COA 373399 IN RE BRANNOCK/VANBLARICUM MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/9/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
December 09, 2025
3:05 PM
In re BRANNOCK/VANBLARICUM, Minors.
No. 373399
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 17-854809-NA
In re VANBLARICUM, Minors. No. 373462
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 17-854809-NA
Before: YATES, P.J., and BOONSTRA and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 373399, respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her minor children, AB, TV, CV, and JV. In Docket No. 373462,
respondent-father appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to TV, CV,
and JV.1 We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondents have three children together: TV, CV, and JV. Respondents’ youngest child,
JV, was born during the lower court proceedings. Respondent-mother’s oldest son, AB, is from a
1 On December 11, 2024, this Court consolidated these appeals on its own motion. In re
Brannock/VanBlaricum, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 11, 2024
(Docket Nos. 373399 and 373462).

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prior relationship; his father, G. Brannock, was not a respondent in the proceedings below and is
not a party to these appeals. Although the proceedings below were initiated by a petition filed by
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS or petitioner) related to events that occurred
in the summer of 2022, respondents have a history of Children’s Protective Services (CPS)
involvement.2 In 2017, AB was removed from respondent-mother’s care following a CPS
investigation that substantiated allegations of improper supervision and threatened harm. DHHS
offered respondent-mother a treatment plan and services. In mid-2018, while AB was still in care,
respondent-mother gave birth to TV. Because respondent-mother was still participating in services
and had yet to show any benefit, TV was also removed from respondents’ care. In 2019, the trial
court terminated its jurisdiction and returned AB and TV to respondents’ care.
In early 2020, respondent-mother gave birth to CV. In the summer of 2022, respondents
lived together with AB, TV, and CV in a trailer located in Oakland County. On August 21, 2022,
AB, then seven years old, choked on a biscuit. He stopped breathing and eventually experienced
cardiac arrest. Respondents called 911 and emergency medical services were dispatched to the
home. Paramedics were eventually able to remove the airway obstruction and revive AB. Medical
providers and police who responded to the 911 call noted that the condition of respondents’ home
was extremely poor: in every room of the home, surfaces were covered in human and animal feces,
mildew, and mold; there were piles of dirty diapers, garbage, and rotting food throughout the home,
and the home smelled overwhelmingly bad. Law enforcement officers who returned to the home
to execute a search warrant were forced to wear protective biohazard equipment.
AB was transported to a hospital in Novi and subsequently transferred to Mott Children’s
Hospital (MCH) in Ann Arbor. At MCH, medical staff noticed severe bruising all over AB’s body.
After further testing and examination, Dr. Bethany Mohr, Medical Director of the Michigan
Medicine Child Protection Team, concluded that AB had been physically abused.
Upon AB’s arrival at MCH, respondent-mother impeded his treatment, refused to allow
hospital staff to provide physical therapy, and refused to consent to outpatient speech therapy.
Similarly, respondent-father’s mother, i.e., AB’s stepgrandmother, C. Reblin, interfered when
hospital staff asked AB about his injuries.
On August 23, 2022, DHHS filed a petition in Washtenaw Circuit Court seeking AB’s
removal from respondents’ care. AB was the only child identified in the petition. At the
August 26, 2022 preliminary hearing, the parties waived probable cause and the court authorized
the petition. The court also placed AB with Brannock, his legal and biological father, but granted
respondent-mother supervised parenting time. In addition, the court ordered that respondent-
father, Reblin, and respondent-father’s grandmother, G. VanBlaricum, have no contact with AB.
The Washtenaw Circuit Court also transferred the matter to the Oakland Circuit Court.
2 Because child protective proceedings are deemed single continuous actions, In re LaFlure, 48
Mich App 377, 391; 210 NW2d 482 (1973), and “[h]ow a parent treats one child is certainly
probative of how that parent may treat other children,” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 730;
858 NW2d 143 (2014), a brief review of the family’s entire CPS history is warranted.

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On September 13, 2022, AB disclosed during a forensic interview that he had been
repeatedly physically abused by respondent-father and that respondent-mother was present during
the abuse. This abuse included being beaten with a belt or a piece of wood. AB also stated that
respondent-mother, TV, and CV were often present during the abuse. On September 15, 2022,
DHHS filed a first-amended petition that sought the removal of AB, TV, and CV, and identified
both respondent-father and respondent-mother as respondents.
