Scott Blackwell v. Betsy Reed

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CP-01037-COA

SCOTT BLACKWELL APPELLANT

v.

BETSY REED APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/08/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SHEILA HAVARD SMALLWOOD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MARION COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SCOTT BLACKWELL (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LEIGH KENNINGTON BERRY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/12/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2009, the Marion County Chancery Court granted Scott Blackwell and Betsy Reed

an irreconcilable differences divorce and ordered Blackwell to pay Reed periodic alimony

in the amount of $800 per month. In 2021, Blackwell filed a complaint to terminate or

reduce alimony, which the chancellor denied following a trial. Blackwell appealed, but his

two-page pro se brief fails to cite any legal authority or relevant parts of the record or

develop any meaningful argument. For these reasons, his argument that the chancellor erred

is procedurally barred. Procedural bar notwithstanding, the chancellor did not err by denying

Blackwell’s request to terminate or modify alimony. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Blackwell and Reed were married in 1994 and divorced in 2009. The final judgment
ordered Blackwell to pay rehabilitative alimony of $2,000 per month for eighteen months and

periodic alimony of $800 per month thereafter. In 2016, Blackwell filed a complaint to

terminate or reduce alimony, which the court denied.

¶3. In November 2021, Blackwell filed another complaint to terminate or reduce alimony.

In December 2021, the chancellor temporarily reduced Blackwell’s obligation to $400 per

month based on Blackwell’s representation that he had been “laid off” and could not afford

his alimony payment.

¶4. A one-day trial was held in May 2022. Blackwell, who had worked as a drilling

consultant for various oil companies since the parties’ divorce, testified that he had retired

from ConocoPhillips a “couple of weeks” prior to trial. Blackwell claimed that his only

income going forward would be a monthly Social Security retirement benefit of $2,356.

Blackwell stated that even with his current wife’s income1 he could no longer afford to pay

their own expenses and alimony. Blackwell testified that he had to retire because his knees

were “bad,” and he could no longer do the work; however, he offered no other evidence to

corroborate his testimony. Blackwell testified that he had earned over $47,000 in his

consulting business during November 2021, but then he was “laid off.”

¶5. When questioned by the chancellor,2 Blackwell admitted that his bank records showed

that he earned $13,450 in December 2021; $36,000 in January 2022; $25,000 in February

1
Blackwell testified that his current wife is employed, but there is no evidence as to
where she was employed or how much she earned.
2
Blackwell was represented by counsel at trial, while Reed represented herself. On
appeal, Blackwell is pro se, while Reed is now represented by counsel.

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2022; $15,000 in March 2022; and $56,000 in April 2022.3 Blackwell also admitted that

these figures were “correct.” The chancellor asked Blackwell why he claimed that he had

been “laid off” in December 2021. Blackwell testified he had been “laid off at different

times” but was called back to work later.

¶6. Reed testified that her only income other than alimony is her monthly Social Security

retirement benefit of $1,178. She testified that she is not employed because she lives with

and cares for her mother, who is in poor health.

¶7. Following the trial, the chancellor entered an opinion and final judgment. The

chancellor emphasized that Blackwell continued to earn significant income after he claimed

to have been “laid off” and unable to pay alimony. The chancellor stated,

It’s troubling that [Blackwell] claimed he was laid off and the [c]ourt reduced
his alimony by 50% in December 2021 and yet . . . he deposited $13,450 for
consulting services that month. It is also troubling that [Blackwell’s] financial
disclosure shows payments for a tractor, a dozer and a camper that exceed the
amount of the very alimony payment he is attempting to terminate.
....
The nondisclosure of . . . significant income by [Blackwell] is troubling. The
[c]ourt reduced the alimony obligation by half . . . under the mistaken belief
that [Blackwell] was laid off and unable to pay his alimony obligation. In fact,
[Blackwell] averaged $32,453 per month for the six months before the trial.

The chancellor found there had been a material change in circumstances because both parties

had begun drawing Social Security benefits, but after considering the Armstrong factors,4 the

3
These records were admitted into evidence at trial, but Blackwell failed to include
these records and other exhibits in the record on appeal. “It is the appellant’s duty to see that
all matters necessary to his appeal, such as exhibits, witnesses’ testimony, and so forth, are
included in the record . . . .” Scott v. Rouse, 348 So. 3d 345, 349 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.
2022) (quoting Branch v. State, 347 So. 2d 957, 958 (Miss. 1977)).
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Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).

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chancellor found that no modification of alimony was warranted. Accordingly, the

chancellor denied Blackwell’s complaint to terminate or reduce his alimony and reinstated

his obligation to pay $800 per month. Blackwell filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶8. Blackwell argues that the chancellor erred by declining to terminate or reduce his

alimony. However, Blackwell’s argument is procedurally barred and without merit.

¶9. To begin with, Blackwell’s two-page brief fails to cite any legal authority or parts of

the record on which he relies. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(7) provides

that the appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of appellant with respect to the issues

presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and

parts of the record relied on.” “Arguments that do not comply with the rule are procedurally

barred.” Reading v. Reading, 350 So. 3d 1195, 1199 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022); see also,

e.g., Home Solutions of Miss. LLC v. Ridge, 301 So. 3d 670, 677 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)

(holding that appellants waived their argument on appeal by failing to cite any relevant parts

of the record), cert. denied, 302 So. 3d 647 (Miss. 2020); Doss v. Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of

Supervisors, 230 So. 3d 1100, 1104 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“In the absence of

meaningful argument and citation of authority, an appellate court generally will not consider

an assignment of error. A cursory argument without further reason or explanation is

inadequate.” (citation, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted)); Concerned Citizens

of Raven Wood Subdivision v. Pearl River County, 172 So. 3d 1234, 1236 (¶10) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2014) (“It is axiomatic that the trial court’s judgment is presumed to be correct and that

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the appellant bears the burden of showing reversible error in the court below.”).

¶10. Procedural bar notwithstanding, the chancellor did not err by denying Blackwell’s

request to terminate or modify his alimony. We will reverse such a ruling only if the

chancellor manifestly erred or abused her discretion. Peterson v. Peterson, 129 So. 3d 255,

257 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). The party seeking a modification of alimony has the burden

to prove that there has been an “unanticipated” and material change of circumstances since

alimony was awarded. Id. at (¶7). If the chancellor finds that an unanticipated and material

change in circumstances has occurred, the chancellor should then consider the Armstrong

factors to determine whether to modify alimony and the appropriate amount of alimony. Id.

Here, the chancellor thoroughly examined each of the Armstrong factors before determining

that no modification was warranted. The chancellor emphasized that although Blackwell

claimed he had been “laid off” and could not pay alimony as of December 2021, he actually

earned over $32,000 per month during the next six months leading up to the May 2022 trial.

The chancellor also noted that Blackwell had incurred unnecessary expenses, such as the

purchase of a camper and a dozer, and Blackwell testified that he “plan[ned] on selling a

bunch of that stuff.” The chancellor considered the totality of the relevant circumstances,

addressed the relevant Armstrong factors, and did not manifestly err or abuse her discretion

by declining to terminate or modify Blackwell’s alimony.

CONCLUSION

¶11. Blackwell’s argument on appeal is both procedurally barred and without merit.

¶12. AFFIRMED.

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BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

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