Joe Michael Coleman v. Thomas McKinney Coleman and Larry Redell Coleman, By and Through His Conservator, Greg Younger

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-CA-00389-COA

JOE MICHAEL COLEMAN APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS McKINNEY COLEMAN AND LARRY APPELLEES
REDELL COLEMAN, BY AND THROUGH HIS
CONSERVATOR, GREG YOUNGER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEPHEN TRAVIS BAILEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ALCORN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GREGORY D. KEENUM
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL D. CHASE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND RENDERED - 08/31/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND EMFINGER, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This appeal arises from an action to quiet and confirm title for a property dispute

concerning “the McPeters Hill property.” The trial court found that Evelyn Coleman,

Thomas McKinney Coleman, Joe Michael (Mike) Coleman, Walter (Frazier) Coleman, and

Larry Redell Coleman all agreed that Evelyn properly deeded the McPeters Hill property to

Thomas, though she only held a life estate interest. Mike appealed the decision. Finding

error, we reverse and render.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On March 4, 1974, Thomas Hill Coleman (Coleman) became the owner of the
McPeters Hill property, which is comprised of two adjacent twenty-acre tracts of land

situated in Alcorn County. Coleman was Evelyn’s husband and father to all four of their

sons: Thomas, Mike, Frazier, and Larry. Coleman died testate in 1977. After his death,

Thomas served as the executor of Coleman’s estate during probate proceedings. It is

undisputed that Coleman’s Last Will and Testament devised a life estate in several tracts of

real property, including the subject property,1 to Evelyn with the remainder interests being

equal in the four sons as tenants in common. In 1978, Thomas signed and conveyed an

executor’s deed, which stated:

I, Thomas McKinney Coleman, executor of the Last Will and Testament of the
Estate of Thomas Hill Coleman, do hereby convey and specially warrant unto
Evelyn S. Coleman, for her life, and at her death, in equal shares to Thomas
McKinney Coleman, Walter Frazier Coleman, Joe Michael Coleman, and
Larry Redell Coleman, the following described real property to-wit:

Situated in the County of Alcorn, State of Mississippi, to-wit:

....

Tract 3:
The West Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter of Section 11, Township 2, Range 6 East, etc.,
containing twenty (20) acres, more or less.

....

Tract 5:
The East Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 11, Township 2, Range 6 East, etc., containing twenty
(20) acres, more or less.

Evelyn and all four sons signed this deed.

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The subject property in the will is the same property included in the executor’s deed.

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¶3. On March 31, 1987, in an attempt to forgive a debt of Frazier and give equally to the

other sons, Evelyn drafted an agreement that (1) forgave Frazier’s debt of $10,600; (2)

forgave Mike and Larry for the balances of their joint notes and their rent for 1985, 1986, and

part of 1987, resulting in a forgiven debt of $21,200; (3) and gave Thomas land worth

$10,600. Notably, no land was described in this agreement. However, all four sons and

Evelyn signed the agreement. Attached as Appendix A to this opinion is an image of the

1987 agreement admitted into evidence. Following the 1987 agreement, Evelyn gave a

warranty deed to Thomas for:

The Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 11, Township 2
South, Rage 6 East in Alcorn County, Mississippi, containing 40 acres, more
or less.

Attached as Appendix B to this opinion is the image of the warranty deed signed by Evelyn

and admitted into evidence.

¶4. In December 2012, Evelyn died, and Thomas served as executor of her estate.

Thomas’s attorney later discovered that Evelyn only possessed a life estate interest in the

subject property. In an attempt to cure the defect, Thomas’s attorney sent a letter on June 17,

2013, to Frazier, Mike, and Larry asking them to quitclaim their respective interests in the

subject property. Frazier conveyed his interest and signed the provided quitclaim deed. Mike

and the conservator of Larry’s estate refused to sign the provided quitclaim deeds.

Subsequently, Mike initiated an action to quiet and confirm title.2

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In October 2003, Larry suffered a brain injury and as a result sustained a disability
that necessitated the appointment of Greg Younger as his conservator because Larry was non
compos mentis and incapable of making any business-related decisions.

