COA 371471 GEORGEANN LEE BELANGER V DARREN INC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/8/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
GEORGEANN LEE BELANGER and JAMIE
PETERSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
June 08, 2026
1:31 PM
v No. 371471
St. Clair Circuit Court
DARREN, INC. and JOSHUA HARNDEN, LC No. 21-001632-CD
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: YOUNG, P.J., and BORRELLO and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Georgeann Belanger and Jamie Peterson (plaintiffs) initiated this
negligence action against Defendant-Appellee Darren Inc. (defendant) after defendant’s employee,
Defendant-Appellee Joshua Harnden1 sexually harassed plaintiffs while they were shopping in
defendant’s gas station store. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant,
finding that it owed no duty to plaintiffs because defendant had no actual or constructive
knowledge of Harnden’s propensity to sexually harass its customers. The trial court also dismissed
plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claim because the underlying negligence claim upon which it relied
failed. Plaintiffs now appeal that order. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The December 24 and December 27 Incidents
On December 24, 2020, Jamie Peterson walked into a BP gas station store to purchase
scratch-off lottery tickets. There was no one in the store at the time besides the clerk and Harnden,
who took a $100 bill from the cash register and asked Peterson to “show him [her] tits” while also
making comments about her being “so hot and all this stuff.” Peterson replied, “I don’t think so,”
and left the store. About two days later, Peterson testified that she went back to the gas station and
1 Harnden has not filed anything in this Court or otherwise participated in the instant appeal.

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explained to the employee who was working that day, Francis Schomberg (“Frank”), what
happened between her and Harnden. Peterson recalled that Frank “couldn’t believe it” and
apologized to her. Frank later testified that he had no recollection of this conversation or of
Peterson telling him about the December 24 incident at any time. Frank also never told defendant’s
owner or any other employees about the incident.
On December 27, 2020, Georgeann Belanger went to the same gas station. While Belanger
was pumping gas, she heard a male voice through the speaker say, “If I give you $200, will you
show me your tits?” She ignored this comment, but the same voice asked the question again
through the speaker another three to four times. Belanger went inside the gas station store to get
something to eat and drink. She and Harnden were the only people in the store at that time. While
Belanger was walking to get a sandwich and drink, Harnden took out $200 from the cash register
and again asked her if she would “show him [her] tits” for $200. Belanger asked Harnden to stop,
and told him, “there’s cameras everywhere, they’re watching you, us.” Harnden asked Belanger
if she would go into the bathroom with him where there were no cameras. Belanger ignored
Harnden and continued to fill up her drink from the soda machine.
When Belanger turned around, Harnden was standing directly behind her, facing her with
his shirt unbuttoned at the bottom, his belt unbuckled, and his zipper down. Harnden was holding
his penis in his hand, which appeared to be erect, and shaking it at Belanger. Belanger covered
her face with her hands, ran to the back of the store, and hid while Harnden went back behind the
register. While hiding, Belanger heard the shopkeeper’s bell on the front door ring and got the
attention of the person who entered the store. That person happened to be Peterson.
When Peterson entered, Harnden came from the back of the store and started apologizing
for the incident that occurred on December 24. Harnden said he had “demons that he couldn’t
control.” Peterson did not respond and proceeded to the soda machine to get a drink. Peterson felt
Harnden come up behind her and turned around to Harnden and asked why he was “sneaking up
on [her.]” Harnden had his hands in his pants, which were unbuttoned, and his shirt was up so she
could see his pubic hair and a part of his penis. Harnden then took his hands out of his pants and
walked back behind the counter.
After Harnden went back behind the counter, Peterson noticed Belanger hiding in the back
of the store. Belanger asked Peterson to come over to her and asked Peterson “to please not leave
the store without [her].” Belanger went to the counter to pay for her items while Peterson waited
for her by the door. From behind the counter, Harnden moved his hand around the Plexiglass
barrier and touched Belanger’s breast. Belanger and Peterson left the store together and Peterson
called the police.
After Belanger got back to her car, Harnden came outside and started “beating on [her] car
and trying to get in the windows of [her] car.” Belanger rolled down her window and told him he
needed to go away and not be at work.” The police arrived and spoke to Harnden, who initially
denied what he did to Belanger. Eventually, however, Harnden said he could not tell the officer
“what he had done because his ‘demon’ would not let him.” Harnden told the officer that he had
“been fighting this ‘demon’ for the last two months.”

