LaDonna Murry Jones v. Essie C. Jones, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-CA-00923-COA

LADONNA MURRY JONES APPELLANT

v.

ESSIE C. JONES, JR. APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/30/2020
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CYNTHIA L. BREWER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JEANINE M. CARAFELLO
PAMELA L. HANCOCK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LILLI ALICIA EVANS BASS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 11/23/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2014, the Madison County Chancery Court granted LaDonna Jones and Essie Jones

Jr. an irreconcilable differences divorce. On July 30, 2020, the chancellor modified the

divorce judgment to award physical custody of the parties’ son to Essie. The chancellor also

reduced Essie’s monthly child-support obligation from $600 to $300 and ordered LaDonna

to begin paying Essie $175 a month in child support. On appeal, LaDonna challenges the

chancellor’s modification of custody and the parties’ child-support obligations.

¶2. Upon review, we find no manifest error or abuse of discretion arising from the

chancellor’s modification of custody as to the parties’ son. We therefore affirm that part of
the chancellor’s judgment. We further find, however, that the record contains insufficient

evidence of the parties’ incomes and expenses to support the chancellor’s modification of

their child-support obligations. We therefore reverse that part of the chancellor’s judgment

and remand this case to allow the parties to introduce evidence upon which the chancellor

can base a decision regarding child support.

FACTS

¶3. Over the course of their relationship, the parties had two minor children: their son

Ryan and their daughter Ruth.1 On November 6, 2014, the chancellor granted the parties an

irreconcilable differences divorce. The chancellor fully incorporated the terms of the parties’

child-custody and property-settlement agreement into the final judgment. The agreement

provided for the following: joint legal custody of both children, physical custody to

LaDonna, and reasonable visitation for Essie. The parties also agreed that Essie would pay

LaDonna $600 a month in child support.

¶4. In October 2019, LaDonna filed a contempt petition against Essie, who responded and

filed his own petition for contempt and for the modification of child custody and child

support.2 The chancellor held a July 21, 2020 hearing on the parties’ petitions. LaDonna,

Essie, and Ryan each testified. The parties stated that while Essie still resided in the former

marital home, LaDonna now lived in another school district. Due to this arrangement, the

parties agreed at the time of their divorce to continue to use Essie’s home address for the

1
We use fictitious names to protect the minor children’s privacy.
2
The parties’ underlying contempt claims are not before this Court on appeal.

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children’s schools. The parties testified that LaDonna drove the children to Essie’s home

every morning during the school year so the children could catch the school bus there. At

the end of each school day, the children returned to Essie’s home, and after finishing their

homework and eating dinner, either Essie or his wife would drive them back to LaDonna’s

home.

¶5. The parties further testified that from April to July 2019, both children lived solely

with Essie. During most of that period, LaDonna lived in Texas and searched for a job.

While LaDonna was in Texas, Essie fully cared for the children and paid for all their

expenses. When LaDonna returned to Mississippi in July 2019, Ryan initially refused to

return to her home. Ryan continued to live exclusively with Essie until November 2019,

when he agreed to return to LaDonna’s home. At the time of trial, Ryan still went to Essie’s

home every morning of the summer break except for those weekends when LaDonna had

custody of him. Essie continued to drive Ryan back to LaDonna’s home after dinner each

night, where Ryan would sleep before returning to Essie’s home the next morning.

¶6. Ryan, who was sixteen at the time of trial and about to begin his junior year of high

school, testified that he already stayed at Essie’s home on a regular basis and that he

preferred to permanently live with Essie. When questioned by the chancellor, Ryan was able

to recite Essie’s home address but stated he did not know LaDonna’s address. Ryan testified

that LaDonna often yelled at him and that he argued with her several times a week.

According to Ryan, LaDonna had told him that he would be “taking money out of [her

pocket] and [his] sister’s pocket” if he went to live with Essie. Ryan testified that he felt like

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LaDonna “always yelled at [him] for no reason at all over little things” while Essie took the

time to explain to him “when [he was] doing wrong and why . . . it’s wrong.”

¶7. Ryan stated that he felt LaDonna’s home was not the safest place for him. In addition

to the frequent yelling and fighting, Ryan testified he was scared of being locked outside by

LaDonna. Both Ryan and LaDonna testified about an incident where an argument resulted

in LaDonna locking Ryan outside her home. During the disagreement, Ryan walked outside.

