Michael Stephney, Sr. a/k/a Michael Stephney v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-00936-COA

MICHAEL STEPHNEY, SR. A/K/A MICHAEL APPELLANT
STEPHNEY

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/25/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RICHARD A. SMITH
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIE DEWAYNE RICHARDSON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/03/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Michael Stephney Sr. was jointly indicted with his son, Michael Stephney Jr. for the

first-degree murder of Victor Hallman and attempted murder of Dexter Hallman. The

indictment also included a firearm enhancement. Stephney Sr. and Stephney Jr. were tried

jointly on April 18, 2023. At the close of the State’s evidence, Stephney Jr. was granted a

directed verdict and dismissed from the trial. The jury convicted Michael Stephney Sr. of

second-degree murder and attempted murder, with a firearm enhancement. For his

convictions of second-degree murder and attempted murder, the trial court sentenced

Stephney Sr. to two thirty-year terms in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (MDOC), with twenty years to serve and ten years suspended, and five years of

post-release supervision. For the firearm enhancement, Stephney Sr. was sentenced to five

years in the custody of the MDOC. The court ordered all sentences to run concurrently.

Stephney Sr. appeals and argues that his two lawyers’ failure to move for a severance from

Stephney Jr. amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel or, in the alternative, the trial

judge erred in not assuring that Stephney Sr. was aware of the potential conflict and that he

knowingly waived it.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2. On November 3, 2018, Dexter Hallman and Stephney Sr. exchanged a couple of

threatening phone calls and text messages. During the course of their phone conversations,

they agreed to have a “fair fight,”1 allegedly over a woman. Dexter and his father Victor

Hallman drove to the Lil Wayne convenience store that Stephney Sr. owned in Greenville,

Mississippi. Upon their arrival, Dexter got out of his vehicle and walked toward the store.

Stephney Jr. handed Stephney Sr. a gun. Dexter, seeing this, jogged back to his car and drove

away. Stephney Sr. aimed the gun in Dexter and Victor’s general vicinity and fired multiple

shots,2 resulting in Victor being shot. Dexter drove Victor to the emergency room, where

Victor ultimately died from the gunshot wounds to his left arm and chest.

¶3. In April 2019, Stephney Sr. and Stephney Jr. were jointly indicted by a Washington

1
The record described a “fair fight” to mean a fight without weapons.
2
The store was located near a busy highway, and several cars were passing by as
Stephney Sr. fired the gun, creating an even more dangerous situation given the proximity
of the traffic.

2
County grand jury for the first-degree murder of Victor Hallman and the attempted murder

of Dexter Hallman, with a firearm enhancement. Stephney Sr. was represented by Wayne

Lee, and Stephney Jr. was represented by Stanley Perkins. Prior to the initial trial setting, on

January 18, 2023, at a pretrial hearing, Stephney Sr. agreed to also be represented by Perkins.

The court ensured Stephney Sr. understood the change in representation and advised him of

the risks involved:

THE COURT: All right. This case is set for trial. We’re going to move
it to start tomorrow.[3] And I understand Mr. Lee has
Covid and is not able to be here. But I also understand
that you’re wanting Mr. Perkins to represent you?

STEPHNEY SR.: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Before we can do that, I need to make sure you
understand a couple of things, all right? First of all,
generally, when you have three people charged in a case,
each has their own lawyer. Okay?

....

Many times, there’s what’s called plea negotiations. In
other words, a defendant will – his lawyer will talk with
the State, and the State may or may not say: Well, I tell
you – if you’ll – if you’re willing to enter a guilty plea,
then we’ll offer you a lesser – either a lesser crime or
lesser time or both.

And it may be that one lawyer representing three people
might find that hard to do. In other words, your interests
may be different from Stephney, Jr. and Mr. Jarmon.[4]
My question is, if you want Mr. Perkins to represent you,

3
The case did not go to trial the following day. The trial began on April 18, 2023.
4
Nathaniel Jarmon was a third co-defendant and was indicted for tampering with
evidence, but he pled guilty before trial.

