Robert Alexander Keys a/k/a Robert A. Keys a/k/a Dough Boy v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-KA-00438-COA

ROBERT ALEXANDER KEYS A/K/A ROBERT APPELLANT
A. KEYS A/K/A DOUGH BOY

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/28/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PRENTISS GREENE HARRELL
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAMAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: HALDON J. KITTRELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/24/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Robert Keys appeals his jury conviction of statutory rape on the ground that the trial

court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on prior inconsistent statements and

impeachment testimony.1 Keys also argues that the verdict was against the overwhelming

1
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-65 defines statutory rape:
(1) The crime of statutory rape is committed when:
(a) Any person seventeen (17) years of age or older has sexual
intercourse with a child who:
(i) Is at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of age;
(ii) Is thirty-six (36) or more months younger than the person;
and
(iii) Is not the person’s spouse; or
weight of the evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the conviction and

sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On January 14, 2018, Kim2 was thirteen years old. After a fight with her parents, Kim

ran away from her home near Bassfield in Jefferson Davis County. Kim’s parents reported

her missing to the Bassfield Police Department. Jennifer Meredith, the assistant chief of the

Bassfield Fire Department and a close family friend,3 received word that Kim was missing

and immediately searched the community. Meredith eventually received word that Kim had

been dropped off at a friend’s house in the Sumrall area in the neighboring Lamar County.

Meredith reported to George Keys,4 a police officer with the Sumrall Police Department,

(b) A person of any age has sexual intercourse with a child who:
(i) Is under the age of fourteen (14) years; and
(ii) Is twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the person.
(2) Neither the victim’s consent nor the victim’s lack of chastity is a defense
to a charge of statutory rape.
....
(7) For the purposes of this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean a joining
of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which the penis of
the male is inserted into the vagina of the female or the penetration of the
sexual organs of a male or female human being in which the penis or an object
is inserted into the genitals, anus or perineum of a male or female.
2
The victim was a minor under the age of fourteen years at the time of the assault.
As such, she is referred to as “Kim.”
3
Meredith worked with Kim’s father, who was the chief of the Bassfield Fire
Department.
4
George Keys is not related to the appellant.

2
where Kim had been dropped off, and they both went to find her. Upon finding her at her

friend’s house, Officer Keys and Meredith took Kim to the police station, where Meredith

tried to comfort Kim and keep her calm until her parents arrived. While at the police station,

Kim made statements that she had been sexually assaulted. Later, based on these statements

and others, a Lamar County grand jury indicted both Forest Shoemake and Robert Keys for

statutory rape.

¶3. The trial date was finally set, after various continuances, for April 26, 2022. Aside

from the continuances and a motion in limine Keys filed regarding a polygraph test that

Forest Shoemake took, no other motions or orders were entered prior to trial. After a jury

was empaneled and opening statements were made, the State called its witnesses. Below are

summations of each key witness’s testimony and the jury instructions.

Kim’s Testimony

¶4. At trial, Kim testified that she had run away from home after a fight with her parents

on January 14, 2018, the day before she turned fourteen. Kim left home between 2:30 and

3:00 in the morning. After running away, Kim decided to go to Sumrall to a friend’s house.

She realized she was cold and quite far from Sumrall, so she decided to turn around and go

back home. As she was going home, a car pulled up beside her with Keys and another person

inside. Keys asked if she needed a ride, and Kim asked him to take her to Bassfield or

Sumrall. When she got in the car, Keys asked how old she was, and Kim told him she was

thirteen. Instead of taking Kim home or to her friend’s house in Sumrall, Keys took her to

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his apartment. After arriving at his apartment, Forest Shoemake and his girlfriend Charikee

Prosser arrived. Keys said that they were going to have an “ice party.” Kim testified that she

did not know what that meant at the time, but later she understood that it meant they were

going to smoke meth. While at the apartment, the four of them, including Kim, proceeded

to smoke meth and marijuana and snort a “white powder.” Afterward, Shoemake mentioned

to Kim that Keys had invited him over to have sex with her. When Shoemake asked to have

sex with her, she refused. Shoemake then offered her more drugs. After Kim took more of

the drugs, Shoemake proceeded to take her clothes off and have sex with her while Keys and

Prosser were in the room. Kim testified that Prosser and Keys also started having sex with

each other, but eventually they “swapped out”: Shoemake started having sex with Prosser,

while Keys started having sex with Kim. Specifically, Kim testified that Keys penetrated her

vagina with his penis.

