Mark Allen Williams a/k/a Mark A. Williams a/k/a Mark Williams v. State of Mississippi;

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2018-KA-00631-COA

MARK ALLEN WILLIAMS A/K/A MARK A. APPELLANT
WILLIAMS A/K/A MARK WILLIAMS

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/16/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEWIS-BLACKMON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: YAZOO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JAMES H. POWELL III
RICHARD T. STARRETT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: AKILLIE MALONE OLIVER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 02/25/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A Yazoo County grand jury indicted Mark Williams for two counts of simple assault

against a law-enforcement officer. A jury convicted Williams of Count I but found him not

guilty of Count II. The Yazoo County Circuit Court fined Williams $500 and sentenced him

to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with

three years to serve, two years suspended, and two years of supervised probation. On appeal,

Williams raises the following issues: (1) he was denied his constitutional and statutory rights
to a speedy trial; (2) the circuit court erroneously excluded the testimony of his treating

psychiatrist Dr. Sudhakar Madakasira; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (4)

the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence his pretrial statement to law enforcement;

(5) the circuit court erroneously refused his jury instruction on the right to defend against an

unlawful arrest; and (6) cumulative error entitles him to a new trial.

¶2. Upon review, we find that it was error to exclude Dr. Madakasira’s expert testimony

and that, coupled with the acts of prosecutorial misconduct contained in the record, these

issues constitute reversible error. We therefore reverse Williams’s conviction and sentence

and remand this case to the circuit court for a new trial on the merits. Even though we find

reversible error on these grounds, we must also address Williams’s speedy-trial arguments.

See Newell v. State, 175 So. 3d 1260, 1267-68 (¶5) (Miss. 2015). In so doing, we find that

Williams waived his statutory right to a speedy trial and that his constitutional claim to a

speedy trial lacks merit. After considering Williams’s remaining claims, we find they also

lack merit. We therefore decline to further address those assignments of error on appeal.

FACTS

¶3. At the time of his arrest on April 19, 2014, Williams worked as a supervisor at a

chemical plant, where he had been employed for thirty-two years. Williams and his wife

Douglas had been married for thirty-three years, and during their marriage, they had two

daughters, Lauren and Kristen. At Williams’s trial, Douglas testified that she began to notice

after the first year of marriage that Williams would go into rages for no apparent reason.

Douglas stated that Kristen had also experienced her own terrible rages before her suicide

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in 2003. According to Douglas, she “lost” Williams as soon as they buried Kristen. Douglas

testified that Williams “ended up being unable to stop crying night[ and] day. He couldn’t

. . . move.” Williams eventually sought treatment from a psychiatrist and was admitted for

inpatient treatment at Saint Dominic’s behavioral health center for about two weeks.

Douglas testified that Williams then went to outpatient care at Psycamore, a psychiatric

treatment facility, where he received treatment all day every weekday for about three months.

After Williams’s release from Psycamore, Douglas testified that he was calmer for about six

months.

¶4. The week before Williams’s arrest on Saturday, April 19, 2014, Douglas testified that

Williams seemed angry about something but that he would not discuss the issue with her or

their daughter, Lauren. Douglas recalled advising Lauren that something was wrong with

Williams and that Lauren should stay out of his way. That Thursday evening, Williams

drove to Best Buy to return an item. Douglas testified that Williams was angry when he left

the house. When Williams returned home, he told Douglas that he had hit a pole in front of

Best Buy with his truck. Douglas looked outside and observed a dent in the side of

Williams’s truck. When Douglas questioned Williams the next morning about what had

happened at Best Buy, Williams appeared to have no recollection of the previous night’s

events. Douglas testified that Williams usually either did not recollect or would have trouble

remembering what had occurred during his rage episodes.

¶5. When Williams returned home from work that Friday evening, Douglas testified that

he once again became angry. Douglas testified that Williams hit her in the face and threw

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Lauren against the kitchen counter. Until that Friday evening, Douglas stated that Williams

had never before hit her or ever come close to hitting her. When Lauren asked why Williams

was acting so crazy, Williams responded, “I will show y’all crazy.” Williams then walked

toward the bedroom. Afraid that Williams was headed for his gun case, Douglas and Lauren

got into their cars and tried to leave. When they reached the gate at the end of their

driveway, they found Williams’s truck blocking their way. As Lauren moved Williams’s

truck, Douglas testified that they heard a gunshot from the direction of the house. Although

they feared that Williams might have shot himself, Douglas and Lauren drove to the home

of Douglas’s sister, Lelouise Davis, for help.

¶6. Douglas and Lauren shared with Lelouise their fear that Williams had shot himself.

Lelouise, a nurse practitioner, returned to the Williamses’ house with Douglas and Lauren,

but the women saw no signs of Williams in the yard. Lelouise testified that she entered the

home first and found Williams sitting in his underwear. Lelouise further testified that

Williams was normally “a modest individual” and that “for him to sit in front of me in

underwear with no clothes was very unusual.” When Lelouise asked Williams what was

going on, Williams did not appear to know what she meant. Williams simply sat in his chair

staring at the wall with his gun leaning nearby. Williams eventually stood up, got dressed,

and left the house. Douglas testified that she and Lauren barricaded themselves inside

Lauren’s bedroom for the night and that they did not see Williams again until the next day.

¶7. The following morning, on Saturday, April 19, 2014, Douglas drove to her in-laws’

home to check on her sick mother-in-law. Douglas asked Tonya Cresswell, a friend and

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neighbor, to be on standby in case anything happened while Douglas was gone. Douglas

later called Tonya back and asked if Tonya would drive to the Williamses’ house to check

on Lauren. Tonya testified that a hysterical Lauren met her when she arrived at the

Williamses’ house and that Lauren stated her father was “going crazy.” Tonya looked

outside and observed Williams speeding around the yard in his truck. Tonya testified that

Williams kept “going from one place to another outside and getting in his truck and getting

out of his truck.” Tonya also characterized Williams’s behavior as “crazy” and testified that

she could not tell what he was trying to do.