3
and you know all that – in other words, you know there
is a conflict or a potential conflict, are you willing to
waive that or say that you don’t care about that; and you
still want him to be your lawyer?

STEPHNEY SR.: Yes, sir, I still want him.

THE COURT: I’m sorry?

STEPHNEY SR.: I still want him to be my lawyer.

THE COURT: Okay. So you’re saying that even though there may be a
conflict and there may be a problem, you still want him
to represent you?

STEPHNEY SR.: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody force you or get you to say that?

STEPHNEY SR.: No, sir.

THE COURT: Anybody promise you anything of value?

STEPHNEY SR.: No, sir.

¶4. When the trial began three months later on April 18, 2023, Lee was no longer ill and

was able to attend trial. On the morning of the trial, Lee and Perkins formally requested the

court’s approval of their dual representation of Stephney Sr. and Stephney Jr.:

ATTORNEY LEE: Just a procedural matter, Judge. You know the
last time this case was set, I was having Covid
issues and so Mr. Perkins kind of took the whole
case over.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

ATTORNEY LEE: We’ve talked, and although I’m named as the first
defendant, we would ask that Mr. Perkins kind of
take the lead and I’ll kind of follow him, if that’s
okay with the Court.

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THE COURT: Well, let me make sure now. Are you representing
Senior?

ATTORNEY LEE: I’m resenting Senior, yes, sir.

ATTORNEY PERKINS: Senior. I – I represent Junior.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY PERKINS: But – but we’re – we’re on the same page.

ATTORNEY LEE: But it’s all kind of – it’s going to kind of overlap,
we think, anyway so.

THE COURT: Well, and that’s fine.

¶5. Once the court recognized the dual representation, the State called its first witness,

Sergeant Jeremy Arendale. Sergeant Arendale testified that at the time of the shooting, he

was a supervisor in the criminal investigation division at the Greenville Police Department.

He testified that the Greenville Police Department was informed of a homicide on Highway

82 in Greenville at the Lil Wayne convenience store. Sergeant Arendale went to the scene

of the shooting and found a .40-caliber handgun on the seat of a vehicle he believed belonged

to Stephney Sr. parked in front of the store. During the investigation, he learned there was

video surveillance inside the store. He watched the video of the shooting, which was later

admitted into evidence. Sergeant Arendale testified the firearm found in the car during the

investigation appeared to be the same firearm in the surveillance video.

¶6. The surveillance video depicted Victor and Dexter pull into the Lil Wayne store

parking lot. Dexter walked toward the store, and Victor remained near the vehicle. While

Stephney Sr. and Dexter walked toward each other, Stephney Jr. handed Stephney Sr. a gun.

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Upon noticing the gun, Victor and Dexter retreated back to their vehicle. Stephney Sr.

continued to walk toward them and shoot the gun multiple times as Victor and Dexter got

into the vehicle and drove away.

¶7. The State then called Investigator Jarvis Ford to testify. Investigator Ford was

employed with the Greenville Police Department in the criminal investigations division at

the time of the shooting. Investigator Ford went to the Delta Regional Medical Center in

Greenville, where Victor Hallman was being treated. Investigator Ford testified that after he

saw Victor, he went into the hospital parking lot and noticed the back window of a Honda

vehicle was shattered.5 He also testified that there was blood in the passenger seat and against

the armrest. After taking pictures of the vehicle, Investigator Ford left the hospital and went

to the Lil Wayne store. While investigating inside the store, he also watched the surveillance

video.

¶8. After the State’s last witness testified, Perkins moved for a directed verdict on behalf

of Stephney Jr., and Lee moved for a directed verdict on Stephney Sr.’s behalf. The court

granted the directed verdict as to Stephney Jr., but denied Stephney Sr.’s motion. Perkins

then called Dexter Hallman as an adverse witness. Dexter explained he and his father, Victor

Hallman, went to the Lil Wayne store intending to “fight” Stephney Sr. Prior to their arrival,

during a phone call between Dexter and Stephney Sr., Dexter told Stephney Sr. to “[p]ut your

gun down, and let’s fight.” “Those were [Dexter’s] exact words.” However, upon Dexter and

Victor’s arrival, Stephney Sr. fired multiple bullets from his .40-caliber handgun that injured

5
The vehicle was later discovered to be the vehicle that Dexter and Victor were in
at the time of the shooting.

6
and eventually lead to Victor’s death.