LaDonna testified that she looked outside but did not see Ryan, so she locked the door.

LaDonna further testified that if Ryan had simply knocked on the door, she would have let

him back into the house. Ryan claimed, however, that LaDonna had seen him outside but

had not opened the door to let him back inside. According to Ryan, he had been forced to

text his sister and to ask her to open the door for him.

¶8. In contrast to the circumstances at LaDonna’s home, Ryan described the home

environment Essie provided as “[v]ery calm [and] nice.” Ryan testified that he went to his

father whenever he had a problem and needed a parent’s help. Ryan further stated that Essie

always helped him, did not yell at him, and had never locked him out of the house. Ryan

testified that Essie’s home felt safer and less stressful than LaDonna’s home and that he liked

going to his father’s home every day to get away from the arguments at his mother’s home.

¶9. Following the hearing, the chancellor issued a bench ruling. The chancellor found

that due to “what is occurring in the custodial parent’s home[,]” Ryan had needed “to walk

away from [the situation] to avoid a confrontation.” She further found credible Ryan’s

testimony “that he ha[d] been locked out” of the custodial home and had needed “to text his

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little sister to get in . . . .” The chancellor determined these events were traumatic for Ryan

and had “affected [Ryan’s] peace and dignity in the home of the custodial parent.” Based on

these findings, the chancellor concluded that a substantial and material adverse change in

circumstances had occurred in LaDonna’s home with regard to Ryan.

¶10. The chancellor next conducted an Albright analysis.3 She found that none of the

factors favored LaDonna and that only one factor—the parties’ employment

responsibilities—was neutral. The chancellor concluded that the following factors favored

Essie: (1) Ryan’s age, health, and sex; (2) Ryan’s continuity of care since the divorce; (3) the

parties’ parenting skills; (4) the parties’ willingness and capacity to provide primary child

care for Ryan; (5) the parties’ physical and mental health and age; (6) the emotional ties

between the parties and Ryan; (7) the parties’ moral fitness; (8) Ryan’s home, school, and

community records; (9) Ryan’s preference; and (10) the stability of the parties’ home

environment and employment. The chancellor further concluded there were no other factors

relevant to the parent-child relationship or Ryan’s best interest that would affect her analysis.

¶11. After concluding that a modification of custody was in Ryan’s best interest, the

chancellor awarded Essie physical custody of Ryan and awarded LaDonna visitation with

3
The factors considered in an Albright analysis include the following: (1) the child’s
age, health, and sex; (2) which parent has had “continuity of care”; (3) the parties’
“parenting skills”; (4) the parties’ “willingness and capacity to provide primary child care”;
(5) the parties’ employment responsibilities; (6) the parties’ “physical and mental health and
age”; (7) the “emotional ties of parent and child”; (8) the parties’ “moral fitness”; (9) the
child’s “home, school[,] and community record[s]”; (10) the child’s preference, if the child
is at least twelve years old; (11) the stability of the parties’ home environment and
employment; and (12) any “other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship” or the
child’s best interest. Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).

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Ryan. As a result of the child-custody modification, the chancellor reduced Essie’s monthly

child-support payments from $600 to $300 and ordered LaDonna to begin paying Essie $175

a month in child support. The chancellor further ordered that all other provisions of the

divorce judgment, including those regarding custody of Ruth, remain in full force and effect.

On July 30, 2020, the chancellor entered an order in accordance with her bench ruling.

Aggrieved by the chancellor’s modification of child custody and child support, LaDonna

appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12. This Court narrowly reviews a chancellor’s “ruling on a motion for modification of

custody ‘based on a material change in circumstances’ . . . .” Smith v. Smith, 318 So. 3d 484,

490 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Page v. Graves, 283 So. 3d 269, 274 (¶18) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2019)). We “will not disturb a chancellor’s judgment when it is supported by

substantial credible evidence unless the chancellor abused her discretion, was manifestly

wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Leverett v. Leverett, 309

So. 3d 116, 120 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Gilmer v. Gilmer, 297 So. 3d 324, 331

(¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). We review the chancellor’s “interpretation and application of

the law” de novo. Smith, 318 So. 3d at 491 (¶18) (quoting Taylor v. Timmons (In re C.T.),

228 So. 3d 311, 315 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)).

DISCUSSION

I. Modification of Child Custody

¶13. LaDonna asserts that insufficient evidence supported the chancellor’s finding

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regarding an adverse material change of circumstances in the custodial home. LaDonna also

contends that the chancellor misapplied the Albright factors in determining whether a custody

modification was in Ryan’s best interest. As a result, LaDonna argues the chancellor clearly

erred by modifying custody of Ryan.

