Clinton Winters, Jr. a/k/a Clinton S. Winters v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-KA-00809-COA

CLINTON WINTERS, JR. A/K/A CLINTON S. APPELLANT
WINTERS

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/29/2020
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SMITH MURPHEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
CLINTON WINTERS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN W. CHAMPION
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/07/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On June 2, 2020, a Panola County jury convicted Clinton Winters of possession of

more than ten but less than thirty grams of methamphetamine. The circuit court sentenced

Winters as a violent habitual offender to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department

of Corrections without eligibility for parole.1 Winters filed a motion for judgment

1
Winters was originally indicted as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015). Five months before trial, the State filed a motion
to amend the indictment to charge Winters as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or alternatively, a new trial. The circuit court denied

Winters’ post-trial motion, and he appealed.2

¶2. On appeal, Winters raises four claims: (1) the circuit court erred in allowing

information related to his grand-larceny charge and prior felony convictions into evidence

under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the circuit court erred in denying his request

for a circumstantial-evidence instruction; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction; and (4) the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Finding no error, we affirm Winters’ conviction and sentence.

FACTS

¶3. Winters and Kimberly King met in early January 2019. They started out as friends but

became involved in a romantic relationship around one month later. On February 3, 2019,

Winters sent King several messages on Facebook Instant Messenger. Winters asked King

to meet him at her place in Pope, Mississippi, so they could “finally be alone.” Winters also

said, “I got a[n] oz[.] to share with you. Before I go back to prison.”3 Winters and King met

at her house later that day, and Winters brought methamphetamine for them to smoke.

Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2015). During a hearing on the motion, the State
introduced Winters’ prior felony convictions into evidence. After the hearing, the circuit
court entered an order granting the State’s motion to amend the indictment.
2
Winters filed a pro se supplemental brief that does not comply with Mississippi Rule
of Appellate Procedure 28. Winters also failed to cite any legal authority for his arguments.
Consequently, Winters’ arguments are procedurally barred on appeal. King v. State, 857 So.
2d 702, 725 (¶70) (Miss. 2003).
3
Winters was on probation for another felony conviction at the time. There was also
a warrant out for his arrest in relation to a stolen trailer, which will be discussed in more
detail later in the opinion.

2
Winters and King continued to smoke together for several days and also traveled together to

Tunica, Mississippi, to go to some casinos.

¶4. On the morning of February 8, 2019, Winters and King left Tunica and headed toward

Batesville, Mississippi. Unbeknownst to King, Winters scheduled a meeting with his federal

probation officer in Batesville. King drove Winters’ truck to Batesville, and they stopped

at a gas station, where two local officers were waiting to arrest him for allegedly stealing a

trailer.4 Winters asked King to hold the leftover methamphetamine because she would not

be searched. King placed the leftover methamphetamine in her bra. The two then exited the

truck as the officers approached them and began to question them separately. The two

officers were Investigator Justin Maples of the Panola County Sheriff’s Department and

Officer Beau Dickson of the Batesville Police Department. Both officers noticed the smell

of marijuana on King and Winters. Investigator Maples arrested Winters on the grand-

larceny charge involving the stolen trailer. No drugs were found on Winters or in his vehicle.

As Officer Dickson approached King to conduct a search, she handed the officers two

marijuana cigarettes from her pocket. King then lifted her shirt to get rid of the

methamphetamine hidden in her bra. Officer Dickson also seized a glass pipe from King’s

left pocket and a flashlight containing methamphetamine from her right pocket. At that

point, King was arrested. Both Winters and King were taken to the police station for

questioning.

4
The probation officer did not testify at trial.

3
¶5. King signed a Miranda5 waiver and provided a written statement to the police, stating

that she had no knowledge of Winters’ involvement with a stolen trailer. She also stated that

when she was searched, she “voluntarily” discarded the methamphetamine from her bra and

that she was not aware that the flashlight in her pocket contained methamphetamine. King

stated that she took the flashlight from Winters’ truck console because she had no electricity

at her house.

¶6. Winters also signed a Miranda waiver and provided audio and written statements.