¶5. After having sex, Shoemake and Prosser said they were going to leave, and they

offered to take Kim to her friend’s house in Sumrall. Instead of going to her friend’s house,

however, Shoemake and Prosser took Kim to Brittany’s house, who was the mother of

Shoemake’s child, where Shoemake proceeded to take a shower with Kim. Afterward,

Prosser and Shoemake took Kim to her friend’s house in Sumrall. Kim’s friend alerted the

police, and Kim was later picked up by Meredith and Officer Keys.

¶6. Kim then testified that she did not remember most of the details of her disclosures to

the police or to the hospital staff during her sexual-assault exam. On cross-examination, she

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stated that while she did not remember the details of her disclosures to the hospital staff or

the police officers, she confirmed that based on the records of the hospital and the videotape

of her statement to the police, she never mentioned Keys sexually assaulting her. On

redirect, however, Kim stated that her father’s friend5 was in the room when she gave her

first statement, and she did not mention Keys to officers at the Sumrall Police Department

because she was afraid he would tell her father.

Police Chief Elsie Cowart’s Testimony

¶7. Kim’s medical records and sexual assault kit were admitted through Sumrall Police

Chief Cowart’s testimony. Based on the forensic lab’s report, Chief Cowart testified that

Shoemake’s DNA was found during Kim’s sexual assault exam, but Keys’s was not. Chief

Cowart testified that, in her experience, recovering no DNA evidence in a sexual assault case

was not uncommon. On cross-examination, Chief Cowart was questioned about Kim’s

disclosure at the hospital. According to the hospital records, Kim twice denied any oral or

anal penetration, but did disclose that she had endured “vaginal penetration with penis only

without use of a condom or other barrier of protection.” Kim also disclosed that she believed

the person who assaulted her was around twenty-six years old. Cowart agreed that this

corresponded closer to Shoemake’s age rather than Keys, who was thirty-five. Throughout

Kim’s disclosure to hospital personnel, she primarily referred to Shoemake as the “assailant.”

5
One of the police officers in the room was a friend of Kim’s father, who, as
previously mentioned, was the fire chief for Bassfield Fire Department.

5
Cowart testified on redirect that during Kim’s hospital disclosures, Kim’s mother was

present. Cowart stated that in her experience, many child victims are embarrassed when

discussing specific details of sexual abuse in front of their parents, and it is not uncommon

for child victims to not disclose every detail at first.

Emily Dixon’s Testimony

¶8. A few days after the exam, Kim went to Hattiesburg for a forensic interview with the

Child Advocacy Center. There, Kim made consistent statements regarding a sexual assault.

Emily Dixon with the Child Advocacy Center testified as an expert witness in forensic

interviewing. During direct examination, Dixon was asked whether it was common for

children not to tell the full story regarding a sexual assault, and she testified that it was not

uncommon. After presenting the full forensic interview to the jury, on cross-examination

Dixon was asked whether Kim ever stated that she and Keys had sex. Dixon confirmed that

during the forensic interview Kim never said that she and Keys had sex.

Forest Shoemake’s Testimony

¶9. Forest Shoemake also testified at trial. Shoemake knew Keys as his drug dealer. He

also pled guilty to the statutory rape of Kim. He stated that he did not know Kim’s age at the

time of the rape, but once he found out, he “came clean” because he knew it was wrong.

Shoemake also testified that he signed a plea agreement with the State that required him to

fully cooperate and truthfully furnish complete and detailed information regarding his

involvement in the crimes of his co-defendant, referring to Robert Keys. Shoemake said that

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on the night in question, his girlfriend at the time (Prosser) had mentioned wanting to see him

with another woman, and Shoemake had asked Keys if he knew of a woman he could set him

up with. Keys said that he did and invited Shoemake and Prosser over.

¶10. Once there, Shoemake purchased methamphetamine from Keys and met Kim, who

Shoemake assumed was the girl Keys had mentioned setting him up with. They all snorted

and smoked meth. Shoemake then asked Keys about the girl, and Keys indicated that Kim

was the girl he had mentioned. Shoemake testified that he asked about her age, and Keys

told him she was 19. Shoemake said that he sat by Kim and that she initiated contact.

Eventually they started to have sex. He said that they had oral and vaginal sex and that he

ejaculated inside of her without a condom. Shoemake said that he had asked for a condom,

but Keys had not given him one. Eventually, Keys came over and also had oral and vaginal

sex with Kim. Shoemake said that Kim did not seem willing with Keys and that Keys wore

a condom.