A. Adverse Material Change

¶14. To modify child custody, the noncustodial parent must prove that (1) “a material

change of circumstances has occurred in the custodial home since the most recent custody

decree”; (2) “the change adversely affects the child”; and (3) the modification is in the child’s

best interest. Stewart v. Stewart, 309 So. 3d 44, 83 (¶126) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting

Powell v. Powell, 976 So. 2d 358, 361 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). “Totality of the

circumstances can serve as a basis for a material change.” Munday v. McLendon, 287 So.

3d 303, 310 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). “In analyzing whether a material change of

circumstances has occurred, the chancellor must consider the totality of the circumstances.”

Domke v. Domke, 305 So. 3d 1233, 1240 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “If, after examining the totality of the circumstances, a material change in

circumstances in the custodial home is found to have occurred, the chancellor ‘must

separately and affirmatively determine that this change is one which adversely affects the

child.’” Munday, 287 So. 3d at 310 (¶28) (quoting Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So. 2d 770,

775 (Miss. 1997)).

¶15. After considering the parties’ testimony, the chancellor determined that the totality of

the circumstances showed a material change at LaDonna’s home since the entry of the

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divorce judgment that was adverse to Ryan. In finding such a change, the chancellor relied

on Ryan’s testimony about the repeated confrontations he and LaDonna had engaged in since

the parties’ divorce. Ryan, who was sixteen at the time of the hearing, testified that

LaDonna’s home felt less safe and more stressful for him than Essie’s home. According to

Ryan, he and LaDonna argued multiple times each week. Although Ryan testified that

LaDonna also yelled at his younger sister Ruth, he opined that his mother yelled at him more

often and that she “always yelled at [him] for no reason at all over little things.”

¶16. Ryan further stated he was scared that if he tried to walk away from the confrontations

with his mother, he would get locked out of the house again. Ryan and LaDonna both

testified about the argument that ended with Ryan walking outside to get away from the

disagreement. LaDonna stated that she locked the door afterward because she did not see

Ryan outside. Ryan disputed his mother’s testimony, however, and claimed that she had seen

him but had chosen not to unlock the door for him. According to Ryan, he finally had to text

Ruth and ask her to let him back inside the home.

¶17. The chancellor concluded the recurring negative interactions between Ryan and

LaDonna since the entry of the divorce judgment constituted a material change in

circumstances for Ryan. The chancellor further found the changes had adversely affected

Ryan by causing him trauma and by “affect[ing] his peace and dignity” in LaDonna’s home.

As this Court has repeatedly recognized, “[t]he chancellor, by her presence in the courtroom,

is best equipped to listen to witnesses, observe their demeanor, and determine the credibility

of these witnesses and what weight ought to be ascribed to the evidence given by those

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witnesses.” Munday, 287 So. 3d at 312 (¶38) (quoting Rogers v. Morin, 791 So. 2d 815, 826

(¶39) (Miss. 2001)). Upon review, we conclude the record contains sufficient evidentiary

support for the chancellor’s findings. And in view of the totality of the circumstances

presented, we cannot say that the chancellor abused her discretion or manifestly erred in

determining that an adverse material change in circumstances had occurred in the custodial

home with regard to Ryan. Accordingly, we find this assignment of error lacks merit.

