PEOPLE OF MI V LEON ORLANDO ECHOLS

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh,
Chief Justice
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
Noah P. Hood,
Justices
Order
July 2, 2026
SC: 169176 (59)(60)
COA: 370709
Wayne CC: 89-007735-FC
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
LEON ORLANDO ECHOLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________________
On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The
motion to lift stay and amend bond is DENIED. The application for leave to appeal remains
in abeyance for People v Eads (Docket No. 168205).
W ELCH , J. (dissenting).
Defendant Leon Orlando Echols has served 36 years of a sentence that the Court of
Appeals held was unconstitutional. The trial court determined that he was entitled to an
appeal bond under MCL 770.9a, but it imposed a $250,000 cash bond. Defendant is
indigent, and he cannot afford to post the $250,000 cash bond. Accordingly, despite the
fact that defendant is eligible for an appeal bond, he remains behind bars.
Our court rules provide that “[b]ond must be sufficient to guarantee the appearance
of the defendant.” MCR 7.209(B)(2). I believe that the word “sufficient” acts as both a
floor and a ceiling for bond orders. And in this case, the trial court did not explain how a
$250,000 cash bond was “sufficient” to guarantee defendant’s appearance at resentencing.
In other words, despite finding defendant eligible for bond, the amount set was so high that
defendant could not pay the bond. If a defendant cannot possibly pay the bond, I question
how it can be “sufficient” to ensure his future appearance. For that reason, I would have
vacated the trial court’s order requiring a $250,000 cash bond and directed the trial court
to set a new bond. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s order denying
defendant’s motion to lift stay and amend bond.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 1989, approximately one month after he turned 18 years old, defendant
fatally shot Flery Ivery following an altercation. Defendant’s childhood had been fraught
with violence and neglect. When he was just six years old, his mother’s boyfriend
murdered his little brother. When police officers arrived, they found defendant and his
sister locked in a bedroom that was covered in dog feces. His mother was convicted of

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child neglect, and defendant spent the next 12 years in various foster homes and
institutions. During defendant’s teenage years, his biological father was also arrested for
murder. None of this justifies defendant’s actions in 1989, but this context demonstrates
that he had a traumatic upbringing.
The prosecutor charged defendant with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, but the
jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317.1
Although the guidelines range was a minimum of 10 to 25 years’ imprisonment, the trial
court departed upward from the sentencing guidelines and sentenced defendant to a term
of 75 to 150 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s direct appeal failed, People v Echols,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 6, 1992 (Docket
Nos. 124510 and 124515), as did his first motion for relief from judgment, see People v
Echols, 495 Mich 952, 952 (2014).
In prison, defendant has transformed himself. He has been raising and training
puppies for Leader Dogs for the Blind, serving as a caretaker for medically frail prisoners,
taking courses at Mott College, and voluntarily participating in both Narcotics Anonymous
and Alcoholics Anonymous. He has a strong support system outside of prison including a
longtime romantic partner, friends, and family. Defendant also presented record evidence
indicating (1) that he presents clear indicators of rehabilitation and readiness for
reintegration and (2) that although he accrued misconduct tickets in prison, his record is
far better than the average prisoner.
In 2023, defendant filed his second motion for relief from judgment. Through that
motion, defendant argued that in light of Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and its
Michigan progeny, his term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder for an offense he
committed when he was 18 years old was unconstitutional and disproportionate. The Court
of Appeals agreed. Applying cases published after we denied defendant’s first motion for
relief from judgment, the Court of Appeals held that defendant’s sentence was invalid
under our Constitution and that defendant is entitled to resentencing. People v Echols, ___
Mich App ___ (September 24, 2025) (Docket No. 370709).
After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, the prosecutor applied for leave to
appeal in this Court. For that reason, our court rules automatically stayed defendant’s
resentencing until we resolve the prosecutor’s appeal. See MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a). While
the matter was stayed, defendant moved the trial court for bond pending appeal. After
conducting three hearings on defendant’s bond motion, the trial court determined that
1 The jury also convicted defendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. For that conviction, the trial court sentenced
defendant to two years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to his sentence for
second-degree murder.

