Hannah Rush Daly v. Richard Allen Raines

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CA-00600-COA

HANNAH RUSH DALY APPELLANT

v.

RICHARD ALLEN RAINES APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/28/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CYNTHIA L. BREWER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JEFFREY BIRL RIMES
SARAH LINDSEY HAMMONS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW THOMPSON
CHAD KENNETH KING
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 10/31/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On February 28, 2022, the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi entered

a “Final Judgment of Modification and Contempt” that granted Richard Raines “sole physical

and legal custody” of his and Hannah Daly’s minor child, A.L.R.1 Hannah alleges on appeal

that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the existing Mississippi

custody decree. Alternatively, Hannah claims that she was “deprived due process by the

[c]hancellor’s limitation on [her] ability to discover and put on evidence in her defense” at

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Initials are used to protect the identity of the minor child.
trial. Finally, Hannah claims that the chancery court erred in modifying custody and granting

Richard sole physical and legal custody of A.L.R.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. A.L.R. was born to Hannah and Richard in 2014. They were not married. A.L.R. was

born in Mississippi and continued to live in Mississippi with Hannah after her birth. On

October 1, 2015, the Madison County Chancery Court entered a final judgment of filiation

that established Richard as A.L.R.’s father and awarded Hannah physical custody of A.L.R.

subject to Richard’s visitation. The parties filed multiple motions and petitions between

2017 and 2018 regarding clarification of the court’s previous judgment of filiation and the

specific parameters of Richard’s visitation. On June 18, 2018, the chancery court entered an

“Agreed Final Judgment” modifying certain aspects of custodial periods and visitation

provisions. However, physical custody of A.L.R. remained with Hannah.

¶3. On May 6, 2019, Richard filed an “Emergency Petition for Custody and Petition for

Modification of Custody, Support, Visitation, Contempt, and for Other Relief” in the

chancery court. In his petition, Richard represented that he was currently living in Maryland

and that Hannah was living in Florida. Richard also represented that A.L.R. was living in

Mississippi with her maternal grandparents at the time his emergency petition was filed.

Richard alleged that Hannah had been arrested in Mississippi and Louisiana for domestic

violence and most recently had been arrested in Florida for felony battery. Richard also

asserted that Hannah had been diagnosed with a mental health condition necessitating

inpatient treatment. Because of these allegations and other circumstances, Richard claimed

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that A.L.R. would suffer immediate and irreparable harm if she remained in Hannah’s

custody. In his petition, Richard requested an immediate modification of custody and also

requested that the chancellor appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate the

allegations. Pursuant to an emergency order dated May 8, 2019, the chancellor granted

emergency custody of A.L.R. to Richard. On May 10, 2019, an “Agreed Order Appointing

Guardian Ad Litem” was entered, and Attorney Cynthia Howell was appointed “as an arm

of the court, to investigate, find facts, and make independent reports and send

recommendations to the Court as to what would be in the best interest of the minor child, and

not as the minor child’s lawyer.” A subsequent order was entered on July 16, 2019, that

awarded sole legal and physical custody of A.L.R. to Richard and granted supervised

visitation to Hannah.

¶4. Hannah made multiple filings between the time the July custody order was entered and

the end of 2019, including an objection to the family master’s report, a motion to dissolve

the emergency orders, and a motion to disqualify the GAL. On December 12, 2019, the

chancery court entered three separate orders denying each of Hannah’s motions. Hannah

continued to file numerous pleadings leading up to and after the first day of trial. Specific

to this appeal, Hannah filed a return on a subpoena duces tecum on January 7, 2021. The

subpoena commanded the GAL to produce “[a]ll medical, therapy, counseling, and school

records in your possession pertaining to the minor child, A.L.R., including all

correspondence between you and the minor child’s medical providers, therapists, counselors,

and teachers.” The GAL filed a motion to quash the subpoena on January 14, 2021. The

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chancery court entered an order granting the GAL’s motion to quash on March 9, 2021, and

stated in part:

The Court finds that counsel for [Hannah] failed to identify binding precedent
and authority establishing a party’s right to subpoena documents from the
Guardian Ad Litem; therefore the Guardian ad Litem’s Objection to Subpoena
Duces Tecum, Motion to Quash, and Motion for Protection Order [MEC#120]
is hereby granted.