¶8. Douglas testified that she arrived home around 1:30 p.m. that Saturday after Lauren

called her and stated that Williams was again acting crazy. In addition to Tonya, Douglas

had asked her sister and her brother-in-law, Francis and Chuck Dawkins, to come help her

with Williams. Francis confirmed during her testimony that Douglas had asked her and

Chuck to come over because Williams had gone crazy. When the Dawkinses arrived at the

Williamses’ house, Francis testified that she “watched . . . [Williams] drive crazy around the

yard. And he flew through the pasture and up the driveway across the actual part of the yard

over to the side of the house. He was just driving like a maniac.”

¶9. At Francis’s urging, Chuck got into Williams’s truck. Williams and Chuck drove over

to where Williams had ripped up about thirty or forty feet of fencing, and Chuck asked why

Williams had torn down those sections of the fence. Williams responded that the men’s

father-in-law had told Williams to get his stuff off the father-in-law’s land. Williams told

Chuck that he was therefore moving his dog pen off the father-in-law’s land. Williams

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further claimed that the fence’s gate had been too narrow to move the dog pen through so he

had torn down some of the fencing to create a wider opening. Chuck testified, however, that

the dog pen could have been transported through the fence’s double gate without tearing

down the sections of fence. Despite Williams’s unusual behavior, Chuck began to help

Williams move the pieces of the dog pen. While the men were working, Douglas came over

and stated that her father had never told Williams that he had to move the dog pen. Chuck

testified that he did not remember Williams give Douglas any type of response. Instead,

Williams simply kept working to move the dog pen.

¶10. After the men moved the dog pen, Francis got into the truck to speak to Williams

while Chuck stood by the porch. Francis testified that Williams was a great guy and had

always been wonderful to her. Francis stated that she hoped to help Williams by speaking

with him and urging him to seek treatment. Francis commented on the crazy way Williams

was driving and acting, and she asked Williams what he was doing. Francis testified that in

response to her comments and question, Williams got a “weird” look on his face and asked

her what she meant. Francis stated that she again told Williams he was not acting normally

and that they needed to get him some help. Francis testified that she was scared for Williams

and felt as though the day in question was a “pretty critical” time for Williams. She stated

that Williams told her that at 3 p.m. no one would have to worry about him anymore and that

he would no longer be a problem. As she was urging Williams to seek treatment, Francis

stated that deputies from the Yazoo County Sheriff’s Department arrived. Francis testified

that Williams drove so quickly across the lawn to where the deputies had parked that he

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scared her. When Williams stopped his truck by the deputies, Chuck yelled for Francis to

get out of the truck. Francis exited the truck and joined Chuck by the porch.

¶11. Douglas testified that she had called 911 to request assistance in dealing with her

husband. Douglas stated that she told the 911 operator that Williams was pulling up the

concrete fence posts that corralled her father’s cattle and that he appeared to be going crazy.

According to Douglas, she informed the operator that Williams had never been the same after

Kristen’s suicide, that Williams was sick, and that she needed help getting him somewhere

for treatment. Douglas testified that Williams’s actions during the week leading up to his

arrest were not rational, and she stated that in her opinion, Williams did not know what he

was doing on the day in question.

¶12. Deputy Loraine Hudson responded to Douglas’s 911 call. According to Deputy

Hudson, the dispatcher reported that the caller had claimed Williams was not taking his

antidepressant medication and had been drinking. Upon arriving at the Williamses’ house,

Deputy Hudson testified that Douglas approached her and stated that Williams was taking

street drugs and “had been on street drugs the whole weekend and that he had torn down . . .

her father’s fence.” Deputy Michael Wilson, who also responded to the 911 call, similarly

testified that Douglas told the deputies Williams was on drugs and had been drinking.

¶13. The deputies both testified that Williams drove up to the house after they arrived and

that Deputy Wilson stated they wanted to speak with him. The deputies testified that

Williams then cursed at them and drove away. With the deputies following him in their

respective vehicles, Williams drove to a shed across the street from his house and parked his

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truck. Testimony reflected that Deputy Wilson arrived at the shed next, followed by Deputy

Hudson, and finally, by Chuck.

¶14. Deputy Wilson testified that after he exited his vehicle, Williams charged toward him

in a rage and eventually knocked him to the ground. Both deputies testified that Williams

got on top of Deputy Wilson and began to fight with him. Deputy Wilson stated that

Williams grabbed his (Deputy Wilson’s) neck and tried to force his head toward the ground.

As the two men rolled around on the ground, Deputy Wilson testified that they bit each

other’s hands. Deputy Hudson testified that Williams was on top of Deputy Wilson at one

point and was “[j]ust pounding” Deputy Wilson. Deputy Hudson climbed on Williams’s

back to try to get him off Deputy Wilson, but Williams managed to throw her off his back.

The deputies testified that Williams abruptly stopped fighting, got up, and headed in the

direction of his shed.

¶15. Chuck stated that he arrived at the shed as Williams and the deputies were getting up

from the ground. Chuck, a retired state trooper, testified that he never witnessed Williams

assault anyone. Both deputies testified that Deputy Wilson told Williams to stop walking

toward his shed after the altercation but that Williams responded that the deputies would

have to tase him. The deputies further stated that after Williams refused to stop walking

toward his shed, Deputy Wilson tased him. Chuck testified, however, that he never heard

either deputy order Williams to stop and that Deputy Wilson instead tased Williams in the

back.

¶16. After being tased, Williams fell to the ground. Chuck stated that he then identified

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himself to the deputies and recommended that they restrain Williams before Williams

regained consciousness. Deputy Wilson managed to place one handcuff on Williams before

Williams recovered and stood back up.

¶17. Deputy Wilson testified that he backed away from Williams, and thinking that

Williams was about to charge him again, he dropped his taser and drew his gun. The

deputies and Chuck all testified that Williams told Deputy Wilson to shoot him and stated

that Deputy Wilson did not have the “balls” to shoot him. Deputy Wilson testified that even

though his gun was drawn, Williams steadily walked toward him with a smile on his face.

The deputies testified that Chuck advised them not to shoot because Williams wanted to

commit “suicide by cop.” The deputies stated that Williams finally stopped approaching

Deputy Wilson and allowed Deputy Hudson to place the other handcuff on him.