On September 16, 2022, respondents were both arrested on child abuse charges and held
in the Oakland County Jail. Because this left TV and CV without proper care and custody, the
court entered an interim placement order permitting DHHS to take the children into protective
custody. Thereafter, TV and CV were placed together in a nonrelative licensed foster home. After
several adjournments, the court held a preliminary hearing on October 4, 2022 and authorized the
first-amended petition.
On October 17, 2022, DHHS filed a second-amended petition requesting that the court
authorize the petition, take jurisdiction over the children, terminate respondent-mother’s parental
rights to AB, and terminate both respondents’ parental rights to TV and CV. In addition to
allegations related to respondent-father’s physical abuse of AB, and respondent-mother’s failure
to protect AB, the second-amended complaint included allegations that the children were subjected
to extreme environmental neglect. DHHS alleged that the condition of respondents’ home was
deplorable. After respondent-mother gave birth to JV in mid-2023, the petition was amended again
to include a request that the court also terminate respondents’ parental rights to JV.
In the months that followed, the trial court adjourned the pretrial hearings, and
consequently the jurisdictional trial, on several occasions, for various reasons, including delays
related to respondents’ criminal charges, the production of medical records, the birth of JV, the
filing of an amended petition, and the substitution of appointed counsel. While the matter awaited
adjudication, the court held hearings at regular three- to four-month intervals.
In May 2023, respondent-mother entered a no-contest plea to one count of fourth-degree
child abuse and was released from jail; she was eventually sentenced to time served. After her
release, respondent-mother immediately moved to Florida to live with her parents. In January
2024, respondent-father pleaded no contest to one count of second-degree child abuse and was
sentenced to 7 to 15 years’ imprisonment. Respondent-father’s earliest possible release date is
September 15, 2029.
The trial court held a combined jurisdictional trial and statutory grounds hearing in late
August 2024. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court found that the children came
within its jurisdiction, and that clear and convincing evidence had been presented supporting the
termination of respondents’ rights to each of their children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), and
(k)(iii). At the conclusion of a best-interest hearing in September 2024, the trial court found that
termination of respondents’ parental rights was in each child’s best interest, and accordingly
entered an order terminating respondents’ parental rights. These appeals followed.

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II. RESPONDENT MOTHER’S APPEAL (DOCKET NO. 373399)
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that statutory grounds for
terminating her parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for
termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error.
MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d
747 (2010), citing In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
The trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), and (k)(iii), which permit termination of parental rights under the
following circumstances:
(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so,
fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of
the parent.
(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, the abuse included
1 or more of the following, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will
be harmed if returned to the care of the parent:
* * *
(iii) Battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it terminated respondent-mother’s parental
rights on these grounds.
Respondent-mother’s only argument is that the trial court erred when it found statutory
grounds to terminate her parental rights, because there was no evidence implicating her in any
abuse of the children. Respondent-mother’s argument is belied by the extensive record in this
case, and is devoid of legal merit. Contrary to respondent-mother’s argument, it was not necessary
for DHHS to establish that she herself had physically abused her children. In In re Ellis, 294 Mich
App 30, 35-36; 817 NW2d 111 (2011), this Court held that termination of parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) and (k)(iii), as well as under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and (b)(ii), was
permissible even in the absence of definitive evidence regarding the identity of the abuse
perpetrator “when the evidence does show that respondent or respondents must have either caused

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or failed to prevent the child’s injuries.” In this case, there was clear and convincing evidence that
respondent-mother knew that respondent-father was physically and emotionally abusing AB, yet
she failed to prevent AB’s injuries. In fact, respondent-mother admitted as much at the termination
hearing. Similarly, respondent-mother was aware that TV and CV were being emotionally abused
by respondent-father’s actions, yet she failed to protect them from this abuse.
The evidence presented to the trial court established that AB was the victim of severe
physical abuse. Two first responders, a triage nurse, and Dr. Mohr testified that AB had significant
bruising and abrasions over his chest, back, arms, legs, face, and scalp. AB also had patches of
hair missing and a chipped front tooth. AB’s X-rays showed a healing fracture of his right pelvic
girdle. Some of the injuries were “patterned,” suggesting that AB had been struck with an object.