B. Albright Analysis

¶18. After concluding that Essie had proved an adverse material change, the chancellor

“appl[ied] the Albright factors to determine whether modification [was] in [Ryan’s] best

interest.” Munday, 287 So. 3d at 311 (¶33) (quoting White v. White, 26 So. 3d 342, 351 (¶28)

(Miss. 2010)). The chancellor concluded that only one factor—the parties’ employment

responsibilities—was neutral and that all other factors weighed in Essie’s favor. She further

concluded there were no other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship or Ryan’s best

interest that she needed to consider in her analysis. On appeal, LaDonna argues that the

evidence failed to support the chancellor’s findings as to six factors. She therefore asserts

that the chancellor misapplied the Albright factors in determining that a modification of

custody served Ryan’s best interests.

¶19. “[T]o determine whether or not the chancellor was manifestly wrong or clearly

erroneous, or abused her discretion in applying the Albright factors, we review the evidence

and testimony presented at trial to ensure her ruling was supported by the record.” Id. at 312

(¶36) (quoting Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So. 2d 943, 947 (¶13) (Miss. 2001)). “[T]he

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interpretation of evidence[,] where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation,

[is] primarily for the chancellor [to determine] as the trier of facts.” Id. at (¶35) (quoting

Johnson v. Gray, 859 So. 2d 1006, 1014 (¶36) (Miss. 2003)). While each Albright factor is

important, “the chancellor has the ultimate discretion to weigh the evidence as she sees fit.”

Id. (quoting Johnson, 859 So. 2d at 1013-14 (¶36)). As always in child-custody cases, the

“polestar consideration” remains “the best interest and welfare of the child.” Stewart, 309

So. 3d at 83 (¶127) (quoting Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d 740, 744 (Miss. 1996)).

1. Continuity of Care

¶20. LaDonna first challenges the chancellor’s finding that continuity of care for Ryan

since the divorce favored Essie. She argues the chancellor failed to consider that both

children had resided with her since the parties’ divorce and that Essie was preparing to sell

the former marital home where he resided.

¶21. Upon review, we find no merit to LaDonna’s argument. At the time of the hearing,

Essie still lived in the marital home, and thus, any future plans to sell the home had no

bearing on the continuity of care he had provided to Ryan since the parties’ divorce. Further,

as Essie testified, his new home would remain in the same school district and would therefore

not interfere with or alter the children’s school attendance. In addition, contrary to

LaDonna’s assertions, the chancellor did consider Ryan’s residence since the divorce in

reaching her decision. The parties agreed that even after the divorce they continued to use

Essie’s address as the children’s residence for school purposes. Further, the parties testified

that LaDonna drove the children to Essie’s home each morning during the school year so the

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children could catch the bus from there. And each afternoon, the children returned to Essie’s

home after school before Essie or his wife drove them back to LaDonna’s home. Based on

Ryan’s own testimony, the chancellor concluded that Ryan considered Essie’s home to be

where he lived and that he (Ryan) did not even know LaDonna’s physical address.

¶22. During the summer months, Ryan continued to prefer to spend almost every day at

Essie’s home rather than LaDonna’s home. Although Ryan returned to LaDonna’s home at

night, the chancellor determined that he did so merely to sleep before he went back to Essie’s

home the following morning. The parties’ testimony also reflected that from April to July

2019, the children resided solely with Essie while LaDonna looked for a job in Texas. When

LaDonna returned to Mississippi in July 2019, Ryan refused to return to her home and

continued to live with Essie until November 2019. Based on such evidence, we find no

abuse of discretion or manifest error in the chancellor’s conclusion that continuity of care for

Ryan since the divorce actually favored Essie.

2. Physical and Mental Health and Age

¶23. LaDonna next contends that no evidence supported the chancellor’s finding that the

parties’ physical and mental health and age favored Essie. Although the parties’ offered no

testimony regarding their ages or physical health, the chancellor concluded that the mental-

health component of this factor weighed against LaDonna. In reaching this determination,

the chancellor specifically focused on the events that occurred between April and November

2019 related to LaDonna’s move to and from Texas. The chancellor noted that LaDonna

presented no evidence at the hearing that she ever visited with the children or communicated

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with them during her time in Texas. Instead, the record reflected that the children lived

solely with Essie during that period and that he provided for all their expenses. The

chancellor further noted that even after LaDonna returned to Mississippi in July 2019, Ryan

refused to go back to her home for four months. Based on the testimony and evidence before

her, the chancellor concluded that these facts spoke to LaDonna’s mental health and

ultimately weighed against her. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their

testimony, as well as the interpretation of evidence where it is capable of more than one

reasonable interpretation, are primarily for the chancellor as the trier of facts.” Munday, 287

So. 3d at 312 (¶35) (quoting Johnson, 859 So. 2d at 1014 (¶36)). Because we cannot say that

the chancellor abused her discretion or manifestly erred in concluding that this factor

weighed in Essie’s favor, we find this assignment of error lacks merit.

