Michael Holland v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2018-KA-00872-COA

MICHAEL HOLLAND APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/28/2017
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W. ASHLEY HINES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEFLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ALI MUHAMMAD SHAMSIDDEEN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIE DEWAYNE RICHARDSON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/04/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. One man was killed and three others were seriously injured in a drive-by shooting on

Highway 82 outside Itta Bena, Mississippi. Jacarius Keys provided a statement to law

enforcement, implicating himself and four other men in the shooting—Sedrick Buchanan,

Michael Holland, Armand Jones, and James Earl McClung Jr. In July 2016, all five men

were co-indicted for the murder and attempted murders of the vehicle’s occupants. On

December 28, 2016, Keys was killed. The remaining co-indictees were tried together in the

Leflore County Circuit Court in May 2017. After a four-day trial, the jury found Holland
guilty of second-degree murder and of three counts of attempted first-degree murder.1

Holland was sentenced to serve forty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of

Corrections (MDOC) for the second-degree murder conviction and three terms of thirty years

in the MDOC’s custody for his other convictions, with all sentences set to run consecutively.

He appeals his convictions, and finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. At 11:00 p.m. on August 15, 2015, D’Alandis Love, Perez Love, and their cousins,

Kelsey Jennings and Ken-Norris Stigler,2 were traveling west on Highway 82 in “Munchie”

Brown’s red Pontiac when a light-colored Tahoe sped past them, spraying bullets into the car.

D’Alandis was killed, and Perez, Jennings, and Stigler were seriously injured.

¶3. Keys and his lawyer went to the Leflore County Sheriff’s Office to give a statement

regarding the incident. The chief investigator, Bill Staten, interviewed Keys on September

2, 2015, but after the video equipment failed during that interview, Investigator Staten

re-interviewed Keys, again with counsel, on September 3. Keys said that he was driving the

Tahoe. He also implicated Buchanan, Holland, Jones, and McClung in the shooting. In July

2016, all five men were indicted for “acting alone or in concert with each other or others”

1
Holland’s co-defendants—McClung, Buchanan, and Jones—were also found guilty
and have appealed their convictions and sentences. Initially, these appeals were docketed
by the Supreme Court Clerk under case number 2017-TS-1053. After assignment, this Court
entered an order keeping McClung’s appeal under case number 2017-KA-1053-COA and
assigning a new case number to Buchanan’s and Jones’s appeals.
2
We will collectively refer to all four men as the Loves.

2
on one count of deliberate-design murder in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section

97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2014) and three separate counts of attempted murder in violation of

Mississippi Code Annotated sections 97-1-7 (Rev. 2014) and 97-3-19(1)(a).

¶4. Keys was killed on December 28, 2016. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to

exclude Keys’s videotaped statement and sever the trial. The trial court denied the

defendants’ motions. Jones, Buchanan, McClung, and Holland were tried before a Leflore

County Circuit Court jury in May 2017, each represented by his own counsel.

¶5. Matthew Brown, a deputy with the Leflore County Sheriff’s Office, testified that he

was on patrol on August 15 when he discovered a car on fire in a field off Highway 82.

Deputy Brown helped Perez get out through the car window, and he also pulled Stigler and

D’Alandis out of the vehicle.3 Deputy Brown radioed for emergency services, and after

realizing that it was “not just a car wreck,” he called the sheriff and investigators.

¶6. Staten, the chief investigator, testified that he responded to the scene at approximately

12:20 a.m. and approached the Pontiac. Investigator Staten observed what he believed were

gunshot wounds on D’Alandis’s body. D’Alandis was later pronounced dead at the scene.4

The other three victims had already been transported to the hospital. Investigator Staten said

he “noticed bullet holes on the driver’s side of the vehicle, . . . and along the rear passenger

door the driver’s window had been shot out and there were other bullet holes along that side

3
Jennings was already outside of the vehicle.
4
Lisa Funte, a medical examiner, testified D’Alandis died as a result of multiple
gunshot wounds, and his manner of death was homicide.

3
of the vehicle.” He took photographs and collected evidence, including a number of 7.62mm

shell casings and one .40-caliber shell casing recovered within the immediate area of where

the vehicle had left the highway. The next morning, after the vehicle had been towed to a

secure location, Investigator Staten retrieved a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol from the

Pontiac. Mark Steed, an investigator with the Mississippi Bureau of Investigations (MBI),

also assisted with the investigation and identified the handgun that Investigator Staten

recovered from the Pontiac.