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defendant met the requirements for bond pending appeal. See MCL 770.9a. The trial court
therefore granted defendant’s motion, ordering a “bond of $250,000, no 10 percent, [2] GPS
tether, home confinement.”
II. DISCUSSION
I agree with defendant that a $250,000 cash bond is excessive in light of defendant’s
indigency. We review the trial court’s bond order for an abuse of discretion. See People
v Sefton, 451 Mich 873 (1996); MCR 7.209(B)(2). “A trial court abuses its discretion when
it ‘makes a decision that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes or
makes an error of law.’ ” People v Robinson, ___ Mich ___, ___ (February 4, 2026)
(Docket No. 167595); slip op at 3-4, quoting People v Christian, 510 Mich 52, 75 (2022).
Because defendant committed an assaultive crime, his bond motion was governed
by MCL 770.9a. MCL 770.9a provides in relevant part:
(1) A defendant convicted of an assaultive crime and awaiting
sentence shall be detained and shall not be admitted to bail unless the trial
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely
to pose a danger to other persons and that [MCL 770.9b] does not apply.
(2) A defendant convicted of an assaultive crime and sentenced to a
term of imprisonment who has filed an appeal or an application for leave to
appeal shall be detained and shall not be admitted to bail unless the trial court
or the court to which the appeal is taken finds by clear and convincing
evidence that [MCL 770.9b] does not apply and that both of the following
exist:
(a) The defendant is not likely to pose a danger to other persons.
(b) The appeal or application raises a substantial question of law or
fact.
See also People v Nevers, 462 Mich 913, 913 (2000). And our court rules provide:
In a criminal case the granting of bond pending appeal and the amount
of it are within the discretion of the trial court, subject to applicable law and
2 The “no 10 percent” stipulation refers to the practice of allowing criminal defendants to
post a deposit of 10 percent of the total bond amount. See, e.g., MCL 765.6. The trial
court’s order therefore required defendant to provide $250,000 in cash to secure release
pending appeal.

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rules. Bond must be sufficient to guarantee the appearance of the defendant.
Unless bond pending appeal is allowed and a bond is filed with the trial court,
a criminal judgment may be executed immediately, even though the time for
taking an appeal has not elapsed. [MCR 7.209(B)(2) (emphasis added).]
Putting the court rule and the statute together, once a trial court determines that a defendant
satisfies the conditions set forth in MCL 770.9a and is therefore entitled to an appeal bond,
it “must” determine bond “sufficient” to guarantee defendant’s appearance at future
proceedings.
“Sufficient” means “enough to meet the needs of a situation or proposed end.”
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, sufficient <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sufficient> (accessed June 23, 2026) [https://perma.cc/D64B-
Q8SH]. Interpreting MCR 7.209(B)(2), I believe that “sufficient” acts as both a floor and
a ceiling for trial courts setting bond. That is, bond must be enough to assure defendant’s
presence at future proceedings—no more and no less. And because bond orders are
discretionary, MCR 7.209(B)(2), a trial court abuses its discretion when its calculation of
what is enough to ensure a defendant’s presence “ ‘falls outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes[.]’ ” Robinson, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 3-4, quoting Christian,
510 Mich at 75.
In this case, the trial court determined that defendant was entitled to an appeal bond
under MCL 770.9a. Although it expressed concern over whether defendant satisfied MCL
770.9a(2)(a)—i.e., whether defendant was likely to pose a danger to other persons—it
ultimately resolved the matter in defendant’s favor. Having made that determination, the
trial court was obligated to set bond sufficient to assure defendant’s presence at
resentencing. MCR 7.209(B)(2). But by setting bond at $250,000—an amount of money
that defendant cannot provide—the trial court effectively denied defendant an appeal bond.
In addition, the trial court did not explain how other options to assure defendant’s presence
at resentencing, such as the GPS tether and home confinement included in the bond order,
were insufficient to ensure defendant’s presence at future proceedings. The question here
should have been whether defendant posed a safety or flight risk, not whether he has deep
pockets.
Whatever reservations the trial court had about defendant’s risk to others, it granted
defendant’s bond motion. In so doing, it necessarily concluded by clear and convincing
evidence that “defendant is not likely to pose a danger to other persons.” MCL
770.9a(2)(a). At that point, the trial court should have moved on to set a bond sufficient to
assure defendant’s presence at resentencing. See MCR 7.209(B)(2). At a minimum, the
trial court should have explained why it found that defendant is entitled to bond under MCL
770.9a, but still decided to impose an unaffordable cash bond.

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
July 2, 2026
5
Clerk
Furthermore, I question the amount of the bond order in light of defendant’s
apparent rehabilitation and the nonmonetary bond conditions the trial court included. The
record evidence shows that he is likely ready for reintegration and presents a low risk for
future criminal behaviors. Michigan Department of Corrections has trusted defendant to
participate in the leader dog program and the college program, and it has trusted him to
care for medically frail prisoners. Defendant has used his four decades in prison to better
himself, and he seems to have a strong support system outside of prison to help him
reintegrate into society. Because I would have vacated the trial court’s bond order and
directed the trial court to set a new bond, I respectfully dissent. I note, however, that the
Court’s denial order is without prejudice to any motion to amend that defendant might file
in the Court of Appeals. See MCR 7.209(D).
T HOMAS , J., joins the statement of W ELCH , J.

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