Terry Lee Ing v. Song Adams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-CA-00936-COA

CONSOLIDATED WITH

NO. 2017-CA-00084-COA

TERRY LEE ING APPELLANT

v.

SONG ADAMS APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/24/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN ANDREW GREGORY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MARSHALL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOSEPH WHITTEN COOPER
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: KENT E. SMITH
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CONTRACT
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
RENDERED IN PART - 08/25/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This is the second appeal of a Marshall County Circuit Court lease-purchase case. In

the first appeal, decided on May 15, 2018, we held that Terry Ing had exercised his option

to purchase a building he had rented from Song Adams. We remanded the case to enable Ing

to complete the purchase at a sales price of $350,000. Ing was unable to do this, and Adams

filed an eviction action. On May 16, 2019, the circuit court not only evicted Ing but also

granted a judgment for Adams in the amount of $130,000 for back rent Ing owed. From that

judgment, Ing appeals, arguing that the circuit court erroneously set the purchase price at
$350,000 and erroneously granted Adams a judgment for back rent. Because we find that

the circuit court did not err in enforcing our previously mandated $350,000 purchase price,

but that it did err in calculating the amount of back rent Ing owed, we affirm in part and

reverse and render in part.

Facts

¶2. Our prior opinion in this case, Ing v. Adams, 248 So. 3d 881 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018),

contains the facts of the first phase of this case. Adams, the owner of a three-story building

in Holly Springs, Mississippi, leased the basement to Ing for a five-year period beginning

January 27, 2010, paying $2,500 per month. Ing had purchased the pizza business that was

already in operation. He would occupy the basement while Adams ran a liquor store on the

first floor and rented out an apartment on the third floor.

¶3. The Adams-Ing lease agreement included a purchase option that gave Ing the right to

purchase the entire building at the end of the lease:

At the end of this current five year lease provided that Lessee is current upon
all conditions of this lease, he has the option to extend the lease for an
additional five years or to purchase the building at [its] then appraised value.

If Ing did not exercise that option, the lease would become a month-to-month lease.

¶4. Four days prior to the expiration of the lease, in January 2015, Ing notified Adams of

his desire to purchase the building, but Adams refused to sell it. Ing stopped paying rent, and

Adams filed a complaint in the circuit court for eviction, damages, and other relief. Ing

counterclaimed for damages and other relief, including specific performance.

¶5. At the circuit court’s bench trial of the matter on May 26, 2016, Adams presented, for

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the first time, a $350,000 appraisal of the building she had obtained on February 13, 2015,

from Michael Shaw, a licensed certified residential real estate appraiser.1 On December 23,

2016, the circuit court issued its final judgment with findings of fact. The court ruled that

although Ing was not in material breach of the contract as Adams had alleged, Ing had failed

to exercise his option to purchase. The court granted Adams’s motion to evict and found Ing

liable for back rent. Ing appealed on January 23, 2017, and posted a bond to stay the

execution of the circuit court’s order.

¶6. After the bench trial in May 2016, but before the December 2016 written judgment,

Ing obtained his own appraisal of the property, which prepared by Jeff Norwood of Rip

Walker and Associates, licensed certified general real estate appraisers. In the July 7, 2016

report of the appraisal performed on June 21, 2016, Norwood assessed the property to be

valued at $255,000. The parties apparently used Adams’s and Ing’s appraisals to try to

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Mississippi licenses two types of appraisers:

The following shall be the two (2) classes for licensed certified real estate
appraisers:

(a) Licensed certified residential real estate appraiser. The licensed certified
residential real estate appraiser classification shall consist of those persons
who meet the requirements that relate to the appraisal of residential real
property of one (1) to four (4) units without regard to transaction value or
complexity. In addition, when nonfederally related transactions are involved,
the licensed certified residential real estate appraiser shall enjoy the same
privileges as set forth for the licensed real estate appraiser.

(b) Licensed certified general real estate appraiser. The licensed certified
general real estate appraiser classification shall consist of those persons who
meet the requirements relating to the appraisal of all types of real estate.

Miss. Code Ann. § 73-34-19 (Rev. 2014).