Hannah also filed a return on a deposition subpoena on April 28, 2021. The subpoena sought

to depose the GAL after the trial had begun. On June 4, 2021, the chancery court granted the

GAL’s request to quash the deposition subpoena as well.

¶5. Trial began on Richard’s petition for modification of custody, support, visitation,

contempt, and other relief on March 3, 2021, and continued on August 2-3, 2021. On the

second day of trial, Hannah’s attorney attempted to call A.L.R. as his first witness. After

hearing objections and arguments from both Richard’s counsel and the GAL, the chancellor

stated:

I have now heard the objection, the response and the guardian ad litem’s
argument or presentation in regard to the objection. This child is a seven-year-
old child, [who] would be called upon to answer questions in regard to
individualized time in the presence of each of the respective parents. The
Court finds that the basis of the questioning would not pose a vital point in
regard to this Court’s decision and does hereby grant the objection to the
seven-year-old testifying even in camera.

¶6. On February 28, 2022, the chancery court entered a final judgment of modification

and contempt as well as a separate opinion detailing the court’s judgment. The judgment

stated in part “that a material change in circumstances that is adverse to the minor child has

occurred since the prior order and it is in the child’s best interest for the Plaintiff, [Richard],

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to have sole physical and legal custody of their child, A.L.R., born in the year 2014.”

Aggrieved by the ruling of the chancery court concerning discovery limitations and

modification of custody, and claiming that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction, Hannah

timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. “Whether a court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA[2] to hear a child-custody dispute

is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Miller v. Mills, 64 So. 3d 1023, 1026 (¶11)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “However, the factual findings underpinning the jurisdiction question

are reviewed under the familiar substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standard.”

Clifton v. Shannon, 93 So. 3d 70, 72 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “This Court employs a

limited standard of review in child-custody cases and will ‘affirm findings of fact by

chancellors . . . when they are supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused

her discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was

applied.’” Carter v. Carter, 204 So. 3d 747, 756 (¶37) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Borden v.

Borden, 167 So. 3d 238, 241 (¶4) (Miss. 2014)). “This Court may reverse a chancellor’s

finding of fact only when there is no ‘substantial credible evidence in the record’ to justify

his finding.” Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 586 (¶7) (Miss. 2002) (quoting

Henderson v. Henderson, 757 So. 2d 285, 289 (¶19) (Miss. 2000)).

ANALYSIS

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The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act is codified in
Mississippi Code Annotated sections 93-27-101 to -402 (Rev. 2021).

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I. Did the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi err in
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the case at hand?

¶8. Hannah alleges that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case

at hand. Hannah argues that because she lived in Florida and Richard lived in Maryland,

Mississippi was not the proper state to make a determination regarding the modification of

the existing child custody order.

¶9. Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-27-202 states:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 93-27-204, a court of this state
which has made a child custody determination consistent with Sections
93-27-201 or 93-27-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the
determination until:

(a) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the
child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a
parent have a significant connection with this state and that
substantial evidence is no longer available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationships; or

(b) A court of this state or a court of another state determines
that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a
parent currently do not reside in this state.

(2) A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and
does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify
that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination
under Section 93-27-201.

(Emphasis added). In this case, jurisdiction was established in the Chancery Court of

Madison County, Mississippi, pursuant to an order of filiation dated October 1, 2015. An

additional agreed final judgment signed by both parties regarding custody and visitation was

entered on June 18, 2018. There is no evidence that jurisdiction was contested during any

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stage of litigation resulting in either custody order. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated

section 93-27-202, Mississippi has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction in this case and may

lose jurisdiction only if one of the conditions within this statute is met.

¶10. The record reflects that A.L.R. was born in Mississippi and lived in Mississippi until

August 2018 when Hannah moved to Santa Rosa Beach, Florida. Between 2018 and 2022,

Hannah claimed several different addresses in Florida and Maryland. However, at the

emergency petition hearing on May 7, 2019, Hannah testified, “I don’t think [A.L.R.] should

start school and live there permanently in Maryland. She has a life established here.

Granted, I did move to Destin . . . other than that, her life has been here [in Mississippi].”

The record also reflects that on April 30, 2019, prior to Richard’s petition for emergency

relief, modification, and contempt, Hannah’s father traveled to Florida to pick up A.L.R., and

he brought her back to Mississippi, where she remained until Richard’s emergency petition

was filed and heard.