Other injuries were in locations that would be atypical for injuries associated with normal
childhood accidents.
Dr. Mohr testified that there was no evidence that AB suffered from a bleeding or clotting
disorder that would explain the extensive bruising. Further, neither respondent offered a plausible
explanation for AB’s injuries. Dr. Mohr found the number of injuries alarming, and she opined,
based on the extensive injuries and totality of the circumstances, that AB’s injuries were the result
of physical abuse.
There was also clear and convincing evidence from which the court could conclude that
respondent-mother knew about the abuse yet failed to protect her child. AB had disclosed that
respondent-mother and his two younger siblings were present during his abuse by respondent-
father. Respondent-mother admitted that she saw respondent-father on multiple occasions
repeatedly strike AB with either a belt, hose, or piece of wood, and that these assaults caused AB
to suffer bruises and bleeding gashes on his skin. She also saw respondent-father violently kick
AB in his hip while wearing steel-toed boots. On several occasions, respondent-mother witnessed
respondent-father drag AB across the floor by his hair. Respondent-mother admitted that she stood
by while respondent-father forced AB to stand under a cold shower for 20 to 30 minutes, stand in
a corner for an entire day, and go without food. Indeed, respondent-mother admitted that she
similarly disciplined AB by withholding food and making him stand in a corner for hours. On one
occasion, respondent-father held AB down on a bed by placing his knee on the child’s stomach.
Respondent-mother thought AB had lost consciousness as a result of that abuse, yet she failed to
obtain any medical care for her child.
Moreover, not only did respondent-mother fail to intervene to stop the abuse, there was
evidence that respondent-mother was complicit in the abuse and neglect. Respondent-mother kept
AB out of school in an effort to conceal the abuse. When school resource officers conducted
welfare checks, respondent-mother was hostile and uncooperative. She failed to ask for help or
disclose what was going on in the home. Even when AB almost died from choking on a biscuit,
and the existence of the injuries was finally revealed, respondent-mother did not cooperate with
the medical professionals. Instead, respondent-mother was hostile, and she refused to provide a
history that would have aided in AB’s diagnosis and treatment.
Respondent-mother admitted that she had not intervened when respondent-father
physically and emotionally abused AB. She further acknowledged that the abuse occurred in front
of TV and CV. There was evidence that these younger children were emotionally traumatized by

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what they saw and heard. AB stated that CV was scared during his abuse, and that she would cry
and run away. The worker supervising the parenting-time video visits noted that the children
appeared scared, nervous, and anxious during visits with respondent-father. The trial court did not
clearly err by concluding that clear and convincing evidence showed respondent-father had
emotionally abused CV and TV, that these children were emotionally injured by respondent-
father’s actions, and that respondent-mother failed to protect them from this abuse.
In addition to the physical and emotional abuse, there was also clear and convincing
evidence of severe environmental neglect of AB, CV, and TV. The record establishes that
respondents and the children lived in complete and utter squalor. Every room in the family’s trailer
was uninhabitable. Floors and other surfaces were covered in human and animal feces, mildew,
and mold. The odor in the home was overwhelming. Trash was strewn about, and soiled diapers
were found everyway. Rotting and mold-covered food was found throughout the trailer. The
carpets, walls, beds, and floors were stained. Respondent-mother claimed that the home had only
reached such a condition after the children were removed from her care. However, the trial court
found that respondent-mother’s testimony was not credible, in light of testimony from various first
responders who observed the home in August 2022 (before the children were removed) and
described it as unsanitary and unfit for children.
Regarding the termination of respondent-mother’s rights to JV, there was clear and
convincing evidence to support the conclusion that JV would be neglected if returned to
respondent-mother’s care. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) and (k)(iii); how a parent treats one child is
often probative of how that parent will treat other children. Mason, 486 Mich at 161; In re Kellogg,
331 Mich App 249, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020). JV was born during the lower court proceedings
and immediately removed from respondents’ care. Outside the time they were together in the
hospital at the birth, JV never lived with respondent-mother. Nevertheless, the trial court did not
err by applying the anticipatory neglect doctrine and concluding that JV would be harmed if
returned to respondent-mother’s care. Kellogg, 331 Mich App at 259.
