Effort Alexander v. Charlys Espinoza

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CP-01139-COA

EFFORT ALEXANDER APPELLANT

v.

CHARLYS ESPINOZA APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/05/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. VICKI B. DANIELS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: EFFORT ALEXANDER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JOSEPH M. SPARKMAN JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
DISPOSITION: APPEAL DISMISSED - 08/13/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Effort Alexander contracted with Charlys Espinoza and his Tennessee company C&A

Construction LLC (collectively, “Espinoza”) to frame a home Alexander was building in

DeSoto County, Mississippi. When a dispute arose, Alexander terminated the contract, and

Espinoza filed a mechanic’s lien on the property for $6,200, the amount he claimed

Alexander owed him.

¶2. Alexander sued Espinoza in the DeSoto County Chancery Court, and Espinoza filed

a counter-claim. In a second suit, Alexander filed a motion for declaratory judgment,

claiming that Espinoza’s lien was invalid because Espinoza was not licensed in Mississippi.

The chancery court ultimately denied the motion, assessed attorney’s fees against Alexander,

and transferred the case to the chancellor handling Alexander’s first lawsuit. Alexander
appeals from the order denying declaratory relief. Having reviewed the record and

considered the arguments of the parties, we find that the chancery court’s order was not a

final judgment; therefore, we dismiss Alexander’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Facts

¶3. Alexander, a resident of Memphis, Tennessee, decided to build a home on property

he owned in Southaven, Mississippi. On November 12, 2021, he contracted with Espinoza,

who owned C&A Construction LLC (a sole proprietorship located in Tennessee), to do the

framing work.1 The parties agreed on a contract price of $37,120, which would be paid upon

completion of the work.

¶4. On November 28, 2022, after allegedly paying Espinoza $33,020, Alexander

terminated the contract. In a letter he sent to Espinoza that day, Alexander said that Espinoza

had allowed or was responsible for the theft of building materials that had been delivered to

the gated job site during working hours. Because of this alleged theft, Alexander said he had

to replace the stolen material with lesser quality material.2

¶5. About a month later, on December 20, 2022, Espinoza filed a mechanic’s lien on the

property, claiming Alexander owed him $6,200.

¶6. On December 29, 2022, Espinoza sent a copy of the mechanic’s lien to Alexander’s

1
This project included work on the lower level, main floor, carport, screened porch,
rear balcony and deck, front porch, and an addition to the house.
2
As added grounds for the termination, Alexander said that there was so much
unfinished framing work that the balance of the contract price was not sufficient to cover
the cost of another company finishing the work. Alexander said he based his allegations on
the advice of Matthew Thompson, a licensed construction contractor and architect.

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bank in Southaven (Guaranty Bank). Espinoza told the bank that he had completed the

framing of the home and that he had to file the lien on the property because Alexander

refused to pay him according to their agreement.3

¶7. According to Alexander, Guaranty Bank cut off Alexander’s funding for the project

when the bank received Espinoza’s letter and the mechanic’s lien.

First Lawsuit

¶8. On January 27, 2023, Alexander sued Espinoza in the DeSoto County Chancery Court.

The pro se complaint, entitled “Complaint to Remove Lien and Award Damages Penalty,”

was assigned cause number 23-cv-167. The docket for that cause number is not included in

our record; however, several of the pleadings are in the record.4 In the complaint, Alexander

alleged that he had terminated his contract with Espinoza and that he had paid Espinoza in

full. Alexander further alleged that Espinoza had filed a mechanic’s lien, which Alexander

characterized as “fraudulent” because he did not owe Espinoza anything. Alexander further

alleged that Espinoza sent a copy of the mechanic’s lien to Guaranty Bank along with other

alleged “misinformation.” Alexander claimed that he was entitled to damages because the

bank cut off his funding due to Espinoza’s letter and lien.

¶9. Espinoza filed a motion for a more definite statement and then filed a “Counter-

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Espinoza told the bank that the framing of the structure was complete and ready for
code inspection, and all that remained to be done was to install three windows. The window
installation was not completed, Espinoza said, because Alexander had ordered the wrong
size windows and had added an additional room beyond the contract’s terms.
4
When Alexander designated the record for appeal purposes, he included selected
pleadings from the first and the second cases he filed.

3
Complaint” on April 18, 2023. In it, Espinoza alleged that during the construction process,

Espinoza purchased materials and performed additional work on changes/additions to the

contract that Alexander requested. When Alexander terminated the contract and refused to

pay for these materials, Espinoza filed a mechanic’s lien. Because of Alexander’s alleged

breach of the agreement, Espinoza sought a judgment of $6,200, judicial foreclosure to

satisfy the lien, and attorney’s fees. On May 5, 2023, Alexander denied Espinoza’s

allegations in response to the counter-complaint.