Investigator Maples and Officer J.P. Wallace of the Batesville Police Department were

present for both statements. In his audio statement, Winters said that a man named Marcus

Price asked him to move a trailer from Batesville to Webb, Mississippi, and that Price paid

him “$1,200, a quarter sack of weed, and some ice”6 for the job. Winters’ written statement

was consistent with his audio statement in regard to the form of “payment.” In his written

statement, he added that the methamphetamine he received from Price as payment for

transferring the trailer was the same methamphetamine found on King’s person.

¶7. In October 2019, Winters was indicted for possession of between ten and thirty grams

of methamphetamine. His case proceeded to trial on June 1, 2020. King was the State’s key

witness. She first testified about Winters’ Facebook messages, in which he invited her to

come do drugs with him. Those Facebook messages were introduced into evidence. The

remainder of King’s testimony mirrored her written statement, which was introduced into

5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6
“Ice” is another term for crystal methamphetamine.

4
evidence by the State on redirect examination. She maintained that the methamphetamine

did not belong to her and that Winters asked her to “hold onto it” while they stopped in

Batesville.

¶8. Investigator Maples and Officer Dickson testified to the details surrounding the

searches and arrests of Winters and King. Investigator Maples and Officer Wallace

authenticated Winters’ audio and written statements, which were both introduced into

evidence. A forensic scientist from the Mississippi Crime Laboratory testified that the

substance King discarded from her bra was 11.756 grams of methamphetamine and the

substance retrieved from the flashlight was 1.819 grams of methamphetamine.

¶9. Winters was the only witness to testify on his behalf. He denied writing the Facebook

messages previously admitted into evidence and denied having any connection to the

methamphetamine found on King’s person. He also denied ever giving an audio statement

or a written statement.

¶10. The jury ultimately found Winters guilty of possession of a controlled substance

pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(c)(1)(D) (Rev. 2015). Winters’

post-trial motion was denied, and he appealed.

ANALYSIS

1. Rule 404(b)

¶11. Winters first argues that the circuit court erred in allowing information related to his

grand-larceny indictment and prior felony convictions into evidence under Rule 404(b).

5
Winters filed numerous motions in limine.7 In the first motion in limine, he sought to

“exclude [his] other charges, indictments regarding his grand larceny indictment from being

presented by the State or any witness at the trial of this case.” In the second motion in limine,

he sought to “prevent the eliciting of or the introducing of testimony or the admission into

evidence of [his] past felony convictions . . . .”

¶12. At the pretrial hearing, Winters first argued that any evidence of his prior felony

convictions was more prejudicial than probative and in direct violation of Rule 404(b). The

State argued that it could not tell a complete story of the events without mentioning that

Winters was scheduled to meet with his probation officer at the time the controlled substance

was found. The State maintained that it planned to be “very cautious . . . to minimize the

impact on the jury.” With that in mind, the State informed the court that it did not intend to

elicit any testimony as to Winters’ prior felony convictions. Ultimately, the court denied

Winters’ motion based on the understanding that the State would not delve into the specifics

of those prior felony convictions.8 The court agreed with the State that “there’s no way to

explain why these two people are in the same place at the same time, being the defendant and

the probation officer, without there being information before the jury that there was a

probation officer.”

¶13. Next, Winters requested that the court “exclude or suppress any references to the fact

7
Winters also filed a motion in limine to suppress all jail calls. However, that motion
is not an issue on appeal.
8
The court ruled from the bench and never entered a formal written order as to this
issue.

6
that Mr. Winters is being accused of grand larceny in another indictment.” The State

informed the court that it had “no intention of asking in [its] case in chief whether or not [he]

had been indicted for grand larceny . . . .” The State did, however, plan to reference the

trailer (the source of the grand-larceny indictment) because it could not tell a complete story

of the events without referencing the trailer, as it was the alleged source of payment for the

methamphetamine found on King’s person. The court ultimately found that “at this point in

time the testimony, if it is laid out as the State intends it to be, I would have to deny the

defendant’s motion to exclude evidence pertaining to the exchange of that trailer and the

identity and knowledge of the methamphetamine.”

¶14. “A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility

of evidence. Unless the judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused,

the Court will not reverse this ruling.” Gore v. State, 37 So. 3d 1178, 1183 (¶13) (Miss.