¶18. As a result of the altercation with Williams, Deputy Wilson suffered torn ligaments

in his right shoulder that required surgery. Both deputies described Williams as being in a

state of rage when they interacted with him, but they both stated that they had done nothing

to enrage Williams or to cause him to curse at or charge them. Deputy Wilson testified that

blood tests performed on Williams after his arrest showed no street drugs or alcohol in

Williams’s system. Although Deputy Wilson stated that he did not consider Williams’s

conduct at the time of the altercation to be normal, he further testified that he had

encountered many suspects over the course of his career who displayed abnormal behavior

during their interactions with law enforcement. Chuck testified, however, that on the day of

the altercation Williams “was not the normal Mark” he had known for the past thirty-plus

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years and that Williams “was not in his right mind.” Chuck further stated that he had “never

seen . . . [Williams] act like he acted that day” and that Williams had been “out of control.”

¶19. Yazoo County Sheriff Jacob Sheriff arrived at Williams’s home and transported

Williams to jail. Sheriff testified that during the drive Williams voluntarily gave him an

unprompted statement about the altercation. Sheriff stated that Williams apologized for the

trouble he had caused the deputies and expressed regret that he had not stopped when the

deputies commanded him to do so. Sheriff testified, however, that Williams was smiling and

smirking as he made the statement.

¶20. Investigator William Gilmore interviewed Williams two days after the altercation

occurred. After Williams waived his Miranda1 rights, Investigator Gilmore took Williams’s

statement, which the State introduced into evidence. Williams told Investigator Gilmore that

he had been disassembling a large dog pen when the two deputies arrived at his house. When

Williams drove by the deputies, they asked to speak to him. Williams told the deputies that

he did not have time to speak to them and that he had work to do. Williams stated that he

then drove to his shed to get what he needed to repair his fence. The two deputies followed

Williams to the shed and told him he was under arrest. Williams stated that he “was hot,

tired, and irritated” by that point and that he cursed at the deputies even though he knew

better. Williams also admitted to fighting with Deputy Wilson. Investigator Gilmore

testified that Williams “was laughing the whole time he gave me the statement” and that

Williams “thought it was funny.”

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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¶21. Following his release from jail, Williams returned to Saint Dominic’s behavioral

health center for treatment. Douglas testified that Williams then returned to Psycamore for

intensive outpatient treatment with Dr. Madakasira, whom Williams was still seeing at the

time of trial. Douglas testified that Williams started to receive a monthly Abilify shot and

that his rage episodes had stopped.

¶22. Four days prior to the August 28, 2017 trial, the State moved to exclude Dr.

Madakasira’s expert testimony about Williams’s sanity at the time of the altercation. The

State asserted that Dr. Madakasira’s opinions failed to comply with the M’Naghten2 test

utilized in Mississippi criminal cases to prove insanity and that his opinions were therefore

neither relevant nor reliable. Following a hearing on the State’s motion, the circuit court

concluded that Dr. Madakasira’s testimony relied on an “inappropriate standard for

determining whether a defendant was insane at the time of the crime.” The circuit court

therefore granted the State’s motion to exclude Dr. Madakasira’s testimony.

¶23. After the circuit court excluded Dr. Madakasira’s testimony, Williams retained

psychiatrist Dr. Mark Webb to examine and evaluate him. At trial, the circuit court accepted

Dr. Webb as an expert in psychiatry. In addition to his court testimony, Dr. Webb provided

a written report about his evaluation of Williams. The defense entered Dr. Webb’s report

into evidence. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Webb concluded to a reasonable degree of

probability that at the time of the alleged crime, “Williams was psychotic[;] was in a bipolar

manic state that was characterized by irrational thoughts, irrational behavior, inappropriate

2
M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Clark & F. 200.

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activities[;] and basically as a result of all of that[, Williams was] unable to understand and

comprehend the quality of his actions . . . .” Dr. Webb further opined that Williams was

unable at the time of the altercation to “know the difference between right and wrong.”

¶24. On rebuttal, Dr. Criss Lott testified for the State. The circuit court accepted Dr. Lott

as an expert in clinical forensic psychology. Upon the circuit court’s order, Dr. Lott had

evaluated Williams’s “ability to stand trial, his mental state at the time of the alleged

offenses, and other questions regarding his ability to waive his rights, and whether . . . his

capacity to form his conduct was impaired at the time of the alleged offenses.” Dr. Lott did

not dispute that Williams had “a genuine mental illness” or that Williams had bipolar

disorder. In addition, Dr. Lott agreed that on the day in question Williams “was very

agitated” and “may [even] have been manic . . . .” Dr. Lott opined, however, that while

Williams’s mental disorder significantly impaired his judgment and behavior, Williams still

clearly knew the nature and quality of his actions, the difference between right and wrong,

and that his actions at the time of the altercation were wrong. Unlike Dr. Webb, Dr. Lott

concluded that Williams failed to meet the criteria for legal insanity at the time in question.

¶25. After considering all the evidence and testimony, the jury found Williams guilty of

Count I, simple assault against Deputy Wilson, but not guilty of Count II, simple assault

against Deputy Hudson. The circuit court sentenced Williams to five years in MDOC’s

custody, with three years to serve, two years suspended, and two years of supervised

probation. The circuit court fined Williams $500 and credited him for the five days he had

already served in jail. In addition, the circuit court ordered Williams to undergo a mental-

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health evaluation and treatment. Williams filed an unsuccessful motion for a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. Aggrieved, Williams appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Speedy Trial

a. Statutory Right

¶26. Williams alleges that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. Mississippi

Code Annotated section 99-17-1 (Rev. 2015) provides that “[u]nless good cause be shown,

and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented

to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has

been arraigned.” As we have previously recognized, though, “if a defendant fails to raise the

statutory right to a speedy trial within 270 days of his arraignment, he acquiesces to the

delay.” Ford v. State, 281 So. 3d 1109, 1114 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). The Mississippi

Supreme Court has likewise held that “a defendant may effectively waive his right to

complain of not being tried within the 270-day period set out in [section] 99-17-1[] when the

defendant does not request or assert his right to a speedy trial or object to a delay, especially

when the defendant fails to show any prejudice in the failure to be tried within the statutory

270-day period.” Guice v. State, 952 So. 2d 129, 142 (¶28) (Miss. 2007).