¶9. After Dexter’s testimony, the defense rested. Lee gave the initial closing argument,

and Perkins gave the final closing argument for the defense. The jury found Stephney Sr.

guilty of second-degree murder and attempted murder, with a firearm enhancement. Stephney

Sr. was then sentenced on each count to thirty years in the custody of the MDOC, with

twenty years to serve and ten years suspended, plus five years of post-release supervision,

to run concurrently. The trial court also sentenced Stephney Sr. to five years in the custody

of MDOC for the firearm enchantment, to run concurrently with his other sentences.

Stephney Sr. filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. He now appeals and raises two

issues: (1) whether the failure of counsel for Stephney Sr. to move for a severance from

Stephney Jr. amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel or, in the alternative, (2) whether

the trial judge erred in not assuring that Stephney Sr. was aware of the potential conflict and

that he knowingly waived it.

ANALYSIS

¶10. We first address whether Stephney Sr. received ineffective assistance of counsel by

not seeking a severance from Stephney Jr. Second, we consider whether the trial court erred

by not informing Stephney Sr. of the potential conflict of joint representation and did not

ensure he knowingly waived it.

¶11. Stephney Sr. argues that his trial lawyers were ineffective in their dual representation

because neither counsel moved for a severance from Stephney Jr. This Court reviews claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Taylor v. State, 167 So. 3d 1143, 1146 (¶5)

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(Miss. 2015). “Generally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are more appropriately

brought during post-conviction proceedings.” Ross v. State, 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶29) (Miss.

2020) (quoting Bell v. State, 202 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶12) (Miss. 2016)). However, these

claims will be addressed on direct appeal when “[(1)] the record affirmatively shows

ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or [(2)] the parties stipulate that the record is

adequate and the Court determines that findings of fact by a trial judge able to consider the

demeanor of witnesses, etc., are not needed.” Id. This Court “may also address such claims

on direct appeal when the record affirmatively shows that the claims are without merit.” Id.

¶12. A strong presumption, although rebuttable, exists that counsel’s performance was

effective. Gilley v. State, 748 So. 2d 123, 129 (¶20) (Miss. 1999). To prove his counsel’s

assistance was ineffective, Stephney Sr. must show that his counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). If the defendant cannot satisfy Strickland’s two-pronged test, his

claim fails. Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 781 (¶8) (Miss. 2006).

¶13. There is also a presumption that decisions made by defense counsel are strategic, and

this Court “will not second-guess counsel’s decisions that fairly may be characterized as

strategic.” Shinn v. State, 174 So. 3d 961, 966 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). This Court has

held that “[c]ounsel’s choice of whether or not to file certain motions, call certain witnesses,

ask certain questions, or make certain objections falls within the ambit of trial strategy.” Hill

v. State, 850 So. 2d 223, 226 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Scott v. State, 742 So. 2d

1190, 1196 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). Even the decision of “whether to move for

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severance [is] within the purview of trial strategy.” Cox v. State, 793 So. 2d 591, 600 (¶41)

(Miss. 2001). Furthermore, “[h]aving a trial strategy negates an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, regardless of counsel’s insufficiencies.” Hall v. State, 735 So. 2d 1124, 1127

(¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

¶14. Stephney Sr. argues that his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance by not getting the

trial severed because Perkins conceded in his opening statement that Stephney Sr. may not

have been justified in the shooting by stating, “[M]aybe he overdid it.” He also argues that

Perkins’s elicited testimony by Investigator Ford exculpated Stephney Jr. at the expense of

Stephney Sr. with the following dialogue:

ATTORNEY PERKINS: And Junior’s role, if any, in this, based on
your investigation, was handing a gun to
his father?