¶10. On May 31, 2023, Espinoza filed a motion to dismiss Alexander’s complaint, alleging

insufficient service of process. On June 16, 2023, the chancery court held a hearing on the

motion and dismissed Alexander’s claim without prejudice. The court made no ruling on

Espinoza’s counter-claim, and on July 12, 2023, Espinoza moved to schedule a trial on that

claim.

Second Lawsuit

¶11. On June 27, 2023, Alexander filed a second complaint against Espinoza in the DeSoto

County Chancery Court, entitled “Complaint to Remove Lien and Award Damages Penalty,”

which was docketed as cause number 23-cv-1120. In the pro se complaint, Alexander

claimed Espinoza failed to complete the framing work,5 and Alexander alleged Espinoza had

filed an “illegal, invalid, fraudulent and grievously false lien” on Alexander’s property.

5
Alexander stated that the soffits and facia were not completed, nor was the home’s
interior stairway finished. He alleged that all the windows were not installed, nor was the
“Hardie Panel” siding on the home completed. Alexander pleaded that a June 26, 2023
inspection by the “City of Southhaven Building Department” had determined the work was
incomplete and inadequate.

4
Alexander claimed that Mississippi allows only licensed residential contractors to file

mechanic’s liens, and Espinoza was not licensed.6 Alexander also alleged that Espinoza had

mailed his invalid lien to Alexander’s bank in an attempt to extort $6,200 from Alexander.

In his request for relief, Alexander contended that Espinoza’s filing an invalid mechanic’s

lien was a felonious act, that Espinoza illegally interrupted Alexander’s possession and

peaceful use of his property by filing the lien, and that Espinoza “denied Plaintiff his right

to an unclouded property title.” Alexander asked that the court strike Espinoza’s invalid lien

and award Alexander $18,600, the statutory penalty for filing a false lien authorized under

Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-429 (Rev. 2021),7 and damages for his loss of

peaceful use and the cloud on his title.

¶12. According to the docket for cause 23-cv-1120, which is included in our record,

Espinoza filed an answer to this complaint on August 1, 2023. However, a copy of the

pleading was not included in the record.

¶13. On August 11, 2023, Alexander filed a “Motion to Pass Declaratory Judgement”

pursuant to Rule 57(b)(1) of the Mississippi Code of Civil Procedure, asking the court to

“conclude that Defendant’s lien is invalid under the law of the State of Mississippi.”

6
Alexander learned that Espinoza was not licensed in his (Alexander’s)
communications with the Mississippi Board of Contractors on June 23, 2023.
7
Section 85-7-429(1) (Supp. 2014) provides:

(1) Any person who shall falsely and knowingly file the claim of lien provided
in this article without just cause shall be liable to every party injured thereby
for a penalty equal to three (3) times the full amount for which the claim was
filed, to be recovered in an action by any party so injured at any time within
one hundred eighty (180) days from the filing of the claim of lien.

5
Alexander contended that Mississippi Code Annotated section 73-59-9 (Rev. 2022) requires

that “residential builders” be licensed and that any action, including a lien, brought by an

unlicensed builder be dismissed.8

¶14. Thereafter, on September 22, 2023, Alexander filed a motion for summary judgment,

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Section 73-59-9 reads:

(1) Any person or entity required to have a license under Section 73-59-3(1)
who undertakes or attempts to undertake the business of residential
construction or improvement without having a valid license as required by this
chapter, or who knowingly presents to the board, or files with the board, false
information for the purpose of obtaining such license, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than One
Hundred Dollars ($100.00) and not more than Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) or be imprisoned for not less than thirty (30) nor more than sixty
(60) days in the county jail, or both.

(2) Any person or entity required to have a license under Section 73-59-3(1)
who does not have the license provided by this chapter at the time
construction, building or remodeling services are rendered may not bring any
action, either at law or in equity, to enforce any contract for residential
building or remodeling or to enforce a sales contract, but instead shall be only
permitted to recover as damages actual documented expenses for labor,
materials or both, incurred as a result of the construction, building or
remodeling services rendered, but only for those expenses which can be
shown by clear and convincing evidence.

(3) The board shall have the authority to issue a citation and may stop work
of a residential builder or remodeler performing work without having a valid
license as required by this chapter.

However, Mississippi Code Annotated section 73-59-1(b) (Rev. 2022) defines a
“residential builder” as “any corporation, partnership or individual who constructs a building
or structure for sale for use by another as a residence or who, for a fixed price, commission,
fee, wage or other compensation, undertakes or offers to undertake the construction, or
superintending of the construction, of any building or structure which is not more than three
(3) floors in height, to be used by another as a residence, when the total cost of the
undertaking exceeds Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00).” (Emphasis added).