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negotiate a settlement, but they were unable to agree on a purchase price. But when

negotiations broke down, Ing did not bring this second appraisal to the circuit court’s

attention before the court ruled in December 2016. Thus, the record on the first appeal

contained only the $350,000 appraisal from Adams.

¶7. In January 25, 2018, we heard oral argument on the matter. Ing’s counsel told us that

he obtained a second appraisal but did not tell us the amount because it was not in the record.

Adams took the position that she had put a $350,000 appraisal into the record and that Ing

had not countered it. Ing’s attorney was further questioned about the matter of having only

the single appraisal in the record:

Wilson, J.: So what happens if you find an appraiser that says $250,000 and
hers says $350,000, and they don’t agree, what is the appraised
value?

Counsel: I think the appraised value would be whatever a judge states that
the appraised value should be, given both . . .

....

Carlton, J.: Why isn’t Mr. Ing stuck with the appraisal that is in the record
since he did not present his own opposing appraisal at the trial
court below?

Counsel: Mr. Ing went to trial with the understanding that he was going
to have to prove that he did not breach the contract. That is
what is in the lawsuit. He is going to have to prove that he did
(inaudible) his option to purchase. It was Mr. Ing’s assertion
that he went to trial to show that he should be given an
opportunity to go forward with buying the property.

Carlton, J.: But Mr. Ing filed a counterclaim asking for general and specific
relief and . . . before the trial judge, asked for specific
performance.

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Counsel: Yes, your honor, he did and at that point we did not have an
appraisal done. I agree with that, your honor. So if it is the
Court’s determination that he is, for lack of a better term,
“stuck” with the $350,000, then Mr. Ing will accept that. And
if that would be the ruling, and if that is the ruling, I think there
is a proper foundation laid for that to be the ruling, if this court
decides that.

¶8. After oral argument, we reversed the circuit court’s decision in our opinion issued on

May 15, 2018. We found that Ing had properly exercised his option to purchase Adams’s

building. Id. at 886 (¶22). Because he did so, Ing became an equitable owner of the property

and not a “holdover tenant” subject to liability for accruing rent charges while the case was

in litigation. Id. at 887 (¶26). We acknowledged that “at oral argument, Ing essentially

conceded that he was “stuck” with the $350,000 appraisal presented by Adams at trial since

he had not offered one.” Id. at 885 (¶18). However, we also noted that “once Adams refused

to convey the property, Ing was not required to take any of these steps.” Id. at (¶19). We

remanded the case for the trial court to set a reasonable closing date for the sale of the

property, taking into account Ing’s need, if any, to secure financing based on the sole

appraisal offered at trial. Id. at 887 (¶27). We also said that “in the event that Ing fails to

meet his obligations to tender the purchase price and close on the contract the issue of

holdover rent would have to be revisited.” Id. at 887 n.6 After our decision May 15, 2018,

Ing filed no motion for rehearing, nor did he challenge our mandate that issued on June 5,

2018.

¶9. On remand, Adams promptly filed a “Motion to Set a Closing Deadline and for Other

Relief” with the Marshall County Circuit Court on May 24, 2018. She requested a deadline

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(date and time) for the closing of the purchase at the appraised price of $350,000. On May

30, 2018, the circuit court entered an order setting the closing date within ninety days of the

entry of the order or by 3:00 p.m. on August 28, 2018. The court also addressed the bond

funds ($30,000) that were being held by the Ing’s lawyers, the Farese Law Firm, and ordered

that they not be disbursed except to serve as a down payment on the purchase. The court also

noted that if Ing failed to meet his obligations to tender the purchase price and close on the

contract, the issue of holdover rent would be revisited.

¶10. Ing sought financing for the purchase. In that process, the two banks he contacted

each secured appraisals of the property. The Bank of Holly Springs retained Rip Walker and

Associates to prepare another appraisal. Again, Jeff Norwood appraised the property at

$255,000. Renasant Bank obtained an appraisal from Integra Realty Resources, another

licensed general appraisal company, which valued the building at $280,000. Based on the

Integra appraisal, on June 20, 2018, Renasant approved Ing for a loan of $255,000

(approximately 85% of the appraised value).