INVESTIGATOR FORD: Yes.

Investigator Ford’s testimony continued, and Perkins again diminished Stephney Jr.’s

involvement in the incident.

ATTORNEY PERKINS: Okay. So this is really between Senior and
Dexter Hallman?

INVESTIGATOR FORD: Yes.

¶15. We find Stephney Sr.’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is based on facts not

fully apparent from the record, including facts related to his counsel’s trial strategy and

tactics, such as whether to file a motion for severance or ask certain questions. Perkins’s

strategy was likely aimed at exculpating Stephney Jr., emphasizing that his involvement was

limited to handing his father the gun. This approach did not undermine Stephney Sr.’s

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self-defense claim, as Perkins was not attributing blame to Stephney Sr. for his son’s actions

but merely seeking to absolve his own client of culpability. The record before us does not

affirmatively show whether counsel was ineffective of constitutional dimensions; and again,

Stephney Sr.’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is based on facts not fully apparent

from the record. Accordingly, we deny this claim without prejudice to allow Stephney Sr.’s

right to assert it in a properly filed motion for post-conviction collateral relief.

¶16. Stephney Sr. also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the two attorneys to

jointly represent Stephney Sr. and Stephney Jr. during the trial because an actual conflict

existed, which rendered their counsel ineffective.

¶17. “Conflict-of-interest claims involving attorneys in criminal cases are a species of

ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Magee v. State, 349 So. 3d

734, 742-43 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Galloway v. State, 298 So. 3d 966, 974

(¶43) (Miss. 2020)). The United States Supreme Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court

have “repeatedly held that joint representation of co-defendants is not per se violative of the

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” Stringer v. State, 485 So. 2d 274,

275 (Miss. 1986) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)). Indeed,

“[r]epresenting multiple defendants in a criminal case can be accomplished without violating

the lawyer’s duty to any of his clients, and one attorney can indeed upon occasion meet the

needs of all better.” Littlejohn v. State, 593 So. 2d 20, 26 (Miss. 1992) (citing Holloway, 435

U.S. at 482). “It has been firmly established that a potential for conflict or hypothetical or

speculative conflicts will not suffice for reversal.” Stringer, 485 So. 2d at 275. A conflict

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must be actual in order for the conviction to be reversed. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez,

580 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978)).

¶18. A conflict is actual “if a defense attorney owes duties to a party whose interests are

adverse to those of the defendant. . . . The interests of the other client and the defendant are

sufficiently adverse if it is shown that the attorney owes a duty to the defendant to take some

action that could be detrimental to his other client.” Magee, 349 So. 3d at 743-44 (¶20)

(quoting Witt v. State, 781 So. 2d 135, 137 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)) (quoting Irving v.

Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1144 (N.D. Miss. 1981)). Thus, courts are not required to

consider “speculative possibilities of conflicts in attempts to plea bargain or use other

possible defenses that were not raised at trial.” Id. at 744 (¶20) (quoting Stringer, 485 So.

2d at 275).

¶19. When an attorney represents the accused and has an actual conflict of interest, the

accused has “received ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law,” and “reversal is

automatic irrespective of a showing of prejudice unless [the accused] knowingly and

intelligently waived his constitutional right to conflict[-]free representation.” Armstrong v.

State, 573 So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Miss. 1990). “Under the rules governing professional

responsibility, consent of a criminal defendant is a necessary pre-requisite to joint

representation, and trial court inquiry into whether the defendant has made a knowing and

voluntary waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel is imperative.” Id. at 1334 (emphasis

omitted) (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 798 (1987)). “In order for a defendant

effectively to waive his right to conflict-free counsel, the trial judge should affirmatively

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participate in the waiver decision by eliciting a statement in narrative form from the

defendant in indicating that he fully understands the nature of the situation and has

knowingly and intelligently made the decision to proceed with the challenged counsel.”

Littlejohn, 593 So. 2d at 25 (quoting Alvarez, 580 F.2d at 1259-60).