¶11. After the rape, Keys said that he was going to the store and left the three of them

alone. When he left, Kim told Shoemake and Prosser that Keys was keeping her there

against her will. Upon hearing this, Shoemake and Prosser told her that they would get her

out of there. From there, the three of them went to Shoemake’s “baby momma’s” house.

Shoemake confirmed that he took a shower with Kim but that it occurred before he had

learned her actual age. He said that Kim told him she was scared and did not want to be by

herself and was having trouble standing. He said that while he watched his daughter, his

7
daughter’s mother and Prosser spoke with Kim, which is when they learned her age. Kim

then told them the address of her friend in Sumrall, and Shoemake and Prosser dropped her

off there.

¶12. On cross-examination, Shoemake admitted that he gave multiple statements during

the course of the investigation. In his first statement in April 2018, Shoemake said that he

did not see Kim have sex with anybody. In his second statement, Shoemake said that he did

not have sex with Kim at Keys’s apartment but that he had sex with her in his car after

leaving the apartment. In that second statement, Shoemake also said that he did not know

if Keys had sex with Kim back at Keys’s apartment, and he did not witness it. At trial,

Shoemake said that he lied during those statements to protect Prosser. On cross-examination,

Shoemake confirmed that in return for his testimony, the State would recommend reducing

his sentence from thirty years in custody, with fifteen years to serve, down to thirty years in

custody, with ten years to serve. On redirect, Shoemake also admitted that he never

mentioned Keys in his previous statements because he was scared of him.

Charikee Prosser’s Testimony

¶13. The State also called Charikee Prosser to testify. Prosser said that she was in a

relationship with Shoemake for about five years and that in 2018 they had an “open

relationship.” She clarified that meant they would have sexual relations with other people.

Prosser said that she met Keys through Shoemake and that Keys was Shoemake’s drug

dealer. She said she would often have sex with Keys in exchange for drugs. On the night

8
of January 14, 2018, Prosser said Keys had invited them over to do drugs and have sex. Keys

also told them he had a girl over there for them to “have fun with,” referring to Kim. Prosser

said that she had not met Kim, but she had seen her at Keys’s apartment before. She said that

she saw Kim doing drugs that night and having sex with Shoemake. Prosser said she had sex

with Keys, who then went over and began having sex with Kim.

¶14. After all sexual relations ceased, Prosser, Shoemake, and Kim told Keys they were

going to leave and then come right back. Prosser said she lied about coming right back

because she was scared of Keys and did not want to start trouble. The three of them went to

Brittany’s house and stayed there until 5:00 or 6:00 in the morning before eventually

dropping Kim off. Prosser said that while at Brittany’s house, Shoemake took a shower with

Kim “[b]ecause [he] was messing with her, trying to have sex with her still and everything.”

She did not recall Kim being unable to stand up by herself.

¶15. Prosser then testified about the statement she gave to the police in April 2018. She

said that she lied in that statement because she was scared of Keys and Shoemake. During

cross-examination, Prosser confirmed that in her April statement, she said that she did not

see anybody have sex with Kim and that she had seen Kim at Keys’s apartment before. She

also confirmed that she offered to give the police information regarding Keys’s drug dealing.

Jennifer Meredith’s Testimony

¶16. Meredith testified that while at the police department on the night of the alleged

assault, Kim spoke with her about what had occurred that night. Kim told Meredith that

9
Keys (a/k/a “Dough Boy”) had picked her up while she was walking to Bassfield. Keys then

took Kim to his apartment in Sumrall and invited Shoemake and Prosser to come over. Kim

said that Keys, Shoemake, and Prosser all kept giving her a pipe and telling her to smoke it.

Keys and Prosser then started to have sex and Shoemake initiated intercourse with Kim. Kim

told Meredith that the group mentioned her having sex with Keys, but she did not want to.

Kim then told Meredith that Keys eventually did have sex with her.

¶17. During cross-examination, Meredith stated that although she spoke with Kim in

January 2018, she did not give a written statement describing the conversation until the

police department asked her to do so in September. Meredith testified that her statement in

September was based on notes she took after speaking with Kim in January. Her complete

statement was entered into evidence for the jury to consider.

¶18. After the State rested its case, Keys moved for a directed verdict, which the court

denied. Keys did not testify in his defense. The defense presented no witnesses or evidence,

but during cross-examination of the witnesses during the State’s case, all the previous

statements of the witnesses were entered into evidence. The defense then rested.

