COA 366202 MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES V EARL R MIDLAM AND HAZEL M MIDLAM TRUST Opinion - On Remand SCt - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/16/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 16, 2026
9:32 AM
v Nos. 366202; 366766
Calhoun Circuit Court
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR., and LISA R.
MIDLAM, Cotrustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM
AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST,
LC No. 2022-000973-CC
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY,
CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY,
CONSUMERS ENERGY, MICHIGAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY, EXXON COAL
RESOURCES, GARY TROLZ, MATRIX
EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS
EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT,
STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT, CALHOUN COUNTY ROAD
COMMISSION, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of
the MYMACHOD TRUST, and DOUBLE EAGLE
FARMS II, CO,
Defendants.
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v Nos. 366204; 366767
Calhoun Circuit Court

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E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR., and LISA R.
MIDLAM, Cotrustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM
AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST,
LC No. 2022-000983-CC
Defendants-Appellants,
and
MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,
GARY TROLZ, GLYNN TROLZ AND
ASSOCIATES, INC., MATRIX EXPLORATION &
DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION &
DEVELOPMENT, WEST BAY EXPLORATION
COMPANY, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP,
TIMMUS ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., POLARIS
ENERGY, INC., NOVERR ENTERPRISES, LLC,
TONI S. TONDA, JES ENTERPRISES, LLC, JES
INVESTMENTS, LLC, JEFFREY S. SOBECK,
SNH HOLDINGS, PETER NOVERR, CASEY
COWELL, INNOVA EXPLORATION, INC,
CHERRY RIVER INVESTMENTS, LLC, JORDAN
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ROCK OIL
COMPANY, LLC, TREDWELL ENERGY
CORPORATION, TIMOTHY L. BAKER, JIM
BOWSER, GARY GOTTSCHALK, HARRY L.
GRAHAM, MATT JOHNSTON, MURRAY
MATSON, ERIC MAYFIELD, SHEILA
MAYFIELD, MORRIS A. MICELI, DAVID
RATAJ, KEITH SCHAUB, BENNETT L. SMITH
III, BENNETT LAWSON SMITH III TRUST,
MARY VANCE TUCKER STILLWELL TRUST,
LUCY LEA TUCKER TRUST, ROBERT E.
TUCKER, JR., MATTHEW A. JOHNSTON and
KELLY L. JOHNSTON, Cotrustees of the
JOHNSTON TRUST, CALHOUN COUNTY
WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PETER S.
LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST,
AT&T, L. NICHOLAS & NANCY RUWE
CHARITABLE TRUST, JOHN SCHMITZ, Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF N. RUWE,
CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, CONSUMERS ENERGY
COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY,

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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, and DOUBLE
EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendants.
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 367103
Calhoun Circuit Court
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR., and LISA R.
MIDLAM, Cotrustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM
AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST,
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY,
CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY,
CONSUMERS ENERGY, MICHIGAN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY, EXXON COAL
RESOURCES, GARY TROLZ, MATRIX
EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS
EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT,
STRICKLER RESOURCES, LP, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT, CALHOUN COUNTY ROAD
COMMISSION, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of
the MYMACHOD TRUST, and AT&T,
LC No. 2022-000973-CC
Defendants,
and
and DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendant-Appellant.
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 367104
Calhoun Circuit Court
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR., and LISA R.
MIDLAM, Cotrustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM
AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, MICHIGAN
LC No. 2022-000983-CC

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BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, GARY TROLZ,
GLYNN TROLZ AND ASSOCIATES, INC.,
MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT,
LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT,
WEST BAY EXPLORATION COMPANY,
STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, TIMMUS
ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., POLARIS ENERGY,
INC., NOVERR ENTERPRISES, LLC, TONI S.
TONDA, JES ENTERPRISES, LLC, JES
INVESTMENTS, LLC, JEFFREY S. SOBECK,
SNH HOLDINGS, PETER NOVERR, CASEY
COWELL, INNOVA EXPLORATION, INC.,
CHERRY RIVER INVESTMENTS, LLC, JORDAN
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ROCK OIL
COMPANY, LLC, TREDWELL ENERGY
CORPORATION, TIMOTHY L. BAKER, JIM
BOWSER, GARY GOTTSCHALK, HARRY L.
GRAHAM, MATT JOHNSTON, MURRAY
MATSON, ERIC MAYFIELD, SHEILA
MAYFIELD, MORRIS A. MICELI, DAVID
RATAJ, KEITH SCHAUB, BENNETT L. SMITH
III, BENNETT LAWSON SMITH III, TRUST,
MARY VANCE TUCKER STILLWELL TRUST,
LUCY LEA TUCKER TRUST, ROBERT E.
TUCKER, JR., MATTHEW A. JOHNSTON and
KELLY L. JOHNSTON, Cotrustees of the
JOHNSTON TRUST, CALHOUN COUNTY
WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PETER S.
LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST,
AT&T, L. NICHOLAS & NANCY RUWE
CHARITABLE TRUST, JOHN SCHMITZ, Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF N. RUWE,
CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, CONSUMERS ENERGY
COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY,
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY,
Defendants,
and
DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendant-Appellant.