¶27. Here, the 270-day period began to run on August 25, 2015, when Williams waived

arraignment. Williams’s trial did not start until April 9, 2018, which was clearly more than

270 days later. However, Williams also failed to raise his statutory right to a speedy trial

until his appeal to this Court. We therefore find that Williams waived his statutory right to

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be tried within 270 days of arraignment.

b. Constitutional Right

¶28. Williams also asserts a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. For all

criminal prosecutions, our federal and state constitutions provide that “the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI; accord Miss. Const.

art. 3, § 26. To determine if a defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial right has been violated,

we consider the following four factors: “1) the length of delay, 2) the reason for the delay,

3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and 4) prejudice to the defendant.”

Ford, 281 So. 3d at 1114 (¶17) (quoting Collins v. State, 232 So. 3d 739, 744 (¶18) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2017)). “[C]ourts must engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process of the

four factors because none of the factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the

finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. Instead, the factors are related “and

must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Id.

1. Length of Delay

¶29. “The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of a formal indictment

or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to a criminal

charge.” Collins, 232 So. 3d at 745 (¶19) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our supreme

court “has previously held that a delay of eight months or more is presumptively prejudicial.”

Id. Because the delay in Williams’s case was well over eight months, this factor weighs

against the State.

2. Reasons for the Delay

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¶30. “Once the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial, the burden shifts to the State to

produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the legitimacy of

these reasons.” Id. at (¶20). We “must then determine whether the delay is attributable to

the State or the defendant.” Id. In addition, we assign “different weights . . . to different

reasons for delay.” Rowsey v. State, 188 So. 3d 486, 495 (¶25) (Miss. 2015). For instance,

we weigh heavily against the State any delays the State intentionally causes “for the purpose

of depriving a criminal defendant of his or her constitutional rights[,]” whereas we weigh less

heavily against the State “[d]elays for good cause, [such as] a continuance for the purpose

of finding a missing witness . . . .” Id. By contrast, “continuances sought on behalf of the

defendant toll the speedy[-]trial clock.” Id.

¶31. Between the time of Williams’s arrest on April 19, 2014, and the start of his trial

almost four years later on April 9, 2018, the State moved three times to continue the

matter—once to allow Dr. Lott to conduct a mental evaluation of Williams and twice due to

the unavailability of key witnesses. The record reflects that Williams twice moved for his

own continuances—the first time was due to the State’s alleged delay in providing requested

discovery, and the second time was due to Dr. Madakasira’s unavailability on the scheduled

trial date. Because both parties filed their continuances for good cause, we find this factor

to be neutral.

3. Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial

¶32. “The failure to assert the right to a speedy trial ‘will make it difficult for a defendant

to prove he was denied a speedy trial.’” Collins, 232 So. 3d at 745 (¶24) (quoting Fisher v.

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State, 532 So. 2d 992, 996 (Miss. 1988)). As previously discussed, Williams’s first mention

of his right to a speedy trial occurred in his appellate brief. Accordingly, we find this factor

weighs against Williams.

4. Prejudice

¶33. “To determine whether the delay resulted in actual prejudice[,] the Court considers

three interests that the right to a speedy trial was meant to protect: ‘(i) to prevent oppressive

pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit

the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’” Ford, 281 So. 3d at 1116 (¶25) (quoting

Collins, 232 So. 3d at 746 (¶26)). Williams bears the burden to show actual prejudice “since

the defendant is clearly in the best position to show prejudice under this factor.” Id.

¶34. Williams was released on bond four days after his arrest. His argument therefore does

not focus on the first consideration under the “prejudice” prong. As to the second interest

regarding the accused’s anxiety and concern, Williams merely states, without expounding or

pointing to any supporting evidence, that his “anxiety and concern over the pending charges,

over the four[-]year delay, was exacerbated by his severe mental disorder.” The focus of

Williams’s argument instead appears to be the impairment his defense experienced due to the

delay. Williams argues that the delays in proceeding to trial clearly prejudiced him because,

had his trial occurred earlier, he would have had the benefit of Dr. Madakasira’s testimony.

Williams’s argument assumes, however, that the State would not have moved to exclude Dr.

Madakasira’s testimony had the trial begun earlier. No evidentiary support for this

assumption exists in the record. Because Williams has failed to show an actual prejudice

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resulting from the delay in proceeding to trial, we must conclude that this factor weighs

against Williams.

¶35. In summary, we find that the length of the delay weighs against the State while the

reasons for the delay weigh in neither party’s favor. But because Williams never raised the

issue of a speedy trial before the circuit court and because he now fails to articulate any

actual prejudice resulting from the delay, we find these factors weigh against Williams. In

balancing these four factors, we conclude that no violation of Williams’s constitutional right

to a speedy trial occurred. We therefore find that this issue lacks merit.

II. Expert Testimony

¶36. Williams argues the circuit court erred by excluding Dr. Madakasira’s testimony about

his lack of sanity at the time of the altercation. We review the admission or exclusion of

evidence, including expert testimony, for abuse of discretion. Emergency Med. Assocs. of

Jackson PLLC v. Glover, 189 So. 3d 1247, 1260 (¶60) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “Unless this

Court concludes that a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence was arbitrary and

clearly erroneous, that decision will stand.” Id. (quoting Watts v. Radiator Specialty Co., 990

So. 2d 143, 145-46 (¶7) (Miss. 2008)). We may only reverse “if the admission or exclusion

of evidence results in prejudice and harm or adversely affects a substantial right of a party.”

Chaupette v. State, 136 So. 3d 1041, 1045 (¶7) (Miss. 2014).

¶37. On January 4, 2016, Williams filed a notice that he intended to present an insanity

defense. In asserting insanity as a defense to his charges, Williams provided the State with

Dr. Madakasira’s November 23, 2015 letter in which Dr. Madakasira stated that Williams

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suffered from previously undiagnosed and untreated bipolar disorder. Dr. Madakasira opined

in his letter that Williams “was suffering from temporary insanity as part of [his] untreated

bipolar condition on April 19, 2014[,] when he resisted and assaulted a police officer . . . .”

