Jeffery LeCompte v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-KA-01245-COA

JEFFERY LECOMPTE APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/16/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAVID H. STRONG JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: DEE BATES
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/07/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND SMITH, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jeffery LeCompte appeals from his conviction in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County,

Mississippi for exploitation of a vulnerable adult in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated

section 43-47-19(2)(b) (Rev. 2015).1 After a jury trial on July 11, 2021, LeCompte was

1
Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-47-19(2)(b) states:

Any person who willfully exploits a vulnerable person, where the value of the
exploitation is less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00), shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine
not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or by imprisonment not to
exceed one (1) year in the county jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment;
where the value of the exploitation is Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00)
or more, the person who exploits a vulnerable person shall be guilty of a
convicted for writing checks belonging to Lynn Richardson, who was seventy-eight years

old, to access money in her checking account. The circuit court sentenced LeCompte to ten

years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with two years suspended

and eight years to serve, followed by two years of post-release supervision. LeCompte was

also ordered to pay a $3,000 fine and restitution to Trustmark Bank in the amount of $2,350.

LeCompte appeals on the ground that the trial court erred by refusing to grant an accomplice

jury instruction. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Richardson hired Erica Etheridge to clean her house. Each time Etheridge cleaned,

she brought LeCompte, her live-in partner, with her. At some point in January 2019,

somebody began writing checks from Richardson’s account, and Richardson was informed

by her bank of the suspicious activity. Richardson filed a complaint with the Lincoln County

Sheriff’s Department in April 2019. In her complaint, Richardson accused LeCompte and

his friend Samantha Lemieux of forging the checks. Samantha was originally charged with

felony forgery. After being arrested and questioned regarding two forged checks made out

to her, Samantha admitted to police that she cashed the two checks. However, she claimed

that LeCompte had misrepresented to her that Etheridge had been given the checks by

Richardson, and LeCompte was trying to cash them for Etheridge. LeCompte said he could

not cash the checks himself because he did not have an ID. Based on Samantha’s statement,

the charges against her were reduced to misdemeanor uttering and forgery, to which

felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
custody of the Department of Corrections for not more than ten (10) years.

2
Samantha pled guilty.

¶3. Trial commenced on July 11, 2021. The State called Detective Leslie Falvey to

testify. While interviewing LeCompte, Detective Falvey asked him to write his name in both

cursive and print. These handwriting samples were entered into evidence. Detective Falvey

also testified about two checks that were cashed from Richardson’s account that had

LeCompte’s fingerprints on them.

¶4. The State also called Richardson to testify. Richardson said that she hired Etheridge

to clean her house. She said that when Etheridge cleaned, LeCompte always came with her.

Richardson testified regarding twenty-two checks, written over the course of four months,

that the State entered into evidence. Of all the checks presented, Richardson recalled writing

only two, which were made out to Etheridge. She claimed that all the other checks (the

eighteen checks made out to LeCompte and the two made out to Samantha) had been forged.

Richardson said that she never left the payee line blank. She also confirmed that she signed

and dated checks in cursive, rather than in printed fashion like the forged checks. All the

checks made out to LeCompte were in print, and the two made out to Etheridge were written

in cursive. She also said she never wrote out four digits for the year, as some of the forged

checks did. Lastly, Richardson confirmed that she did not give LeCompte permission to cash

the checks.

¶5. The State also called Samantha to testify against LeCompte. Samantha said that she

cashed checks from Richardson’s account without Richardson’s permission. However, she

said that LeCompte had given her the checks to cash for him because he said he did not have

3
an ID. Samantha said that LeCompte drove her and Christian Newman, a friend of hers, to

a place called Kumar’s 84 in Brookhaven and waited in the car while Samantha and Newman

went inside to cash a $300 check. Samantha gave a second check for $500, also made out

to her, to an individual named Stan Winborne.2

¶6. Lastly, the State called Christian Newman to testify. He said that he was present when

LeCompte gave Samantha the $300 check to cash. Newman said that when LeCompte and

Samantha discussed cashing the check, LeCompte had a checkbook with him. When

Samantha questioned whether the checks were okay for her to cash, LeCompte said that the

checkbook and checks belonged to his partner, Etheridge, and that nothing bad would happen

if Samantha cashed it. Newman stated that Samantha agreed to cash the checks after

LeCompte assured her that he would not let anything bad happen to her.

