MSC 166509 IN RE D V LANGE MINOR Opinion on Application - Remand to TC 4/14/2025

In re LANGE
Docket No. 166509. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 9, 2024. Decided
April 14, 2025.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition in the Wayne
Circuit Court seeking to take jurisdiction of the minor, DVL, from respondent-mother under MCL
712A.2(b)(1) or (2). In June 2021, respondent took DVL, who had a history of mental illness and
several mental health diagnoses, to St. John Hospital after he attempted to start a fire in
respondent’s home and threatened to commit suicide. DVL was held at the hospital, without
receiving treatment, while DHHS searched for a suitable inpatient pediatric psychiatric program.
However, rather than transferring DVL to such a program, in July 2021, the hospital cleared DVL
for discharge and recommended that he return home to receive intensive outpatient mental health
services. Respondent refused to pick DVL up from the hospital, explaining that bringing him
home would endanger DVL, the family pets, respondent’s other children, and herself. DHHS filed
its petition, and after several hearings, the trial court, Frank S. Szymanski, J., denied the petition
under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) on the basis that there was no evidence that respondent was
neglectful or abusive. Rather, respondent had made numerous efforts to seek help for DVL but
was unwilling to put her other children at risk. DHHS appealed, and the Court of Appeals,
O’B RIEN and F EENEY, JJ. (R EDFORD , J., dissenting), reversed in a split unpublished decision. The
Court of Appeals majority held that jurisdiction was appropriate under both MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
and (2). According to the majority, a preponderance of the evidence showed that respondent’s
actions rendered the home environment a place of danger for DVL and her other children and,
thus, statutorily unfit. Respondent sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. In lieu of granting
leave to appeal, the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on, among other things,
whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court should have assumed
jurisdiction over DVL pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). 513 Mich 1032 (2024).
In an opinion by Chief Justice C LEMENT, joined by Justices C AVANAGH , WELCH, and
B OLDEN, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
The trial court did not clearly err by refusing to take jurisdiction of DVL under MCL
712A.2(b)(1) or (2) because respondent was not “able” to provide necessary care and support for
DVL at home, and her treatment of DVL was not neglectful.
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus Chief Justice:
Elizabeth T. Clement
Justices:
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Megan K. Cavanagh
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
Reporter of Decisions:
Kimberly K. Muschong

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1. Child protective proceedings are generally divided into two phases: (1) the adjudicative
phase, which determines whether the court can take jurisdiction over a juvenile, and (2) the
dispositional phase, which determines what action will be taken on behalf of the juvenile. During
the adjudicative phase, which was implicated here, the trial court may exercise jurisdiction over a
juvenile if a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that one of the bases for jurisdiction set
out in MCL 712A.2(b) applies. MCL 712A.2(b)(1) applies to a child whose parent, when able to
do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support. Although this Court assumed
that respondent, by refusing to take DVL home to receive outpatient treatment after he was
discharged from the hospital, failed to provide him with proper or necessary support, the question
was whether she was “able to do so.” “Able” may be defined as “having sufficient power, skill,
or resources to do something.” Thus, under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), “able to do so” means that a
parent must have “sufficient power, skill, or resources” to provide necessary care and support.
Respondent did not have sufficient power, skill, or resources to have DVL return to her home
because he posed a danger to himself and to the other members of the household. Even if
respondent had worked with DHHS to obtain outpatient services for DVL, those services had
previously failed to meet his needs and there was no indication that such services would enable
DVL to live at home safely. Accordingly, respondent was not truly “able” to bring DVL home
within the meaning of the statute by providing proper or necessary support for him. Therefore, the
trial court did not clearly err by refusing to take jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
2. MCL 712A.2(b)(2) allows a court to take jurisdiction over a child whose home or
environment, by reason of neglect by a parent, is an unfit place for the child to live. The statute
incorporates the definition of “neglect” in MCL 722.602(1)(d). In order for there to be “neglect,”
as defined in MCL 722.602(1)(d), there must be “negligent treatment,” which is not defined by the
statute. “Negligent” is defined similarly in both a legal and lay dictionary as failing to exercise
the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances. Respondent’s treatment
of DVL did not meet this definition of “negligent”: she tried to get him the medical treatment he
needed, as a reasonably prudent person in her circumstances would have done; and she refused to
take DVL home, where he posed a danger to himself and others, which is also what a reasonably
prudent person would have done in her circumstances. Thus, respondent did not engage in
negligent treatment and thereby commit “neglect” as it is defined by MCL 722.602(1)(d).
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by refusing to take jurisdiction over DVL under MCL
712A.2(b)(2).
Court of Appeals decision reversed and case remanded to the trial court for reinstatement
of its order denying DHHS’s petition.
Justice C AVANAGH , concurring, wrote separately to draw the Legislature’s attention to the
ongoing problem at issue in the case, i.e., DHHS seeking jurisdiction over the child of an otherwise
fit parent because the parent is not able to adequately care for a child with severe mental health
issues. The available grounds for jurisdiction were ill-equipped to address situations involving
children with serious mental health diagnoses. As she did in In re Holbrook, 513 Mich 898, 899
(2023) (C AVANAGH , J., concurring), Justice C AVANAGH asked the Legislature to consider creating
a no-fault procedure allowing the state to intervene without requiring courts to adjudicate parents
as unfit when they are struggling to support children with serious mental health needs.

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Justice B ERNSTEIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by holding that jurisdiction was not proper under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or
(2), but he believed that the majority’s analysis of culpability under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) was
insufficient, and he disagreed that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) provided a basis to obtain jurisdiction over
DVL. A finding of culpable conduct by the parent was central to an exercise of jurisdiction by the
court under both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2): both provisions provide for jurisdiction, in part, on
the basis of a finding of parental neglect, and the Court had previously held in In re Jacobs, 433
Mich 24 (1989), that an exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) necessarily required
culpability by the parent. Jacobs held that under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), culpability was not a
prerequisite for a finding of jurisdiction. After Jacobs was decided, however, the Legislature
defined “neglect” as used in MCL 712A.2, so Jacobs is no longer good law as it relates to
culpability under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). By failing to decide whether Jacobs remained good law
after the statute was amended, the majority opinion failed to provide adequate guidance to courts
applying MCL 712A.2(b)(2). Justice B ERNSTEIN also disagreed that MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A)
allowed the court to exercise jurisdiction over DVL on the basis that he may be “homeless” because
respondent had refused to allow him to return to her home. “Homeless” is not defined in the
statute, but according to its lay definition, its use in the statute refers to whether the child has a
physical dwelling to which they can return, and there was no indication that the Legislature
intended that under MCL 712A.2(b)(3), a child is homeless if their home does not meet their needs.
Additionally, the majority’s assertion that by choosing not to retrieve DVL when he was
discharged from the hospital, respondent may have rendered him homeless would seem to
contradict the majority’s conclusion that respondent did not act in a culpable manner. That is, if
homelessness is defined here in terms of whether respondent rendered DVL homeless, that would
inject the issue of parental culpability into an analysis under MCL 712A.2(b)(3), misinterpreting
the plain language of the provision. The solution to the problem raised by this case was legislative
in nature, not in expanding the scope of MCL 712A.2(b)(3) without a valid basis in law for doing
so.
Justice ZAHRA , dissenting, noted that contrary to the majority opinion’s holding that
respondent and others similarly situated should be excused from refusing to provide care and
maintenance for a child when “other barriers” prevent them from taking the child home, such as
the risk of danger to the family, a respondent’s subjective perception of risk and lack of culpability
are not relevant to the statutory objective of a trial court assuming jurisdiction over a child under
the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Act, MCL 722.601 et seq. Rather, even an entirely
blameless parent may fail to provide care and maintenance for a child, and DHHS must investigate
and take action to protect the child. Further, because the Legislature defined “neglect” in MCL
712A.2(b)(1) and (2), this term no longer has an element of culpability because it does not include
a mens rea requirement. The only exception under Michigan law allowing parents to refuse to
provide a child with necessary and proper maintenance is the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law,
MCL 712.1 et seq. Here, there was no question that respondent was able to provide some necessary
and proper care to DVL, including shelter, food, and clothing. Respondent’s disagreement with a
psychiatrist’s determination that DVL could return home was not relevant to whether the trial court
should have exercised jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b). Justice ZAHRA also
disagreed that declaring DVL “homeless” was an acceptable way for the court to take jurisdiction
over him. Although respondent did not want to be labeled an unfit parent, a parent who causes

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their child to become homeless has abandoned or neglected the child. Allowing a parent to dictate
the scope and extent of a treatment plan was not supported by the statute.
Justice THOMAS did not participate because the Court considered this case before she
assumed office.