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Harnden explained that the demon came out when he drank and Harnden admitted to
having a shot of Crown Royal before coming to work that day. The officers observed Harnden
slurring his words and unable to stand up straight. Harnden agreed to submit a preliminary breath
test, which showed a blood alcohol content of .138.
Plaintiffs later testified that one of the officers that reported to the scene, Trooper McClure,
told them that the same type of incident happened to his family member, who noticed Harnden
acting “weird” and “perverted” towards her while she was at the same gas station.
Defendant fired Harnden that same day.2
Defendant’s Employment Practices And Hiring of Harnden
Jullie Naimi owns defendant Darren, Inc., which owns and operates the BP gas station
where the underlying incidents took place. Jullie’s son, Darren Naimi, is not an employee of
defendant, but sometimes helps his mother with the business’ paperwork, inventory, and
technology, and inventory, the latter of which includes security cameras installed inside the gas
station store that record most areas except for the bathrooms. Jullie, for her part, goes to the gas
station a few days a week to work and personally check on matters.
Jullie also oversees hiring and training new employees. When hiring someone new, Jullie
obtains a copy of that person’s ID and address to keep in her files and trains them for three days.
Defendant does not have any written policies related to training. Instead, Jullie conducts all
training verbally in person. When Jullie hires a new employee, she tells them she expects,
“honesty, [be] nice to [the] customer[s], come on time.”
Jullie hired Harnden to work at the gas station in 2016. At the time of the incidents at issue,
defendant did not conduct background checks on new hires, including Harnden. Jullie admitted
that she did not know of Harnden’s criminal record when she hired him, later testifying that, “[h]e
got hired because I didn’t know.” Harnden worked at the gas station from 3:00p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
five days a week. Though Harnden did not come to work while serving a 93-day jail sentence at
some point during 2016, Jullie did not recall Harnden’s absence. According to Jullie, prior to
December 2020 incidents, Harnden was a “good worker” who came to work on time, worked
holidays, and did not miss shifts. Jullie never saw Harnden drinking or stealing when she reviewed
the store’s security cameras. Frank, who typically worked the shift after Harnden, similarly
testified that he did not remember seeing Harnden intoxicated during the shift change.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint against defendant, alleging that defendant
negligently supervised, hired, retained, and trained Harnden. Further, without naming Belanger’s
2 Harnden was subsequently charged in connection with these events and pleaded guilty to one
count of attempted misdemeanor aggravated indecent exposure and two counts of attempted
misdemeanor criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree and was sentenced to one year in jail
and two years of probation.

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husband, Kenneth Belanger, as a plaintiff, the first amended complaint asserted a loss of
consortium claim on his behalf. At the close of discovery, defendant moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), arguing that plaintiffs’ negligent hiring,
retention, supervision, and training claim failed because defendant was not liable for Harnden’s
unforeseeable, self-interested criminal conduct. Defendant further argued that Kenneth’s
derivative loss of consortium claim failed both because Kenneth was not a named plaintiff in the
case and because the underlying negligence claim failed.
The trial court granted the motion, finding that defendant owed no duty to plaintiffs because
defendant had no actual or constructive knowledge of Harnden’s propensity for violence or to
conduct the actions at issue in this case and that Harnden’s actions were not foreseeable. The trial
court denied the loss of consortium claim because Kenneth was not a named plaintiff and because
the underlying negligence claim failed.3
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Maskery v Bd of Regents, 468 Mich 609, 613; 664 NW2d 165 (2003). The test for a
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), or failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, tests
only the legal sufficiency of the claim, not whether there is any factual support for the claim.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). All factual allegations in the
pleadings are required to be accepted as true along with any reasonable inferences or conclusions
which may fairly be drawn from the facts alleged. McCoy v Berrien Co Clerk, 348 Mich App 602,
613; 19 NW3d897 (2023).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. El-Khalil v
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “In evaluating a motion
for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Maiden, 461 Mich at 120. A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine
issue of material fact. Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an
issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160.
3 After granting summary disposition to defendant, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint, adding claims against Harnden for assault and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Default judgment was entered against Harnden in the
amount of $750,000 in Belanger’s favor and $250,000 in Peterson’s favor. Because plaintiffs’
brief on appeal only makes arguments related to the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition, we do not address the default judgment against Harnden.