¶38. After receiving notice of Williams’s intention to assert an insanity defense, the State

filed no response claiming a defect in Dr. Madakasira’s opinion. Instead, on March 18, 2016,

the State moved to have Dr. Lott also examine Williams. The State further requested a

continuance to allow time for the examination to take place. As an exhibit to its motion, the

State attached Dr. Madakasira’s November 23, 2015 letter. Following a hearing, the circuit

court granted the State’s motion for a mental evaluation. Dr. Lott examined Williams on

August 31, 2016.

¶39. On December 7, 2016, the circuit court granted the State’s ore tenus motion for a

continuance based on Dr. Lott’s unavailability on the date of trial. Without any objection

from the defense, the circuit court rescheduled Williams’s trial for April 3, 2017. In its order,

the circuit court noted “that the Defense will be allowed to call Dr. Sudhakar Madakasira,

MD, on April 4, 2017, even if it is necess[ary] for him to be called out of turn.” On March

17, 2017, the State again moved for a continuance based on Deputy Hudson’s unavailability

for trial. Later that month, on March 29, 2017, Williams also requested a continuance based

on Dr. Madakasira’s unavailability. By order dated March 29, 2017, the circuit court granted

Williams’s motion for a continuance. The circuit court rescheduled Williams’s trial for

August 28, 2017, and again stated that the defense would be allowed to call Dr. Madakasira

as a witness even if it was necessary to call him out of turn.

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¶40. On August 24, 2017, four days before trial, the State filed motions in limine to

exclude the testimony of three defense witnesses, including Dr. Madakasira’s expert

testimony about Williams’s lack of sanity at the time of the crime. At the hearing on the

State’s motion, Dr. Madakasira testified to his credentials and experience in psychiatry. Dr.

Madakasira then stated that he began treating Williams in May 2014, the month after the

altercation with the deputies. On direct examination, Dr. Madakasira opined that Williams

was unable on the day in question “to make a decision as to right or wrong in terms of what

he was doing.” Williams’s attorney asked whether Dr. Madakasira’s opinion as to

Williams’s inability to know right from wrong at the time of the altercation was to a

reasonable psychiatric probability, and Dr. Madakasira responded, “Yes, I would say so.”

Williams’s attorney then asked whether Dr. Madakasira’s opinion remained the same to a

reasonable psychiatric certainty, and Dr. Madakasira again answered, “Yes.”

¶41. On cross-examination, the State asked Dr. Madakasira to clarify whether his opinion

was based on Williams being “irrational” or “insane” at the time of the altercation. In

response, Dr. Madakasira stated that he wished to correct something he had written in his

November 23, 2015 letter. Dr. Madakasira explained that “[i]nsanity is a legal term” while

“irrational thinking is a medical psychiatric term.” Dr. Madakasira testified that he therefore

wished to correct the statement in his letter to provide that Williams “was temporarily out of

his mind, irrational thinking, with poor judgments and poor decision making” at the time of

the altercation with the deputies.

¶42. On redirect, Williams’s attorney asked the following:

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If the defendant was acting from a mental disease that existed to such a high
degree [so] as to overwhelm his reason, judgment, and conscience, then under
our legal definition he would be unable to distinguish right from wrong. In
your opinion, was he [(Williams)] acting from a mental disease . . . [that] he
had to such a high degree [so] as to overwhelm his reason, judgment, and
conscience, that he was unable under those circumstances under that definition
to form an opinion as to right and wrong?

In response, Dr. Madakasira stated, “I would say that he did not know right from wrong.”

¶43. After considering the parties’ arguments, the circuit court granted the State’s motion

to exclude Dr. Madakasira’s expert testimony. By order filed October 24, 2017, the circuit

court found that Dr. Madakasira’s testimony failed to comply with the M’Naghten test

applied by Mississippi courts and instead appeared to discuss diminished capacity, which

Mississippi fails to recognize as a defense to a criminal charge. The circuit court stated that

Dr. Madakasira relied “on impaired thinking, irrational thinking, and poor judgment”

throughout his testimony and that such a standard was inappropriate “for determining

whether a defendant was insane at the time of the crime.” The circuit court therefore

excluded Dr. Madakasira’s testimony.

¶44. As the circuit court correctly noted, Mississippi applies the M’Naghten test (rather

than a diminished-capacity standard) in criminal cases to determine whether a defendant was

legally insane at the time of the crime. See Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (¶46) (Miss.

2008). With regard to the applicable standard, the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained:

The M’Naghten test for determining insanity is whether the accused knew right
from wrong at the time the act was committed. Specifically, the Court has held
that [to] prove insanity under M’Naghten, it must be proven that, at the time
of the act, the accused was laboring under such defect of reason from disease
of the mind as (1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing
or (2) if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was

20
wrong.

Ealey v. State, 158 So. 3d 283, 293-94 (¶32) (Miss. 2015) (citations and internal quotation

mark omitted).

¶45. In Ballard v. State, 768 So. 2d 924, 925 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), the defendant,

Steven Ballard, faced multiple charges of simple assault against a law-enforcement officer.

Ballard asserted he was insane at the time the crime had occurred, and to support his claim,

he provided the written report of Dr. Joe Edward Morris, the clinical psychologist who had

evaluated him. Id. at 927 (¶8). In his report, Dr. Morris diagnosed Ballard with “major

depressive disorder with psychotic features[,]” and he opined that Ballard had experienced

a “temporary psychotic state [that] sprung from his deep depression.” Id. “The State, on the

ground[] of failure to disclose, objected to any opinion from Dr. Morris that Ballard could

not distinguish right from wrong on the day of the incident.” Id. at (¶9). During the

defense’s proffer, Dr. Morris opined that due to a psychotic state at the time of the incident,

Ballard knew neither the nature and quality of his acts nor right from wrong. Id. On cross-

examination, the State questioned whether the language Dr. Morris used in his written report

equaled that of the opinion he provided during the proffer. Id. Dr. Morris responded “that

it was not the same thing but that it inferred the same thing, [and] in the same breath[,] he

went on to state that he and the prosecutor were in a semantical quandary and that his report

used the terms ‘psychotic behavior’ and ‘break from reality’ as opposed to the legal terms

to which the [c]ourt referred as used in the M’Naghten definition for insanity.” Id.