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FILED April 14, 2025
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
In re D. V. LANGE, Minor.
No. 166509
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except T HOMAS , J.)
CLEMENT , C.J.
The issue presented in this case is whether the Court of Appeals properly reversed
the trial court’s holding that neither MCL 712A.2(b)(1) nor (2) provides a basis for
jurisdiction over DVL, a juvenile. Because we believe that the trial court did not clearly
err by finding no basis for jurisdiction, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and
remand to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS
DVL has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and reactive attachment disorder. DVL
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
OPINION Chief Justice:
Elizabeth T. Clement
Justices:
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Megan K. Cavanagh
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas

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has repeatedly set fires in respondent-mother’s home, attempted to injure the family pets,
and demonstrated inappropriate sexual behaviors. He has also threatened to kill
respondent, his siblings, and himself. He has been hospitalized several times for mental
health treatment. In November 2020, respondent enrolled DVL in a year-long out-of-state
treatment program, but after only six months, DVL was discharged for inappropriate sexual
behavior and returned to Michigan.
In June 2021, when DVL again attempted to start a fire in the home and threatened
suicide, respondent took him to St. John Hospital. DVL was held there while the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) searched for a suitable pediatric
inpatient psychiatric program. On July 8, 2021, the hospital did not clear DVL for
discharge. But oddly, on July 9, 2021, without having provided DVL with additional
treatment, the hospital cleared DVL for discharge, recommending that DVL return home
to receive intensive outpatient mental health services.1 Respondent testified that “to hear
that there was no help was . . . heartbreaking.” She refused to pick DVL up from the
hospital, explaining that she felt that bringing DVL home would pose a significant risk to
himself, respondent’s other children, their pets, and herself.
1 It is difficult not to share the Court of Appeals’ skepticism regarding how DVL could
become dischargeable after one day without receiving additional treatment. See In re
Lange, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 2, 2023
(Docket No. 362365), p 5 n 4 (“How in the course of one day DVL could go from being
nondischargeable to dischargeable from the hospital without receiving treatment casts
doubt on whether the hospital chose to wash its hands of this troubled youth rather than
keep him in a holding pattern while DHHS tried but failed to find a suitable placement for
him.”).

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DHHS consequently filed a petition to take jurisdiction over DVL based on MCL
712A.2(b)(1) and (2). MCL 712A.2(b)(1) explains that the court has jurisdiction over a
juvenile
[w]hose parent . . . , when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper
or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary
for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to
his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, . . . or
who is without proper custody or guardianship.
MCL 712A.2(b)(2) provides jurisdiction over a juvenile “[w]hose home or environment,
by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a
parent, . . . is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.”
After conducting several hearings on the matter, the trial court denied the petitions
to take jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2). Commenting that it had
never presided over a case like this, the court said, “I just don’t see how I can find that
[respondent has] been neglectful or abusive . . . .” The court noted that DVL “has a very
severe detachment disorder” that “causes him to act out in very dangerous ways,” and
although respondent “has made numerous efforts to try to have [DVL’s] condition
addressed,” respondent has “two other children who would be at risk if [respondent]
brought [DVL] home . . . .” The court, the assistant attorney general, the lawyer guardian
ad litem, and respondent’s attorney recognized nevertheless that if the petition were not
authorized, DVL’s situation would remain unchanged—he would still need to be picked
up from his current placement, and if respondent again refused to pick him up, DHHS
would file another petition, thus beginning the Kafkaesque cycle over again. Respondent
acknowledged that it was a “no win situation.” The court noted that

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[t]he department can review and decide whether, under the circumstances
and based on my comments, whether it might be appropriate to think about
filing a dependency petition . . . other than that, I haven’t heard anything has
changed; that it’s any safer for [respondent] to bring [DVL] home now than
it was ten months ago or whatever the time frame is. . . . You know, if
[respondent] doesn’t come and pick [DVL] up, you know, Foster Care can’t
do it. You’re right. I’m not disputing that. I’m just, you know, saying that
under these circumstances, I just, I just can’t justify a finding that
[respondent] has been neglectful of some sort.
Thus, the court determined that a preponderance of the evidence did not support
jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or MCL 712A.2(b)(2) and dismissed DHHS’s
petition.
DHHS appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in a split, unpublished per
curiam decision. The majority reversed the trial court’s holdings regarding both MCL
712A.2(b)(1) and (2), opining that both subsections provided adequate bases for
jurisdiction. In re Lange, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
November 2, 2023 (Docket No. 362365). Relying on In re Hockett, 339 Mich App 250;
981 NW2d 534 (2021), the Court of Appeals majority first concluded that the trial court
clearly erred by holding that Subsection (b)(2) did not apply. In re Lange, unpub op at 3-4.
The majority noted that “despite her efforts, respondent admitted that she could not care
for DVL’s special and significant mental health needs. She testified that DVL and her
other two children would be at risk of harm if DVL were in the home.” Id. at 5. Respondent
had refused DHHS’s assistance in securing outpatient treatment. Of course, respondent
had attempted such outpatient therapy for years without success, the majority recognized.
However, the majority held that a preponderance of the evidence showed “that
respondent’s actions rendered the home environment a place of danger for DVL, as well
as respondent’s other two children and, thus, statutorily unfit.” Id. Thus, the Court of

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Appeals concluded that the trial court had clearly erred by failing to take jurisdiction under
MCL 712A.2(b)(2).
Regarding Subsection (b)(1), the Court of Appeals relied on Hockett. In both
Hockett and this case, the respondent-mothers refused to seek outpatient treatment but were
generally willing to obtain inpatient mental health services. In re Lange, unpub op at 5.
The majority conceded that it was unsafe for DVL to return home. Id. In fact, the majority
also observed that while DHHS had considered a Community Mental Health (CMH)
referral to provide outpatient treatment once a week, there was no evidence that such a
program would be sufficient to care for DVL. Id. at 6 n 6. After referring to the trial court
record, the majority nevertheless concluded that the trial court had clearly erred by failing
to take jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), stating:
A preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that, despite
recommendations made by an examining adult (not pediatric) psychiatrist,
respondent, although able to do so, refused to pick him up from the hospital
and failed to secure intensive outpatient treatment for her son. This was
sufficient testimony to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
respondent refused to provide proper or necessary care for DVL, who was
subject to a substantial risk of harm to his mental well-being. [In re Lange,
unpub op at 6-7.]
Thus, whereas the trial court found that neither Subsection (b)(1) nor Subsection (b)(2)
provided a basis for jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held that both subsections did.
Judge R EDFORD dissented, concluding that he would have affirmed the trial court’s
decision not to take jurisdiction. He said:
There is no indication that DVL’s mother did anything other than
undertake exhaustive, comprehensive, and costly measures to try and care
for DVL. Her refusal to allow DVL to be placed in her home with two other
minor children who would be endangered was not an act of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity. Nor was there evidence that she was

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able, despite her repeated and substantial efforts, to provide DVL with the
proper or necessary support in her home. [Id. (R EDFORD , J., dissenting) at 3.]
Respondent sought leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument
concerning whether
(1) the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court should have
assumed jurisdiction over the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and
(2) under the circumstances of this case; (2) In re Hockett, 339 Mich App
250 (2021), was correctly decided; and (3) DVL would qualify as a
dependent homeless minor pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A). [In re Lange,
513 Mich 1032, 1032 (2024).]
II. ANALYSIS
This Court “review[s] the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction for clear error
in light of the court’s findings of fact.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 295; 690 NW2d 505
(2004) (citation omitted). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when this Court is “left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Schadler, 315
Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App
713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014).
Child protective proceedings are generally divided into two phases: the adjudicative
phase, which determines whether the court can take jurisdiction over a juvenile, and the
dispositional phase, which determines what action will be taken on behalf of the juvenile.
In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). This case implicates the
adjudicative phase. The trial court may exercise jurisdiction over the juvenile if a
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that one of the bases for jurisdiction set out in
MCL 712A.2(b) applies. See In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 536; 711 NW2d 426 (2006).

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At issue in this case is whether there was jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
and (2). Those subsections provide, in relevant part, that a court has
(b) [j]urisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years
of age found within the county:
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other
care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial
risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her
parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is without proper custody or
guardianship. As used in this sub-subdivision:
* * *
(B) “Neglect” means that term as defined in section 2 of the child
abuse and neglect prevention act, 1982 PA 250, MCL 722.602.
* * *
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian,
nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live
in. As used in this sub-subdivision, “neglect” means that term as defined in
section 2 of the child abuse and neglect prevention act, 1982 PA 250, MCL
722.602. [Emphasis added.]
Both Subsection (1) and Subsection (2) incorporate the definition of “neglect” from MCL
722.602. MCL 722.602(1)(d) defines “neglect” as
harm to a child’s health or welfare by a person responsible for the child’s
health or welfare that occurs through negligent treatment, including the
failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though
financially able to do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable
means to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.