Jury Instruction Conference

¶19. The court then held a jury instruction conference. During the conference, the defense

offered the proposed jury instruction D-6, which stated:

The testimony of a witness may be discredited by showing that the witness
testified falsely concerning a material matter, or by evidence that at some other
time the witness said or did something or failed to say or do something which
is inconsistent with the testimony the witness gave at this trial.

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Earlier statements of a witness were not admitted in evidence to prove that the
contents of those statements are true. You may consider the earlier statements
only to determine whether you think they are consistent or inconsistent with
the trial testimony of the witness and therefore, whether they affect the
credibility of the witness.

If you believe that a witness has been discredited in this matter, it is your
exclusive right to give the testimony of that witness whatever you think it
deserves.

The judge refused that proposed instruction and said the following:

It’s confusing. It’s covered in others and I just don’t think it’s appropriate.
The jury will be strictly instructed that it is their responsibility to weigh the
testimony of each witness and make the appropriate findings as to how much
cred[i]bility or lack of cred[i]bility they so choose to give. So I will deny it.

The defense made no arguments as to why the instruction should have been granted. The

trial court did, however, give instruction C-1, which covered weight of witness testimony

generally:

As sole judges of the facts in this case, you determine what weight and what
credibility will be assigned the testimony and supporting evidence of each
witness in this case. You are required to use your good common sense and
sound, honest judgment in considering and weighing the testimony of each
witness. . . .

¶20. After the conference, the judge instructed the jury. After deliberations, the jury found

Keys guilty of statutory rape. The court sentenced Keys to serve thirty years in the custody

of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The court ordered him to pay at least $5,000

in fines and register as a sex offender for life. After his post-trial motions were denied, Keys

appealed.

¶21. On appeal, Keys argues that (1) the trial court erred by refusing instruction D-6

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regarding impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement and that (2) the verdict was against

the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶22. “[T]he standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.”

Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010) (citing Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847

(Miss. 2009)). “[T]he instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read,

if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible

error will be found.” Id. (quoting Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 785 (¶224) (Miss.

2006)). “When serious doubt exists as to whether an instruction should be included, the

doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.” Id. at 74 (¶20) (citing Davis, 18 So. 3d

at 847). “On appellate review of the trial court’s grant or denial of a proposed jury

instruction, our primary concern is that ‘the jury was fairly instructed and that each party’s

proof-grounded theory of the case was placed before it.’” Banyard v. State, 47 So. 3d 676,

681 (¶11) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Young v. Guild, 7 So. 3d 251, 259 (¶24) (Miss. 2009)).

¶23. On review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court “view[s] the

evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, and the verdict will be disturbed only when

it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would

sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bowser v. State, 182 So. 3d 425, 431 (¶15) (Miss.

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

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I. Whether the trial court erred by refusing the defense’s proposed
jury instruction on impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement.

¶24. “[A] trial judge is not under an obligation to grant redundant instructions.” Jones v.

State, 203 So. 3d 600, 613-14 (¶43) (Miss. 2016) (citing Swann v. State, 806 So. 2d 1111,

1117 (¶23) (Miss. 2002)). In Swann, the defendant put forth an instruction that stated:

If you believe inconsistent statements were made, you may consider the
inconsistencies in evaluating the believability of [the witness’s] testimony.

Swann, 806 So. 2d at 1117 (¶22). The Supreme Court said that refusing such an instruction

in that case would have been error if not for the other instructions provided to the jury. Id.

at (¶23). The instruction the jury did hear, which was found sufficient, stated:

If upon a consideration of the evidence in this case, you find that there is a
conflict in testimony of the witnesses, it is your duty to settle this conflict.
....

You may also consider their personal credibility in so far as it may legitimately
appear from the trial of this case.

Id. The Supreme Court found that the jury had been presented with the court’s instruction,

informing them of their duty to settle conflicts between witnesses’ testimonies and that they

may consider the personal credibility of a witness as it was made evident at trial. Id. at (¶24).

Furthermore, Swann had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses regarding their

inconsistent statements. Id. Lastly, Swann’s closing argument discussed how the witness

was untrustworthy due to his previous forgery convictions and prior inconsistent statements.

Id. Based on the instruction, the cross-examination, and the closing arguments, the Supreme

Court found that it was reasonable to believe that the jury took the witness’s prior

13
inconsistent statement into account. Id. The Court found no error in the trial court’s refusal

to give the defense’s proposed instruction. Id.6

¶25. We find the facts and analysis in Swann to be controlling in the present case. Keys

argues that the trial court erred by not presenting the proposed instruction D-6 to the jury.