¶46. The circuit court in Ballard excluded Dr. Morris’s expert testimony about Ballard’s

21
insanity on the day in question. Id. at 928 (¶10). The circuit court found that Dr. Morris’s

report offered a clinical diagnosis but provided no opinions as to Ballard’s ability to

understand the nature of his actions and to know the difference between right and wrong at

the time of the offenses. Id. In noting that an expert may not deviate from the contents of

his report without providing supplemental discovery before trial, the circuit court’s “ruling

hinged on the fact that Dr. Morris himself stated in his . . . [proffer] that an ‘inference’ was

necessary as a bridge from his report to his stated opinion.” Id. On appeal, this Court

reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 929 (¶13). In so doing, we stated:

Although it is evident that . . . [Dr. Morris’s] report did not use the magic
words for the M’Naghten test . . . [, the report] clearly notified to the State that
it was Ballard’s basis for his insanity defense.

....

To deny the defendant his substantial right to a fair trial on the basis of a ruling
which ultimately turned on a matter of semantics would indeed be an injustice.
The inference upon which the [c]ourt based its ruling was not one of substance
but of form.

Id. at 928 (¶¶11-12) (citation omitted).

¶47. Similar to our holding in Ballard, we find that Dr. Madakasira’s report may not have

used “the magic words for the M’Naghten test[,]” but his report still clearly notified the State

that Dr. Madakasira’s opinion formed the basis for Williams’s assertion of the insanity

defense. See id. As in Ballard, Dr. Madakasira and the State employed different terms when

referring to the effects of Williams’s mental condition on the day in question. However, a

review of Dr. Madakasira’s hearing testimony, especially his responses to the questions

posed by Williams’s attorney, shows that despite the difference in semantics, Dr.

22
Madakasira’s expert opinion clearly comported with the M’Naghten test.

¶48. During the hearing, Dr. Madakasira testified that he wished to correct the statement

contained in his November 23, 2015 letter to provide that Williams “was temporarily out of

his mind, irrational thinking, with poor judgments and poor decision making” at the time of

the altercation. As Dr. Madakasira further explained, however, “[i]nsanity is a legal term”

while “irrational thinking is a medical psychiatric term.” Although Dr. Madakasira used

psychiatric rather than legal terms to describe Williams’s condition and its effects on the day

in question, he still testified that to a reasonable psychiatric certainty, Williams’s condition

prevented Williams from “mak[ing] a decision as to right or wrong in terms of what he was

doing” at the time of the altercation. Dr. Madakasira reiterated this opinion at the end of his

testimony when, in response to a question from Williams’s attorney, he answered, “I would

say that he [(Williams)] did not know right from wrong.”

¶49. On appeal, Williams argues that the circuit court “took an unreasonably narrow view

of Dr. Madakasira’s testimony” in excluding the psychiatrist’s testimony for failure to

comply with the M’Naghten test. We agree. In accordance with M’Naghten, Dr. Madakasira

clearly opined that at the time of the altercation with the deputies, Williams’s mental disease

prevented him from knowing that his actions were wrong. See Ealey, 158 So. 3d at 293-94

(¶32).

¶50. As stated, we only reverse a circuit court’s exclusion of expert testimony when the

exclusion adversely affects a party’s substantial right. Chaupette, 136 So. 3d at 1045 (¶7).

Our caselaw establishes that “every accused has a fundamental right to have . . . [his] theory

23
of the case presented to a jury . . . .” Jones v. State, 281 So. 3d 137, 144 (¶18) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2019) (quoting Chinn v. State, 958 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (¶13) (Miss. 2007)). Here,

Williams’s theory of the case was that he was insane at the time of the altercation, and the

circuit court’s exclusion of Dr. Madakasira’s testimony prevented Williams from fully

presenting his theory of the case to the jury. As a result, we find that the circuit court

erroneously excluded Dr. Madakasira’s expert testimony.3

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶51. Williams also contends that throughout his trial, and particularly during Dr. Webb’s

cross-examination and during closing arguments, the State committed numerous acts of

prosecutorial misconduct. In a prior case involving reversal for the same district attorney’s

acts of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court stated:

Where prosecutorial misconduct endangers the fairness of a trial and the
impartial administration of justice, reversal must follow. The standard of
review which appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during
opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable
effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the
accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.
The purpose of a closing argument is to fairly sum up the evidence.
Prosecutors are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly
prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. The
prosecutor may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence, and he may
draw whatever deductions and inferences that seem proper to him from the
facts. Counsel cannot, however, state facts which are not in evidence, and
which the court does not judicially know, in aid of his evidence. Neither can
he appeal to the prejudices of men by injecting prejudices not contained in
some source of the evidence.

3
While a harmless-error analysis would normally be warranted due to the admission
of Dr. Webb’s testimony, we find that this error, in conjunction with the prosecutorial
misconduct directed at Dr. Webb’s testimony, as discussed in part III of this opinion, renders
such an analysis unnecessary.

24
Under the cumulative-error doctrine, individual errors, which are not
reversible in themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible
error, where the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a
fundamentally fair trial. The caselaw of our state allows an accumulation of
otherwise harmless error to result in reversal. Aggregate instances of
prosecutorial misconduct can lead to reversal.

White v. State, 228 So. 3d 893, 904-05 (¶¶28-29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

¶52. Upon review, we find that the district attorney made improper and prejudicial

comments throughout Williams’s trial. “While the comments may not be reversible standing

alone, the cumulative effect of the otherwise harmless errors warrants reversal.” Id. at 905

(¶30). We therefore reverse and remand based on this ground as well.

a. Comments During Dr. Webb’s Cross-Examination

¶53. During voir dire, the potential jurors were asked whether they knew Dr. Webb. One

woman, who was later empaneled as Juror 11, responded that she knew of Dr. Webb through

her work as a paralegal. The woman explained that when dealing with workers’

compensation cases, her law firm sometimes sent employees to Dr. Webb for a second

opinion. In reference to Juror 11’s voir dire statement, the district attorney questioned Dr.