¶11. Counsel for Ing asserts, and Adams does not deny, that the parties again attempted to

negotiate a settlement based on the various appraisals and the confirmation that Ing could

obtain financing, albeit not enough to pay the $350,000 that Adams claimed was the value.

The $350,000 appraisal, performed by only a residential appraiser, could not be used by

banking institutions that may use federal funds, and thus they needed a general real estate

appraiser pursuant to the statute. Therefore, the banks Ing approached would not finance any

more than the appraisals given by appraisers who were licensed to appraise commercial

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properties. The parties were unable to resolve the issue.

¶12. The deadline for closing passed, and on November 30, 2018, Adams filed a “Motion

to Evict and For Other Relief.” The motion was set for hearing on April 17, 2019.

¶13. On April 12, 2019, Ing filed his response to the motion and included in that pleading

a “Motion to Determine Appraisal Value of 110 Van Dorn Avenue.” Ing informed the circuit

court that he and Adams had been unable to agree on a purchase price when the case was first

pending on appeal and that they were still unable to even though they now had three

appraisals—the one that Adams had secured ($350,000), and the two that the banks had

secured, valuing the property at $255,000 and $280,000. Ing argued that this Court had erred

in remanding the case with instructions that the property be sold at the appraised value of

$350,000 because this appraisal was prepared by a licensed residential appraiser and that

statutorily, it cannot be relied upon by financial institutions that may use federal funds to

finance the potential loan. Ing argued that he should not be required to purchase a building

at a price $70,000 higher than what a commercial appraiser says it was worth and that he

could not obtain financing for the $350,000 figure. He asked the court to compel Adams to

sell him the property at a price no more than $280,000, and he renewed his request for

damages.

¶14. On May 15, 2019, Adams replied to Ing’s response to her motion to evict, and the next

day, the circuit court heard testimony from Ing’s appraiser and arguments from counsel. The

circuit court ruled from the bench that given the instructions in the appellate opinion, the

court did not think that it had any choice on the issue of the property’s sales price being

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$350,000. The Court found that Ing had not closed by the deadline the court set.

Accordingly, the court granted Adams’s motion to evict and ordered payment of $2,500 per

month as back rent, beginning from the end of the lease (January 27, 2015).

¶15. On May 24, 2019, the court’s ruling was incorporated in a written judgment. The

court gave Ing until June 16, 2019, to vacate the property or be evicted and found that he

owed back rent from January 27, 2015, through May 2019, in the total amount of $130,000.

¶16. On June 6, 2019, Ing filed his notice of appeal and raises two issues: whether the trial

court erred in refusing to invalidate the original appraisal when new evidence indicated that

it overvalued the property, causing Ing to be unable to secure financing, and whether the trial

court erred in finding that Ing was not an equitable owner and owed back rent for failing to

purchase the property.

Standard of Review

¶17. “The standard of review for a judgment entered following a bench trial is well

settled.” Maldonado v. Kelly, 786 So. 2d 906, 908 (¶4) (Miss. 2000). An appellate court will

not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless the trial court “abused [its] discretion, was

manifestly wrong, or made a finding that was clearly erroneous.” Smith v. Wilson, 90 So. 3d

51, 56 (¶13) (Miss. 2012).

Discussion

I. Whether the circuit court erred in refusing to invalidate the
original appraisal.

¶18. Ing argues that the circuit court erred when it required him to purchase Adams’s

building at the $350,000 price that Adams demanded. He contends that new evidence, i.e.,

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two subsequent appraisals that valued the property at $255,000 and $280,000, proved that

the building was overvalued by the $350,000 appraisal. It is reversible error, Ing claims, for

the circuit court to have ignored this new evidence. However, this court had mandated that

the building be sold for that figure—a mandate that Ing did not challenge. Therefore we

disagree and find no error by the circuit in enforcing our mandated purchase price of

$350,000.

¶19. Ing concedes that all parties are bound by the our judgment and mandate from the first

appeal of this case. We have repeatedly reiterated that a mandate is “an order of this Court

which must be followed without deviation.” Griner v. Griner, 282 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (¶12)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2019). “Where [an appellate court] has already decided a specific issue in

a case on a prior appeal, the trial court has been found to be in error where, on remand, it has

refused to follow [the appellate court’s] opinion and directions.” Nelson v. Bonner 13 So.

