Robert Maurice Harris, Jr. a/k/a Robert Harris, Jr. a/k/a Robert Maurice Harris a/k/a Robert Harris v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00231-COA

ROBERT MAURICE HARRIS, JR. A/K/A APPELLANT
ROBERT HARRIS, JR. A/K/A ROBERT
MAURICE HARRIS A/K/A ROBERT HARRIS

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/16/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. M. JAMES CHANEY JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TAMARRA AKIEA BOWIE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/29/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND WEDDLE, JJ.

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Robert Harris appeals from the Warren County Circuit Court’s order denying his

motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). On appeal, Harris asserts that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he was denied the right to counsel due to his

attorney’s alleged conflict of interest with a potential State’s witness. Upon review, we find

no error and affirm the circuit court’s order denying relief.

FACTS

¶2. A Warren County grand jury indicted Harris for one count of first-degree murder. On

November 14, 2019, Harris entered an open plea to the lesser-included offense of second-
degree murder. Before accepting Harris’s guilty plea, the circuit court asked the State to

explain the charges pending against him, advise the court about what the evidence would

show if the matter went to trial, and provide the possible minimum and maximum sentences.

Harris acknowledged under oath that he understood the charges pending against him, that he

did commit the crime the State described, and that he understood the court could impose the

maximum sentence allowed by law. Harris further acknowledged under oath that he

understood the rights he waived if he entered a guilty plea.

¶3. At the sentencing hearing on December 6, 2019, Harris was sentenced to forty years

in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with fifteen years suspended

and twenty-five years to serve, and five years of post-release supervision. On December 5,

2022, Harris filed a PCR motion alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

and that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was given erroneous advice about his

sentence. In support of his motion, Harris submitted his own affidavit as well as affidavits

from his uncle, Clyde Harris, and his mother, Dora James.

¶4. On February 16, 2024, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Harris’s

PCR motion. During the hearing, Harris testified that his trial attorney, Toney Baldwin,

informed him that if he “took an open plea,” he would receive twenty-five years in custody

and would only have to serve half of that time. Harris also testified that because Baldwin had

also represented a potential State’s witness, there was a conflict of interest. In addition to

Harris’s testimony, the circuit court heard testimony from Clyde Harris, Dora James, and

Baldwin. Following the hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying Harris’s PCR

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motion, finding insufficient evidence to grant PCR. Aggrieved by the circuit court’s denial

of his motion, Harris appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. “When reviewing a circuit court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will

reverse the judgment of the circuit court only if its factual findings are clearly erroneous;

however, we review the circuit court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of

review.” Tanner v. State, 332 So. 3d 382, 385 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Hays v.

State, 321 So. 3d 1208, 1211 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)).

DISCUSSION

¶6. In Harris’s first assignment of error, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel because Baldwin also represented Kiante Baker, who was on the witness list to

testify against him. Harris’s claim of a conflict of interest was not raised in his December 5,

2022 PCR motion and, therefore, is not properly before this Court. This Court has held that

“[i]ssues not raised in [a] motion for post-conviction relief are procedurally barred on

appeal.” Bland v. State, 312 So. 3d 417, 419 (¶11) (Miss Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Smith v.

State, 973 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). Because Harris raised this claim

for the first time during the evidentiary hearing and not in his PCR motion, Harris waived

this argument.

¶7. Nonetheless, we find this claim lacks merit. “Conflict-of-interest claims involving

attorneys in criminal cases are a species of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. Our [S]upreme [C]ourt has stated that to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth

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Amendment Rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely

affected his lawyer’s performance. Further, . . . [a]n ‘actual conflict’ means that ‘a potential

for conflict or hypothetical or speculative conflicts will not suffice for reversal.’” Beasley v.