The evidence established that respondent-mother allowed respondent-father to severely
physically abuse a child in the home, exposed other children in the home to the violent assaults,
and severely neglected the children by permitting them to live in almost unimaginable filth. In
addition, respondent-mother was complicit in keeping respondent-father’s abuse from being
discovered, and failed to cooperate with the investigation and medical treatment when the abuse
of AB came to light. From this record, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that the
children would be harmed if returned to respondent-mother’s care and custody, warranting the
termination of her parental rights. Trejo, 462 Mich at 355; Mason, 486 Mich at 161.
B. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION
Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court erred by holding that the termination of
her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We disagree. Whether termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In
re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews for clear error a trial
court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re Jones, 286
Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).

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“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of the
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). When considering whether termination of parental rights is in a
child’s best interests, a court may consider a variety of factors. In re White, 303 Mich App 701,
713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). These factors include the bond between the child and the parent, the
parent’s ability to parent the child, the child’s need for permanency and stability, the advantages
of a foster home over the parent’s home, the parent’s compliance with the case service plan, the
parent’s visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being, and the possibility of adoption.
Id. at 713-714. In addition, the trial court should consider the child’s safety, including the risk of
harm a child might face if returned to the parent’s care. See In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120,
142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). The court may also consider psychological evaluations, the child’s
age, continued involvement in domestic violence, and a parent’s history. Jones, 286 Mich App
at 131.
“The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests.” White, 303 Mich App at 713. The court’s focus must be on the child and not the parent.
Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. When more than one child is involved, a trial court must consider each
child’s best interests separately. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 42. A trial court need not, however,
make “individual” and “redundant factual findings” if the children’s interests do not significantly
differ. White, 303 Mich App at 715-716. Further, in the majority of cases, it is in a child’s best
interests to be placed with his or her siblings. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
In this case, although all of the children shared many of the same interests, they were not
similarly situated for purposes of a best-interest analysis. Approximately eight years separated
AB from his youngest half-sibling. AB was placed with his biological father, while his three half-
siblings were placed together in a nonrelative licensed foster home. Although the trial court
recognized that there were common elements pertinent to evaluating the best interests of the
children, it also recognized the need for individual best-interest determinations and explicitly
considered the best interests of the children individually.
1. AB’s BEST INTERESTS
AB, respondent-mother’s oldest child, was nine years old at the time of termination. His
situation differed from his half-siblings in several respects. After he was removed from
respondent-mother’s home, he was placed with Brannock, his biological father. Further, AB was
the only child who had been severely physically abused while in respondent-mother’s care. It is
clear from the evidence in the record that these experiences had taken their toll on AB. AB
struggled with anger management and behavioral issues. At the time of termination, AB had just
started at a new school that was better able to address and manage his mental health issues. The
caseworker testified that although it had not been an easy transition, Brannock was providing for
AB’s needs. The caseworker had no concerns over the placement. AB had a strong bond with
Brannock, and he felt comfortable talking and playing with his father. AB was meeting all of his
developmental benchmarks, and Brannock was ensuring that AB attended school and scheduled
dental and medical appointments. Brannock met all of AB’s needs, and he provided AB with a
stable home environment. It was evident that AB was in desperate need of this stability and
permanence.

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By contrast, there was no evidence that respondent-mother could meet AB’s needs and
provide him with stability and permanence. AB required a parent who would ensure that he
attended school, participated in therapy, and complied with his medication regime. Respondent-
mother’s track record in this regard was poor. When the children were in her care, respondent-
mother did not enroll AB in school for at least two school years; when he was enrolled in 2021,
respondent-mother admitted that respondents later removed him from school because of concerns
that he would disclose respondent-father’s abuse. Further, respondent-mother had not achieved
the stability required to parent her children. At the time of termination, respondent-mother was
unemployed and living with her parents in their Florida home. Respondent-mother admitted at the
best-interest hearing that if her father were to ask her to leave his home tomorrow, she honestly
had no idea what she would do. The record shows clearly that respondent-mother had yet to
achieve the stability and independence required to take care of herself, let alone a child.