3d 880, 883 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). The trial court has no discretion whether to follow

a mandate. Griner, at 1247 (¶13).

¶20. This may appear harsh, but prior to the trial court’s hearing on remand, there are

opportunities for a party to challenge an appellate ruling. A party who disputes the ruling of

the appellate court may challenge it by filing a motion for rehearing pursuant to Rule 40(a)

of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure,which states:

A motion for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after a decision is handed
down on the merits of a case by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
The motion shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which, in the
opinion of the movant, the court has overlooked or misapprehended and shall
contain such argument in support of the motion as movant desires to present.
The motion for rehearing should be used to call attention to specific errors of

9
law or fact which the opinion is thought to contain; the motion for rehearing
is not intended to afford an opportunity for a mere repetition of the argument
already considered by the court. Oral argument in support of the motion will
not be permitted.

M.R.A.P. 40(a). “The purpose of a motion for rehearing is to provide this Court an

opportunity to correct any errors on issues already presented and decided.” White v. State,

761 So. 2d 221, 225 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

¶21. If a party fails to file such a motion within the time allotted time, the judgment of the

appellate court becomes res judicata with respect to the parties. Dunn v. Dunn, 853 So. 2d

1150, 1153 (¶10) (Miss. 2003). For example, in Griner, in a prior appeal, we ordered the

wife to pay all costs of the appeal. Griner, at 1247 (¶10). The husband filed a motion for

rehearing, but the wife did not. Id. at (¶11). On remand, the husband filed a motion for

recovery of the appeal costs that we ordered the wife to pay. Id. at (¶14). The chancery court

failed to assess the wife with the appellate fees and we reversed, saying that “the chancery

court did not the discretion to ignore the mandate.” Id. at 1248 (¶16). The wife had not

sought rehearing when we reached the decision, so she could not challenge our findings or

mandate thereafter. Id.

¶22. Further, a mandate issued by an appellate court becomes the law of the case:

This doctrine dictates that a mandate issued by this Court is binding on the trial
court on remand, unless the case comes under one of the exceptions to the law
of the case doctrine. Exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are material
changes in evidence, pleadings or findings, or the need for the Court to depart
from its former decision after mature consideration so that unjust results will
not occur.

City of Hernando v. N. Miss. Util. Co., 3 So. 3d 775, 786 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)

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(citations omitted). But, “if the facts are different, so that the principles of law announced

on the first appeal are not applicable, as where there are material changes in the evidence,

pleadings, or findings, a prior decision is not conclusive upon questions presented on the

subsequent appeal.” Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Travis, 106 So. 3d 320, 326 (¶13) (Miss. 2012)

(quoting Fortune v. Lee Cty Bd. of Supervisors, 725 So. 2d 747, 751 (¶6) (Miss.1998); see

also Griner, 282 So. 3d at 1250 (¶23-24) (“Whatever is once established as the controlling

legal rule of decision, between the same parties in the same case, continues to be the law of

the case, so long as there is a similarity of facts.”).

¶23. In the case at hand, the lease-purchase option contained in the Ing-Adams rental

agreement gave Ing the opportunity to purchase the building “at [its] appraised value.” The

provision did not specify what appraised value the parties intended—whether one determined

by a commercial real estate appraiser or one prepared by a residential appraiser. Nor did the

provision include any conditions such as Ing’s ability or inability to secure financing.

¶24. Ing took no steps to include the alternative appraisal that he obtained in July 2016 in

the record in the prior appeal. He could have added it between the bench trial in May and

the chancery court’s judgment in December so that it could be reviewed by us in the first

appeal. At oral argument, Ing’s attorney told us there was a second appraisal, but he did not

say that the value was different. He agreed that if this Court ruled that the purchase price

would be $350,000, there was foundation in the record for us to do so. We did so rule in our

opinion in May 2018. While our mandates should not improperly “usurp the role of fact-

finder,” Estate of Burgess v. Trotter, 6 So. 3d 1109, 1115 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), Ing

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had an opportunity to advise us of the existence of another appraisal that disputed the

$350,000 value even during oral argument. But he did not.