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¶5. The matter was tried on May 23, 2019, in which the parties admitted to a mutual

mistake in believing that Evelyn possessed a fee simple interest in the property. The court

declared that it was the intent of the parties in the 1987 agreement to make Thomas the sole

owner of the property in fee simple although Evelyn only possessed a life estate interest. The

court therefore entered a judgment declaring Thomas as the sole owner of fee simple title to

the McPeters Hill property. Mike now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. We will employ the following standards of review:

As for questions of fact, “an appellate court will not disturb the findings of a
chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor
abused his discretion, applied an erroneous legal standard, was manifestly
wrong, or was clearly erroneous.” Stanley v. Miss. State Pilots of Gulfport Inc.,
951 So. 2d 535, 538 (¶9) (Miss. 2006). Questions of law are reviewed de
novo. Biglane v. Under The Hill Corp., 949 So. 2d 9, 14 (¶17) (Miss. 2007).

Am. Pub. Fin. Inc. v. Smith, 45 So. 3d 307, 310 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted)

(quoting Harris v. Tom Griffith Water Well & Conductor Servs. Inc., 26 So. 3d 338, 340 (¶7)

(Miss. 2010)).

DISCUSSION

¶7. The issue raised before this Court is whether the trial court erred when interpreting

the 1987 agreement and granting a fee simple interest in the McPeters Hill property to

Thomas although Evelyn only possessed a life estate interest. Finding that the court

committed error, we reverse and render.

I. Evelyn could not have conveyed a property interest in fee simple
when only having a life estate.

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¶8. The court interpreted the 1987 agreement and found it reflected an intended

conveyance of the McPeters Hill property in fee simple, though Evelyn only possessed a life

estate interest. McClelland v. Bank of Clarksdale, 238 Miss. 557, 569, 119 So. 2d 262, 266

(1960), provides:

A life estate expressly created by the language of an instrument will not be
converted into a fee or any other form of estate greater than a life estate merely
by reason of there being coupled with it a power of disposition, however
general or extensive. This well-recognized rule has been followed consistently
in the Mississippi cases.

¶9. In McClelland, a petition was filed for construction of a will jointly executed by a

husband and wife. Id. at 563-64, 119 So. 2d at 263. “The husband predeceased his wife, and

the bequests and devises by the husband gave his wife a life estate with unlimited power of

disposition, with a remainder in named takers.” Id. She did not exercise power. Id. at 564,

119 So. 2d at 263. The widow survived some of the remaindermen. Id. The main question

on appeal was whether the “unlimited power of disposition enlarged the widow’s life estate

to one in fee simple.” Id. Our Supreme Court held that “the widow received only a life

estate, and the remainders in the second takers vested at testator’s death.” Id., 119 So. 2d at

263-64.

¶10. Evelyn cannot deed anything greater than what she possesses. Evelyn was conveyed

a life estate in the McPeters Hill property, and her four sons were conveyed a remainder

interest in a tenancy in common. The agreement did not convey any other interests in the

property. Evelyn’s utilization of a warranty deed did not increase her interests in the

property. A life estate simply cannot be enlarged to a fee simple through the use of a

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warranty deed.

II. There was a mutual mistake among all parties to the agreement.

¶11. Mike also argues that the mutual mistake of the parties invalidates the agreement. The

parties all admit that there was a mutual mistake concerning Evelyn’s life estate interest.

They all mistakenly believed that she had a fee simple interest in the McPeters Hill property.

During the hearing, Thomas testified, “We made a mistake by assuming that mother had title

to the property in order to convey to me a warranty deed.” Additionally, Mike asserts in his

brief, “All the parties, including Thomas M., readily admit that there was a mutually

mistaken belief between everyone—including Evelyn—that she owned the McPeters Hill

Property outright at the time the agreement was executed. But they also now recognize that

she only owned a life estate.”

¶12. Our Supreme Court has stated:

A mutual mistake (of fact) is one common to both parties to a contract, each
laboring under the same misconception; more precisely, it is one common to
both or all parties, wherein each labors under the same misconception
respecting a material fact, the terms of the agreement, or the provisions of the
written instrument designed to embody such agreement. The mistake may
apply to the nature of the contract, the identity of the person with whom it is
made, or the identity or existence of the subject matter; but in order to relieve
a party from liability on the contract, the mistake must relate to a material fact,
past or present. Misrepresentation or fraud is not essential to proof of a mutual
mistake.