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A. MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
Subsection (b)(1) applies to a child “[w]hose parent . . . , when able to do so,
neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support[.]” We assume that by refusing
to take DVL home and having him live there while receiving outpatient treatment,
respondent failed to provide proper or necessary support. But the question is whether she
refused to provide such support “when able to do so.”
“ ‘Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded
its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are
used.’ ” Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 515;
821 NW2d 117 (2012) (citation omitted). MCL 712A.2 does not define “when able to do
so.” Therefore, we turn to the dictionary to discern the meaning of “when able to do so.”
See People v Feeley, 499 Mich 429, 437; 885 NW2d 223 (2016) (explaining that it is
appropriate to consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning
of a word when a statute leaves that word undefined).
“Able” is defined as: (1) “having sufficient power, skill, or resources to do
something”; (2) “having the freedom or opportunity to do something”; or (3) “having a
quality or nature that makes something possible[.]” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (11th ed). We believe that the first definition is the most contextually
appropriate. The third definition would require courts to undergo a strangely ontological
analysis of a parent’s nature. The second definition perhaps overlaps with the first, as
having the “opportunity” to do something arguably requires having sufficient power, skill,
or resources to do something. Insofar as the second definition suggests that only a technical
liberty to do something is sufficient to be considered “able” to do it, we do not believe that

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the definition is contextually appropriate. In a practical sense, to be “able” to do something,
someone must have both the technical freedom to do it and the resources to make it
possible. We doubt that the Legislature would consider a parent “able” to provide
necessary care or support if, though free to provide such care or support, they did not have
the resources to do so.2 See also In re Hockett, 339 Mich App at 255 (recognizing that
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) “implies some understanding of the existence of parents who do not
have the resources to provide for their children”). We therefore hold that “able to do so”
as used MCL 712A.2(b)(1) means that a parent must have “sufficient power, skill, or
resources” to provide necessary care or necessary support.
Respondent, while perhaps physically able to bring DVL home, reasonably
concluded that DVL could not live in the home without putting DVL, her other children,
and herself in harm’s way. In other words, respondent did not have sufficient power, skill,
or resources to have DVL return and stay at home because he posed a danger to the other
members of the household, as well as himself. Even had respondent worked with DHHS
to obtain outpatient services, those services had failed in the past, and there was no
2 As Justice CAVANAGH explained in her concurring statement in In re Holbrook, 513 Mich
898, 901 (2023) (CAVANAGH , J., concurring),
I believe that the phrase [“when able to do so”] should be understood more
broadly under a plain-language reading. . . . [R]espondent did not have the
resources to care for the child’s extensive medical needs. Looking at whether
the parent . . . physically had the capacity to pick up her child, or whether
respondent physically had the capacity to complete CMH paperwork, misses
the point. . . . [O]ther barriers prevented respondent from being able to take
[the child] home, notably, the risk of danger to the family and the
recommendation by health professionals that appropriate treatment included
24/7 monitoring. How can it be said that respondent was “able to” provide
proper care?

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indication that such services would provide respondent with sufficient power, skill, or
resources to enable DVL to live at home safely, especially given that DVL did not receive
treatment during his most recent hospital stay. Consequently, respondent was not truly
“able” to bring DVL home and thus provide proper or necessary support for him. The trial
court therefore did not clearly err by refusing to take jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
B. MCL 712A.2(b)(2)
Subsection (b)(2) allows a court to take jurisdiction over a child “[w]hose home or
environment, by reason of neglect . . . on the part of a parent, . . . is an unfit place for the
juvenile to live in.” Again, MCL 722.602(1)(d) defines “neglect” as “harm to a child’s
health or welfare by a person responsible for the child’s health or welfare that occurs
through negligent treatment, including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing,
shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so, or the failure to seek financial or
other reasonable means to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.”3
3 We have held that Subsection (b)(2), unlike Subsection (b)(1), does not require a finding
of culpable neglect. See also In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 41; 444 NW2d 789 (1989) (“[W]e
hold that culpability is not a prerequisite for probate court intervention under [MCL
712A.]2(b)(2).”). See also id. at 33-34 (“Subsection 2(b)(2) . . . uses ‘neglect’ as a noun
and speaks to the objective condition of the home. Jurisdiction may be conferred under
this subsection if the home is in fact an unfit place for the child to live. This subsection,
by its own terms, mandates an inquiry into the objective state of being neglected rather
than an examination of the individual causes or reasons for the neglect.”). However,
Jacobs looked to dictionary definitions of “neglect” because at the time, MCL 712A.2 did
not define “neglect.” Id. at 34. In a subsequent amendment, 2018 PA 58, the Legislature
added language to MCL 712A.2 incorporating the definition of “neglect” from MCL
722.602(1)(d). As demonstrated by Justice ZAHRA ’s and Justice B ERNSTEIN ’s opinions,
there is disagreement over the effect of the amendments—Justice Z AHRA posits that
currently, neither Subsection (b)(1) nor Subsection (b)(2) involves a determination of
culpability. Post at 7 (Z AHRA , J., dissenting) (“However, our Legislature later expressly
defined ‘neglect’ in both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The term “neglect” as currently
defined in both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) no longer has an element of culpability because

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MCL 712A.2(b)(2) requires a home to be unfit by reason of a parent’s “neglect.” In
order for there to be “neglect” as defined in MCL 722.602(1)(d), there must be “negligent
treatment.” That term is not defined by the statute, which only states that “negligent
treatment” includes “the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care,
though financially able to do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable means
to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.” MCL 722.602(1)(d). See
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West,
2012), p 132 (“The verb to include introduces examples, not an exhaustive list.”). These
examples do not fit the instant situation because respondent did at least seek other
reasonable means to provide shelter or medical care, as she has consistently tried to obtain
inpatient treatment for DVL.4 Consequently, we must ask whether respondent has caused
it is not defined to include a mens rea requirement.”) (citation omitted). Justice BERNSTEIN
posits to the contrary that now both subsections have an element of culpability. Post at 11
(BERNSTEIN , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I would hold that when the
Legislature chose to statutorily define the term ‘neglect,’ it implemented a culpability
requirement in both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2).”). We did not request briefing on the
effect of 2018 PA 58 or whether we should overrule Jacobs. Thus, we do not decide
whether Jacobs remains good law despite the amendments of the statute. Instead, we
ground our analysis in the current text of MCL 712A.2(b)(2), which now includes the
definition of “neglect” in MCL 722.602(1)(d).
4 Justice Z AHRA ’s dissenting opinion contends that respondent did fail to “provide adequate
food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so,” and that thus,
Subsection (b)(2) applies. I am dubious. Here, respondent at least sought “other reasonable
means” to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care. MCL 722.602(1)(d).
I believe that is enough to conclude that there was no negligent treatment or, by extension,
neglect. Presumably, the “other reasonable means” clause would only apply to a
respondent who has not succeeded in providing adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical
care, though financially able to do so. In other words, I read the statute as stating that if a
respondent has provided adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, there is no
negligent treatment; if a respondent has failed to provide those things though financially
able to do so, then we ask whether they have sought “financial or other reasonable means”

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12
harm to DVL through her “negligent treatment.” Because the examples of negligent
treatment given earlier do not provide a comprehensive definition, we again turn to the
dictionary to define the term.
“An undefined statutory term must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. A
lay dictionary may be consulted to define a common word or phrase that lacks a unique
legal meaning. A legal term of art, however, must be construed in accordance with its
peculiar and appropriate legal meaning.” Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 276;
753 NW2d 207 (2008) (citations omitted). “Negligence” is a legal term of art as it relates
to a cause of action for negligence in tort. Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151, 158; 188
NW2d 593 (1971) (“ ‘Negligence’ and ‘tort’ remain legal terms of art . . . .”). It is not
certain, though, whether the Legislature intended to invoke that technical definition by its
use of “negligent,” given that “negligent” is also a common word.
In this case, we need not determine whether “negligent” as used in “negligent
treatment” is used per its common or legal definition because both the lay dictionary and
the legal dictionary we consulted contain the same definition. See Brackett, 482 Mich at
276 (explaining that the Court did not need to decide whether the statutory phrase was “a
common phrase or a legal term of art because the terms in the phrase are similarly defined
of providing them. Only if the respondent’s actions fit under neither clause is there
negligent treatment under the statute.
In any case, given Justice Z AHRA ’s contention that Subsection (b)(1) applies
because respondent neglected to provide proper or necessary support by failing to take
DVL home, it is strange that that he argues that Subsection (b)(2) also applies. That
subsection requires a finding that the “home . . . [was] an unfit place for [DVL] to live in.”
There is a tension in asserting that respondent should have taken DVL home to avoid the
application of Subsection (b)(1) but also that the home was unfit.

