order to minimize the risk that it will be abused or used as a pretext for conducting an

investigatory stop and search for criminal evidence.’” Id. at 689 (¶14). We do so by

examining the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

CONCLUSION

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¶28. Because we find that the trial court did not err in determining that Officer Vaughn’s

stop of Davis was a legitimate use of the officer’s authority under a community caretaking

function analysis, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Davis’s motion to

suppress the firearm. Accordingly, we affirm Davis’s conviction and sentence.

¶29. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McCARTY,
SMITH, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. LAWRENCE, J., CONCURS
IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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