¶7. After the State rested, LeCompte moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the

State failed to meet its burden of proving each element of the crime charged. The court

denied the directed verdict motion. The defense presented no evidence and rested. The court

then held a jury-instruction conference. During the conference, LeCompte proposed

instruction D-9, which would have instructed the jury as follows:

During the course of her testimony in this trial, the witness Samantha claimed
to have participated with Jeffery LeCompte in the in the [sic] crime with which
Mr. LeCompte is charged. Samantha is an admitted accomplice, and, as such,
the jury should consider her testimony with great caution and suspicion. The
jury is the sole judge of the credibility and the believability of all the witnesses,
and it is for the jury to decide how much weight and worth, if any, to give the
testimony of the witnesses, including Samantha. As you consider Samantha’s

2
The record does not reflect any information regarding who Stan Winborne was, and
why Samantha gave him the $500 check.

4
testimony, you may accept such portions, if any, that you deem credible, and
reject such portions, if any, that you do not deem worthy of belief.

The trial court refused the instruction on the ground that Samantha did not admit to being an

accomplice but, rather,

[t]he only testimony we’ve heard was Mr[s]. Samantha and Mr. Newman
which stated that at the time she admittedly cashed the check she had no idea
that – that it was represented to her that the checks belonged to Mr.
LeCompte’s wife[, Etheridge,] and she had no idea that she was doing
anything nefarious.

LeCompte objected to the court’s refusal of the jury instruction. The judge then charged the

jury with the approved instructions.

¶8. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of exploitation of a vulnerable

adult. On September 29, 2022, after a sentencing hearing, the court entered an order

sentencing LeCompte to ten years in custody, with two years suspended and eight years to

serve, and two years of post-release supervision, as well as a fine of $3,000 and restitution

in the amount of $2,350 to be paid to Trustmark Bank.

¶9. LeCompte filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on

October 5, 2022, arguing that the court should not have allowed the canceled checks into

evidence because they were hearsay; that the verdict was contrary to the law and the weight

of the evidence; that the court erred by denying the directed verdict motion and a peremptory

instruction; that discovery violations occurred; and that the court erred by refusing the

defense’s accomplice jury instruction D-9. On December 14, 2022, the court denied the

motion for a JNOV or new trial.

¶10. On December 5, 2022, LeCompte filed his notice of appeal. On appeal, LeCompte

5
argues the single issue regarding the court’s refusal of the jury instruction D-9. LeCompte

claims that he was entitled to a cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony because

Samantha’s testimony showed that she was an accomplice, and the only corroborating

testimony in the record is that of Newman, who LeCompte argues was also an accomplice.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11. Our Court reviews a trial court’s decision to refuse jury instructions under an abuse-

of-discretion standard. Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 71 (¶9) (Miss. 2010). Instructions

should be read as a whole, and if they fairly announce the law of the case, there is no error.

Id. at 73-74 (¶20). A defendant has a right to have jury instructions that present his theory

of the case. Id. at 74 (¶20). However, a trial court “may refuse an instruction which

incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without

foundation in the evidence.” Id.

DISCUSSION

¶12. An accomplice instruction should be given when “the accomplice’s testimony is the

sole basis for the conviction, and the defendant’s guilt is not clearly proven.” Williams v.

State, 32 So. 3d 486, 490 (¶12) (Miss. 2010) (citing Wheeler v. State, 560 So. 2d 171, 173

(Miss. 1990)). Before giving an accomplice instruction, the trial court must consider (1)

whether the witness was in fact an accomplice, and (2) whether the accomplice’s testimony

was corroborated. Id. Furthermore, an accomplice’s testimony cannot be considered

corroborated when the only corroboration comes from another accomplice’s testimony. Id.

In determining whether a cautionary jury instruction is required, the testimony
that must be corroborated is the testimony tying the defendant on trial to the

6
crime, and it is irrelevant whether other portions of the accomplice’s testimony
are corroborated.