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making the same arguments he made in his motion for declaratory judgment. Alexander

initially noticed his summary judgment motion for a hearing to be held that same day,

September 22, 2023. On September 25, 2023, Espinoza filed a motion to quash the notice

because the setting did not give him the ten days’ notice he was entitled to under Rule 56(c)

of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Alexander then re-noticed his summary

judgment motion for a hearing on October 2, 2023.

¶15. On September 28, 2023, Alexander noticed his motion for a declaratory judgment for

a hearing on October 2, 2023 as well. On October 2, 2023, the parties appeared before the

chancery court, but no transcript of the argument is in the record. From the briefs filed and

the introductory language in the court’s order, it appears Alexander told the court that he

elected to forego a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, and Espinoza’s attorney

waived any challenge to Alexander’s failure to timely notice the motion for a declaratory

judgment. The court proceeded to hear arguments on only the declaratory judgment motion.

¶16. The next day, the chancery court signed an order denying the motion for a declaratory

judgment, and the order was entered on October 5, 2023. The court found the motion was

“without substantial justification” and was “frivolous and groundless in fact and law.” The

court concluded that Alexander “was unable to present even an arguable basis” for the

motion, that “bringing the motion on for hearing unnecessarily expanded the proceedings,”

and that Alexander “clearly knew or reasonably should have known that his claim was

without substantial justification.” The chancery court further noted that Alexander had failed

to properly strike his notice for hearing on the summary judgment motion or notice his

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motion for a declaratory judgment. The court held that Alexander did not prevail on any

issue and that “no new theory of law “ was presented. In addition to denying this motion, the

court entered an order awarding Espinoza $1,500 for attorney’s fees and costs.9 The order

did not certify that there was “no just reason for delay” or direct that the order be entered as

a final judgment against any party or on any claim. M.R.C.P 54(b).

Post-Order Proceedings

¶17. On October 10, 2023, the chancellor entered a separate order sua sponte, finding that

the facts of the current action (23-cv-1120) were the same as those pleaded in Alexander’s

previously filed action (23-cv-167). The chancellor transferred the case to the docket of the

chancellor handling that case.

¶18. The docket for cause number 23-cv-1120 shows that after the court’s order, on

October 11, 2023, Alexander filed another motion for a declaratory judgment, but that

pleading is not in our record.10 In his brief, Espinoza claims that Alexander also filed

another motion for summary judgment in cause number 23-cv-1120 on February 22, 2024.11

In addition, as noted earlier, Espinoza filed a motion for a trial setting on the counter-claim

he had filed in cause number 23-cv-167. Thus, it appears there were several issues between

9
The docket does not reflect that Espinoza filed a written motion for sanctions, and
without the transcript, it is unclear whether an oral motion was presented during the hearing
or whether the chancery court imposed sanctions sua sponte.
10
Because we do not have the docket of cause number 23-cv-167, we do not know
whether Alexander’s motion was considered by the transferee chancellor in that case.
11
However, that pleading is not in the record, and the docket Espinoza included in
his record excerpts merely refers to a “Motion (Miscellaneous)” filed on that date without
further description or identification of the filing party.

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the parties that needed resolution even after the order on the declaratory judgment motion had

been rendered.

Appeal of October 5, 2023 Order Denying Motion for Declaratory Judgment
in Cause Number 23-cv-1120

¶19. On October 16, 2023, Alexander filed his notice of appeal from the October 5, 2023

order denying declaratory relief and awarding attorney’s fees in cause number 23-cv-1120.

On appeal, Alexander argues that the chancery court erred in denying his motion for a

declaratory judgment because Espinoza had filed an invalid lien and that nothing in

Espinoza’s motion warranted the payment of attorney’s fees. In response, Espinoza argues

that this Court has no jurisdiction over the appeal because the chancery court’s order denying

declaratory relief was not a final judgment, and Alexander sought no permission to file an

interlocutory appeal. In the alternative, Espinoza contends that the chancery court correctly

denied the motion for a declaratory judgment and correctly imposed sanctions under Rule 11

of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

Discussion

¶20. There are critical parts of the record that the parties did not designate to be included,

among them Espinoza’s answer to Alexander’s complaint in cause no. 23-cv-1120, as well

as the transcript of the chancery court’s hearing on Alexander’s motion for a declaratory

judgment. However, because the chancery court transferred the case, which consolidated it

with Alexander’s first case, the October 5, 2023 order was not a final, appealable judgment,

and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

¶21. Mississippi Code Annotated section 9-3-9 (Rev. 2019) provides, among other things,

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that cases shall not be “removed,” i.e. appealed, “until after final judgment in the court

below.”12 The need for the judgment appealed to be final before this Court has jurisdiction

has been incorporated into the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and repeatedly reiterated

in appellate decisions. See M.R.C.P. 54(b). For example, we recently stated that “[a]n

appeal may be taken only from a final judgment,” which is one that “adjudicates the merits

of the controversy and settles all issues between all parties.” Blaney v. Black Jack Oil Co.,

325 So. 3d 1204, 1206 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citing LaFontaine v. Holliday, 110 So.

3d 785, 787 (¶8) (Miss. 2013)); accord Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (Rev. 2019). An

appellate court, on its own initiative, may dismiss an appeal if a judgment does not meet the

requisites of Rule 54(b). Miller v. R.B. Wall Oil Co., 850 So. 2d 101, 103 (¶5) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2002).