Greer v. Higgins, 338 So. 2d 1233, 1236 (Miss. 1976) (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 144,

at 894 (n.d.)). And “where both parties at the time of the agreement were operating under a

mutual mistake of fact,” the “contract may be set aside.” Lane-Lott v. White, 126 So. 3d

1016, 1019 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting White v. Cooke, 4 So. 3d 330, 334 (¶15)

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(Miss. 2009)); see also Greer, 338 So. 2d at 1236 (cancelling quitclaim deeds because all

parties mistakenly believed the decedent’s property had been transferred by intestate

succession, when in fact the decedent had a will).

¶13. Here, the parties were mistaken as to a material fact to the agreement: the interest that

Evelyn possessed. The living, competent sons attest they did not comprehend that they

possessed remainder interests in the property. They were not aware that Evelyn sought to

convey an interest that she did not possess. Because of this misunderstanding, there was not

a meeting of the minds and assent due to the mistake.

¶14. While there was a mutual mistake regarding the conveyance of the sons’ land

interests, this does not void the agreement in its totality. The agreement sought to do two

things: (1) absolve the debts of Frazier, Mike, and Larry; and (2) convey land to Thomas. The

agreement is viable in terms of debt forgiveness, but this opinion does not reach that issue

because it is not before us on appeal. However, the agreement as to a conveyance in fee

simple is void.

III. The sons did not convey an interest in the 1987 agreement.

¶15. The trial court erred when interpreting the 1987 agreement to be a conveyance of

property. Our Supreme Court has stated:

In construing instruments of conveyance, “it is necessary under well
recognized rules of construction that they be considered as a whole, and the
intent of the parties be gathered from the plain and unambiguous language
contained therein.” Rogers v. Morgan, 250 Miss. 9, 21, 164 So. 2d 480, 484
(1964). “The meaning of the language and intention of the parties to be
determined by the Court is to be found in the language used in the instrument.”
Id.; Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 351-53 (Miss. 1990); see
also Simmons v. Bank of Miss., 593 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Miss. 1992) (In

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construing written instruments, “our concern is not nearly so much what the
parties may have intended as it is what they said, for the words employed are
by far the best resource for ascertaining intent and assigning meaning with
fairness and accuracy.” (quoting UHS–Qualicare v. Gulf Coast Comm. Hosp.,
525 So. 2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987))). Courts must ascertain the meaning of the
language actually used, and not “some possible but unexpressed intent of the
parties.” Simmons, 593 So. 2d at 42-43.

Whittington v. Whittington, 608 So. 2d 1274, 1278 (Miss. 1992) (cleaned up).

¶16. Here, the 1987 agreement does not have language attesting to any of the sons

conveying their interests in the McPeters Hill property to Thomas. The agreement states,

“Evelyn Coleman has given Thomas M. Coleman his amount ($10,600) in land.” Our

precedent instructs courts to ascertain the meaning of the language actually used. The

agreement simply reflects Evelyn’s intent to forgive debts of some sons and give land to

Thomas. In comparison, the warranty deed also does not reflect a conveyance on behalf of

any of the sons. The deed details a conveyance from Evelyn to Thomas. Neither of the sons

signed this deed nor conveyed the subject property in any other deeds or agreements.

Thomas’s attorney later realized that the agreement did not convey the sons’ interest in the

property and attempted to rectify it by providing quitclaim deeds to the sons. Frazier

quitclaimed his interests to Thomas. Therefore, we will not disturb this conveyance.

However, the court erroneously interpreted that Larry and Mike intended to convey their

remainder interests as well.

CONCLUSION

¶17. Ultimately, Evelyn intended to bestow gifts of debt forgiveness to her sons and

provide Thomas with land since he was not indebted to her. But as mentioned, the debt

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forgiveness is not properly before us and is separate from the land conveyance. Finally,

Evelyn could not have conveyed an interest that she did not possess. Finding that the trial

court erred, we reverse the judgment appealed from, strike its recording from the land

records, and render the portions of the 1987 agreement purportedly conveying a fee simple

interest solely to Thomas void.3

¶18. REVERSED AND RENDERED.

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, McDONALD, LAWRENCE
AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR IN PART
AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BARNES,
C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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With regard to unjust enrichment, both parties agree that any ruling or explanation
on unjust enrichment is not in the record, thus we decline to reach that issue.

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APPENDIX “A”

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APPENDIX “B”

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