Additionally, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that no bond existed between
respondent-mother and AB. Respondent-mother admitted that she only had a slight bond with AB.
Respondent-mother never asked the caseworker about her son. Similarly, AB never asked about
his mother. When the caseworker attempted to speak with AB about his mother, he would not
respond. In fact, AB’s refusal to talk in therapy initially impeded his progress. The record contains
overwhelming evidence that AB was betrayed by a person who was supposed to love and protect
him. Instead of acting in her child’s best interests, respondent-mother allowed her husband to
severely and persistently physically and emotionally abuse her son in ways that could accurately
be described as “torture.” AB was clearly aware of this betrayal and never displayed even a hint
of desire to be reunited with respondent-mother.
The trial court also considered the fact that AB was placed with his biological father.
Recently, this Court determined that a minor child’s placement with a biological parent at the time
of the termination hearing must be considered in determining whether it is in child’s best interests
to terminate a respondent’s parental rights. See In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App ___, ___;
___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 371973); slip op at 10-11. Relative placement is a factor that
weighs against termination. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. This is so because a relative
caretaker may be open to allowing the parent to maintain a relationship with the child, and
maintenance of that relationship may be in the child’s best interests. Mason, 486 Mich at 168-169.
However, while placement with a relative weighs against termination, it is not dispositive because
a trial court “may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relative if it finds that
termination is in the child’s best interests.” Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
In this case, the court considered the fact that the AB was placed with his biological father
and recognized that it was a factor that weighed against termination. Nonetheless, the court found
that termination was still in AB’s best interests. The court found that AB’s need for protection
from respondent-mother could only be adequately assured by terminating respondent-mother’s
parental rights. We agree. Jones, 286 Mich App at 129.
2. TV, CV, AND JV
At the time of the best-interest hearing, six year old TV, four year old CV, and one year
old JV were placed together in a nonrelative licensed foster home. TV and CV had been in this
home for two years. JV had been in this placement his entire life, and it was the only home he had

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ever known. The evidence showed that the foster home was clean and appropriate, and the foster
parents were meeting all of the children’s needs. The foster parents were able to engage the
children, and they were supportive, loving, and encouraging. TV was participating and
progressing in therapy designed to help him process his behaviors, and was meeting his
developmental milestones. CV was thriving in the foster home. Initially, she had exhibited some
speech delays, but her speech had improved. CV also struggled with attachment to male adults,
but she was making progress in this area as well. Similar to his siblings, JV was doing well in the
foster home. Initially, he had shown some developmental delays, but he had recently completed
and been discharged from occupational and physical therapy. The caseworker reported that the
foster parents were interested in adopting the children should the trial court terminate respondents’
parental rights.
By contrast, as discussed above, the evidence demonstrated that respondent-mother had
not established the stability necessary to properly parent her children and provide them with a safe
and stable home environment. Moreover, the caseworker testified that no bond existed between
respondent-mother and these three children, although respondent-mother testified that she had a
bond with CV and TV. When considering a child’s best interests, the court may consider the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 42. Further,
the trial court may consider the possibility of adoption. White, 303 Mich App at 713. In this case,
a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the licensed foster home was preferable to
respondent-mother’s home because it would provide TV, CV, and JV with the care they required
to facilitate their continued growth and development. Moreover, termination of respondent-
mother’s parental rights would provide an avenue by which these three children could achieve the
stability, finality, and permanence they required.
The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent-mother’s
parental rights was in all four children’s best interests. At the end of the day, respondent-mother
could not safely and appropriately care for her children, and continuing a parent-child relationship
would have been detrimental to the children’s physical, educational, and emotional well-being.
The court properly weighed the appropriate factors when considering all of the children’s best
interests. On balance, a preponderance of the evidence weighed in favor of terminating
respondent-mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in holding that
termination was in her children’s best interests, and in ordering the termination of respondent-
mother’s parental rights. Jones, 286 Mich App at 129.
III. RESPONDENT-FATHER’S APPEAL (DOCKET NO. 373462)
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
The trial court terminated respondent-father’s parental rights under the same statutory
grounds it relied on to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. Respondent-father argues
that the court improperly relied on the anticipatory neglect doctrine to find statutory grounds to
terminate his parental rights to TV, CV, and JV. We disagree.