2010) (quoting Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 653 (¶29) (Miss. 2005)). Rule 404(b)

provides:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose,
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

MRE 404(b).

¶15. Before admitting evidence of prior bad acts, a circuit court must filter the evidence

through Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 and determine whether the evidence’s probative

7
value outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. Derouen v. State, 994 So. 2d 748, 756

(¶20) (Miss. 2008). If a circuit court finds the probative value outweighs the prejudicial

effect, the evidence will be admitted, provided the jury is given a limiting instruction

regarding the evidence in question. Id.

¶16. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that “where the bad conduct is so closely

intertwined with the crime charged and has a direct relationship to the [crime charged], as

it does here, there is no error in allowing the jury to hear it.” Bell v. State, 725 So. 2d 836,

851 (¶36) (Miss. 1998). Here, the circuit court applied that reasoning and agreed with the

State’s contention that it could not tell the entire story without mentioning the probation

officer or the trailer. After review, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial

of Winters’ motions. To hold otherwise would have forced the State to only tell pieces of

the story and created confusion among the jurors. “When dealing with closely related acts,

the State ‘has a legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened.’”

Newell v. State, 175 So. 3d 1260, 1276 (¶34) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Welde v. State, 3 So. 3d

113, 117 (¶14) (Miss. 2009)).

¶17. For the first time on appeal, Winters claims that the introduction of King’s written

statement, particularly the reference to a stolen trailer, violated the court’s ruling. At trial,

Winters attempted to attack King’s credibility on cross-examination. As a result, the State

introduced her written statement to the police on redirect examination in order to rehabilitate

her. The beginning of King’s written statement read, “I was not in town when [Winters]

stole the trailer.” The remainder of the statement was consistent with her testimony at

8
trial—that Winters gave her the methamphetamine right before they stopped at the gas station

in Batesville. Before the statement was marked as an exhibit, the following exchange

occurred:

THE STATE: Your Honor, at this time, the State would ask that this be
entered into evidence as an exhibit to this witness’[s]
testimony.

BY THE COURT: Any objection?

THE DEFENSE: No objection, Your Honor.

¶18. As shown above, Winters made no objection at trial when the State introduced King’s

statement. It is well established that “[f]ailure to object with specificity in the trial court

results in a waiver” of the issue on appeal. Pustay v. State, 221 So. 3d 320, 346 (¶73) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2016) (citing Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 730 (Miss. 1984)). Further, it must

be acknowledged that the State did not introduce any evidence that Winters had been

indicted for stealing a trailer.9 That was the information Winters sought to prohibit in his

motion in limine, and that was the information the court ruled on. Winters cannot expand

his written pretrial motion in limine for the first time on appeal, and argue, as error, issues

that he did not argue before the trial court.10 See, e.g., Warren v. State, 456 So. 2d 735, 738

9
In fact, Winters’ testimony revealed that he was arrested for grand larceny, stating
that he “was remanded in handcuffs because the initial pullover was for assuming that [he]
stole or committed the crime of grand larceny.” He also testified that he was under federal
and state probation at the time of the offense. The court provided the jury with two curative
instructions concerning Winters’ testimony about his state probation and federal probation
and the “stealing the trailer” testimony. Neither party objected to the proposed instructions
when asked by the court.
10
It is worth noting that Winters’ failure to object at trial would not have been fatal
if he had specifically raised this issue in his motion in limine, and the court had denied his

9
(Miss. 1984); Crenshaw v. State, 520 So. 2d 131, 134-35 (Miss. 1988) (stating that “[a] trial

judge cannot be put in error on a matter [that] was not presented to him for decision”). Thus,

we find that Winters’ argument on this issue is without merit.

2. Circumstantial-Evidence Instruction

¶19. Winters also argues that the circuit court erred in denying his requested circumstantial-

evidence jury instruction because there was no direct evidence that he was in possession of

a controlled substance. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to give or refuse jury

instructions for abuse of discretion. Valentine v. State, 322 So. 3d 417, 423 (¶27) (Miss.

2021). Additionally, the given jury instructions “must be read as a whole. When so read, if

the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error

will be found.” Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010).

