State of Minnesota v. Joseph William Finfrock

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0736

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph William Finfrock,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-14404

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, N. Nate Summers, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Schmidt,

Judge.

SYLLABUS

To determine whether an out-of-state offense is “in conformity with” a Minnesota

offense such that the out-of-state offense may be used to enhance a gross misdemenaor

offense to a felony under Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451, subdivision 3(b)(3) (2022),

a district court must determine whether the elements of the out-of-state offense would

satisfy the elements of the Minnesota offense.
OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

Appellant Joseph William Finfrock challenges his conviction of fifth-degree

criminal sexual conduct, arguing that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to enhance

the Minnesota offense to a felony, and (2) the district court committed reversible error by

admitting evidence of his prior offense to prove intent or lack of mistake. Both parties

agree that this case should be remanded for recalculation of Finfrock’s criminal-history

score. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

In 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged Finfrock with one count of

fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct—nonconsensual sexual contact, in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451, subdivision 1a(1) (2022). The state enhanced the

charge from a gross misdemeanor to a felony because Finfrock had been convicted of an

Ohio offense of a criminal-sexual-conduct offense in 2018. 1 See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451,

subd. 3(b)(3) (2022) (enhancing a gross misdemeanor to a felony under certain conditions).

During the three-day trial, the state offered—over Finfrock’s objection—evidence

of two prior offenses to prove intent or lack of mistake: (1) a conviction for violating an

Ohio criminal-sexual-conduct statute, and (2) a 2022 Ramsey County conviction for

1
Finfrock was convicted under Ohio Revised Code section 2907.06(A)(4) (2002) for
touching a “13-year-old victim’s thigh and inner thigh and pubic area.”

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violating a Minnesota criminal-sexual-conduct statute. 2 The district court concluded, as a

matter of law, that the Ohio statute under which Finfrock was convicted was “in conformity

with” Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451, subdivision 1a(1). The jury found Finfrock

guilty of felony fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.

At sentencing, the district court used the Ohio conviction to enhance Finfrock’s

conviction from a gross misdemeanor to a felony. The district court also included the Ohio

conviction in the calculation of Finfrock’s criminal-history score.

Finfrock appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err when it concluded that the Ohio statute, section
2907.06(A)(4), is in conformity with Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451,
subdivision 1a(1)?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the state’s motion to admit
Spreigl evidence?

III. Did the district court err in calculating Finfrock’s criminal-history score?

2
Finfrock was convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct—nonconsensual sexual
contact in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(1).

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ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not err when it concluded that the Ohio statute is “in
conformity” with the comparable Minnesota statute.

Finfrock argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he committed a felony-

level fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct crime because his Ohio conviction is not “in

conformity” with the Minnesota crime. This presents an issue of first impression.

To address this question, we must perform a statutory analysis of both the

Minnesota and the Ohio statute. See State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017)

(“Because the meaning of a criminal statute is intertwined with the issue of whether the

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the statute, it is often

necessary to interpret a criminal statute when evaluating an insufficiency-of-the-evidence

claim.”). “We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” Id.

The Minnesota statute under which Finfrock was convicted states, a person is guilty

of fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offense if “the person engages in nonconsensual

sexual contact.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(1). For a fifth-degree criminal-sexual-

conduct offense, the Minnesota Legislature has defined “sexual contact” to mean:

(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the
complainant’s intimate parts, or

....

(iv) in any of the cases above, the touching of the
clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts, or

(v) the intentional touching with seminal fluid or sperm
by the actor of the complainant’s body or the clothing covering
the complainant’s body.

4
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(a) (2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(1)

(“For purposes of this section, ‘sexual contact’ has the meaning given in section 609.341,

subdivision 11, paragraph (a), clauses (i), (iv), and (v)”). A violation of criminal sexual

conduct in the fifth-degree is a gross misdemeanor unless the conviction is enhanced to a

felony by operation of subdivision 3(b). Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 2 (2022).

Subdivision 3(b)(3) states that “[a] person is guilty of a felony . . . if the person violates

subdivision . . . 1a within ten years of . . . the first of two or more previous convictions for

violating subdivision 1a, clause (1), or a statute from another state in conformity with this

offense.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 3(b)(3).

Our analysis focuses on the meaning of “in conformity with” in Minnesota Statutes

section 609.3451, subdivision 3(b)(3). The parties have cited no authority—and we have

found none—that interprets this phrase in section 609.3451, subdivision 3(b)(3). But we

do not conduct this statutory analysis from a blank slate. Minnesota courts have performed

similar analyses when considering whether a conviction for out-of-state driving while

under the influence (DWI) is “in conformity with” a Minnesota DWI conviction such that

the Minnesota conviction may be enhanced to a felony. See, e.g., Anderson v. State,

305 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Minn. 1981) (comparing elements of Minnesota and Colorado DWI

statutes); State v. Geyer, 355 N.W.2d 460, 461 (Minn. App. 1984) (comparing elements of

Minneosta and Ohio DWI statutes).