¶7. Investigator Staten testified that Jasmine Cage, Perez’s girlfriend, was at the scene of

the incident. She told a deputy that she knew the people in the car and had witnessed the

shooting. Cage was transported to the Sheriff’s Office so that Investigator Staten could take

her statement.

¶8. Amber Conn, a crime scene analyst with the MBI, was accepted as an expert in crime-

scene investigation. Conn opined that the Pontiac was shot from the back toward the front

on the driver’s side. During her investigation, Conn recovered another .40-caliber Smith &

Wesson pistol from the front passenger floorboard of the Pontiac. Conn testified that the gun

was fully loaded (one bullet was in the chamber), and its safety was locked when she found

it.

¶9. Starks Hathcock was accepted as an expert in firearms and tool-marks identification.

Examining both .40-caliber pistols recovered from the Pontiac and comparing them to the

.40-caliber bullet recovered from Perez’s head, Hathcock was able to confirm that the bullet

4
was not shot by either of the guns recovered from the Pontiac. He also examined the .40-

caliber pistol recovered when Buchanan was stopped after his arrest, while out on bond.

Hathcock testified that he could not positively determine whether that gun had fired the

recovered shell casing; however, the gun could not be excluded as having done so. Hathcock

also testified that the 7.62mm (.30-caliber) shell casings recovered from the highway could

have been fired from an AK-47 or SKS—a semiautomatic assault rifle “designed for war.”

However, he could not link the .30-caliber shell casings recovered to a specific weapon.

Hathcock did testify that the projectile jackets recovered from the Pontiac bore similar

characteristics to the bullets recovered from D’Alandis’s right chest and his right leg.

¶10. Bentravious “Munchie” Brown testified that on the night of the incident, he had

loaned his car, a red Pontiac Grand Prix, to the Loves. He testified that Perez drove the

vehicle and that the group headed to a club at around 11:00 p.m. Jasmine Cage testified that

on the night of the shooting, she had followed Perez and the others in Brown’s car to “make

sure Perez was not going to the club.” She saw the Pontiac ahead of her on Highway 82 and

saw a Tahoe or Yukon pass her on the right. After testifying that she could not see who was

in the Tahoe/Yukon and did not know the color of the vehicle, Cage was reminded about her

statement given to Investigator Staten. Cage thereafter testified that she had told Investigator

Staten she thought the vehicle was gold and that she saw Jones, Keys, David Reedy, and

Holland in the vehicle. She thought Jones was in the front passenger seat, and Holland was

seated in the back on the passenger side. On cross-examination, Cage confirmed that she

5
knew Buchanan and that she did not see him in the vehicle that night.

¶11. Cage also testified she told Investigator Staten that Reedy had been driving the

Tahoe/Yukon and that Keys was in the backseat on the driver’s side. After the Tahoe/Yukon

passed her, she saw “sparks like fire” a far distance in front of her. Cage called Perez’s

friend to ask him whether gunshot looks like fire at nighttime, and he said that it did. Cage

continued to the Moroccan Lounge, but when the Pontiac failed to show up, she turned

around and headed back to Greenwood. On her way, she saw the Pontiac in a ditch; so she

stopped her car and approached the scene.

¶12. Two of the victims, Stigler and Perez, testified that the shooters were traveling in a

beige or gold Tahoe-type vehicle and that Jones and Holland were the ones who shot bullets

at them.5 Perez said he saw Jones in the Tahoe with a “baby assault rifle,” sometimes called

“a mini-Draco.” Both Stigler and Perez saw Holland with a pistol as the Tahoe passed them.

Stigler also testified that he saw Jones shoot Perez in the top of the head.

¶13. Although Perez testified that he could not positively identify anyone besides Holland

and Jones in the vehicle, he acknowledged that he had identified other people, including

Reedy and Keys, in his statement after the incident.6 Perez explained that he identified the

people in the Tahoe because he saw “all of them” riding in the vehicle every day, and he

5
Although Jennings testified, he could not identify anyone in the Tahoe.
6
Investigator Staten testified that he thought Perez had also identified Buchanan,
though he was not sure. Defense counsel specifically questioned Perez about whether he
had identified Buchanan, but Perez said he never saw Buchanan and, other than Jones and
Holland, could not recall whom he had previously identified.

