Ulylesses Demonte Deer v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CP-00019-COA

ULYLESSES DEMONTE DEER APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/08/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEVE S. RATCLIFF III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ULYLESSES DEMONTE DEER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/25/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2017, Ulylesses Deer was indicted for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed

robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, burglary of a dwelling with a sentencing

enhancement of terrorizing the occupant, and possession of a firearm by a felon.

¶2. In January 2018, Deer pled guilty to aggravated assault and burglary of a dwelling.

The State agreed to nolle prosequi the remaining counts of the indictment. The trial court

found that Deer’s plea was “freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made and

entered.” The court sentenced Deer to consecutive terms of twenty years in custody for

aggravated assault and twenty-five years in custody for burglary of a dwelling.

¶3. Over four years later, in May 2022, Deer filed a motion for post-conviction relief
(PCR). Deer alleged that he was entitled to “change or modify his sentence” because it was

imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Mississippi law, because the trial

court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him, and because of new evidence. Deer also alleged

that his claim was excepted from the three-year statute of limitations of the Uniform Post-

Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) based on newly discovered evidence. See Miss.

Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020). Deer claimed he received ineffective assistance of

counsel prior to his plea, that his convictions for aggravated assault and burglary violated

double jeopardy, that his sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and that he

was unconstitutionally forced to incriminate himself during his pre-sentence investigation.

¶4. The trial court dismissed Deer’s PCR motion, holding that it was barred by the

UPCCRA’s three-year statute of limitations. Deer appealed.

¶5. We affirm. A PCR motion must be filed within three years after the entry of a

judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea. Id. While the statute provides certain

exceptions, “the PCR movant . . . bears the burden to prove a statutory exception.”

Simoneaux v. State, 359 So. 3d 665, 667 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). In his PCR motion and

his appellate brief, Deer simply lists the statutory exceptions and asserts that his claim is

excepted, but he does not show how any exception would apply to his claims. Thus, Deer

has failed to show that any of his claims are excepted from the statute of limitations. See

Govan v. State, 591 So. 2d 428, 431 (Miss. 1991) (“In the absence of meaningful argument

and citation of authority, this Court generally will not consider the assignment of error.”).

¶6. Deer also argues that we must consider his claims under the “fundamental-rights

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exception” to the statute of limitations. But this argument is foreclosed by the Mississippi

Supreme Court’s decision in Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2023). Prior to Howell,

the Court had held that errors affecting certain “fundamental constitutional rights” were

excepted from the UPCCRA’s statute of limitations. Id. at 615 (¶7). However, Howell

expressly “overrule[d] . . . any . . . case in which the Mississippi Supreme Court ha[d] held

that the courts of Mississippi can apply the judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception

to . . . the [UPCCRA’s] three-year statute of limitations.” Id. at (¶8); accord Ronk v. State,

391 So. 3d 785, 791-92 (¶¶3, 16) (Miss. 2024). Accordingly, Deer’s argument based on the

“fundamental-rights exception” is without merit.

¶7. The circuit court correctly dismissed Deer’s PCR motion pursuant to the UPCCRA’s

three-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. EMFINGER, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.

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