Webb as follows on cross-examination:

[D]uring our voir dire section, the question was raised regarding you. And it
was stated . . . that you have a history in the profession that if you have a
doctor that you want to say whatever it is that you want him to say, then you’ll
call Dr. Webb. Is that kind of true regarding your reputation in the
community?

¶54. During the recess that followed Dr. Webb’s testimony, Juror 11 informed the circuit

judge that she did not make any such statement about Dr. Webb. After reviewing the

25
transcript, the circuit judge found that Juror 11 never made such a statement. Williams’s

attorney explained that he was having trouble hearing all the questioning due to the

courtroom’s acoustics and that he had not heard the district attorney’s question to Dr. Webb.

Williams’s attorney further stated that if he had heard the question, he would have objected

to it. Following the recess, the circuit court instructed the jury that in judging Dr. Webb’s

credibility, it must disregard the district attorney’s question because no such voir dire

statement had ever been made.

¶55. The district attorney also questioned Dr. Webb about research not in evidence that she

had obtained by conducting an Internet search. With regard to her out-of-court research, the

district attorney asked Dr. Webb the following:

I did a little Googling myself, you know, regarding a couple of cases. And
isn’t it true that in over 95 percent of the cases that you testify in, that . . .
[whoever] the person is . . . [who] hired you, that that’s pretty much the
opinion that you give based off the person . . . [who’s] hired you? If . . . they
hired you[,] then 95 percent of the cases that you’ve testified in, then that’s
pretty much your opinion?

¶56. Our caselaw holds that an attorney may not “state facts which are not in evidence, and

which the court does not judicially know, in aid of his evidence.” Wilson v. State, 194 So.

3d 855, 864 (¶30) (Miss. 2016). Williams’s attorney objected to the district attorney

questioning Dr. Webb with out-of-court evidence, but the circuit court overruled the

objection and stated that Dr. Webb could respond if he knew the answer.

¶57. While the district attorney’s comments during Dr. Webb’s cross-examination may not

have been sufficient, standing alone, to reverse Williams’s conviction and sentence, we find

that, when combined with the remaining acts of prosecutorial misconduct discussed below,

26
they resulted in cumulative error that deprived Williams of a fundamentally fair trial. See

White, 228 So. 3d at 905 (¶29).

b. Closing-Argument Comment on Dr. Webb’s Hiring
Date

¶58. Prior to closing arguments, Williams’s attorney moved to prohibit the State from

arguing that the jury should consider during its deliberations the late date at which Williams

retained Dr. Webb. Williams’s attorney pointed out that Dr. Madakasira had been prepared

from the outset to testify as to Williams’s lack of sanity and that Dr. Webb was retained three

months before trial only after the circuit court granted the State’s motion to exclude Dr.

Madakasira’s testimony. Williams’s attorney therefore argued that it would be improper and

unfairly prejudicial to the defense for the State to assert that Williams had purposely waited

until three months before trial to obtain an expert.

¶59. In denying the defense’s motion, the circuit court noted that Williams’s attorney raised

no objection when the district attorney questioned Dr. Webb on cross-examination about the

date on which Williams retained him. After the circuit court’s denial of Williams’s motion,

the following occurred during the district attorney’s closing argument:

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Now, they had Dr. Webb[,] and Dr. Webb, you
know, he had one opinion from Dr. Lott and four
months prior to this trial–

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, we object for the same reason stated
earlier.

THE COURT: Overruled.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Four months prior to the trial, that’s when he
came in and he told this court that he charged

27
$5,000. And he was not appointed by the Court.
He was hired by the Defendant. Dr. Lott was not
hired by the victims, and he was not hired by me.
The expert that came in to say that he wasn’t
insane was specifically hired by him.

¶60. On appeal, Williams contends the circuit court’s reason for denying his motion in

limine “was flawed because the Defendant’s objection was not to establishing the date [Dr.]

Webb had been hired but to unfairly using that date as a reason to disbelieve his [(Dr.

Webb’s)] opinion.” Williams agrees that no valid objection existed to the district attorney

asking the date on which Williams retained Dr. Webb. Williams argues, however, that “[t]he

proper objection, and the one [that] defense counsel made, was to the State unfairly arguing

that the jury should disbelieve Dr. Webb’s testimony because he was not consulted until

shortly before trial.”

¶61. In White, the State moved pretrial to prevent the defendant from using social-media

evidence to show that the victim was lying and that the alleged events never occurred. White,

228 So. 3d at 899-900 (¶13). The circuit court granted the State’s motion and excluded both

the social-media evidence and any references to such evidence. Id. at 908 (¶42). During

closing arguments, however, the State focused heavily on the defense’s failure to present

motive evidence that showed the victim had a reason to lie about the allegations. Id. On

appeal, this Court found that the State exploited the circuit court’s pretrial ruling excluding

the social-media evidence. Id. at (¶43). In so finding, we explained:

It is improper for a prosecuting attorney to comment on evidence
excluded by the court. Here, because the circuit court went to such lengths to
exclude evidence even remotely connected to the social-media evidence, the
defense was deprived of the ability to present evidence supporting the

28
defense’s theory regarding . . . [the victim’s] motive to fabricate the
allegations. Both the district attorney and the assistant district attorney used
the circuit court’s exclusion of the evidence to argue that the defense did not
provide evidence of . . . [the victim’s] motive for fabrication because none
existed. The exploitation of the court’s pretrial ruling in this manner was
misleading to the jury, prejudicial to the defendant, and improper under the
findings of this Court.

Id. at (¶44) (citation omitted).

¶62. In the present case, Williams filed a January 4, 2016 notice of his intent to assert an

insanity defense. The record further reflects that by March 18, 2016, the State had received

Dr. Madakasira’s opinion that Williams was temporarily insane at the time of the assault.