6
thought they were in the vehicle that night. But Perez said that after he thought about it

more, he realized that he never actually saw anyone other than Jones and Holland. On

cross-examination, Perez also testified that he thought Reedy was in the Tahoe because

Reedy used to own the Tahoe.

¶14. Because Keys was not available at trial, his videotaped statement was admitted into

evidence and was played for the jury.7 Keys said that he was driving the gold Tahoe on the

night of the shooting. He stated that Holland and Jones were on the passenger side, McClung

was in the rear seat on the driver’s side, and Buchanan was sitting in the third-row seat.8

Keys, Buchanan, Holland, Jones, and McClung had been at Holland’s house that evening,

and, around 11:00 p.m., they left in Keys’s Tahoe to go to the Moroccan Lounge.

¶15. Keys said Jones brought his AK-47 with him, which was described as being “short

with a long magazine.” Keys did not know Jones had the gun until “he first upped it”

(meaning until Jones began shooting). Keys also said that Jones had the AK-47 that night

because “he always had it.” Keys was unsure whether anyone else had a weapon. At the end

of his statement, Keys said that no one had a gun except Jones. Keys said that there had been

no previous discussion of any retaliation against the Loves. However, when questioned

about Jones, Keys said that Jones had said “days earlier” that he needed to get one of them

7
The jury was not told that Keys had been killed.
8
In comparison, Cage and Perez identified Reedy as driving the vehicle, with Keys
in the backseat. In his statement, Keys said that he was driving and that Reedy was not with
them. Although Reedy was questioned, there was evidence that he was in Batesville near
the time of the incident.

7
(the Loves) because they (the Loves) “had got some of their friends.” As they drove down

Highway 82, they approached a car, and Jones called out that it looked like the Loves in that

car.9 As they passed the vehicle, according to Keys, Jones rolled down the window, leaned

out the window, and opened fire with his AK-47. As soon as Jones started shooting, Jones

told him, “Go, go, go,” and Keys sped up to get away.

¶16. Keys said that Holland made a phone call to arrange for someone to get rid of the car.

Keys drove to Moorhead, Mississippi, and a mechanic that Holland knew met them in a grey

Nissan. The mechanic took Keys’s Tahoe, and Keys and the others left in the Nissan. The

Tahoe was never recovered.

¶17. After switching vehicles, they went to a Best Western hotel in Greenwood. When

they got to the hotel, Jones brought his gun in with him. Holland and Jones later left

together, but Jones returned a short while later without his gun. Keys, Buchanan, Jones, and

McClung spent the night at the Best Western. The next morning, Jones arranged for his own

ride home, and Keys, Buchanan, and McClung got a ride together. Keys stayed with his

mother for several days after the shooting until he got a lawyer and turned himself in. While

Keys was at his mother’s home in Tennessee, Jones contacted him from a phone that Keys

did not recognize and said he was in Chicago. When Keys gave his statement on September

9
Keys said that he did not recognize the car. Perez, however, said in his pretrial
statement that Keys was standing outside before Perez and the others had left for the club.
When questioned about that statement at trial, Perez testified that his statement was wrong
and that he meant to say it was “Munchie” (Brown) standing outside, not Keys.

8
3, 2015, he had not spoken with anyone else involved in the incident. However, after

providing his statement to law enforcement, Keys approached Jones’s lawyer and informed

him that he had given an incriminating statement. Buchanan turned himself in on September

18, 2015, and Holland was arrested shortly thereafter.

¶18. After the State rested, defense counsel for Buchanan, Holland, Jones, and McClung

moved for directed verdicts, which the trial court denied. None of the defendants testified

or presented any other evidence. The jury found each of the defendants guilty of various

offenses. Relevant to this appeal, the jury found Holland guilty of second-degree murder and

of three counts of attempted first-degree murder. For the second-degree murder conviction,

Holland was sentenced to serve forty years in the custody of the MDOC. He was sentenced

to serve three terms of thirty years in the MDOC’s custody for his remaining convictions,

with all sentences to be served consecutively. On June 8, 2017, Holland filed a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the trial

court denied.