¶11. The Madison County Chancery Court never made a determination that it lost

jurisdiction pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-27-202. In fact, in her final

judgment dated February 28, 2022, the chancellor stated, “After finding jurisdiction over the

parties and this cause and finding that venue is proper, the Court grants a modification of

custody, visitation, and child support, and grants in part Plaintiff’s request for contempt.”

At no point during the three years that this matter was pending in Madison County,

Mississippi, did Hannah file any pleadings concerning the minor child in any court of any

other state or jurisdiction. Nor did Hannah seek to enroll the Mississippi judgment in any

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other jurisdiction. Further, she did not file any pleadings requesting a UCCJEA hearing to

determine the most convenient forum for the case or if Mississippi should or would

relinquish jurisdiction. Instead, Hannah proceeded to actively participate in litigation in the

Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi, seeking relief on her own behalf and failing

to challenge the chancery court’s jurisdiction. We find no error by the chancery court in

exercising jurisdiction over the case at hand.

II. Did the chancery court deprive Hannah of due process by limiting
her ability to discover and present evidence in her defense?

¶12. Hannah claims that “reversal is further warranted because of the prejudice [she]

suffered when she was hamstrung in her ability to discover and put on evidence in her

defense against [Richard’s] petition.” First, Hannah alleges that the chancellor erred by

denying her the ability to discover certain documents from the GAL through a subpoena

duces tecum. Secondly, Hannah alleges that the chancellor erred when she denied Hannah’s

request to allow the minor child to testify at trial.

A. Did the chancery court err in denying Hannah’s ability to
discover certain documents from the GAL through a
subpoena duces tecum?

¶13. Hannah asserts that the court erred in granting the GAL’s motion to quash her

subpoena duces tecum and claims that the GAL should have been required to provide

Hannah with the documents she requested. Hannah issued a subpoena duces tecum on

December 17, 2020, that requested the GAL to produce “[a]ll medical, therapy, counseling,

and school records in your possession pertaining to the minor child, A.L.R. including all

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correspondence between you and the minor child’s medical providers, therapists, counselors,

and teachers.”

¶14. Rule 26(b)(1), (3) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure3 states in part:

Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules,
the scope of discovery is as follows:

(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses
of any party. The discovery may include the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, electronically stored
information, or other tangible things; and the identity and location of persons
(i) having knowledge of any discoverable matter or (ii) who may be called as
witnesses at the trial. It is not ground for objection that the information sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
....
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by
or for that other party’s representative (including that party’s attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of that party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.

Notwithstanding any exceptions provided for in the Rules, it is clear that A.L.R.’s medical,

therapy, counseling, and school records in the GAL’s possession and the correspondence

between the GAL and the minor child’s medical providers, therapists, counselors, and

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According to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 1, “[t]hese rules govern procedure
in the circuit courts, chancery courts, and county courts in all suits of a civil nature,
whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity . . . .” (Emphasis added).

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teachers falls within the parameters of discoverable material set forth in Rule 26. The

documents that Hannah requested fit squarely in the category of documents relevant in a

child custody modification case. Further, the documents undoubtedly assisted the GAL in

formulating her custody recommendation for the court. The only question that remains is

whether the requested documents fall within one of the exceptions provided for in the Rules.

¶15. Rule 45(d)(1)(A) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states:

On timely motion, the court from which a subpoena was issued shall quash or
modify the subpoena if it (i) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance; (ii)
requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or
waiver applies, (iii) designates an improper place for examination, or (iv)
subjects a person to undue burden or expense.

(Emphasis added). In its order granting the GAL’s motion to quash, the chancery court held:

The Court finds that counsel for [Hannah] failed to identify binding precedent
and authority establishing a party’s right to subpoena documents from the
Guardian Ad Litem; therefore, the Guardian ad Litem’s Objection to
Subpoena Duces Tecum, Motion to Quash, and Motion for Protection Order
[MEC # 120] is hereby granted.