Respondent-father argues that because the evidence showed that he only physically abused
his stepson, AB, there was insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that there was a
reasonable likelihood that his biological children would suffer injury or abuse in his care. We

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disagree. For the purposes of the anticipatory neglect doctrine, the probative value of evidence of
abuse or neglect of one child in anticipating the neglect or abuse of another child may be
“decreased by differences between the children, such as age and medical conditions.” Kellogg,
331 Mich App at 259; see also LaFrance, 306 Mich App at 730-731. However, both Kellogg and
LaFrance concerned the neglect of particularly vulnerable children with special needs; this Court
concluded in those cases that a parent’s failure to provide specialized care or recognize the unique
risks posed by a child’s medical issues may not permit the inference that the parent would neglect
children without those needs or vulnerabilities. LaFrance, 306 Mich App at 730-732; Kellogg,
331 Mich App at 259-261.
In this case, to the extent that respondent-father’s parental rights were terminated because
the trial court inferred that his children would be at risk of the same kind of abuse respondent-
father perpetrated against AB, it did not err by doing so. The record shows that his children were,
or with the passage of time would have soon become, similarly situated to AB. Respondent-father
began abusing AB when AB was very young. The abuse occurred in the family home while the
children’s mother was present. Respondent-father’s biological children were all under the age of
four at the time of removal. The age differences between AB and respondent-father’s children are
not so pronounced so as to negate the probative value of respondent-father’s treatment of AB.
Further, although on appeal respondent-father relies heavily on the fact that AB is his stepchild,
not his biological child, the record shows that respondent-father referred to AB as his son and
occupied a parental role (albeit an abusive and neglectful one) in AB’s life. He also testified at
the best-interest hearing that the primary reason he did not inflict the same “physical discipline”
upon TV and CV as he did upon AB was that TV and CV were not old enough, strongly implying
that they would have received the same or similar treatment as AB in the next few years, if they
had remained in respondent-father’s care. Contrary to respondent-father’s assertion, the evidence
does not show that respondent-father treated AB differently than his biological children because
of the lack of biological relation. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it applied the
anticipatory neglect doctrine to find that there existed statutory grounds to terminate respondent-
father’s parental rights to his biological children. Trejo, 462 Mich at 355; Mason, 486 Mich at 161.
In any event, there was significant evidence presented that respondent-father emotionally
harmed and severely neglected TV and CV. When a respondent in a termination of parental rights
case is a perpetrator of domestic violence, “the commission of domestic violence is an appropriate
concern. Similarly, termination may be properly based on the fact that [a] respondent’s own
behaviors were directly harming the children or exposing them to harm.” In re Jackisch/Stamm-
Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 334; 985 NW2d 912 (2022), quoting In re Plump, 294 Mich App
270, 273; 817 NW2d 119 (2011) (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). There were no
allegations that respondent-father physically assaulted TV and CV; however, there was evidence
that he physically abused AB in front of the younger children, and there was evidence that the
children were emotionally traumatized by what they saw and heard. Accordingly, there was clear
and convincing evidence that respondent-father’s children were subject to emotional abuse. The
harm to a child contemplated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) includes emotional harm as well as
physical harm. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 279; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). The trial court
could have inferred that JV would suffer this same harm based on the treatment of his siblings.
Mason, 486 Mich at 161; Kellogg, 331 Mich App at 259. Similarly, the trial court could have

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based its termination on respondent-father’s severe neglect of TV and CV’s living environment
alone, and the inference that JV would have suffered the same neglect. Id.
B. RELATIVE PLACEMENT
Respondent-father also argues that DHHS failed to investigate potential relative
placements before placing his children with a nonrelative licensed foster family. Specifically,
respondent-father contends that the children should have been placed with Reblin, their paternal
grandmother. We disagree. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this Court reviews
de novo. In re Piland, 336 Mich App 713, 720; 972 NW2d 269 (2021).
In support of his position, respondent-father cites to In re Rood, 483 Mich 73; 763 NW2d
587 (2009), and “Title IV-E” for the proposition that DHHS was required to give preference to
relatives. Although respondent-father does not engage in any meaningful discussion of his cited
authority, it is true that preference must be given to appropriate relatives in placing children that
come into care. See MCL 722.954a(2).