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13
in both a lay dictionary and a legal dictionary”). Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed) defines
“negligent” as “[c]haracterized by a person’s failure to exercise the degree of care that
someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised in the same circumstance.” Merriam-
Webster defines “negligent,” in relevant part, as “marked by or given to neglect especially
habitually or culpably” or “failing to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent
person in like circumstances[.]” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). Both
legal and lay dictionaries provide similar definitions of “negligent.” The second definition
from Merriam-Webster, which is essentially the same as the Black’s definition, squarely
fits the context here. Thus, we define “negligent” for purposes of MCL 722.602(1)(d) as
failing to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances.
Respondent’s treatment of DVL does not meet this definition of “negligent.”
Respondent has been trying to get DVL the treatment he needs, as any reasonably prudent
person in her circumstance would have. Refusing to take DVL home under the
circumstances was precisely what an ordinarily and reasonably prudent person would do,
given that DVL posed a danger to himself and others if taken home. Past experience
indicated that even if DVL were provided outpatient treatment, he would still pose a danger
to the household. Because respondent did not engage in “negligent treatment,” and
therefore did not commit “neglect” as that term is defined by MCL 722.602(1)(d), the trial
court did not clearly err by refusing to take jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2).5
5 Justice Z AHRA ’s dissenting opinion implies that we have elevated a respondent’s
“subjective perspective of risk” to a decisive factor in our statutory analysis. Post at 3 (“A
respondent’s subjective perspective of risk and lack of culpability are not relevant to the
statutory objective of a trial court assuming jurisdiction over a child under the Child Abuse
and Neglect Prevention Act (CANPA), MCL 722.601 et seq.”). That is not the case. Per
our textual analysis, when determining whether Subsection (b)(1) is a basis for jurisdiction,

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14
Additionally, we note again that the Court of Appeals majority here looked to In re
Hockett, 339 Mich App 250, reasoning that that case is analogous and its rationale
supported a reversal here. In re Lange, unpub op at 4-7. While we agree that the facts of
the two cases are similar, we point out that there is a deferential standard of review, namely,
clear error. Hockett affirmed a trial court decision, whereas here the Court of Appeals
majority reversed the trial court. While the Court of Appeals was certainly right to look to
Hockett, it should have remained mindful of the deference owed to the trial court’s
decision.6
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court did not clearly err by declining to take jurisdiction under
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and
remand to the trial court for reinstatement of the trial court’s order denying DHHS’s petition
a court should ask whether a respondent has “sufficient power, skill, or resources” to
provide necessary care or support, in accordance with the statute’s requirement that a
parent to be “able” to provide such care or support. That is an objective standard and does
not turn on a parent’s subjective view of their ability. When determining whether
Subsection (b)(2) is a basis for jurisdiction, a court should ask whether the respondent
failed to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances as
required under the definition of “negligent treatment” and ultimately “neglect.” Again,
that is an objective standard. In other words, this opinion requires lower courts to apply
the statutory text based on objective definitions. It does not allow respondents to evade a
finding of jurisdiction based on their subjective views or render professional medical and
psychiatric recommendations of no significance.
6 What Justice Z AHRA refers to as “improperly indulg[ing]” respondent, post at 10, I believe
is a proper deference to trial court findings.
Other statutes that the dissenting opinion seems to claim that respondent violated,
such as MCL 750.161, are beside the point. No charges have been filed against respondent
on that ground, and DHHS has raised no argument based on that statute.

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15
and for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. This decision is without prejudice
to DHHS to seek jurisdiction under other statutory grounds by filing a subsequent petition.7
Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
7 We note that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) may provide an adequate basis for jurisdiction in cases
such as this. MCL 712A.2(b) allows a court to take jurisdiction over a juvenile
(3) If the juvenile is dependent and is in danger of substantial physical
or psychological harm. The juvenile may be found to be dependent when
any of the following occurs:
(A) The juvenile is homeless or not domiciled with a parent or other
legally responsible person.
Here, when the hospital had discharged DVL and respondent refused to take him to her
house, DVL was arguably homeless, given that he had no permanent place of residence at
that time. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) (defining “homeless”
as “having no home or permanent place of residence”). The statute puts forward no
minimum time requirement for a juvenile to be found homeless. DVL was also seemingly
“in danger of substantial physical or psychological harm,” given his mental health
struggles. We leave it to DHHS’s discretion whether they wish to file a petition seeking
jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A). If DHHS should choose to file a petition, we
note that the facts in this case have of course changed since the filing of the original
petition, and the trial court’s determination on a new petition would have to consider the
current facts. In re MU, 264 Mich App 270, 278-279; 690 NW2d 495 (2004) (“The statute
[MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2)] speaks in the present tense, and, therefore, the trial court must
examine the child’s situation at the time the petition was filed.”).
We note that Justice ZAHRA claims that we are remanding this case for the trial court
to address whether Subsection (b)(3) applies. Justice BERNSTEIN claims that we are
“vaguely expand[ing]” Subsection (b)(3). We do neither. DHHS can choose to seek
jurisdiction under Subsection (b)(3) or not. As Justice ZAHRA notes, given DVL’s current
age, DHHS may not wish to claim that he is “dependent.” If DHHS does seek jurisdiction
under that subsection, the trial court can make its own determination regarding whether the
subsection applies.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
In re D. V. LANGE, Minor,
No. 166509
CAVANAGH , J. (concurring).
I concur with the majority opinion. The trial court did not clearly err by declining
to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or MCL 712A.2(b)(2). If DVL is
still in need of services on remand, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
may wish to seek the trial court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(3) and not simply
“leave [DVL] at the nearest homeless center and hope for the best,” which DHHS
characterizes as its only option in its brief on appeal. Whether jurisdiction will be
appropriate under MCL 712A.2(b)(3) or some other provision will be up to the trial court
to decide under the circumstances as they exist at the time a petition is filed.1
I write separately in another attempt to draw the Legislature’s attention to this
ongoing problem—that is, instances where DHHS seeks jurisdiction over an otherwise fit
parent because the parent is unable to adequately care for a child with severe mental health
1 The majority opinion notes that DHHS may elect to file a petition under MCL
712A.2(b)(3) if it deems it appropriate. The majority does not order DHHS to file such a
petition, does not define “homeless” under MCL 712A.2(b)(3), nor does it determine
whether DVL’s situation would come under that definition. The majority simply
acknowledges that the Court directed briefing as to whether DVL would qualify as
“dependent” under Subsection (b)(3). We received briefing both in support of and against
this proposition, and the majority opinion takes no position on the matter because to do so
would be premature at this juncture.

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2
issues, like the respondent-mother in this case. See In re Holbrook, 513 Mich 898, 899
(2023) (CAVANAGH , J., concurring). Although I agree with the majority that there is no
clear error in the trial court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction, the facts of this case
continue to demonstrate why the “available grounds for jurisdiction are ill-equipped to
address situations” involving children with serious mental health diagnoses. Id. at 902.
Parents who have gone to great lengths to help their mentally ill children but who ultimately
exhaust the resources at their disposal should not suffer additional legal and collateral
consequences. On the other hand, children in crisis should not go without adequate
resources, nor should DHHS be compelled to file petitions alleging unfitness where none
exists just so that the agency is able to provide services. There must be a better solution.
Once again, “I ask the Legislature to consider creating a no-fault procedure that allows the
state to intervene without requiring courts to adjudicate parents as unfit when they are
struggling to support children with complex mental health needs.” Id. at 903. Reform is
needed, or parents and children will continue to suffer.
Megan K. Cavanagh

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
In re D. V. LANGE, Minor.
No. 166509
BERNSTEIN , J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority’s recitation of the facts and its analysis to the extent it
holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that jurisdiction was not
properly asserted under either MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (b)(2). I believe that both statutory
provisions require a showing of culpability on the part of a parent before a court can
exercise jurisdiction over a child, and I do not believe that respondent acted in a culpable
manner. However, I write separately because I believe that the majority’s analysis of
culpability with respect to MCL 712A.2(b)(2) is insufficient, and to the extent that the
majority suggests that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) “may” provide an adequate basis to obtain
jurisdiction over DVL, I disagree.
I. MCL 712A.2(b)(1), (b)(2), AND CULPABILITY
To support its conclusion that jurisdiction over DVL was not properly asserted
under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (b)(2), the majority concludes that respondent here did not
commit neglect or act in a negligent manner. I agree. The record clearly demonstrates that
DVL required constant complex care, which respondent was not able to provide.
Respondent was actively seeking alternative care that could meet DVL’s complex needs.
It would be counterintuitive to characterize these actions as neglectful or negligent.