3. Moral Fitness

¶24. LaDonna also asserts the chancellor erred by finding that consideration of the parties’

moral fitness weighed in Essie’s favor. With regard to this factor, the chancellor stated the

following during her bench ruling:

Now that the father is married and no longer living outside the bonds of
wedlock in the presence of the children, the Court is not going to hold that
against him. I do find that moral fitness also requires one to pay one’s bills,
and I see an attempt of late to catch his [(Essie’s)] child support up to date and
an attempt to have the former marital domicile sold. Thus[,] the Court finds
that the moral fitness has improved on the part of the father. I cannot state that
your ability to not control your anger or your frustration with [your] sixteen-
year-old [son] is in your favor, madam, so I have to have that factor favor the
father.

¶25. As Ryan and LaDonna both testified, they regularly argued with each other. They also

12
both testified that one argument between them resulted in Ryan walking outside and

LaDonna locking him out of the house. Although their opinions differed as to whether

LaDonna had intentionally locked Ryan outside and then refused to let him back into the

house, the chancellor found Ryan’s testimony on the incident credible. Upon review, we find

that it was within the chancellor’s discretion to weigh the evidence about events that had

occurred since the parties’ divorce in Essie’s favor and to find that this factor favored him.

We therefore find no error.

4. Home, School, and Community Records

¶26. LaDonna next contends the chancellor erred in finding that Ryan’s home, school, and

community records favored Essie. The record reflects, however, that Essie lived in the

former marital home while LaDonna had lived at her current residence for about a year. As

previously discussed, even after their divorce, the parties continued to use Essie’s home

address for everything related to the children’s education. LaDonna drove the children to

Essie’s home every morning prior to school to catch the bus, and they then rode the bus back

to Essie’s home in the afternoons. After completing their homework and eating dinner at

Essie’s home, the children returned to LaDonna’s home for the remainder of the evening.

Essie testified that he always helped his children complete their homework and that he

attended as many of their school functions as he could. Ryan also testified that Essie helped

with his homework, and he stated that he sought Essie’s advice when he had a problem.

Even during the summer, Ryan stated that he preferred to spend, and did spend, most of his

time at Essie’s home. Ryan testified that he considered Essie’s home to be where he lived

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and that he did not even know LaDonna’s home address. Because the record contains

substantial credible evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that Ryan’s home, school,

and community records favored Essie, we find no error with regard to this factor.

5. Stability of the Home Environment and
Employment

¶27. Despite LaDonna’s assertions to the contrary, we find substantial credible evidence

supported the chancellor’s determination that the stability of the parties’ home environment

and employment favored Essie. Essie testified that he lived in the former marital home but

that he and his wife were building a new home in the same school district. Essie stated that

the new home would have bedrooms for both children and that he and his wife would like

to have the children live with them. As previously discussed, Essie presented testimony that

the children were at his home almost every day and that he helped with their homework. As

Ryan testified, he felt that the environment at Essie’s home was safer, calmer, and less

contentious than the environment at LaDonna’s home. In addition, Essie testified that he had

worked at his current employment for seventeen-and-a-half years and that his salary had

increased during that time. Although Essie had been furloughed for a little while during the

coronavirus pandemic, he testified that at the time of the hearing he had resumed working

on a full-time basis. In contrast, the chancellor heard testimony that LaDonna had moved to

Texas for several months in 2019 to search for a job, had lived in her current residence for

about a year, and had just begun a new job around the time of the hearing. Based on the

parties’ testimony, we find no abuse of discretion or manifest error in the chancellor’s

determination that this factor favored Essie.