¶20. Contrary to Winters’ assertion, the State did present direct evidence in the form of (1)

Winters’ admission in his written statement that the methamphetamine he received as

payment for moving the trailer was the same methamphetamine found on King’s person; and

(2) King’s eyewitness testimony. King specifically testified that Winters supplied the

motion. In Kettle v. State, 641 So. 2d 746, 748 (Miss. 1994), the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that a defendant is not required to object to certain evidence at trial if the defendant
previously filed a motion in limine to exclude that evidence. See also Goff v. State, 14 So.
3d 625, 640 (¶45) (Miss. 2009) (stating that “[w]hile Goff did not object to the admission
of any evidence taken from his vehicle at trial, we find that the pretrial proceedings were
sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal”). The supreme court in Kettle stated that “[w]hile
it would have been preferable, and by far the safer practice for [the defendant] to have
renewed his objection, we find the error in this case was sufficiently preserved by language
of the motion in limine . . . .” Kettle, 641 So. 2d at 748. Here, Winters’ motion in limine
specifically sought to exclude evidence of the grand-larceny “indictment,” not the trailer
itself.

10
methamphetamine and that she received physical, actual possession of the methamphetamine

from Winters. More specifically, she testified that Winters asked her to “hold onto it because

[she] wasn’t going to be checked.”

¶21. For the sake of argument, even if there was only circumstantial evidence in this case,

the Mississippi Supreme Court has recently overruled the need for a special jury instruction

for circumstantial evidence. Nevels v. State, 325 So. 3d 627, 630-31, 634 (¶¶11-12, 20)

(Miss. 2021). The supreme court specifically held that the jury instruction for circumstantial

evidence requiring a heightened burden of proof—“to the exclusion of every reasonable

hypotheses consistent with innocence”—is incorrect. Id. The supreme court further stated

that “it is finally time to lay aside the false notion that, when it comes to circumstantial

evidence cases, there is somehow a higher burden of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. at 629 (¶2). Instead, there is only one burden of proof regardless of whether evidence is

direct or circumstantial: “Jurors should not be concerned about whether evidence is ‘direct

evidence’ or ‘circumstantial evidence.’ They should consider and weigh all of the evidence

presented. And ‘if the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no

more.’” Id. at 634 (¶20) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 141 (1954)).

¶22. Here, the jury was instructed on the elements of possession of a controlled substance

and the State’s burden to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Reading the jury

instructions as whole, we find the instructions fairly announced the applicable law and

created no injustice for Winters. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s

refusal of Winters’ proposed circumstantial-evidence instruction.

11
3. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶23. Winters contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for JNOV because

there was insufficient evidence presented to support his conviction of possession of a

controlled substance under section 41-29-139(c)(1)(D). Sufficiency of the evidence claims

are reviewed de novo. Sanford v. State, 247 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (¶10) (Miss. 2018). When

reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant question is whether

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d

722, 740 (¶54) (Miss. 2008)). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

State, and the State is given all favorable inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the

evidence presented at trial. Henley v. State, 136 So. 3d 413, 416 (¶8) (Miss. 2014). “This

Court will reverse and render only when the facts point so overwhelmingly in favor of the

defendant that reasonable men could not have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the

defendant was guilty.” Jones v. State, 991 So. 2d 629, 634 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

¶24. It is well-settled law that “[t]o support a conviction for possession of a controlled

substance, ‘there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that the defendant was aware

of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally and

consciously in possession of it.’” Glidden v. State, 74 So. 3d 342, 345 (¶12) (Miss. 2011)

(quoting Wall v. State, 718 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (¶7) (Miss. 1998)). Section 41-29-139(c)

specifically provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to

possess any controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant

12
to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner . . . .” That possession can either be “actual

or constructive.” Johnson v. State, 81 So. 3d 1020, 1023 (¶7) (Miss. 2011).