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2
But the majority opinion stops short of concluding that MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and
(b)(2) each require a finding of culpable conduct on the part of the parent.1 I believe such
a finding is central to an exercise of jurisdiction under either of these provisions.
To begin, each statutory provision provides for jurisdiction, in part, on the basis of
parental neglect. In this context, the Legislature has chosen to define “neglect” as
harm to a child’s health or welfare by a person responsible for the child’s
health or welfare that occurs through negligent treatment, including the
failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though
financially able to do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable
means to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care. [MCL
722.602(1)(d).]
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) provides a court with jurisdiction over a minor
[w]hose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other
care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial
risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her
parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is without proper custody or
guardianship.
As this Court has previously said, an exercise of jurisdiction on this basis necessarily
requires culpability on the part of the parent. See In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 33; 444
NW2d 789 (1989) (“According [to MCL 712A.2(b)(1)], jurisdiction may be conferred
upon the probate court if a parent, ‘when able to do so,’ neglects or refuses to provide
1 I note that I do not believe that culpable conduct requires intentional mens rea. Instead,
culpable conduct refers merely to a person’s blameworthiness. See Merriam-Webster.com
Dictionary <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culpable> (defining “culpable”
as “meriting condemnation or blame especially as wrong or harmful”) (accessed March 4,
2025) [https://www.perma.cc/MZ6X-YVLZ]. In this way, even a parent’s negligence is
blameworthy and, therefore, amounts to culpable conduct.

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3
necessary support or care. This subsection, which uses ‘neglect’ as a verb, is subjective on
its face. By inserting ‘when able to do so,’ the Legislature has created a ‘built-in’
culpability requirement.”).
Nothing in the majority opinion today changes this conclusion. The problem lies
with the majority opinion’s approach to MCL 712A.2(b)(2). MCL 712A.2(b)(2) allows a
court to take jurisdiction over a child “[w]hose home or environment, by reason of
neglect . . . on the part of a parent, . . . is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.” In
determining whether the child’s home is unfit by reason of neglect, and by defining neglect
as a failure on the part of a parent to properly provide for the child, see MCL 722.602(1)(d),
this provision necessarily instructs courts to look to whether the parent has made the home
unfit. In other words, like MCL 712A.2(b)(1), this provision also asks courts to make a
finding that a parent has acted in a culpable manner. However, Jacobs previously held that
MCL 712A.2(b)(2) allows for a finding of jurisdiction “if the home is in fact an unfit place
for the child to live. [MCL 712A.2(b)(2)], by its own terms, mandates an inquiry into the
objective state of being neglected rather than an examination of the individual causes or
reasons for the neglect.” Jacobs, 433 Mich at 33-34. Ultimately, Jacobs held that
“culpability is not a prerequisite” for a finding of jurisdiction pursuant to MCL
712A.2(b)(2). Id. at 41.
I believe that, as it relates to culpability under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), Jacobs’s holding
is no longer good law. As the majority correctly acknowledges, at the time that Jacobs
was decided, the Legislature had not yet defined neglect. By now defining neglect in terms
of whether a parent has failed to provide adequate support, the Legislature has necessarily
disagreed with Jacobs about the application of MCL 712A.2(b)(2) and found that parental

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4
culpability is a prerequisite to the court’s exercising jurisdiction, as it is with MCL
712A.2(b)(1).2
The majority concludes that the use of the term “neglect” in MCL 712A.2(b)(2)
requires courts to look to whether a parent has exercised proper care over the child.
However, the majority fails to address the tension between its own analysis and the Jacobs
holding to the contrary, instead stating, “[W]e do not decide whether Jacobs remains good
law despite the amendments of the statute.” I do not believe that the majority opinion and
Jacobs can be reconciled, and by failing to address this conflict, I believe that the majority’s
approach fails to provide adequate guidance to courts applying MCL 712A.2(b)(2).
Indeed, the Court of Appeals has continued to rely upon Jacobs for its assertion that MCL
712A.2(b)(2) does not require an inquiry into a parent’s culpability. See In re Hockett, 339
Mich App 250, 256; 981 NW2d 534 (2021) (relying on Jacobs for the proposition that
culpability is not a prerequisite for a finding of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) and
that a parent’s inability to care for a child’s needs can support a finding of jurisdiction
under MCL 712A.2(b)(2)); In re Holbrook, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
of Appeals, issued May 19, 2022 (Docket No. 359504), pp 4-5 (relying on Jacobs and
2 I note that the Legislature previously required that any parent who committed neglect be
placed on a central registry. See MCL 722.627j, as amended by 2010 PA 81. There would
have been little sense for a parent to be placed on a registry if the Legislature did not believe
that committing neglect, a finding required by both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2), did not
necessarily include a finding of parental culpability. However, this provision was amended
in 2022. See 2022 PA 64. MCL 722.627j now requires a parent to be placed on the registry
if the parent has committed “serious abuse or neglect.” (Emphasis added.) This Court has
not addressed whether there is a difference between neglect as used in MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
and (b)(2) and neglect or serious neglect as used in MCL 722.627j(2). In any event, I
believe that by characterizing neglect as something that could require a parent to be placed
on a central registry, the Legislature has acknowledged that neglect necessarily includes
some level of parental culpability.

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5
Hockett to explain that though the respondent could not manage her child’s complex needs,
culpability was not a prerequisite under MCL 712A.2(b)(1)); In re Lange, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 2, 2023 (Docket No. 362365)
(relying on Jacobs and Hockett for the proposition that culpability is not a prerequisite
under MCL 712A.2(b)(2)). The majority opinion leaves unclear how and when courts can
rely on Jacobs in the future.
I do not see a principled manner in which the majority can issue an opinion that
states that MCL 712A.2(b)(2) requires courts to look to a parent’s negligence, i.e., whether
the parent has acted in a culpable manner, and simultaneously refuse to address an opinion
which says that culpable behavior is irrelevant to an inquiry under MCL 712A.2(b)(2).
Instead, I believe that MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2) each require a finding of culpable
conduct on the part of the parent, and to the extent that Jacobs has held otherwise, I would
hold that Jacobs has been negated by legislative amendment.
II. MCL 712A.2(b)(3)
When a child requires services and a parent cannot provide that child the requisite
care through no fault of their own, the question remains whether MCL 712A.2 provides
some other basis for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to seek a
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the child. Although the petitioner never filed a petition
seeking jurisdiction on the basis of MCL 712A.2(b)(3), this Court nonetheless ordered oral
argument asking whether that provision could serve as a basis for jurisdiction. Today, the
majority suggests that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) may provide such a basis. Specifically, MCL
712A.2(b)(3)(A) allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over a child if that child is

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6
dependent and is in danger of substantial physical or psychological harm. Of particular
relevance here, a juvenile may be found to be dependent if they are homeless.3
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that this provision may provide a basis for
jurisdiction here. To begin, I have no qualms with the majority’s explanation of the record;
it is true that the family home did not adequately meet DVL’s needs. According to the
record, DVL required constant monitoring and care and engaged in violent behavior. The
home was not a safe place for DVL or the other residents. But there is no basis to hold that
these circumstances rendered DVL homeless under MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A).
Respondent has provided this Court with state and federal statutes that define a
person as homeless if their home is not adequate for their needs. See 42 USC 11302(a)(1)
of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 USC 11301 et seq. (defining the
terms “homeless” and “homeless person,” in part, as “an individual or family who lacks a
fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence”); MCL 388.1763a(2) of the State School
Aid Act, MCL 388.1601 et seq. (adopting the definition of “homeless” in 42 USC
11302(a)(1)); MCL 28.292(14)(g)(i), addressing state personal identification cards
(adopting a definition of “homeless” that is used by the United States Department of
3 MCL 712A.2(b)(3) also provides for a finding that the child is dependent if the child is
not domiciled with a parent. I believe that DVL remained domiciled with respondent even
though DVL did not return to the family home. See Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence,
494 Mich 475, 503; 835 NW2d 363 (2013) (explaining that a “child’s domicile is
determined by reference to the domicile of his or her parents” and that a “child’s domicile
of origin remains the child’s domicile until a new domicile is acquired through the actions
of the child’s parents or until that point in time when the minor, either through
emancipation or by reaching the age of majority, can acquire a domicile of choice”). In
any event, because respondent concedes that DVL remained domiciled with her and
because the majority does not address domicile, I limit my analysis under MCL
712A.2(b)(3) to the question of homelessness.