Id. at 491 (¶19) (citing Holmes v. State, 481 So. 2d 319, 322 (Miss. 1985)). For example, in

Holmes, the defendant’s accomplice, Thompson, testified that he and Holmes had burglarized

a store. Id. at 320. A footprint at the scene matched Thompson’s foot, but the supreme court

held that this evidence merely corroborated that Thompson had committed the crime. Id. at

322. The supreme court reversed Holmes’ conviction, stating that “without the testimony of

Everette Thompson, there is nothing to indicate that the defendant was in any way involved

in the burglary of the Co-op.” Id. Based on Holmes, we reiterate that to be entitled to an

accomplice instruction, the defendant must show that the State’s case relies solely on

accomplice testimony and that the State presented no other evidence to support the

defendant’s guilt.

¶13. LeCompte argues that because Samantha pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts of

uttering and forgery for cashing the checks, she is an accomplice. LeCompte argues that

satisfies the first requirement for accomplice instructions under Williams. LeCompte further

argues that Samantha’s testimony was not corroborated by anything other than the testimony

of Newman. LeCompte claims that because Newman was present when Samantha agreed

to cash the checks for LeCompte and that because he was aware that there could be some

criminal element to the act, Newman was an accomplice as well. Based on Williams,

LeCompte argues that Newman, as an accomplice, could not corroborate Samantha’s

testimony. Thus, the second requirement for an accomplice instruction (that the accomplice’s

testimony is uncorroborated) is also met. This argument is flawed for numerous reasons.

7
I. Whether Samantha and Newman were accomplices.

¶14. An accomplice is “a person who is implicated in the commission of the crime.” Hye

v. State, 162 So. 3d 818, 823 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Slaughter v. State, 815

So. 2d 1122, 1134 (¶66) (Miss. 2002)). If the evidence gives a reasonable inference that the

person may have been a co-perpetrator or the sole perpetrator, then that person is an

accomplice. Hye, 162 So. 3d at 823 (¶16) (citing Bailey v. State, 960 So. 2d 583, 590 (¶30)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2007)).

¶15. Based on the above definition, it appears evident that Samantha could be considered

an accomplice. Samantha was implicated as being centrally involved in the commission of

the crime and could have been reasonably considered a co-perpetrator based on the facts that

she actually cashed the checks and pled guilty to misdemeanor counts of uttering and forgery.

¶16. However, for the same reason that Samantha could be considered an accomplice,

Newman is very clearly not an accomplice. Newman was present during the cashing of the

forged check and testified that there was some concern on Samantha’s part about the

authenticity of the check. However, Newman never testified that he was aware that the check

was a bad check, never actually cashed a forged check, and never appeared to have benefitted

or taken any part in the commission of the crime aside from merely being in the room when

the check was cashed. This does not meet the requirements of Slaughter or Hye for

classifying a witness as an accomplice. Because Newman was very clearly not an

accomplice, his testimony corroborated Samantha’s testimony.

II. Whether other corroborating evidence supported the conviction.

8
¶17. Furthermore, there was other substantial evidence presented by the State that

supported LeCompte’s guilt. First, there were the checks themselves that Richardson

testified were forged. Richardson testified that on the checks she wrote, she did not use four

numbers for the date, and she never wrote in print. Next, LeCompte provided handwriting

samples to Detective Falvey, which the jury was able to compare to the handwriting on the

forged checks. Also, Detective Falvey testified that LeCompte’s fingerprints were found on

at least two of the checks made out to LeCompte, both of which Richardson testified were

forgeries. Moreover, Newman testified that he saw LeCompte with Richardson’s checkbook.

Lastly, Richardson’s and Etheridge’s testimony confirmed that LeCompte accompanied

Etheridge to Richardson’s home where he had ample opportunity to steal the checkbook.

¶18. Based on Williams and Holmes, an accomplice instruction is only warranted where

the accomplice testimony is uncorroborated, and the accomplice’s testimony is the only

evidence presented that supports the defendant’s guilt. Williams, 32 So. 3d at 492 (¶20).

Because Newman was not an accomplice, his testimony corroborated Samantha’s testimony.

Further, Samantha’s accomplice testimony was not the only evidence presented that

supported the State’s case. Based on this, the trial court did not err in refusing LeCompte’s

accomplice instruction D-9.

CONCLUSION

¶19. Based on the above reasoning, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

to give LeCompte’s accomplice instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and

sentence.

9
¶20. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.,
CONCUR.

10