The chancery court’s order did not list any one of the four reasons set forth in Rule 45 for

quashing the subpoena duces tecum but, rather, held that Hannah failed to provide the court

with authority establishing her right to subpoena the GAL. As discussed in the paragraphs

above, Rule 26 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure is the authority that allows

Hannah to obtain information through discovery and, more specifically, a subpoena duces

tecum in the case at hand. In Flechas v. Pitts, 138 So. 3d 907, 911 (¶9) (Miss. 2014), the

Mississippi Supreme Court held that the “chancery court was required to find whether the

subpoena at issue sought irrelevant or privileged information under the same standards as set

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forth in Rule 26(b) and other discovery rules.” Because the chancery court failed to list one

of the reasons prescribed by Rule 45 in its order granting the GAL’s motion to quash, we

reverse and remand the chancellor’s ruling to quash the subpoena duces tecum.

B. Did the chancery court err in denying Hannah’s request to
allow the minor child to testify at trial?

¶16. Hannah argues that A.L.R. should have been able to testify at trial. She claims that

the chancellor violated binding Mississippi Supreme Court precedent by failing to take the

necessary steps before refusing the testimony. Hannah bases her argument on Jethrow v.

Jethrow, 571 So. 2d 270, 274 (Miss. 1990). In Jethrow, the Mississippi Supreme Court held:

We conclude that there can be no per se prohibition against a child witness
testifying in a divorce case between his parents. The right of every litigant to
compulsory process for witnesses and have them testify under oath in court is
so well grounded that any per se exclusion simply because he or she is a child
of the divorcing parents risks offending the due process provisions of
Amendments V and XIV of the U.S. Constitution, and Art. 3, Sec. 14 of the
Mississippi Constitution. . . .

We agree that there is a certain amount of discretion vested in the trial court,
in conducting proceedings of this type. The court should not, however, reject
outright proposed testimony of a child in custody proceedings, where the
omission of such crucial testimony might be harmful to the child’s best
interests. The trial court should take great pains under such conditions at least
to conduct an in camera conference with the child to determine the
competency of the child, as well as the competency of any evidence which the
child might present. The court should also then determine whether the best
interests of the child would be served by permitting her to testify or be
sheltered from testifying and being subjected to a vigorous cross-examination.
A report of the essential material matters developed at the in camera
conference should be made of record by the trial court and the court should
state the reasons for allowing or disallowing the testimony of the child, and
also note the factual information which the court developed from the
conference with the child which would be considered by the court in its
ultimate determinations in the case. . . .

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Generally, the testimony of a child called as a witness in a divorce case should
not be excluded for reasons other than competency or evidentiary defects or
for the protection of the child.

Id. at 273-74 (quoting Crownover v. Crownover, 337 N.E. 2d 56, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)).

¶17. More recently, in Denham v. Denham, 351 So. 3d 954, 961 (¶9) (Miss. 2022), the

supreme court held:

The clear legal standard is that the chancellor must interview a child of tender
years in order to determine both competency and the child’s best interests. The
chancellor’s determination that the children were incompetent to testify and
that testifying was not in their best interest before interviewing them clearly
contravened this Court’s mandates in Jethrow; thus, the chancellor applied an
erroneous legal standard in coming to her determination. Furthermore, the
refusal to record the in-chambers interviews with the children by use of a court
reporter clearly contravened this Court’s mandate in Robison [v. Lanford, 841
So. 2d 1119 (Miss. 2003)], further compounding the chancellor’s application
of erroneous legal standards and depriving this Court of a complete appellate
record.[4]

¶18. In the case at hand, Hannah’s counsel argued both at trial and through her post-trial

motion that the chancellor was required, at the very least, to conduct an in camera conference

with the child to make a determination as to her competency and whether it was in her best

interest to testify. After hearing arguments from counsel and the GAL regarding A.L.R.

testifying at trial, the chancellor stated, “Well I heard the testimony. It’s not happening

now.” The chancellor failed to conduct an in camera conference with the minor child or hear

from the child at all to determine her competency to testify at trial or the substance and

reliability of her potential testimony. We agree with Hannah that the chancellor erred in

failing to comply with the procedure set forth in Jethrow and Denham. Therefore, the

4
Notably, Denham v. Denham, 351 So. 3d 954 (Miss. 2022), was published after the
chancellor made her ruling.

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chancellor’s denial of Hannah’s request to allow A.L.R. to testify at trial is reversed and

remanded.

CONCLUSION

¶19. Based upon the above analysis and findings, the chancery court’s judgment is affirmed

as to the jurisdiction of the chancery court as discussed in Part I of this opinion. However,

the chancery court’s final judgment of modification and contempt is reversed, and the matter

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with Part II of our opinion.

¶20. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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