¶25. “To establish constructive possession, the drug simply has to be found near the

defendant ‘in a place over which the defendant exercises dominion or control.’” Fontenot

v. State, 110 So. 3d 800, 804 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Glidden, 74 So. 3d at 348

(¶20)). The defendant’s location in connection with the drugs “is not a determinative factor

in establishing constructive possession.” Id. (citing Knight v. State, 72 So. 3d 1056, 1063

(¶26) (Miss. 2011)). Notably, “[t]he elements of constructive possession may be proven by

circumstantial evidence.” Bates v. State, 952 So. 2d 320, 325 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)

(citing Martin v. State, 413 So. 2d 730, 732 (Miss. 1982)).

¶26. In this case, King testified that Winters supplied her methamphetamine in the days

leading up to the arrest. She also testified that before they stopped at the gas station in

Batesville, he asked her to “hold onto [the methamphetamine] because [she] wasn’t going

to be checked . . . .” Officer Dickson testified that he saw King discard what he believed to

be methamphetamine from her bra. He also searched King and retrieved what he believed

to be methamphetamine from a flashlight in her pocket. A forensic scientist from the

Mississippi Crime Laboratory confirmed at trial that both substances were methamphetamine

and combined it weighed more than thirteen grams. Investigator Maples and Officer Wallace

testified that they were both present when Winters gave his audio and written statements.

In his audio statement, Winters stated that he was paid “$1,200, a quarter sack of weed, and

some ice” to move a trailer. In his written statement, he stated that he was paid “$1,200, a

13
quarter bag of weed, and some meth” to move the trailer and that the methamphetamine was

“the same meth that Kimberly King had on her.”

¶27. Winters was the only defense witness. He denied providing either statement to police.

He also denied sending King the Facebook messages that were admitted into evidence.

Finally, Winters testified that he did not use methamphetamine and had no connection to or

knowledge of the drugs found on King’s person.

¶28. “The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, and its decision based on

conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial and believable evidence

supporting the verdict.” Jones v. State, 252 So. 3d 574, 587 (¶54) (Miss. 2018). Further,

“the jury . . . is free to accept or reject all or some of the testimony given by each witness.”

Young v. State, 236 So. 3d 49, 57 (¶35) (Miss. 2017). Here, the jury was presented with

conflicting testimony—the State’s witnesses’ testimony and Winters’ testimony. The jury

determined the weight and worth of the conflicting testimony and found that Winters was

guilty of possession of a controlled substance. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, this Court finds that sufficient evidence was presented for a reasonable

trier of fact to find that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.

4. Weight of the Evidence

¶29. Finally, Winters asserts that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the

evidence and therefore the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. “A motion for

new trial falls within a lower standard of review than does that of a [JNOV] or a directed

14
verdict. A motion for a new trial simply challenges the weight of the evidence.” Lacey v.

State, 310 So. 3d 1206, 1215 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Daniels v. State, 107 So.

3d 961, 963 (¶12) (Miss. 2013)). When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence,

this Court must determine whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. Daniels, 107

So. 3d at 963 (¶12).

¶30. Our role as an appellate court is to “view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and disturb the verdict only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of

the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Little v.

State, 233 So. 3d 288, 289 (¶1) (Miss. 2017). When determining if a trial court judge abused

his or her discretion in denying a motion for new trial, this Court will not act as the

“thirteenth juror.” Id. at 292 (¶20). “We do not reweigh evidence. We do not assess the

witnesses’ credibility. And we do not resolve conflicts between evidence. Those decisions

belong solely to the jury.” Id. at 289 (¶1).

¶31. The jury here had ample evidence to consider. As previously stated, the State

presented eyewitness testimony and an admission by the defendant in the form of his written

statement. Winters denied any connection to the methamphetamine found on King’s person

and denied providing any audio or written statement. The jury judged each witness’s

credibility and ultimately determined that Winters was guilty of possession of a controlled

substance. Accepting the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict as true in this case, we do

not find the verdict to be so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to

allow the verdict to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.

15
CONCLUSION

¶32. This Court finds no error in the circuit court’s denial of Winters’ motions in limine.

Additionally, the direct evidence presented in this case coupled with the supreme court’s

recent decision in Nevels renders Winters’ circumstantial-evidence-instruction argument

without merit. Further, we find there was sufficient evidence to support to the jury’s verdict,

and the verdict is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we

affirm Winters’ conviction and sentence.

¶33. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.
McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.

16