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7
Housing and Urban Development); MCL 333.2891(19)(a) of the Public Health Code, MCL
333.1101 et seq. (same). The problem with reliance on these authorities, however, is that
“homeless” is specifically defined by these statutes for application within the relevant act.
Though the statutory scheme here defines certain terms, such as “neglect,” it does no such
thing for the term “homeless.” Indeed, the Michigan Legislature has chosen to incorporate
specific definitions of the word “homeless” elsewhere, see MCL 388.1763a; MCL
28.292(14)(g)(i); MCL 333.2891(19)(a), but it has chosen not to do so here. Thus, there is
no indication that the Legislature intended for “homeless,” as it is used in MCL
712A.2(b)(3), to be read with a technical legal meaning. See MCL 8.3a (“All words and
phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage
of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar
and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning.”).
Instead, an undefined statutory term is to be given its “plain and ordinary” meaning.
People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 151; 730 NW2d 708 (2007). “We consult a lay
dictionary when defining common words or phrases that lack a unique legal meaning. This
is because the common and approved usage of a nonlegal term is most likely to be found
in a standard dictionary, not in a legal dictionary.” Id. at 151-152 (citations omitted). See
also Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 515; 821
NW2d 117 (2012) (“ ‘Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should
be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the
words are used.’ ”) (citation omitted). Merriam-Webster defines “homeless” as “having
no home or permanent place of residence.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, homeless

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8
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/homeless> (accessed March 4, 2025)
[https://www.perma.cc/Z2ZH-MGPM]. In turn, “home” is defined as “one’s place of
residence.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, home <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/home> (accessed March 4, 2025) [https://www.perma.cc/ADX9-
VKE7].4
These dictionary definitions lead me to conclude that “homeless,” as it is used in
MCL 712A.2(b)(3), merely refers to whether the child has a physical dwelling to return to.
Here, DVL did have a physical dwelling he could return to. While respondent makes a
facially attractive argument that a child should be considered homeless if that child’s home
cannot meet his basic needs, respondent cites unrelated federal and state statutes as support
for her argument. This Court cannot import definitions from unrelated statutory schemes
merely because we believe that those specialized definitions are a matter of good policy.
Per our canons of statutory interpretation, we must first look to the dictionary definition of
the word “homeless” to help parse its plain meaning. No dictionary definition supports
respondent’s argument that a child is effectively homeless if a child’s home does not meet
their needs, and respondent has likewise failed to provide any legislative history indicating
that the Legislature intended that courts adopt this reading of “homeless.”
4 Similarly, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary.com defines “homeless” as “having
no home[.]” <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/
homeless?q=homeless> (accessed March 6, 2025) [https://www.perma.cc/2VN3-9GUB].
In turn, “home” is simply defined as “house, etc.” Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary.com, home <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/
home_1?q=home> (accessed March 6, 2025) [https://www.perma.cc/V643-PPRN].
Collins Dictionary.com defines “homeless” as “having no home; without a permanent
place of residence.” Collins Dictionary.com, homeless
<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/homeless> (accessed March 4, 2025).

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9
The majority also suggests that, because respondent refused to retrieve DVL when
he was discharged from the hospital, DVL was “arguably homeless.”5 However, such an
argument flies face-first into the majority’s conclusion that respondent did not act in a
culpable manner. Here, a team of medical professionals said that DVL could return home
and receive outpatient therapy.6 The majority’s focus on the fact that respondent chose not
to retrieve DVL in its analysis under MCL 712A.2(b)(3) necessarily invites questions into
respondent’s culpability. In other words, the majority opinion appears to be defining
homelessness in terms of whether respondent has rendered the child homeless. But, while
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2) speak directly to a parent’s actions, and thus invoke
questions of parental culpability, MCL 712A.2(b)(3) does not. Compare MCL
712A.2(b)(1) (providing a court with jurisdiction over a minor “[w]hose parent . . . , when
able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support”) (emphasis added)
and MCL 712A.2(b)(2) (providing a court with jurisdiction over a minor “[w]hose home
or environment, by reason of neglect . . . on the part of a parent . . . is an unfit place for the
juvenile to live in”) (emphasis added) with MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A) (stating that a juvenile
5 I note that respondent did not raise this argument in her briefing. Her briefing has only
characterized the home as an unfit place for DVL’s needs.
6 I do not question respondent’s testimony that she did not have the ability to adequately
care for DVL in the home. However, without any medical record evidence, I cannot share
in my colleagues’ skepticism surrounding DVL’s discharge. While I acknowledge that
respondent felt incapable of caring for DVL in the home, at bottom, a team of medical
professionals monitored DVL and concluded that DVL could return home and receive
intensive outpatient therapy. At this point in the litigation, I have no reason to believe that
DVL’s medical team acted in bad faith, and I would accept their conclusion moving
forward.

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10
may be found to be dependent if “[t]he juvenile is homeless or not domiciled with a parent
or other legally responsible person”).
Injecting parental culpability into an analysis under MCL 712A.2(b)(3)
misinterprets the plain language of the provision and appears to directly conflict with the
majority’s earlier analysis finding that respondent was blameless under this set of
circumstances. While there are certainly circumstances in which a parent can render a
child homeless, such actions would likely result in a petition for jurisdiction on the basis
of abandonment under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), not homelessness under MCL 712A.2(b)(3).
When we ordered oral argument on the application in this case, we asked the parties
to brief whether MCL 712A.2(b)(3) was an appropriate basis for a finding of jurisdiction
under circumstances like these. While the majority does not take a definitive stance on this
question, having received such briefing, I would answer the question and hold that MCL
712A.2(b)(3) does not support a finding of jurisdiction in this circumstance.
I, like my colleagues, sympathize with parents who find themselves in respondent’s
position. It seems that the only way children with complex mental health crises can receive
necessary help under the statute is if their parents or caregivers are adjudicated as
neglectful, even when courts have found that these parents were willing to address the
child’s needs. In circumstances like these, the current statutory scheme thus results in a
conundrum: either children who require services will not receive them, or they will receive
services at the expense of adjudicating largely faultless parents as neglectful. The fix,
however, appears to be a purely legislative one. I cannot sign onto a majority opinion that
vaguely expands the scope of MCL 712A.2(b)(3) without a valid basis in law and
encourages DHHS to litigate this case in that manner.

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11
III. CONCLUSION
Like the majority, I would conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it
found that jurisdiction was not properly asserted under either MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (b)(2).
Unlike the majority, I would hold that when the Legislature chose to statutorily define the
term “neglect,” it implemented a culpability requirement in both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and
(b)(2). To the extent that Jacobs held otherwise as it relates to MCL 712A.2(b)(2), I would
hold that Jacobs has been negated by the codification of “neglect” in MCL 722.602(1)(d).
I disagree with the majority that MCL 712A.2(b)(3) may support a finding of jurisdiction
in this circumstance. I do not believe that any specialized meaning of “homeless” applies
in this context. Moreover, I do not believe that it is consistent to simultaneously find that
respondent did not act in a culpable manner for purposes of MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (b)(2),
while also considering the child homeless on the basis of respondent’s actions for purposes
of MCL 712A.2(b)(3). For these reasons, I concur in part with, and dissent in part from,
the majority’s opinion.
Richard H. Bernstein

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
In re D. V. LANGE, Minor.
No. 166509
Z AHRA , J. (dissenting).
This is a tragic case that involves a troubled child who was exposed to trauma and
abuse while in the care of his family of origin. Respondent mother adopted the child
(“DVL”) when he was five years old, knowing he suffered from significant behavioral
disorders.1 Despite many tribulations,2 respondent provided DVL with care and
1 Respondent adopted DVL in a single-parent adoption when he was five years old.
Respondent also shares legal custody of two other children with her former spouse.
2 Over the years, DVL repeatedly attempted to set fires in the family home and injure the
family pets. He also exhibited sexually inappropriate behaviors at home and while in
placement. Between the ages of 10 and 13, DVL was hospitalized six or seven times to
receive psychiatric care for threatening to kill his parents and siblings. The hospitalizations
were typically two weeks in duration and were followed by outpatient treatment.
During this time, respondent’s former spouse would sometimes provide for DVL’s
care and maintenance. Indeed, she paid for 13-year-old DVL’s treatment at a year-long
out-of-state residential treatment program. However, respondent testified that her former
spouse refused to allow DVL at her home in August or September of 2020. Yet, as of April
2021, respondent testified that respondent would sometimes have all her children, i.e., the
children she shared with her former spouse and DVL, over to her house. She explained:
Initially, [her former spouse] was against the other two boys being [at
her home] when [DVL] was there, but [her former spouse] had no say over
what went on in my household. So yes, they were coming and they were
staying with me while [DVL] was there.