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ON REMAND
Before: REDFORD, P.J., and MALDONADO and YOUNG, JJ.1
PER CURIAM.
This consolidated case arose from efforts by plaintiff, Michigan Gas Utilities Corporation,
to condemn easements for a natural-gas pipeline to replace an existing pipeline. Defendant The
Earl R. Midlam and Hazel M. Midlam Trust appealed by leave granted the trial court’s orders
denying its motion for a second hearing to review the necessity of an additional easement across
property owned by the trust. Defendant Double Eagle Farms II, Co., who leased property from
the Midlam Trust through which the proposed easement would run, appealed by leave granted the
trial court’s orders denying its motions for a necessity hearing and to dismiss the condemnation
action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A panel of this Court reversed and remanded the
matter to the trial court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of the Midlam
Trust and Double Eagle. Summary disposition was without prejudice to Michigan Gas refiling the
action in compliance with the statutory requirements. Mich Gas Utilities Corp v Earl R Midlam
and Hazel M Midlam Trust, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
May 1, 2025 (Docket Nos. 366202, 366766, 366204, 366767, 367103, and 367104), pp 11-12.
Michigan Gas then applied for leave to appeal the panel’s decision in the Michigan
Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court remanded the case to this
Court “for consideration of whether the issues raised in [Midlam Trust’s and Double Eagle’s]
applications for leave to appeal filed in the Court of Appeals were rendered moot given the
[pipeline’s] completion before the parties applied for leave to appeal.” Mich Gas Utilities Corp v
Midlam, 27 NW3d 89 (Mich, 2025). Having considered the issue on remand, we conclude that
completion of the replacement pipeline before the Midlam Trust and Double Eagle filed their
applications for leave to appeal in this Court did not render moot the issues raised in those
applications. Therefore, we affirm our earlier decision.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The relevant facts and procedural history leading to the Midlam Trust’s and Double Eagle’s
appeals were stated in the earlier decision as follows:
Michigan Gas is a utility corporation that distributes natural gas to
consumers. It owned and operated the Partello Pipeline, which ran from the Partello
Compressor Facility to the Vector Pipeline Station in Calhoun County, Michigan.
Michigan Gas installed the original Partello Pipeline under a certificate of necessity
issued by the Public Service Commission (PSC) in 1963. Michigan Gas determined
1 Judge YOUNG has been designated to serve in the stead of Judge NOAH HOOD, now Justice HOOD,
who served on the panel that heard this case on direct appeal.