State, 355 So. 3d 245, 250-51 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (citations omitted). An actual

conflict exists “when defense counsel is compelled to compromise his or her duty of loyalty

or zealous advocacy to the accused by choosing between or blending the divergent or

competing interests of a former or current client.” Galloway v. State, 298 So. 3d 966, 975-76

(¶48) (Miss. 2020). And “[i]t must be demonstrated that the attorney made a choice between

possible alternative courses of action. . . . If [counsel] did not make such a choice, the

conflict remained hypothetical.” Id. (citing United States v. Garcia-Jasso, 472 F.3d 239, 243

(5th Cir. 2006)).

¶8. The circuit court heard testimony from Harris and Baldwin during the evidentiary

hearing regarding the potential conflict of interest. Harris testified that once he was

incarcerated, he learned that Baldwin was representing a potential State witness while

representing Harris. During Baldwin’s testimony, he stated that he did represent the witness

in an unrelated murder trial. He went on to add that he knew the witness was not going to

testify on behalf of the State at Harris’s trial. However, even if the witness had testified, our

Court and the Supreme Court have not disturbed convictions where defense counsel had

previously represented a witness for the State. McCaleb v. State, 743 So. 2d 409, 412 (¶15)

(Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Perry v. State, 682 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Miss. 1996)); Davis v.

State, 897 So. 2d 960, 970 (¶31) (Miss. 2004); see also Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452,

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480 (¶53) (Miss. 2001) (holding “there is no evidence in the record to suggest that defense

counsel acted in some manner other than capabl[y]”). When Baldwin was asked if he was

representing Harris and the State’s witness at the same time, Baldwin responded, “Without

seeing the records, I don’t have the exact dates.” Nonetheless, an actual conflict only existed

if Baldwin owed a duty to a party whose interests were adverse to those of Harris. See Magee

v. State, 349 So. 3d 734, 744 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). Harris has failed to demonstrate

that an actual conflict of interest existed that adversely affected his lawyer’s performance;

therefore, we find this issue is without merit.

¶9. In Harris’s next assignment of error, he argues that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel, rendering his guilty plea involuntary, because he was given erroneous advice

about his sentence. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris must show that “(1)

counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) prejudice resulted.” Kennedy v. State, 287 So.

3d 258, 265 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Hughes v. State, 106 So. 3d 836, 840 (¶12)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2012)). “In the context of a guilty plea, one must show counsel’s errors

proximately resulted in the guilty plea, and, but for counsel’s error, the defendant would not

have entered the guilty plea.” Id. (citing Moore v. State, 248 So. 3d 845, 850 (¶14) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2017)). During the evidentiary hearing, Harris testified that he would not have entered

into an open plea had he known that he would not be eligible for early release or parole. In

support of his claim, Harris submitted his own affidavit and affidavits from Clyde Harris and

Dora James. They asserted in those affidavits that Baldwin continuously advised Harris to

accept the plea deal or risk serving life in prison if he went to trial. The affidavits maintained

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that Baldwin informed them he knew the judge would only sentence Harris to twenty-five

years, and Harris would only have to serve half that time for second-degree murder.

Conversely, the State submitted Baldwin’s affidavit stating that he advised Harris on the

possibility of entering an open plea considering the facts of the case. Baldwin asserted that

he informed Harris of the minimum and maximum sentences, and Baldwin clarified that

sentencing was solely up to the discretion of the judge.

¶10. Furthermore, during the plea colloquy, the circuit court judge specifically asked

Harris, “Anybody told you this Court is going to be any easier or lighter on you if you pled

guilty?” Harris responded, “No, sir.” The circuit judge additionally asked, “Anybody make

promises to you about early release from probation or parole?” to which Harris answered,

“No, sir.” This Court has held that “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity.” Moore v. State, 398 So. 3d 292, 296 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)

(citing Reardon v. State, 341 So. 3d 1004, 1009 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). Thus, we find

no error in the circuit court’s ruling that there was insufficient evidence to grant Harris’s

motion.

CONCLUSION

¶11. Finding no error in the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of Harris’s PCR motion,

we affirm.

¶12. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.

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