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2
maintenance such that he was never viewed as a child of neglect. On June 4, 2021, then
13-year-old DVL attempted to start a fire in the home and threatened suicide. Respondent
took him to a hospital, seeking admission into an inpatient treatment program. DVL
remained at the hospital for more than a month, and he was provided with basic care. Still,
the hospital was unable to secure a placement for DVL with any juvenile inpatient
treatment program. Medical records suggest that DVL was not cleared for discharge on
July 8, 2021, but the hospital cleared him for discharge the following day, recommending
he engage in intensive outpatient treatment.
Respondent refused to pick DVL up from the hospital or allow him into the family
home. She insisted that the hospital had not yet provided him proper pediatric psychiatric
care. She also maintained that any outpatient services offered to DVL through the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) would not be efficacious.3 In the face
of respondent’s refusal to pick DVL up from the hospital and return him to the family
home, on July 16, 2021, DHHS filed a petition alleging that respondent’s abandonment of
DVL required the court to assume jurisdiction over DVL. At the adjudication, respondent
offered poignant testimony explaining that she feared that if DVL returned home, he would
harm himself, her, and others within the household.
After staying six months in the out-of-state program, DVL was dismissed, allegedly for
sexually inappropriate behavior with other residents. DVL returned to respondent’s home
in April 2021.
3 In support of this proposition, respondent maintains that DVL had previously received
outpatient care on several occasions, and even when followed by brief periods of inpatient
psychiatric treatment, outpatient care was not efficacious.

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3
The trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction over DVL, finding no basis to
conclude that respondent had been neglectful or abusive. DHHS appealed, and the Court
of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that the court
clearly erred by declining to exercise jurisdiction over DVL based on both MCL
712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Respondent applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and in lieu of
granting leave, we ordered oral argument on the application. In re Lange, 513 Mich 1032
(2024).
The majority opinion holds that a respondent may be excused from refusing to
provide care and maintenance to a child when “ ‘other barriers prevented [the] respondent
from being able to take [their child] home, notably, the risk of danger to the family . . . .’ ”4
I disagree. A respondent’s subjective perspective of risk and lack of culpability are not
relevant to the statutory objective of a trial court assuming jurisdiction over a child under
the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Act (CANPA), MCL 722.601 et seq. The
statutory objective of CANPA is the protection of the child. Even an entirely blameless
parent may fail to provide care and maintenance for a child. Under those circumstances,
DHHS is obligated to investigate and take action to protect the child.5 The parent’s
subjective belief that a child is at risk of self-harm or harming others does not relieve DHHS
of this responsibility. Interestingly, once the trial court in this case declined to exercise
4 Ante at 9 n 2, quoting In re Holbrook, 513 Mich 898, 901 (2023) (C AVANAGH , J.,
concurring) (alteration omitted).
5 MCL 400.115b(2).

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4
jurisdiction, DHHS immediately informed the court that it would file another petition
because no one was then providing care and maintenance for DVL.
This is not a novel issue or one of first impression. In fact, last term we reviewed
very similar issues. In In re Holbrook,6 we expressly asked the parties to address whether
In re Hockett7 was correctly decided. In In re Hockett, the Court of Appeals addressed the
phrase “when able to do so” under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). As in the instant case, the
respondent-mother in In re Hockett “was unable to manage the complex mental health
needs of her child.”8 The panel concluded:
The referee correctly determined that respondent declined to retrieve her
child upon discharge. The referee also correctly noted that respondent had
the physical capacity to retrieve her minor child and did not do so. Our
concern is that this mother, who took desperate action to get care for her
child, is now labeled “unfit” and listed on a registry for persons who acted to
harm children when she, in fact, was seeking to protect her child. The scant
and costly resources available for mental healthcare for children likely places
other parents in the same situation as this respondent. We can only look to
our policymakers for a resolution to this conundrum. However, “culpability
is not a prerequisite” for court intervention under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). In re
Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 41; 444 NW2d 789 (1989). Respondent’s admitted
inability, not her unwillingness, to care for NRH’s special needs with the
level of assistance she was receiving, along with her homelessness, rendered
NRH’s environment a place of danger for the seriously ill child and, thus,
statutorily unfit.[9]
6 In re Holbrook, 510 Mich 1085, 1085 (2022).
7 In re Hockett, 339 Mich App 250; 981 NW2d 534 (2021).
8 Id. at 255.
9 Id. at 255-256.

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5
Ultimately, this Court vacated In re Holbrook as moot because the child aged out of
the court’s jurisdiction.10 Still, Justice CAVANAGH wrote a concurring statement, joined
by Chief Justice CLEMENT , observing that
[t]he laws on the books simply do not account for parents who are
overwhelmed by their children’s mental health crises and need state
intervention. It strikes me as fundamentally unfair to deem parents faced
with such insurmountable challenges as unfit or neglectful.
* * *
. . . Cases like this, where parents are undeserving of those possible
consequences, illustrate why reform is needed. “The scant and costly
resources available for mental healthcare for children likely places other
parents in the same situation as this respondent. We can only look to our
policymakers for a resolution to this conundrum.” [11]
The Legislature has taken initial steps to address the concerns raised in the Holbrook
concurrence, but, to date, no legislation has been enacted.12
This majority opinion ignores governing statutory text and precedents. This Court
has long held that jurisdiction over a child is proper regardless of whether parents are at
10 In re Holbrook, 513 Mich 898 (2023).
11 Id. at 902-903 (CAVANAGH , J., concurring), quoting In re Hockett, 339 Mich App at 255-
256.
12 Michigan House Bill No. 6149 of 2023 currently proposes amending MCL 712A.2(b)(3)
to include the following subparagraph:
(E) The juvenile is without proper or necessary support, care, or
services due to the juvenile’s special medical, mental health, educational, or
social needs through no fault of the juvenile’s parents, guardian, or other
custodian. As used in this [subparagraph], “no fault” means that the court
finds that the parent, custodian, or legal guardian has sought state and local
assistance and resources and is still unable to provide the support or get the
care or services needed by the juvenile.

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6
fault for the conditions that gave rise to jurisdiction. Indeed, more than 30 years ago, in In
re Jacobs, we specifically rejected the contrary contention:
We recognize that the respondent has not intentionally or culpably neglected
her children. The purpose of the juvenile code, however, is to protect
children from an unfit home, not to punish bad parents. Were we to require
a showing of culpable neglect before a probate court may exercise
jurisdiction, an entire class of children, i.e., those neglected by blameless
parents, would remain neglected. [13]
The majority opinion does not address this basic principle of Michigan family law.
Further, since In re Jacobs was decided, the Legislature acted to provide a consistent
meaning for the term “neglect” under both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) by incorporating the
definition from MCL 722.602. MCL 722.602(1)(d) defines “neglect” as
harm to a child’s health or welfare by a person responsible for the child’s
health or welfare that occurs through negligent treatment, including the
failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though
financially able to do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable
means to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care. [14]
At the time In re Jacobs was decided, “[n]eglect” was not “defined in the juvenile
code, although the term appear[ed] in both the jurisdictional provisions quoted above and
the subsection governing the termination of parental rights, MCL 712A.19a(e).”15 The
13 In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 41; 444 NW2d 789 (1989) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
14 Emphasis added.
15 In re Jacobs, 433 Mich at 33.

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7
Court engaged in “a comparison of these jurisdictional provisions [to shed] light on the
proper construction of ‘neglect’ in [the context of MCL 712A.2(b)(2)]:”16
According to [MCL 712A.2(b)(1)], jurisdiction may be conferred
upon the probate court if a parent, “when able to do so,” neglects or refuses
to provide necessary support or care. This subsection, which uses “neglect”
as a verb, is subjective on its face. By inserting “when able to do so,” the
Legislature has created a “built-in” culpability requirement.
[MCL 712A.2(b)(2)], on the other hand, uses “neglect” as a noun and
speaks to the objective condition of the home. Jurisdiction may be conferred
under this subsection if the home is in fact an unfit place for the child to live.
This subsection, by its own terms, mandates an inquiry into the objective
state of being neglected rather than an examination of the individual causes
or reasons for the neglect. We agree with Judge BOYLE that [MCL
712A.2(b)(2)] contemplates the assumption of jurisdiction in both
situations.[17]
Thus, In re Jacobs reasonably interpreted MCL 712A.2(b)(1) to include a subjective
component of neglect. However, our Legislature later expressly defined “neglect” in both
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).18 The term “neglect” as currently defined in both MCL
712A.2(b)(1) and (2) no longer has an element of culpability because it is not defined to
include a mens rea requirement. Our Legislature’s plain statement that a parent must
“provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, [when] financially able to do
so,” does not require much more definition. A parent’s financial ability is not a subjective
matter. This amendment confirms that the Legislature intended to cabin the subjectiveness
of the phrase “able to do so” under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and ensure that DHHS provides
16 Id.
17 Id. at 33-34.
18 See 2018 PA 58.