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6. Other Relevant Factors

¶28. Finally, LaDonna challenges the chancellor’s finding that no other factors relevant to

the parent-child relationship or Ryan’s best interest affected her analysis. In raising this

assignment of error, LaDonna notes that the chancellor expressed her reluctance to separate

siblings in custody matters. Because the chancellor’s custody decision separated the parties’

siblings, LaDonna argues this factor favors her. After the chancellor’s statement regarding

her general reluctance to separate siblings, she acknowledged that Ryan “already believes he

has been split from his sibling by the behavior of his mother[,]” whom he feels treats him

differently than his sister. The chancellor therefore stated that under the circumstances of

the present case, she did not believe splitting custody of the children would harm their

relationship as long as the children continued to spend time together in each parent’s home.

After review, we find sufficient evidentiary support for the chancellor’s conclusion. We

therefore find no manifest error or abuse of discretion.

II. Modification of Child Support

¶29. After modifying child custody and awarding Essie physical custody of Ryan, the

chancellor reduced Essie’s monthly child-support obligation from $600 to $300 and ordered

LaDonna to pay Essie $175 a month in child support. On appeal, LaDonna asserts that the

parties never submitted to the chancellor any financial evidence such as Rule 8.05 financial

statements,4 tax returns, or W-2 forms. Without such information as to the parties’ incomes,

expenses, assets, and liabilities, LaDonna contends that the chancellor erred by modifying

4
UCCR 8.05.

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their child-support obligations.

¶30. “[I]n child-support matters, a chancellor is afforded considerable discretion . . . .”

Dixon v. Olmstead, 296 So. 3d 227, 232 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). As we acknowledged

in Dixon,

[t]he process of weighing evidence and arriving at an award of child support
is essentially an exercise in fact-finding, which customarily significantly
restrains this Court’s review.
A chancellor may modify a child-support award if there has been a
substantial or material change in the circumstances of one or more of the
interested parties. The child[-]support calculation guidelines set forth in
[Mississippi Code Annotated] section 43-19-101(1) [(Rev. 2015)] establish
that a child-support award for one child should be fourteen percent of the
noncustodial parent’s adjusted gross income. Section 43-19-101(3) provides
the method of calculating the adjusted gross income. We recognize that a
rebuttable presumption exists that the amount set forth in the statutory
guideline is correct both in determining the amount of the initial award and in
modifying that award.

Id. at (¶¶18-19) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶31. As the record here reflects, Essie’s original child-support obligation of $600 a month

was established by the parties in their child-custody and property-settlement agreement rather

than by the chancellor’s examination of the parties’ financial disclosures and application of

the statutory child-support guidelines. Even so, our caselaw recognizes that “[t]he rules

governing [a] modification proceeding [pursuant to an irreconcilable differences divorce

child-support agreement] are the same as if the chancellor had made a support award after

a contested divorce trial.” Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So. 2d 410, 417 (Miss. 1983). In either

instance, the child-support obligations “are subject to modification only upon [a] showing

of a substantial or material change in circumstances” of one or more of the interested parties.

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Id.

¶32. Mississippi Code Annotated sections 43-19-101 and 43-19-103 (Rev. 2015) set forth

the child-support guidelines (and the exceptions to these guidelines) and provide a clear

framework of the evidence to be considered in establishing or modifying an award of child

support. After a thorough review, we find the record contains insufficient evidence of the

parties’ incomes and expenses at the time of the hearing. Without such evidence, we cannot

say on appeal that a sufficient basis existed for the chancellor’s modification of the parties’

child-support obligations.5 We therefore must reverse that part of the chancellor’s judgment

and remand the case to allow the parties to introduce evidence upon which the chancellor can

base her determination of their child-support obligations.

CONCLUSION

¶33. Because we find no error in the chancellor’s decision to modify custody of the parties’

son, we affirm that portion of the chancellor’s judgment. We find, however, that the record

lacks evidence of the parties’ incomes and expenses upon which to base a modification of

their child-support obligations. We therefore reverse the chancellor’s modification of child

support and remand the case to allow the parties to submit additional relevant evidence.

¶34. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J.,

5
Section 43-19-101(1) establishes that child support for one child should be fourteen
percent of the noncustodial parent’s adjusted gross income and that child support for two
children should be twenty percent of the noncustodial parent’s adjusted gross income. Thus,
from the record before us, it appears that the reduction of Essie’s monthly child-support
payment by half would not be justified under the statutory child-support guidelines.

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CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.

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