As discussed above, this instruction informed the jury that “if you believe that a witness has

been discredited in this matter, it is your exclusive right to give the testimony of that witness

whatever you think it deserves.” The trial court refused this instruction and instead presented

C-1, which, among other things, stated, “[Y]ou determine what weight and what credibility

will be assigned the testimony and supporting evidence of each witness in this case.” Keys

also cross-examined each witness and emphasized their prior inconsistent statements. Lastly,

Keys’s closing argument focused almost entirely on the fact that Kim, Prosser, and Shoemake

had made prior inconsistent statements. “Given the jury instructions, the cross-examination

of [the witnesses], and [Keys’s] closing argument, it is reasonable to believe that the jury did

take [the witnesses’] prior inconsistent statements into account.” Id.

¶26. Furthermore, the Court also provided a cautionary instruction regarding co-defendant

Shoemake’s testimony, which stated:

6
See also Bolden v. State, 23 So. 3d 491, 501 (¶¶32-34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that because both parties referred to the prior inconsistent statements of witnesses
in their closing arguments and attempted to explain those inconsistencies in a way that
supported the party’s proposed explanation of events and because the jury was instructed on
its right to weigh the credibility of witnesses, the jury instruction specifically informing the
jury that it must disregard testimony that was contradicted by a prior inconsistent statement
was not necessary).

14
The Court instructs the jury that the law looks with suspicion and distrust on
the testimony of an alleged co-defendant, and requires the jury to weigh that
testimony with great care and suspicion. You should weigh the testimony from
an alleged co-defendant, and passing on that weight, if any, you should give
this testimony, you should weigh it with great care and caution, and look upon
it with distrust and suspicion.

Based on the general C-1 instruction, which informed the jury of its duty and power to weigh

the credibility of all witnesses’ testimonies, as well as the co-defendant instruction, which

cautioned the jury regarding the testimony of Shoemake, the jury was fairly instructed on the

law, and the defendant’s proof-grounded theory of the case was placed before the jury.

Banyard, 47 So. 3d at 681 (¶11). Thus, the circuit court did not err by refusing Keys’s D-6

instruction on impeachment.

II. Whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence.

¶27. On review of a trial court’s decision to deny a new trial based on the weight of the

evidence, this Court never reweighs the evidence, assesses witness credibility, or resolves

conflicts between the evidence. Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (¶20) (Miss. 2017).

Rather, “when the evidence is conflicting, the jury will be the sole judge of the credibility of

witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony.” Id. (quoting Gathright v. State, 380

So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Miss. 1980)); see also Lenoir v. State, 222 So. 3d 273, 278 (¶21) (Miss.

2017). As such, a “verdict will be disturbed only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming

weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.”

Bowser, 182 So. 3d at 431 (¶15) (internal quotation marks omitted).

15
¶28. This Court addressed a similar argument Keys relies on in Ross v. State, 51 So. 3d

977 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). In that case, Tyshunna Ross, a thirty-seven-year-old woman, was

indicted on one count of sexual battery and one count of gratification of lust for her

relationship with a twelve-year-old boy, A.B. Id. at 978 (¶1). At trial, the A.B. testified that

Ross invited A.B. and two of his friends, both fourteen, to “hang out” with her at her home.

Id. at 979 (¶2). Ross and the children smoked cigarettes and drank vodka, which A.B.

consumed four to five shots of. Id. at (¶3). The group then went into the woods where Ross

kissed A.B. and had him fondle her breasts. Id. The next day, Ross contacted A.B. and told

him her boyfriend had beaten her and that she needed a place to stay. Id. at (¶4). A.B.

offered to let Ross stay with him and snuck her into his room. Id. While there, Ross fondled

A.B., and they proceeded to have sex. Id. at 979-80 (¶5). Afterward, A.B.’s mother entered

the room and discovered the two. Id. at 980 (¶5). Ross hid under the blankets. Id. The

mother, unaware that Ross was an adult, assumed A.B. was with a girl his age and questioned

A.B. about what he was doing, to which A.B. responded to his mother that they had not done

anything sexual. Id. at 980-81 (¶¶5-6). Ross later left with a friend. Id. at 981 (¶6).