When a Minnesota statute incorporates out-of-state statutes “in conformity with”

the Minnesota statute, Minnesota courts have held that “[i]t is the prohibited behavior

which must be in conformity, not the evidentiary standards by which that act is proven.”

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Geyer, 355 N.W.2d at 461. In Anderson, the Minnesota Supreme Court compared the

elements of the Minnesota and Colorado DWI statutes and concluded that the elements of

the offenses are the same, and that, if proven in Minnesota, would justify a conviction for

DWI. 305 N.W.2d at 787. The supreme court reached this conclusion even though the

statutes had different evidentiary proof requirements. Id.

Similarly, in Geyer, we held that Minnesota and Ohio implied-consent statutes were

“in conformity” because the laws “prohibit[ed] identical behavior.” 355 N.W.2d at 461.

We reached this conclusion even though “Minnesota’s implied consent statute require[d]

that a person be advised that he may consult with an attorney before taking a breath, blood

or urine test[,]” whereas “Ohio’s implied consent statute ha[d] no such requirement.” Id.

We see no reason to deviate from the statutory analysis of “in conformity with” that

courts have applied in the DWI context when comparing out-of-state convictions to their

Minnesota counterparts. Thus, we hold that to determine whether an out-of-state

conviction is “in conformity with” a Minnesota conviction for fifth-degree criminal-sexual-

conduct conviction, a district court should determine whether the elements of the out-of-

state conviction satisfy the elements of Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451,

subdivision 1a(1). See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 3(b)(3). With this framework in

mind, we now turn to Finfrock’s specific arguments.

The Ohio statute under which Finfrock was convicted provided:

(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the
spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the
offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two
or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the
following applies:

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(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is
offensive to the other person, or one of the other persons, or is
reckless in that regard.

(2) The offender knows that the other person’s, or one
of the other person’s, ability to appraise the nature of or control
the offender’s or touching person’s conduct is substantially
impaired.

(3) The offender knows that the other person, or one of
the other persons, submits because of being unaware of the
sexual contact.

(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is
thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age,
whether or not the offender knows the age of such person, and
the offender is at least eighteen years of age and four or more
years older than such other person.

(5) The offender is a mental health professional, the
other person or one of the other persons is a mental health client
or patient of the offender, and the offender induces the other
person who is the client or patient to submit by falsely
representing to the other person who is the client or patient that
the sexual contact is necessary for mental health treatment
purposes.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.06. Finfrock was convicted of violating subdivision (A)(4).

Ohio’s subdivision (A)(4) is “in conformity with” Minnesota’s fifth-degree

criminal-sexual-conduct statute, which prohibits (1) engaging in sexual contact; (2) with a

victim who does not consent to the contact. Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(e) (2022).

Finfrock’s actions in Ohio also would also satisfy the elements of Minnesota’s fifth-degree

criminal-sexual-conduct statute because he (1) engaged in sexual contact (2) with a victim

who could not consent to the contact. Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1a(1); see also Bjerke

v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 193 (Minn. App. 2007) (“The preclusion of consent as a

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defense to statutory rape reflects the feeling of society in general that sexual contact by

adults with children under 16 is reprehensible whether or not the child consents, because

at that age, the child should be deemed incapable of consenting.”), aff’d, 742 N.W.2d 660

(Minn. 2007). Because the elements for the Ohio offense prohibit the same behavior as

the Minnesota statute, we conclude that the Ohio statute is “in conformity with” the

Minnesota fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct statute.

Finfrock asserts that because the Ohio statute prohibits a broader range of conduct

than the Minnesota statute, the two laws are not in conformity. 3 Finfrock essentially argues

for a standard that the statutory elements of the out-of-state conviction be identical to the

elements in Minnesota’s statute. But the plain language of subdivision 3(b)(3) does not

require that the elements of the out-of-state statute be “identical” to the elements of the

Minnesota statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 3(b)(3). Rather, the two statutes must

be “in conformity with” one another. Id. If the legislature desired a framework that

required the out-of-state statute to be “identical,” it would have used that language rather

than requiring “conformity.” Because the elements in Ohio Revised Code section

2907.06(A)(4) and Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451, subdivision 1a(1) prohibit the

same behavior, the district court did not err in using the Ohio conviction to enhance

Finfrock’s fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction to a felony-level offense.

3
Arguably, the elements of the Ohio statute would also be “in conformity with”
Minnesota’s second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct statute. Compare Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2907.06(A), with Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(e).

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the state’s motion
to enter Spreigl evidence about Finfrock’s Ramsey County conviction to prove
intent or lack of mistake.

Finfrock argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Finfrock’s

Ramsey County conviction as Spreigl evidence. 4 We disagree.