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that the existing Partello Pipeline needed to be abandoned and replaced with a new
10-inch pipeline along a 15-mile stretch to address safety and reliability concerns.
In 2020, Michigan Gas applied for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity with the PSC. The PSC then entered into a settlement agreement with
Michigan Gas concerning its application. The settlement agreement provided that
the PSC’s staff reviewed Michigan Gas’s filings with a focus on the “project route,
necessity, engineering specifications, and environmental impact.” It provided that
the replacement pipeline served the “public convenience and necessity” and would
be built along the most direct, reasonable, and economical route. It also provided
that the replacement pipeline would be constructed within existing rights of way or
on private property owned by Michigan Gas or to be acquired by Michigan Gas.
And it provided that the existing pipeline would be abandoned or deactivated in
accord with law.
The PSC approved the settlement agreement. In its corresponding order,
the PSC restated the proposed route and found that it was reasonable. It noted that
“84% of the proposed route for the replacement pipeline lies within permanent
easement, with 16% located in or along road right-of-way, and, to the greatest extent
possible, the proposed replacement pipeline will follow the aging Partello
transmission pipeline to be replaced.” The PSC found that the “company’s selected
route is the most practical, cost-effective, and least intrusive method to maintain
service reliability.”
Michigan Gas submitted what it titled as a unitary good-faith offer to
purchase temporary and permanent easements over the two parcels of land owned
by the Midlam Trust. Michigan Gas made the offer to the Midlam Trust and to
those persons or entities that might have owned mineral and gas rights in, or
easements over, the Midlam Trust’s properties.
Double Eagle was not included among the offerees. As part of its offer,
Michigan Gas submitted to the Midlam Trust a “Landowner Construction Form.”
It asked the Midlam Trust to provide information about the land that might be
relevant to the construction. One of the questions stated: “Are there any renters of
the agricultural land within the proposed [Michigan Gas] easement?” Neither the
Midlams, nor the Midlam Trust, responded to Michigan Gas’s inquiry.
The various interested parties did not accept Michigan Gas’s unitary offer,
and Michigan Gas sued to condemn the easements over the Midlam Trust’s
properties. Michigan Gas filed separate complaints for the two parcels at issue—
Parcel 27 and Parcel 30. The Midlam Trust moved to review the certificate of
necessity in both cases. The trial court held a hearing and determined that the
Midlam Trust had not identified a valid basis for challenging necessity. The trial
court entered orders denying the Midlam Trust’s motions and granting title to the
easements to Michigan Gas.

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The Midlam Trust then moved for summary disposition. It argued that
Michigan Gas failed to satisfy the requirements for a condemnation action and the
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceedings because it did not
make an offer to the Midlam Trust’s lessee, Double Eagle, which leased Parcels 27
and 30 for farming. In response, Michigan Gas noted that the Midlam Trust did not
disclose that it had a lessee despite the request included as part of Michigan Gas’s
original offer, and the Midlam Trust did not record the lease with the county.
Michigan Gas argued that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the
condemnation proceedings because Michigan Gas was only required to send a
good-faith offer to owners of record, which did not include Double Eagle.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the Midlam Trust’s summary
disposition motion. It reasoned that Michigan Gas was only required to send a
good-faith offer to owners of record, and the Midlam Trust did not respond to
Michigan Gas’s inquiry included as part of its original offer. The trial court
permitted Michigan Gas to amend the complaint to add Double Eagle as a party.
Michigan Gas filed an amended complaint and served Double Eagle with a
copy that included the unitary good-faith offer to purchase temporary and permanent
easements over the two parcels of land owned by the Midlam Trust. The Midlam
Trust made multiple requests for an additional necessity hearing, which the trial
court denied. Double Eagle also moved to dismiss, contending that Michigan Gas
did not make a statutorily compliant good-faith offer to purchase the easements
before suing for condemnation. The trial court denied Double Eagle’s motions.
[Mich Gas Utilities Corp, unpub op at 6-7.]
II. APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
As indicated, the Midlam Trust and Double Eagle applied for leave to appeal the trial
court’s various orders. We granted leave in each docket and ordered the appeals consolidated.2
We held that Michigan Gas did not make a statutorily compliant good-faith offer to acquire the
easements and, therefore, that “the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
2 Mich Gas Utilities v Earl R Midlam & Hazel M Midlam Trust, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered October 23, 2023 (Docket No. 366202); Mich Gas Utilities v Earl R Midlam &
Hazel M Midlam Trust, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 23, 2023
(Docket No. 366204); Mich Gas Utilities v Earl R Midlam & Hazel M Midlam Trust, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 23, 2023 (Docket No. 366766); Mich Gas Utilities
v Earl R Midlam & Hazel M Midlam Trust, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
October 23, 2023 (Docket No. 366767); Mich Gas Utilities v Earl R Midlam & Hazel M Midlam
Trust, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 23, 2023 (Docket No. 367103);
Mich Gas Utilities v Earl R Midlam & Hazel M Midlam Trust, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered October 23, 2023 (Docket No. 367104).