Despite having received ample notice of Williams’s insanity defense and Dr. Madakasira’s

opinion, the State waited until August 24, 2017, four days before trial, to move to exclude

Dr. Madakasira’s testimony. By order filed October 24, 2017, the circuit court granted the

State’s motion and excluded Dr. Madakasira’s testimony. Williams then retained Dr. Webb,

who examined Williams on January 18, 2018. Williams’s trial began a little less than three

months later on April 9, 2018.

¶63. Upon review, we agree with Williams that the district attorney’s closing-argument

comment about Dr. Webb’s late date of hire was improper, misleading, and unfairly

prejudiced the defense. After successfully moving to have Dr. Madakasira’s testimony

excluded, the district attorney then used the circuit court’s pretrial ruling to assert that

Williams waited until just a few months before trial to hire an expert who would support his

theory of the case. As in White, we hold that “[t]he exploitation of the court’s pretrial ruling

in this manner was misleading to the jury, prejudicial to the defendant, and improper under

29
the findings of this Court.” Id.

c. Closing-Argument Comments that “Something Is
Wrong with Our Justice System”

¶64. Multiple times during her closing argument, the district attorney told the jury that

something was wrong with the justice system if a defendant such as Williams could be

allowed to assert an insanity defense. The district attorney’s comments included the

following:

[W]hen I think about this case[,] something is wrong with our justice system
where we can have a case where there’s undisputed evidence that someone
committed a crime, undisputed. They didn’t call not one witness and say that
these officers were not assaulted. Not one. Something is wrong if that’s okay.
And then they come in and say well he was insane–

....

Something is wrong [when] a person is able to do all of this, say all of this,
clearly he understands[,] and then he comes in and says, well, I didn’t
understand what was going on. I was insane. Really. No, no, no, no. That’s
not right.

....

[Y]ou can’t treat our law enforcement like this and then admit that you did it
and then come in and say, I was insane. I didn’t know what was going on.
You’re not allowed to do that.

....

Something is wrong if you got this in writing with the man who’s written it
himself, and he’s still coming in here saying he’s insane and telling you that.

....

Something is wrong when a man tells you he did it and apologizes for doing
it and then you still say not guilty. Go home. Something is wrong with our
system when that happens.

30
¶65. In conjunction with the other instances of misconduct discussed in this assignment of

error, we find that the district attorney’s improper closing-argument comments on Williams’s

right to assert an insanity defense endangered the fairness and impartiality of his trial.

CONCLUSION

¶66. Because we find that the circuit court erroneously excluded the testimony of

Williams’s treating psychiatrist and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, we

reverse Williams’s conviction and sentence and remand this case to the circuit court for a

new trial. In considering Williams’s remaining claims on appeal, we find that his failure to

timely assert his statutory right to a speedy trial waived the claim and that no violation of his

constitutional right to a speedy trial occurred. Because we find that Williams’s other claims

lack merit, we decline to further address those arguments on appeal.

¶67. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY
AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, C.J., AND McDONALD, J., CONCUR
IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
CARLTON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

CARLTON, P.J., DISSENTING

¶68. I dissent because I find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

Dr. Madakasira’s expert testimony, an expert who Williams had retained to opine about his

mental state with respect to his insanity defense. As recognized by the majority, the

applicable standard of review regarding the exclusion of testimony, including expert

testimony, is as follows:

A trial court’s admission of testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

31
We give great deference to the discretion of the trial judge, and unless we
conclude that the discretion was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to
an abuse of discretion, the trial judge’s decision will stand. Moreover, we may
reverse a case only if the admission or exclusion of evidence results in
prejudice and harm or adversely affects a substantial right of a party.

Chaupette, 136 So. 3d at 1045 (¶7) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). I do not

find that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Madakasira’s expert

testimony because the circuit court’s decision on this issue did not “prejudice and harm or

adversely affect” a “substantial right” belonging to Williams. Id.

¶69. As the majority recognizes, after the circuit court excluded Dr. Madakasira’s expert

testimony, Williams retained Dr. Webb, a psychiatrist, to examine and evaluate him. Dr.

Webb was accepted as an expert in psychiatry at trial, and he testified about Williams’s

mental state at the time of the alleged crime and Williams’s ability to tell right from wrong,

as follows:

[Defense counsel:] Based upon your interview or your evaluation of Mr.
Williams and those records and circumstances of this
incident, were you able to reach or come to a conclusion
or an opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological
probability of what the mental state would have been of
Mr. Williams at the time of these crimes that he’s alleged
to have committed?

[Dr. Webb:] I did.

[Defense counsel:] Okay. And, Doctor, could you tell us what opinion that
was?

[Dr. Webb:] That at the time of the alleged crime that Mr. Williams
was psychotic, was in a bipolar manic state that was
characterized by irrational thoughts, irrational behavior,
inappropriate activities, and basically as a result of all of
that unable to understand and comprehend the quality of

32
his actions and know the quality of his actions. And also
know the difference between right and wrong.

Dr. Webb also prepared a written evaluation of Williams, and this report was admitted into

evidence. As the majority details above, based on his evaluation, Dr. Webb concluded to a

reasonable degree of probability that at the time of the alleged crime, “Williams was

psychotic[;] was in a bipolar manic state that was characterized by irrational thoughts,

irrational behavior, inappropriate activities[;] and basically as a result of all of that[, Williams

was] unable to understand and comprehend the quality of his actions . . . .” Dr. Webb further

opined in his report that Williams was unable at the time of the altercation to “know the

difference between right and wrong.”

¶70. In short, Williams was allowed to present Dr. Webb’s expert testimony and his expert

report that supported Williams’s insanity defense. As such, Williams was not prejudiced, nor

did the circuit court affect a substantial right of Williams when it excluded Dr. Madakasira’s

expert testimony. Based upon the applicable standard of review, I therefore find that reversal

of the circuit court’s decision on this issue is not warranted, and I find that the alleged

prosecutorial misconduct addressed by the majority does not constitute a sufficient basis,

standing alone, to warrant reversal in this case. Because I find that Williams’s other claims

likewise lack merit, I would affirm Williams’s conviction and sentence.

33