¶22. Rule 54 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure sets out when, in a case of

multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment is final and when partial judgments may

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The full text of section 9-3-9 reads:

The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court
of appeals, and shall hear and determine all manner of pleas, complaints,
motions, causes, and controversies, civil and criminal, which are now pending
therein, or which may be brought before it, and which shall be cognizable in
said court; but a cause shall not be removed into said court until after final
judgment in the court below, except as provided by Section 9-4-3, or in cases
particularly provided for by law; and the Supreme Court may grant new trials
and correct errors of the circuit court in granting or refusing the same.

Provided, however, the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate
jurisdiction as may be otherwise provided by law in cases and proceedings for
modification of any rates charged or sought to be charged to the public by any
public utility.

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nonetheless be appealed:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed
direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination
and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated which
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.

M.R.C.P. 54(b). The Rule is clear that when an order of the trial court adjudicates fewer than

all the claims between the parties, it is an interlocutory order that may only be appealed if the

trial court expressly states that there is no just reason for delay and directs the entry of a final

judgment. The advisory committee notes to the Rule state, “[a]bsent a certification under

Rule 54(b), any order in a multiple-party or multiple-claim action that does not dispose of the

entire action is interlocutory, even it if appears to adjudicate a separable portion of the

controversy.” M.R.C.P. 54(b) advisory committee notes.

¶23. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held:

Without the entry of a Rule 54(b) certificate, a trial court order which disposes
of less than all of the claims against all of the parties in a multiple party or
multiple claim action, is interlocutory.

Taylor v. Tolbert, 324 So. 3d 763, 766 (¶13) (Miss. 2021) (quoting M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926

So. 2d 897, 900 (¶4) (Miss. 2006)). The avenue to appeal from an interlocutory order is for

a party to seek permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court under Rule 5 of the

Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides in part:

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(a) Petition for Permission to Appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order
may be sought if a substantial basis exists for a difference of opinion on a
question of law as to which appellate resolution may:
(1) Materially advance the termination of the litigation and avoid
exceptional expense to the parties; or
(2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or
(3) Resolve an issue of general importance in the administration of
justice.

¶24. In this case, the court’s order denying the motion for a declaratory judgment did not

resolve all of the claims between the parties as Rule 54(b) requires. The chancery court itself

noted that Espinoza had an outstanding counter-claim against Alexander and sua sponte

transferred cause number 23-cv-1120 to consolidate it with cause number 23-cv-167 for final

resolution. If a trial court’s order does not dispose of all the claims against all the parties and

was not certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), the order is interlocutory and not

final. Meekins v. Kennon, 141 So. 3d 51, 53 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

¶25. In addition, Alexander sought not only a declaratory judgment that Espinoza’s

mechanic’s lien was invalid, but also the statutory damages he claimed he was entitled to for

Espinoza’s allegedly fraudulent filing of a lien, as well as damages for the interrupted loss

of his possession and the cloud the lien placed on his title. The chancery court only ruled on

the declaratory relief claim, not the others. Further, Alexander’s own actions of filing

additional motions after the October 5, 2023 order show that he treated the chancery court’s

order as not final.

¶26. We also note that the chancery court’s order did not include the certification language

required under Rule 54(b) for an interlocutory order to be appealable. “Without the entry of

a Rule 54(b) certificate, a trial court order which disposes of less than all of the claims

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against all of the parties in a multiple party or multiple claim action, is interlocutory.”

Taylor, 324 So. 3d at 766 (¶13). Here, the chancery court simply denied the motion for a

declaratory judgment and entered a judgment in favor of Espinoza for attorney’s fees. The

order contains no finding that “there is no just reason for delay,” nor did the chancery court

expressly direct the entry of the judgment as a final judgment and use the specific and

express language required by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). If the chancery

court intended the order to be final, the court did not state so “in a definite, unmistakable

manner” that the Mississippi Supreme Court requires. M.W.F., 926 So. 2d at 900 (¶5).

¶27. Finally, Alexander did not seek permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court under

Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 to appeal from the chancery court’s interlocutory

order.

Conclusion

¶28. The order appealed from in this case was not a final judgment because it did not

resolve all the claims between all the parties, nor did it contain the proper certification

language to make it appealable. Alexander also did not seek permission from the Mississippi

Supreme Court to file an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to

adjudicate the issues Alexander raises on appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction.

¶29. APPEAL DISMISSED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

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