¶20. In Magee, 349 So. 3d at 741 (¶13), the defendants, Haynes and Magee, were jointly

indicted on multiple charges, including kidnapping, sexual battery, attempted murder, and

conspiracy. They were tried together and represented by the same two attorneys. Id. Prior to

trial, the court advised both defendants of the potential conflicts that could arise from joint

representation. Id. Haynes and Magee signed a “Waiver of Conflict of Interest,” which

outlined the risks associated with dual representation. Id. at 741-42 (¶13). Before accepting

the waivers, the court held a hearing on the record to confirm that both defendants

understood their constitutional right to effective legal counsel. Id. at 742 (¶13). The court

also specifically cautioned them about the dangers of being represented by the same

attorneys. Id. Despite the warnings, Haynes and Magee chose to proceed with joint

representation, and the circuit court accepted their waivers before moving forward with the

trial. Id. At the trial’s end, Magee was convicted of kidnapping and conspiracy, while Haynes

was found guilty of kidnapping, sexual battery, and conspiracy; both were acquitted of

attempted murder, and Magee was also acquitted of sexual battery. Id. at (¶15). After their

post-trial motions were denied, they appealed, claiming ineffective assistance due to joint

representation by the same attorneys. Id. at (¶16). However, the record showed that both

defendants knowingly and intelligently waived their right to conflict-free counsel, requesting

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joint representation despite being fully informed of the risks. Id. at 746 (¶24). The circuit

court thoroughly addressed the constitutional concerns through written waivers and an

on-the-record hearing, and the appellate court affirmed on this issue. Id.

¶21. Here, a potential conflict arose when Perkins began representing both Stephney Sr.

and Stephney Jr. after Lee was diagnosed with COVID-19 and was potentially unavailable

to represent Stephney Sr. Like Magee, the judge took steps to ensure Stephney Sr. knowingly

and intelligently waived his right to conflict-free representation by asking the questions

quoted above. See supra ¶¶3-4. Stephney Sr. never revoked his waiver or indicated a

potential conflict with a dual representation. He never advised the trial court that he was no

longer in agreement with the joint representation, and he clearly articulated on the record at

the pre-trial hearing.

¶22. Further, the Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is critically important that trial courts

address potential conflicts and balance a defendant’s right to choose his attorney in

considering those potential conflicts.” Magee, 349 So. 3d at 746 (¶24). The trial court did just

that by eliciting statements from Stephney Sr. confirming that he understood the risks of joint

representation and knowingly waived his right to conflict-free counsel. During the hearing,

the State clarified that the addition of Perkins as counsel was not solely due to Lee’s COVID-

19 diagnosis, asking whether the waiver was made “because Wayne Lee can’t be here,

because of the illness?” The court responded, “[Lee] might be able to be here tomorrow,” and

Perkins confirmed that Lee would return “as soon as possible.” Once Lee recovered from

COVID-19, both attorneys resumed joint representation of Stephney Sr. and Stephney Jr. In

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fact, on the morning of trial, Lee formally requested the court’s approval for joint

representation, stating, “[W]e would ask that Mr. Perkins kind of take the lead and I’ll kind

of follow him, if that’s okay with the Court.” The record clearly shows that joint

representation occurred as Perkins continued to examine witnesses and delivered the closing

arguments for Stephney Sr., even after Stephney Jr. was dismissed from the case. After

review, we find that Stephney Sr. knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right

to conflict-free representation. See, id. Further, we find there was not an actual conflict but

a joint defense with both lawyers clearly representing both defendants. This issue is without

merit.

CONCLUSION

¶23. In conclusion, we deny Stephney Sr.’s claim that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel by not seeking a severance from Stephney Jr.’s case without prejudice to Stephney

Sr.’s right to assert it in a motion for post-conviction collateral relief. Nonetheless, we also

find that Stephney Sr. knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to conflict-

free representation. Accordingly, we affirm Stephney Sr.’s convictions and sentences.

¶24. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON. P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.

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