To protect a “defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial,” Minnesota courts have

generally excluded “evidence connecting a defendant with other crimes, except for

purposes of impeachment.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006) (quotation

omitted). But Spreigl evidence may “be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake

or accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). A district court may admit Spreigl evidence if five

requirements are met: (1) the state gave adequate notice of its intent to use the evidence;

(2) the state indicated a valid purpose that “the evidence is being offered to prove”; (3) there

is “clear and convincing proof that the defendant participated in the other offense”; (4) the

“evidence is relevant and material”; and (5) the district court concludes that the probative

value of the “evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice”

to the defendant. Washington, 693 N.W.2d at 201.

We review a district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). If a district court abused

its discretion in admitting the Spriegl evidence, we next must determine whether there is a

“reasonable possibility” that the error significantly affected the verdict. Id. at 262.

4
Evidence of “prior bad acts” is known as Spreigl evidence. State v. Washington,
693 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)).

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Finfrock argues that the district court failed to weigh the probative value of the

Spreigl evidence for a non-propensity purpose against the risk of unfair prejudice as

required by caselaw and rule 404(b). Finfrock’s assertion is not supported by the record.

At trial, the state argued that the district court should admit the evidence of the

Ramsey County conviction. In doing so, the prosecutor provided detailed argument for

each of the five factors on the admission of Spreigl evidence. See Ness, 707 N.W.2d at

685. Finfrock asked the district court to deny the motion. The district court indicated its

intention to admit the evidence so long as Finfrock continued with the defense theory that

this was a mistake or a misunderstanding and that he had no sexual intent.

Finfrock objected to the Spreigl evidence a second time at the end of trial. The

district court overruled the objection, but noted it would provide a limiting jury instruction.

On appeal, Finfrock fails to show that the district court abused its discretion when

it granted the state’s motion to admit Spreigl evidence at trial. Finfrock cites State v. Smith,

749 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. App. 2008), to argue that the district court did not give adequate

weight to the dissimilarities between the Ramsey County case and Finfrock’s present

charges. In Smith, we reversed the admission of Spreigl evidence, in part, because there

were “more dissimilarities than similarities” between prior conviction and charges before

the jury. 749 N.W.2d at 95. Here, the district court had an opportunity to weigh the factual

similarities and dissimilarities between the two incidents while listening to testimony from

three witnesses about the Ramsey County conviction. The district court considered and

rejected any dissimilarities that might weigh against admitting the evidence. We discern

no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision.

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We also discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s weighing of the five

requirements before admitting the Spreigl evidence. See Washington, 693 N.W.2d at 201

(reciting five requirements district courts should consider when deciding whether to admit

Spreigl evidence). First, the state provided notice of its intent to use the evidence. Id.

Second, the state clearly indicated a valid non-propensity purpose—of intent and lack of

mistake—that the evidence being offered would prove. Id. Third, there is “clear and

convincing proof”—the conviction—that Finfrock “participated in the other offense[.]” Id.

Fourth, the evidence of the conviction was relevant and material to the state’s case for

proving intent and a lack of mistake. Id. Fifth, the probative value did not outweigh the

potential for unfair prejudice. Id. The five factors support our determination that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.

Finally, the district court minimized the potential for unfair prejudice by providing

appropriate instructions that limited the jurors consideration of the Ramsey County

conviction. The district court provided the limiting instructions before the relevant

testimony was heard, after the testimony concluded, and during the final instructions. We

presume the jury followed the district court’s instructions and considered the testimony for

the appropriate limited use. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009)

(determining that district court abused its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence of

defendant’s past criminal sexual conduct, but concluding that the error was harmless, in

part, because district court provided the jury with limiting instructions and “jury is

presumed to have followed [the] instructions”). The district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the Spreigl evidence.

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III. The district court erred in calculating Finfrock’s criminal-history score.

Finfrock argues the district court abused its discretion in calculating his

criminal-history score. State v. Stillday, 646 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. App. 2002)

(reviewing calculation of criminal-history score for an abuse of discretion). We agree.

Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, “[w]hen the current offense is a felony

solely because the offender has previous convictions for misdemeanor and gross

misdemeanor offenses,” the prior convictions “may be used in determining custody status,

but cannot be used in calculating the remaining components of the offender’s criminal

history score.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines § 2.B.6.a (2022).

Here, Finfrock’s gross-misdemeanor offense was enhanced to a felony based, in

part, on the Ohio conviction. As such, the guidelines did not authorize the district court to

use that same conviction to calculate Finfrock’s criminal-history score. Id. We, therefore,

reverse and remand for the district court to recalculate Finfrock’s criminal-history score.

DECISION

Because the Ohio statute is in conformity with the Minnesota statute, the district

court properly used Finfrock’s Ohio conviction to enhance his Minnesota offense to a

felony. Finfrock failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in

admitting the Spreigl evidence. We, therefore, affirm Finfrock’s conviction.

But we reverse and remand for the district court to resentence Finfrock with a

criminal-history score that does not include the Ohio conviction.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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