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8
services to destitute parents so they may correct this specific condition before it leads to a
child’s removal.19
19 The majority does not decide “whether [In re] Jacobs remains good law despite the
amendments of the statute. Instead, [the majority] ground[s] [its] analysis in the current
text of MCL 712A.2(b)(2), which now includes the definition of ‘neglect’ in MCL
722.602(d)(1).” Ante at 11 n 3. In contrast, Justice BERNSTEIN “would hold that when the
Legislature chose to statutorily define the term ‘neglect,’ it implemented a culpability
requirement in both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2).” Ante at 11 (B ERNSTEIN , J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Oddly enough, he reaches this conclusion without even
mentioning the language of the amendment. Instead, he simply says that “[t]here would
have been little sense for a parent to be placed on a registry if the Legislature did not believe
that committing neglect, a finding required by both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2), did not
necessarily include a finding of parental culpability.” Ante at 4 n 2. To the contrary, I
believe it makes a good deal of sense to protect “an entire class of children, i.e., those
neglected by blameless parents[.]” In re Jacobs, 433 Mich at 41.
The majority opinion also concludes that the trial court properly declined to exercise
jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). Specifically, the majority states:
In order for there to be “neglect” as defined in MCL 722.602(1)(d), there
must be “negligent treatment.” That term is not defined by the statute, which
only states that “negligent treatment” includes “the failure to provide
adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to
do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable means to provide
adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.” MCL 722.602(1)(d). See
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul:
Thomson/West, 2012), p 132 (“The verb to include introduces examples, not
an exhaustive list.”). These examples do not fit the instant situation because
respondent did at least seek other reasonable means to provide shelter or
medical care, as she has consistently tried to obtain inpatient treatment for
DVL.
I fail to understand how “[t]hese examples do not fit the instant situation”; rather, they
precisely fit. Respondent not only failed but also refused to provide DVL adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care. Nothing in the definition of “neglect” suggests that
attempting to obtain inpatient treatment for DVL is an acceptable alternative to actually
providing DVL care and maintenance, especially when a parent is financially able.

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9
Moreover, MCL 712A.18(1) suggests that the trial court in this case improperly
considered the “substantial risk of harm to the juvenile or society” when determining
whether the court should exercise jurisdiction.20 MCL 712A.18(1) instructs that “if the
court finds that a juvenile is within this chapter, the court shall order the juvenile returned
to his or her parent if the return of the juvenile to his or her parent would not cause a
substantial risk of harm to the juvenile or society.”21 In other words, the “substantial risk
of harm to the juvenile or society” must be considered after the court has taken jurisdiction,
but there is no statutory indication that it must be considered when the court is
contemplating whether to exercise jurisdiction.
The interpretation of MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) adopted in the majority opinion
does nothing to protect troubled children, and it subordinates the needs of a child to a
parent’s subjective understanding of their ability to provide “care and maintenance.”
Currently, Michigan law has but one exception allowing parents to refuse to provide a child
with necessary and proper maintenance or simply abandon a child, which is the Safe
Delivery of Newborns Law, MCL 712.1 et seq. Otherwise, refusing to provide support for
or abandoning a child is a felony.22 And here, notwithstanding the extremely difficult
20 See MCL 712A.18(1), as amended by 2020 PA 389.
21 Id.
22 MCL 750.161(1) provides:
A person who deserts and abandons his or her spouse or deserts and
abandons his or her children under 17 years of age, without providing
necessary and proper shelter, food, care, and clothing for them, and a person
who being of sufficient ability fails, neglects, or refuses to provide necessary
and proper shelter, food, care, and clothing for his or her spouse or his or her
children under 17 years of age, is guilty of a felony, punishable by

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10
situation in which respondent found herself, there is no question that respondent was able
to provide some necessary and proper care for DVL, including shelter, food, and clothing.
She refused to do so despite the hospital staff’s determination that DVL was cleared for
discharge. Respondent’s refusal to pick DVL up from the hospital because she disagreed
with a psychiatrist’s recommendation is simply not relevant to whether the trial court
should have exercised jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). Respondent, not
the hospital, is ultimately legally responsible for DVL’s ongoing care and maintenance.
And by refusing to take custody of DVL and instead abandoning him at a hospital,
respondent in fact withdrew her protection, support, or help from DVL.23
The majority opinion improperly indulges respondent by sharing her subjective
belief that “other” barriers excuse her from providing care and maintenance to DVL. For
instance, the majority too readily agrees that “[r]espondent . . . reasonably concluded that
DVL could not live in the home without putting DVL, her other children, and herself in
harm’s way.”24 Respondent testified that her other children have lived with their other
parent since before DHHS had even sought custody of DVL. She also testified that,
initially, her former spouse “was against the other two boys being [at my home] when
[DVL] was there, but she had no say over what went on in my household.”
imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not less than 1 year and not
more than 3 years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 3
months and not more than 1 year.
23 “Abandon” is defined in this context as “to withdraw protection, support, or help from.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed).
24 Ante at 9 (emphasis added).

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11
From all accounts, DVL’s behavior presented the same risk of harm to respondent
or her other children before the June 4, 2021 incident that he would have presented on
July 9, 2021, the date on which the hospital cleared DVL for discharge and respondent
refused to pick him up from the hospital. Both the majority opinion and the Court of
Appeals majority express “skepticism regarding how DVL could become dischargeable
after one day without receiving additional treatment.”25 Yet, I question how respondent
could insist that DVL and her other children stay in her home together before the June 4,
2021 incident and then suddenly believe that he presented such a continuing danger to
herself and her other children that intensive outpatient treatment would not meaningfully
aid DVL.
The fact remains that a psychiatrist at the hospital cleared DVL to return home.
Respondent disagrees with the psychiatrist’s recommendation, noting the lack of a
treatment plan from a pediatric psychiatrist. Perhaps there is good reason to question this
expert medical conclusion. But psychiatrists can and do treat adolescents such as DVL.
Moreover, respondent’s refusal to pick DVL up from the hospital because she disagreed
with the psychiatrist’s recommendation is simply not relevant to whether the trial court
should have exercised jurisdiction over DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
DVL was in fact cared for at the hospital for over a month before the hospital cleared
him for discharge. Respondent simply disagrees with the sort of treatment DVL would be
provided after his discharge, which is outside her purview and does not justify abandoning
25 Ante at 2 n 1, citing In re Lange, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
November 2, 2023 (Docket No. 362365), p 5 n 4.

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12
DVL. It is respondent, not the hospital, that is ultimately legally responsible for DVL’s
ongoing care and maintenance. In sum, a parent’s subjective fear that a child may be at
risk of self-harm or harming others does not justify the parent’s withdrawal of all
maintenance or care from the child.
I am also troubled that the majority opinion accepts as fact that “[e]ven had
respondent worked with DHHS to obtain outpatient services, those services had failed in
the past, and there was no indication that such services would provide respondent with
sufficient power, skill, or resources to enable DVL to live at home safely . . . .”26 Yet, DVL
has never previously been provided with the very intensive in-home outpatient services
that were offered. Respondent categorically refused any outpatient services, insisting that
similar services had not previously worked. Respondent’s position is essentially that if
DVL does not receive the treatment she believes is necessary, she is entitled to abandon
DVL and obtain more substantive services from the state. Instead of squarely rejecting this
position, the majority opinion again indulges respondent, stating that she “did at least seek
other reasonable means to provide shelter or medical care, as she has consistently tried to
obtain inpatient treatment for DVL.”27
Respondent wants the family court to take jurisdiction of DVL, but only on her
terms. In part, she does not want to be labeled an unfit parent and prefers that the court
assume jurisdiction by having DVL found “dependent” because he is “homeless.” Having
a court declare DVL “homeless” apparently spares respondent from being deemed an unfit
26 Ante at 9-10.
27 Ante at 11.

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13
parent but does not allow the court to take custody of DVL, which, in turn, permits DHHS
to provide him additional care and maintenance. Respondent’s attorney and DVL’s
lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) agree that declaring DVL “homeless” is the ideal
solution. While I acknowledge this case presents a heart-wrenching situation, I disagree
that declaring DVL homeless is ideal. Simply put, a parent who causes their child to
become homeless has in fact neglected or abandoned the child. Further, the notion adopted
by the majority opinion—that a parent can dictate the scope and extent of a treatment
plan—is not supported by statute and is certain to create more problems than it purports to
solve.28
For these reasons, I dissent.
Brian K. Zahra
T HOMAS , J., did not participate because the Court considered this case before she
assumed office.
28 The majority opinion accepts the invitation from respondent and DVL’s LGAL to
remand this case to the trial court to address whether MCL 712A.2(b)(3) may provide an
adequate basis for jurisdiction. MCL 712A.2(b)(3) allows a court to take jurisdiction over
a juvenile “[i]f the juvenile is dependent and is in danger of substantial physical or
psychological harm.” Under MCL 712A.2(b)(3)(A), a juvenile may be found to be
dependent when “[t]he juvenile is homeless or not domiciled with a parent or other legally
responsible person.”
This issue has never been raised by the parties and is therefore unpreserved. Further,
there has been no claim that DVL lacks a home or residence. Moreover, DVL is currently
over 17 years old and DHHS is not bound to claim he is “dependent,” especially given the
evidence in the lower court record that respondent has rarely visited DVL since the trial
court ordered DHHS to assume custody.

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