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condemnation complaints.” Id. at 11. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded the matter to the
trial court for entry of an order granting summary disposition without prejudice in favor of the
Midlam Trust and Double Eagle. Id. at 12.
Michigan Gas applied for leave to appeal our decision in the Michigan Supreme Court.
Among other things, Michigan Gas challenged this Court’s determination that the trial court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction, as well as this Court’s interpretation of pertinent statutes. As indicated,
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to consider
whether defendants’ direct appeal was mooted by the fact that the pipeline went into service in
March 2023, approximately two months before defendants applied in this Court for leave to
appeal.3
III. ANALYSIS
Generally, an appellate court will not review a moot issue. City of Jackson v Thompson-
McCully Co, LLC, 239 Mich App 482, 493; 608 NW2d 531 (2000). An issue is moot when an
event occurs that renders it impossible for the reviewing court to grant relief. Attorney Gen v Mich
Pub Serv Comm, 269 Mich App 473, 485; 713 NW2d 290 (2005). An appellate court will review
a moot issue only if it is “publicly significant and likely to recur, yet is likely to evade judicial
review.” Id.
Michigan Gas sought to acquire an easement for its replacement pipeline under the
Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.51 et seq., which “provides standards
for the acquisition of property by an agency, the conduct of condemnation actions, and the
determination of just compensation.” MCL 213.52. “The UCPA is to be strictly construed, and
its jurisdictional conditions must be established in fact and cannot rest upon technical estoppel and
waiver.” Indiana Mich Power Co v Community Mills, Inc, 336 Mich App 50, 54; 969 NW2d 354
(2020); Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs for Co of Washtenaw v Shankle, 327 Mich App 407, 412; 934 NW2d
279 (2019).
Appeals seeking to halt or reverse a condemnation project may be deemed moot once the
project is substantially completed. See Novi v Robert Adell Children’s Funded Trust, 473 Mich
242; 701 NW2d 144 (2005) (suggesting that the completion of a condemnation project under the
UCPA could indeed moot appeals challenging construction of the project if the project was fully
realized and no further relief can be granted); see also Mulligan v Kalamazoo, 9 Mich App 713,
714; 158 NW2d 59 (1968) (dismissing as moot the plaintiffs’ appeal from the trial court’s order
granting summary disposition in favor of the defendant because the project had been completed
between the hearing in the trial court and the submission of the case to this Court).
3 Michigan Gas first asserted in its appellate brief to this Court that its replacement pipeline went
into service on March 6, 2023.

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Courts in sister states4 have also deemed claims to be moot when property owners seek
only to enjoin or set aside a condemnation project that is substantially completed. See, e.g., Wilson
& Wilson v City Council of Redwood City, 191 Cal App 4th 1559; 120 Cal Rptr 3d 665 (2011)
(observing that a project’s completion moots requests to set aside or rescind Resolutions
authorizing the project and holding that the completion of the subject project mooted the plaintiff’s
action because nothing could be accomplished by invalidation of the city council’s Resolutions);
In re Highway No 16, 286 Minn 528; 175 NW2d 502 (1970) (declining to exercise discretionary
review because the highway construction project in question had been substantially completed).
But see Town of Midland v Morris, 209 NC App 208, 213-214; 704 SE2d 329 (2011) (reasoning
that the completion of a pipeline construction project did not render the property owners’ appeal
moot because, if the property owners were successful in their appeal, then they could still obtain
relief in the form of reimbursement of their costs in the action and the return of title to the land).
However, the completion of a condemnation project under the UCPA does not
automatically moot appeals related to the project. The dispositive issue is the type of relief sought
and whether the reviewing court can grant relief. See Attorney Gen, 269 Mich App at 485.
Defendants in the present case asserted procedural irregularities and jurisdictional infirmities in
their applications for leave to appeal. The Midlam Trust argued that the trial court erred by not
affording it the hearing on necessity to which it was entitled under MCL 213.56.5 The Midlam
Trust further argued that, when ruling on necessity as a matter of law, the trial court misstated the
trust’s position and ignored the trust’s actual argument, which was that there was no need for a
second route for the same project across the same farm.
Similarly, Double Eagle argued that the trial court’s ruling on necessity as a matter of law
misstated Double Eagle’s argument and that this misstatement was the basis of the trial court’s
refusal to grant Double Eagle an evidentiary hearing on necessity under MCL 213.56.
MCL 213.56 does not contain any express references to an “evidentiary hearing.” Nevertheless,
this Court has long recognized that a determination of necessity is predicated on the unique factual
circumstances of each case and that opposing parties in a proceeding to determine necessity each
bear a burden of establishing their claims with evidentiary proof. See Nelson Drainage Dist v
Filippis, 174 Mich App 400, 404; 436 NW2d 682 (1989), abrogated in part on other grounds Novi,
473 Mich at 249 n 4.
4 “Decisions of other state courts and lower federal courts are not binding on the Court of Appeals,
but may be persuasive.” Farmland Capital Solutions, LLC v Mich Valley Irrigation Co, 335 Mich
App 370, 381 n 8; 966 NW2d 709 (2021).
5 MCL 213.56(1) provides that “an owner of the property desiring to challenge the necessity of
acquisition of all or part of the property for the purposes stated in the complaint may file a motion
in the pending action asking that the necessity be reviewed.” MCL 213.56(1) provides that a
motion challenging necessity must be filed within the time prescribed to responsively plead after
service of a condemnation complaint. Within 30 days after the challenge is filed, the trial court
must hold a hearing to “determine the public necessity of the acquisition of the particular parcel.”