¶19. Appealing his convictions, Holland lists several issues in the “Statement of Issues”

portion of his appellant’s brief. However, with respect to four of the issues, he cites no

authority and provides no argument.10 See Arrington v. State, 267 So. 3d 753, 756 (¶8)

(Miss. 2019) (“The law is well established that points not argued in the brief on appeal are

10
These issues are whether the trial court erred (1) in denying the motion to change
venue; (2) in failing to grant an order refuting any gang affiliation; (3) in allowing witness
intimidation; and (4) in failing to exclude Keys’s videotaped statement.

9
abandoned and waived.”). Therefore, we will limit our review to the remaining issues argued

by Holland: (1) whether the court erred in denying his motion to sever the trial; and (2)

whether the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict or, in the alternative, whether

the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of the Motion to Sever

¶20. Holland asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever. The only

argument he makes on this issue, however, is his citation to factors a trial court may consider

in determining whether to grant a motion to sever, as outlined by the Mississippi Supreme

Court in Duckworth v. State, 477 So. 2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1985). Holland has not applied this

authority to the facts of the case; therefore, he has waived this issue on appeal. See Doss v.

State, 956 So. 2d 1100, 1103 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he failure to . . . make any

meaningful argument constitutes a waiver of any issues which may have been properly

presented to this Court for our review.”).

¶21. Nevertheless, we find the trial court did not err in denying Holland’s motion to sever

the trial. “Defendants jointly indicted for a felony are not entitled to separate trials as a

matter of right.” Maggett v. State, 230 So. 3d 722, 727 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “[J]oint

trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling

a more accurate assessment of relative culpability—advantages which sometimes operate to

the defendant’s benefit.” Id. (quoting Cavett v. State, 717 So. 2d 722, 727 (¶30) (Miss.

10
1998)). Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 9.03, which was applicable when

Holland and his co-defendants were tried in May 2017,11 states:

The granting or refusing of severance of defendants in cases not involving the
death penalty shall be in the discretion of the trial judge. The court may, on
motion of the state or defendant, grant a severance of offenses whenever:

1. If before trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination
of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense . . . .

URCCC 9.03. In reviewing the denial of a motion for severance, we consider two criteria:

“(1) whether the testimony of one co-defendant tends to exculpate that defendant at the

expense of the other defendant and (2) whether the balance of the evidence introduced at trial

tends to go more to the guilt of one defendant rather than the other.” Hayes v. State, 168 So.

3d 1065, 1074 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Thus, under this test, as articulated in Duckworth, 477 So. 2d at 937, Holland must show that

he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to grant his motion for severance.

¶22. Regarding the first factor, Holland does not argue that Keys’s statement was

exculpatory, and none of the remaining defendants testified at trial. Therefore, the first factor

weighs in favor of a joint trial because one defendant’s testimony could not be used to

exculpate himself at the expense of the other co-defendants. The second factor also weighs

in favor of a joint trial. Both Jones and Holland were identified at trial as shooters, and all

of the defendants were charged with acting in concert with respect to the shooting.

11
The Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure did not become effective until July
1, 2017.

11
Accordingly, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for

severance.

II. The Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

¶23. Holland claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict “because the

testimony of the witnesses [was] uncorroborated by any credible evidence and is in fact

discredited by much of the evidence presented at trial.” Holland further argues that the

testimony by the victims and Cage was “unsupported,” “contradictory,” and “inconsistent

with one another” and that there was no physical evidence that Holland was guilty of second-

degree murder and attempted murder.

¶24. When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the question is not

whether this Court ‘believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt . . . [but] whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” McCarty v. State, 247 So. 3d 260, 268 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App.

2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005),

abrogated on other grounds by Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 289-90, 291-93 (¶¶1, 14-21)

(Miss. 2017)). A challenge to the weight of the evidence, on the other hand, “is separate and

distinct from a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, in that it seeks a new trial.”

Brown v. State, 269 So. 3d 1262, 1264-65 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation

mark omitted) (quoting Bradford v. State, 102 So. 3d 312, 316 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)).

12
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we will not disturb a verdict

on appeal unless it “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow

it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id.

¶25. Holland was convicted of second-degree murder and of three counts of attempted

murder. Second-degree murder is defined as “[t]he killing of a human being without the

authority of law . . . in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing

a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to

effect the death of any particular individual . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (Rev.