In this case, the possibility of relative placement for respondent-father’s children was
addressed from the outset. At the September 26, 2022 adjourned preliminary hearing, counsel for
respondent-father asked if the children’s paternal great-grandmother, VanBlaricum, could be
considered for placement. At the October 4, 2022 preliminary hearing, DHHS worker Erin Brooks
testified that she had investigated for placement both VanBlaricum and Reblin. She testified that
neither placement was suitable because the Washtenaw Circuit Court had ordered that
VanBlaricum and Reblin could not have any contact with AB. She further explained that because
of this no-contact order, it would be difficult to facilitate sibling visits if TV and CV were placed
with either the grandmother or the great-grandmother. Brooks further testified that placement with
Reblin was not suitable because of reports that Reblin had interfered with hospital staff attempting
to question AB about his injuries. Regarding VanBlaricum, on multiple occasions during AB’s
and TV’s prior removals, she had, at respondent-father’s direction, refused to allow a CPS worker
to see the children. Brooks also testified that maternal relatives had been investigated for possible
placement, but that no suitable placement had been found.
The record shows that petitioner thereafter made ongoing efforts to determine whether an
appropriate relative placement existed. Caseworker Dawn Cushing assessed Reblin’s home on
October 14, 2022. Although the home appeared physically appropriate, the caseworker
recommended that respondent-father’s children not be placed in Reblin’s home. Cushing noted
that during the investigation, a no-contact order was entered because Reblin interfered with the
hospital and law enforcement investigations. Cushing also stated that during an earlier court
hearing, Reblin had falsely reported that she was a licensed foster parent. Cushing asserted that
Reblin did not have a current foster-care license, and she was denied a license in 2019 when TV
was removed from the home. Further, Reblin reported to Cushing that she was around the children
all the time. From this, Cushing believed that Reblin was aware of the abuse and the condition of
the home.
Respondent-father’s attorney again raised the issue of relative placement at a pretrial
hearing held on October 19 and 25, 2022. At the outset, respondent-father’s attorney admitted that
Reblin was not, in fact, a licensed foster parent. Cushing testified that, in total, DHHS workers

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successfully contacted nine relatives. Nearly all of these relatives were willing to provide short-
term respite care or visits, but the overwhelming majority were not willing to take placement of
the children. Multiple attempts were made to contact VanBlaricum to further discuss placement,
without success. The only relative that DHHS workers were successful in contacting and
investigating for placement was Reblin. Regarding Reblin, Cushing testified that DHHS had not
changed its determination that placement of the children with her would not be appropriate.
Cushing testified that Reblin had misrepresented that her home was licensed for foster-care when,
in fact, Reblin was not and, indeed, she was denied a license in 2019. Cushing also testified that
despite the no-contact order, Reblin had contact with AB at a combined sibling and parenting-time
visit. The children’s lawyer-guardian ad litem agreed that DHHS had fulfilled its obligation to
investigate relative placement. The trial court found that DHHS reasonable efforts had been made
to identify relative caregivers.
Respondent-father attempted to revisit the issue again at a November 2022 pretrial hearing.
A home assessment had been made of VanBlaricum’s home. The trial court stated that it was not
going to change the children’s placement that day, but it advised respondent-father to take the
matter up with DHHS. DHHS’s counsel confirmed that a home assessment was completed, that
there were still some underlying issues, and that the matter should be discussed at a Family Team
Meeting.
The matter of relative placement was again revisited on August 17, 2023, after respondent-
father’s newly appointed attorney questioned why the children were not placed with either Reblin
or VanBlaricum. At this point, the children had been in the same licensed foster home for
approximately one year. Cushing testified that both individuals were extensively investigated and
found unsuitable for placement. Cushing reported that Reblin and VanBlaricum had both
interfered with the investigation into the children’s abuse and neglect.
The existing record does not support respondent-father’s position that DHHS failed to
properly consider placing respondent-father’s children with relatives. DHHS investigated
potential relatives for placement but, for several reasons, the individuals were not deemed
appropriate caregivers for respondent-father’s three children. We conclude that DHHS complied
with its statutory obligations to explore relative placement. See MCL 722.954a(2).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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