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Double Eagle also argued that the trial court violated MCL 213.55(1) by excusing a
mandatory, jurisdictional prerequisite to Michigan Gas’s filing its condemnation complaint.
MCL 213.55(1) states, in relevant part, “Before initiating negotiations for the purchase of property,
the agency shall establish an amount that it believes to be just compensation for the property and
promptly shall submit to the owner a good faith written offer to acquire the property for the full
amount so established.”
It was undisputed that Double Eagle was an owner6 for purposes of a condemnation
proceeding under the UCPA. It was also undisputed that Michigan Gas did not make a good-faith
written offer to Double Eagle before commencing its condemnation action to acquire the
easements at issue. An agency’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements for
condemning property under the UCPA leaves the trial court without subject-matter jurisdiction.
Shankle, 327 Mich App at 412. When a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
condemnation proceeding must be dismissed without prejudice to the condemner’s refiling of the
action after complying with the statutory requirements. Id. at 418-419 n 9. As already noted, the
UCPA’s “jurisdictional conditions must be established in fact and cannot rest upon technical
estoppel and waiver.” Indiana Mich Power Co, 336 Mich App at 54. If the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over the condemnation proceedings, as Double Eagle claims, then the trial court’s
rulings with respect to the Midlam Trust, including denial of the trust’s initial motion to review
necessity, were void. Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 56; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (“When a court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim, any action it takes, other than to
dismiss the action, is void.”).7
We have found no authority allowing an appellate court to affirm a trial court’s decisions
when the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. An appellate court’s role when confronted
with a jurisdictional defect is limited to reversing and ordering dismissal. The reviewing court
cannot cure the defect, retain jurisdiction to allow correction, or affirm the trial court’s substantive
rulings on the merits because those rulings were made without valid jurisdiction and are, therefore,
void. See id. In light of the requirements of the UCPA and this Court’s precedents regarding
6 Under MCL 213.51(f), an “owner” for purposes of the UCPA includes a corporation having a
beneficial or possessory interest in the property to be condemned.
7 We acknowledge that, had the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction, completion of the
replacement pipeline likely would have mooted the Midlam Trust’s issues on appeal, particularly
its claim that the trial court erred by not granting it a second necessity hearing. Construing the
clear and unambiguous language of MCL 213.56 in a manner that fulfills the UCPA’s purpose of
facilitating and expediting lawful condemnations, see Consumers Energy Co v Storm, 509 Mich
195, 255; 983 NW2d 397 (2022), it is clear that MCL 213.56(1) reflects the Legislature’s intent
that a landowner has only one opportunity to challenge necessity; all challenges to necessity must
be raised at that time. Allowing a landowner to file additional motions would undermine the time-
sensitive process for a reviewing court to consider challenges to public necessity and would subject
condemnation proceedings to repeated delays. It is undisputed that the Midlam Trust had a
necessity hearing. Neither the text nor the purpose of the UCPA supports that the trust was entitled
to a second such hearing.