¶29. The next day, after learning from a friend that Ross had given A.B. alcohol on July

3, A.B.’s mother took A.B. to the police department to give a statement regarding the events

of that day. Id. at (¶7). A.B. told the police that he and his friend had kissed and fondled

Ross on July 3, and on July 4 Ross had touched his penis and he had fondled her breasts but

denied that they had sex. Id. A.B. then went to the Child Advocacy Center, where a forensic

16
interview was conducted. Id. During the interview, A.B. again did not disclose that he and

Ross had sex. Id. On July 13, A.B. told his mother the “full truth” that he and Ross had sex

on July 4. Id. A.B.’s mother took A.B. to the police department again, where he recanted

his previous statement and gave a statement that confirmed he and Ross had sex on July 4.

Id.

¶30. At trial, the full audio recording of A.B.’s second statement was played for the jury,

and detectives with the police testified for the State. Id. at 981-82 (¶¶7-8). A friend of

Ross’s testified for the State, saying that on July 4 he had dropped Ross off near A.B.’s

home, after Ross had told him it was the home of “a friend.” Id. at 982 (¶9). Ross did not

testify, id. at (¶10), but the defense did introduce her statement to the police, in which she

said she did provide alcohol to A.B. and his friends and that she was present in A.B.’s room

on July 4, but that no sexual contact occurred. Id. at 921 (¶8). Ross was subsequently

convicted of both counts and appealed. Id. at 982 (¶10).

¶31. On appeal, Ross argued that the weight of the evidence was not enough to support her

conviction. Id. at (¶11). Ross argued that A.B.’s initial denial of sexual contact, his

staggered disclosure, and inconsistencies with his testimony undermined the credibility of

his testimony. Id. at 982 (¶13). She further argued that A.B.’s description of the physical

act of intercourse was “impossible or improbable.” Id. at 982-83 (¶13). Regarding A.B.’s

initial denials, this Court stated:

“[I]t is common for a victim of sexual abuse to be embarrassed and to initially
deny that the crimes occurred.” A.B. testified that he initially denied sexual

17
contact with Ross because he was afraid of what would happen and that he
feared he would “get in trouble.” . . . A.B. also stated that during the initial
police and CAC interviews, he was embarrassed by the events and felt
uncomfortable with the interviewers.

Id. at 983 (¶14) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We also noted that A.B. was intoxicated

during the events of July 3, which explained some of the inconsistencies with his testimony

regarding events that occurred on that day. Id.

¶32. Ultimately, our Court found that since the defense primarily hinged its argument on

the credibility of the State’s witnesses, the jury should be the sole judge. Id. at 984-85 (¶16)

(citing Nix v. State, 8 So. 3d 141, 146 (¶26) (Miss. 2009)). We also noted that at trial, Ross

brought all these credibility issues to the attention of the jury, and the jury still found A.B.’s

testimony credible enough to support the guilty verdict. Id. at 983-84 (¶16). Lastly, we said

that A.B.’s testimony was not “inherently implausible, nor was it so seriously impeached that

no reasonable juror could find it credible.” Id. Based on the above, we refused to find that

the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id.

¶33. Our analysis in the present case is very similar to Ross. Kim provided statements to

the police, hospital, and CAC interviewer that she later contradicted. However, when asked

why she did not originally say that Keys also raped her, she said she was “embarrassed” due

to the presence of her parents and friends of her father being present during the interviews.

At trial, both Cowart and Dixon testified that it was not uncommon for child victims not to

tell the full story during their interviews. Further, it is undisputed that Kim was under the

influence of drugs and alcohol on the night of the abuse, as well as still under the influence

18
during her first statements to the police and hospital staff. Generally, the uncorroborated

testimony of a victim of sexual abuse can be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Massey v.

State, 992 So. 2d 1161, 1164 (¶14) (Miss. 2008). Kim’s testimony was corroborated, albeit

by less-than-stellar witnesses. However, regardless of the questionable credibility of

Shoemake and Prosser, all this testimony and evidence was presented to the jury, and the jury

still found Kim’s testimony to be credible enough to support a guilty verdict.

¶34. For the above-stated reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Keys’s motion for a new trial because the verdict was not against the

overwhelming weight of the evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶35. The trial court did not err by refusing the defense instruction on impeachment based

on prior inconsistent statements because the court’s instruction sufficiently stated the law,

and the defendant’s counsel sufficiently cross-examined witnesses and made arguments

during the closing. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion

for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. For the above reasons, we affirm the

conviction and sentence.

¶36. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.
SMITH, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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