2014). “The Supreme Court has described conduct ‘evincing a depraved heart’ as ‘grave

recklessness manifesting utter disregard or indifference to a resultant creation of eminent

danger to human life.’” McCarty, 247 So. 3d at 269 (¶27). With regard to the attempted-

murder charges, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the indictment,

that Holland “willfully, unlawfully, purposely, knowingly and feloniously design[ed] and

endeavor[ed] or attempt[ed] to kill [Perez, Stigler, and Jennings] . . . without the authority

of law and not in necessary self defense.”

¶26. During cross-examination, Investigator Staten acknowledged that Keys did not

indicate in his statement that Holland was a shooter:

Q. Did Mr. Keys say that Mr. Holland was shooting?

A. Mr. Keys indicated in his statement that the only person he knew was
shooting was [Jones].

Keys did say, however, that Holland was seated on the passenger side of the Tahoe. Cage

13
also testified that she thought she saw Keys, Reedy, Holland, and Jones in the Tahoe when

they passed her and that Holland was seated in the back seat of the Tahoe on the passenger

side.

¶27. It was the testimony of two of the victims, Stigler and Perez, that provided evidence

Holland was firing a gun at the Pontiac. Stigler testified that Holland “had a pistol in his

hand shooting, too.” Perez, the driver of the Pontiac, said that Jones and Holland were

“[h]anging out the window” with guns in their hands and that he had no doubt who was in

the Tahoe and who had shot at him and his friends.12

Q. Do you have any doubt in your mind about who was in the gold Tahoe
and who shot at your car?

A. No, ma’am.

Q. No doubt whatsoever? I need you to say it out loud.

A. No, sir.

Q. Who shot you?

A. Depending on what kind of gun they said was used and the bullet they
took out my head, it was a .40[-]caliber and the handgun I seen Michael

12
Holland contends that “[a]lthough evidence was presented which showed that a
homicide took place, the State presented absolutely no evidence that corroborated the
testimony that Mr. Holland murdered or attempted to murder anyone as required by
Mississippi law.” To the extent Holland suggests that he was not the shooter who killed
D’Alandis, under the accomplice theory of liability, the jury could convict Holland of
murder as a principal even if it believed another defendant killed D’Alandis. See Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-1-3 (Rev. 2014) (providing that any person who is an accessory to a felony before
the fact “shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished as
such”).

14
Holland holding. So that’s who shot me.

Q. What about who shot at your car?

A. Both of them, Armand Jones and Michael Holland.

The physical evidence retrieved from the scene of incident included .40-caliber shell casings,

and a .40-caliber bullet was recovered from Perez’s head.

¶28. On review, this Court is required to accept as true the evidence that supports the

verdict. Smith v. State, 180 So. 3d 771, 773 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). In this case, we

find no inconsistency or contradiction in the evidence as Holland claims. Except for

Jennings, who could not confirm the identity of anyone in the Tahoe, the witnesses to the

shooting said Holland was in the Tahoe seated on the passenger side of the car behind Jones.

Two of the victims said Holland had shot at them. Keys also provided evidence through his

statement that Holland was instrumental in getting rid of the Tahoe after the shooting.13

13
As noted, Holland has failed to cite any authority or argument concerning the
admissibility of Keys’s statement. Regardless, to the extent that the statement supports
Holland’s convictions, we find no error in the trial court’s admission of Keys’s statement
against Holland under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies the doctrine
of forfeiture by wrongdoing. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). Rule
804(b)(6) “applies only when the defendant ‘engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.’” Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353, 367 (2008) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6)). “The party offering
this evidence must make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States
v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524, 534 (5th Cir. 2018). In this case, the State provided surveillance-
video evidence showing Holland chasing Keys with a gun mere moments before Keys was
shot and killed. Furthermore, Sergeant Bankston, the investigator for Keys’s murder,
testified that both Holland and Buchanan were suspects in Keys’s murder and that Holland
received a text from Buchanan on Jones’s cell phone after Buchanan was arrested and in jail
for Keys’s murder. Based on these circumstances, we find the trial court could reasonably

15
Holland’s witness-credibility argument was a matter for the jury, who is “the ultimate

decision-maker as to what weight and worth” to give said testimony. McCarty, 247 So. 3d

at 270 (¶32).

¶29. Finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict and that the verdict

was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we affirm Holland’s convictions

and sentences.

¶30. AFFIRMED.

CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL,
LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN
PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.

infer, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that Holland killed Keys to prevent him
from testifying and/or was part of a conspiracy to do so.

16