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subject-matter jurisdiction, completion of the replacement pipeline did not moot the issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction on appeal.
Further, the completion of the replacement pipeline did not moot the Midlam Trust’s and
Double Eagle’s issues on appeal because this Court could provide relief to these defendants.
Reversing the trial court’s orders and ordering dismissal would not necessarily unwind the
completed project. Rather, it would provide defendants relief by allowing them to address
Michigan Gas’s abandonment of the original easement and removal of the original pipeline from
the original easement. Defendants did not dispute the necessity of a pipeline route across the
Midlam Trust’s parcels; their objection was to a second route for the same project. Productive
discussions about the details of Michigan Gas’s abandonment of the original pipeline route may
satisfy both sides in the matter, making continued litigation of the condemnation proceeding
unnecessary, as well as avoiding the expense of future litigation regarding the continued presence
of the original pipeline. See Minerva Partners, Ltd v First Passage, LLC, 274 Mich App 207; 731
NW2d 472 (2007) (observing that, once an easement is abandoned, the unencumbered fee-simple
interest in the land previously burdened remains in the titleholder, thus implying that the continued
physical presence of Michigan Gas’s original pipeline would constitute a continuing trespass).
In supplemental briefing submitted for our consideration on remand, both sides of the
dispute rely for support on Goodwill Comm Chapel v Gen Motors Corp, 200 Mich App 84; 503
NW2d 705 (1993). Goodwill is the third appeal arising from the City of Detroit’s efforts to invoke
the UCPA to condemn property owned by Goodwill Community Chapel. While Goodwill
Community Chapel’s first appeal was pending, the city conveyed the condemned property to
General Motors by warranty deed. General Motors demolished the building that was on the
property and made the property part of General Motors’s Detroit/Hamtramck assembly plant. Id.
at 86. In the second appeal, this Court held that the circuit court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the condemnation proceeding because the city did not make a bona fide good-
faith offer to Goodwill Community Chapel before initiating the proceeding. Id. Goodwill arose
from Goodwill Community Chapel’s suit against General Motors for trespass. Goodwill
Community Chapel argued that the city’s failure to make a good faith offer prevented the city from
obtaining good title to the property and, therefore, from conveying good title to General Motors.
Consequently, General Motors’s actions on the property constituted trespassing. The trial court
granted summary disposition in favor of General Motors, and Goodwill Community Chapel
appealed. Id. at 86-87. This Court affirmed, holding that “the filing of the complaint for
condemnation, regardless of whether the complaint is later adjudged defective, vests title with the
condemning authority.” Id. at 91.
Goodwill provides little insight into the issue on remand. First, unlike defendants in the
present case, Goodwill Community Chapel did not challenge the necessity of the city’s acquisition,
only the proper amount of just compensation for the condemned property. MCL 213.57(1)
provides that, absent a motion to review necessity filed under MCL 213.56, “the title to the
property described in the [condemnation] petition shall vest in the agency as of the date on which
the complaint was filed.” Goodwill did not refer to the effect of a necessity challenge on the
vesting of title to condemned property because it was never at issue. In fact, when quoting
MCL 213.57(1), this Court omitted reference to a necessity challenge under MCL 213.56. See id.
at 87.

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Second, whether completion or substantial completion of the assembly plant mooted
Goodwill Community Chapel’s claims also was never at issue because challenges to the amount
of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings generally survive completion of the
condemnation project. The right to just compensation is protected by the United States and
Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am V and XIV; Const 1963, art 10, § 2. This constitutional
protection ensures that property owners can pursue adequate compensation regardless of the
project’s status. MCL 213.57(1) reinforces this right by vesting title to the property in the
condemning agency and vesting the right to just compensation in the property owners. Given that
Goodwill Community Chapel did not challenge the necessity of the city’s acquisition of its
property, which allowed title to the property to vest in the city upon the filing of the condemnation
complaint, and considering that completion or substantial completion of the project could not
render moot Goodwill Community Chapel’s pursuit of just compensation, Goodwill does not affect
our conclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Completion of the replacement pipeline before defendants applied for leave to appeal in
this Court did not render defendants’ issues moot; particularly the issue regarding the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction. Michigan authority requires this Court to reverse and order dismissal
when confronted with a jurisdictional defect. Even if reversal and dismissal were not required,
taking such action would provide defendants effective relief short of unwinding the replacement
pipeline project by allowing them to address on remand Michigan Gas’s abandonment of the
original easement and removal of the original pipeline from the property. Because Double Eagle
raised a valid claim that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the completion of the
pipeline before defendants filed their applications in this Court for leave to appeal did not moot
the issues raised in those applications. In addition, because this Court could grant relief to
defendants that did not necessarily unwind the project, defendants’ issues were not mooted by
completion of the project. For these reasons, we conclude that completion of the replacement
pipeline before defendants filed their applications for leave to appeal in this Court did not render
moot the issues raised in those applications.
Affirmed.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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