¶25. Thereafter, although Ing was aware that this Court had set the sales price and that he

he had obtained an assessed value in July 2016 that was less than $350,000, Ing took no steps

to seek re-hearing from us on the matter. Nor did he seek a writ of certiorari from the

Supreme Court or move for a stay of the mandate in order to do so, as is allowed under Rule

41 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure.2 Because Ing sought no further

consideration from the appellate courts on the issue, the sales price was set by our previous

opinion and mandate.

2
Relevant portions of Rule 41 include:

(b) Date of Issuance: Court of Appeals. Unless otherwise ordered, the
mandate of the Court of Appeals shall issue 21 days after the latest of: the
entry of judgment; the disposition of a timely motion for rehearing; or the
denial or dismissal of a petition for certiorari review in the Supreme Court. If
the Mississippi Supreme Court grants certiorari review, the mandate shall
issue in accordance with Rule 41(a).

(c) Stay of Mandate Pending Application for Certiorari. A stay of the mandate
pending application to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
may be granted upon motion, reasonable notice of which shall be given to all
parties. The stay shall not exceed 90 days unless the period is extended for
cause shown. If during the period of the stay there is filed with the clerk of
Supreme Court a notice from the clerk of the United States Supreme Court
that the party who has obtained the stay has filed a petition for the writ in that
Court, the stay shall continue until final disposition by that Court. Upon the
filing of a copy of an order of the United States Supreme Court denying the
petition for writ of certiorari, the mandate shall issue immediately. A bond or
other security may be required as a condition to the grant or continuance of a
stay of the mandate.

M.R.A.P. 41.

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¶26. Ing contends that after the first appeal, his case became one of contesting appraisals

as in Crow v. Crow Sports Center, 119 So. 3d 352 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). We disagree. In

Crow, the lease-purchase option read that the sales price would be determined “by an

appraisal by a licensed real estate appraiser.” Id. at 354 (¶2). The controversy arose when

the parties each obtained qualifying appraisals that differed sharply. Id. (¶3-4). The

chancery court judge had to choose one and from that choice, the losing party appealed. Id.

at 355 (¶7-8). Because of the wide disparities in the values of the appraisals, we reversed the

decision and ordered the chancery court to obtain an independent appraisal and rehear the

matter. Id. at 356 (¶15). The difference between Crow and this case is obvious. In this

case, the sales price was decided and set as a result of the first appeal. There was nothing

more for the chancery court to do but enforce the mandate, which it did.

¶27. Ing further invokes the exception to the “law of the case doctrine,” arguing that the

appraisals secured by the banks after remand are “new evidence” that relieved the chancery

court of its obligation to enforce our mandate. We disagree. It is undisputed that the same

parties are involved, and despite Ing’s claims, there is a similarity of facts. At the time of the

first appeal, and even before that, prior to the chancery court’s first opinion in this case, Ing

had secured an appraisal which valued the property at $255,000. Ing did not present that

figure to the chancery court before it made its decision, nor did Ing present it to us before we

made ours. On remand, one of Ing’s banks secured the same appraisal from the same

appraiser Ing had used. Thus, there were no “new” facts developed after we issued our

mandate—just different documents reflecting the same fact, i.e., that the property may be

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worth less than the $350,000 appraisal. That Ing could not secure financing at the $350,000

is an irrelevant fact, because the option provision in the lease agreement was not conditioned

on Ing being able to do so. There being the same parties and similar facts, our prior mandate

stands as the law of the case and the chancery court did not err in enforcing it.

II. Whether the circuit court erred in finding that Ing was not an
equitable owner and owed back rent from June 2015.

¶28. The circuit court held that Ing had “failed to tender any money and has not purchased

the building from the Plaintiff” yet he continued to occupy the building. The circuit court

pointed to a footnote in our first opinion that stated “in the event that Ing fails to meet his

obligations to tender the purchase price and close on the contract, the issue of holdover rent

would have to be revisited.” The court then ordered that Ing be immediately evicted no later

than June 16, 2019. It further ordered that Ing pay holdover rent in the amount of $2,500 per

month going back to the date of the expiration of the lease: January 27, 2015, through May

2019.

¶29. On appeal, Ing argues that the circuit court was in error because Ing claims he did not

breach any terms of the original lease agreement. In the alternative, he argues that it would

be inequitable for Adams to benefit from her own misdeeds. We disagree with Ing’s analysis

but reverse the circuit court’s assessment of back rent Ing owes.

¶30. In our prior decision, we reasoned that because Ing exercised his option, which

required only notification to Adams of his intent to do so, Ing became an “equitable owner”

of the property. Ing, 248 So. 3d at 887 (¶24). We said:

This point bears emphasis: at no point was [Ing] a holdover tenant. Thus, no

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holdover rent was due by law, as [Ing] was the equitable owner of the property
and was not a holdover tenant.

Id. at 887 (¶26).

¶31. It was Adams’s refusal to convey the property to Ing that warranted our ruling on

Ing’s status. We referenced the case of Fairchild v. Bilbo, 166 So. 3d 601, 607 (¶16) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2015), which found that “because it was the landlord that breached the contract,

the tenants are not in default for discontinuing their monthly payments.” Just as our mandate

set the sales price for the building, our opinion established that between January 27, 2015 and

the time Ing failed to close on the building, he was an equitable owner and owed no back rent

up to that time.

¶32. On remand, however, Ing’s status changed. After our opinion and mandate, Adams

no longer refused to sell the property to Ing. To the contrary, Adams moved the circuit court

to set a date for closing the sale. Adams was no longer in breach of contract. Neither was

Ing until he failed to close by the August 28, 2018 deadline. At that point, Ing lost his

equitable ownership status and became a tenant holding over on his lease. Accordingly, we

find no error by the circuit court in finding that Ing owes Adams back rent.

¶33. But we do find error in the circuit court’s calculation of the back rent owed. To assess

the amount, the circuit court went back to the end of lease when Ing first exercised his option

to purchase: January 27, 2015. The total from that date through May 2019 amounted to

$130,000,3 and the circuit court awarded Adams a judgment for that amount. However, Ing

3
The circuit court calculated back rent owed for fifty-two months at $2,500 per
month.

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was a equitable owner for part of that time, and the circuit court should have calculated rent

from the time Ing lost that status, i.e., from the time he failed to close, August 28, 2018,

forward. Assuming Ing vacated the premises, or was evicted by June 16, 2019, as the circuit

court ordered, the back rent amount Ing owes is ten months at $2,500 per month,4 or

$25,000.5 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court for the amount of the

back rent owed and render judgment for Adams in the amount of $25,000.

Conclusion

¶34. Because Ing failed to challenge this court’s opinion and mandate, we find no error by

the circuit court in enforcing our mandate that Ing purchase the building at the price of

$350,000. When Ing failed to close on the property, Ing no longer held “equitable

ownership” status and became a holdover tenant liable for future rent. We affirm the circuit

court’s finding Ing as such, but we reverse and render on the amount of back rent Ing owes,

4
Adams did not cross appeal the monthly rental amount that the circuit court used in
calculating the back rent owed. Technically, as a holdover tenant, Ing could have been
charged double rent under Mississippi Code Annotated section 89-7-25 (Rev. 2011):

When a tenant, . . . shall fail or refuse to quit the demised premises and deliver
up the same . . . he shall . . . thenceforward pay to the landlord double the rent
which he should otherwise have paid. . .

Miss. Code Ann. § 89-7-25. Here Adams did not challenge the circuit court’s use of the
$2,500 per month figure, nor cross-appeal the issue. Accordingly, Ing is only required to
pay $2,500 per month for the period of time after failing to close that he remained in the
building.
5
If Ing did not vacate the building by June 16, 2019, as required in the circuit court’s
eviction order, further rent at the rate of $2,500 per month would accrue until he did.

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reducing it from $130,000 to $25,000.6

¶35. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR.

6
The circuit court’s May 24, 2019 order does not deal with the $30,000 in bond funds
being held by the Farese Law Firm. If not already distributed, said funds may be used by
Ing to pay the back rent owed.

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