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2. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ NEGLIGENT HIRING
AND RETENTION CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT
Employers have a duty to exercise reasonable care when hiring and retaining employees.
Hersh v Kentfield Builders, Inc, 385 Mich 410, 414; 189 NW2d 286 (1971); McClements v Ford
Motor Co, 473 Mich 373, 381 n 6; 702 NW2d 166 (2005). To establish a claim of negligent hiring
and retention, a plaintiff must show that the defendant-employer had “actual or constructive
knowledge by the employer that would make the specific wrongful conduct perpetrated by an
employee predictable.” Mueller v Brannigan, 323 Mich App 566, 575; 918 NW2d 545 (2018),
citing Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 553-556; 739 NW2d 313 (2007) (emphasis in original).
“[E]mployers are not expected to anticipate that their employees will engage in criminal conduct
without some particularized forewarning thereof.” Mueller, 323 Mich App at 575. And employers
can assume that their employees will obey the criminal law. Brown, 478 Mich at 555.
The trial court held that “[plaintiffs’] claims fail for lack of duty” and “whether there is a
duty owed is a question of law.” It further found that Peterson’s act of reporting the first incident
to Frank did not sufficiently give notice to defendant because there is no evidence that Frank told
defendant about what happened. The trial court concluded, “[plaintiffs] failed to provide any
evidence that [defendant] was actually . . . on notice of any inappropriate behavior . . . by employee
Harnden. There is no evidence that Harnden’s actions were foreseeable.” We agree.
i. Defendant Had No Duty To Conduct A Background Check
Plaintiffs argue that Harnden’s criminal history put defendant on notice of Harnden’s
propensity to commit sexual misconduct and that defendant was negligent in failing to discover
said history in part by failing to conduct a background check. This argument fails because
defendant had no duty to conduct a background check on Harnden. In Tyus v Booth, 64 Mich App
88, 93; 235 NW2d 69 (1975), this Court explained that employers are generally not automatically
required to conduct “in-depth” background investigations of their employees, even in
circumstances where an investigation would reveal an employee’s criminal history.4 This Court
continues to reinforce Tyus’ holding in the employment context. See Hernandez v Moore,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 17, 2019 (Docket Nos.
343648, 344954), p 7 (defendant-employer had no duty to investigate its employee until it
discovered a police report or otherwise learned of the employee’s previous workplace altercation);
4 Tyus is unclear as to what exactly an “in-depth” background check requires. Tyus relied on the
reasoning from Tortora v Gen Motors Corp, 373 Mich 563, 567-568; 130 NW2d 21 (1964), which
in the context of a negligent entrustment claim, held that the defendant employer was not required
to actively seek its employee’s driving record although it was publicly available. Tyus, 64 Mich
App at 91-92. The Tyus court concluded, “defendant, a gasoline service station employer, was not
required to conduct an in-depth background investigation of his employee. An employer is not
absolutely liable for assault committed by his employee. The duty is to use reasonable care to
assure that the employee known to have violent propensities is not unreasonably exposed to the
public.” Id. at 92. Extending this reasoning to the instant case, defendant had no duty to actively
seek or obtain records related to Harnden’s criminal history.

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see also Kendrick v Ritz-Canton Hotel Co, LLC, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued July 27, 2006 (Docket No. 256696), pp 3-5 (defendant-employer was not required
to affirmatively investigate the publicly available sex offender registry or conduct a background
check on its employee).
Plaintiffs generally argue throughout their brief that defendant should have conducted a
background check on Harnden but fail to cite any authority to indicate that defendant was required
to do so. They emphasize Jullie’s testimony that, had she known of Harnden’s criminal history,
he would not have been hired. But this is immaterial to our analysis. See Brown, 478 Mich at 556
(“[W]e will not transform the test of foreseeability into an ‘avoidability’ test that would merely
judge in hindsight whether the harm could have been avoided.”). Plaintiffs fail to establish
defendant owed a duty to conduct a background check on Harnden or otherwise breached a duty
owed to its customers by hiring Harnden without conducting a background check.
ii. Defendant Had No Actual Or Constructive Notice
Plaintiffs next argue that defendant was put on notice of “Harnden’s abuse of alcohol and
reckless behavior” after he was absent from work for 93 days while serving a jail sentence related
to his 2016 convictions and that plaintiffs had notice of “Harnden’s harassing behavior” before the
December 27 incident because Peterson had told Frank what happened on December 24. We
disagree.
First, Harnden serving a jail sentence in connection with his 2016 convictions of operating
while intoxicated and driving while license suspended, revoked, or denied does not give rise to
actual or constructive notice. Jullie testified that she did not remember Harnden’s absence from
work. And even if Jullie did know about Harnden’s time in jail, because the 2016 convictions are
substantially different from the sexual misconduct at issue, knowledge of Harnden serving a
sentence for the drunk-driving and suspended license convictions while employed by defendant
would not lead defendant to predict that Harnden would commit sexual misconduct several years
later. Mueller, 323 Mich App at 575. To establish a claim of negligent hiring and retention, a
plaintiff must establish that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that would have
made the specific wrongful actions of the employee at issue predictable. Id. Harnden’s criminal
history includes a misdemeanor assault and battery conviction from 2007 and convictions for one
count of operating while intoxicated and one count of operating while license suspended, revoked,
or denied from 2016.5 These prior convictions are substantially different from Harnden’s
convictions arising from the incident at issue. Compare MCL 750.81 (misdemeanor assault and
battery), MCL 257.625 (operating while intoxicated), and MCL 257.904b (driving while license
suspended, revoked, or denied) with MCL 750.335A2B (aggravated indecent exposure) and MCL
5 Plaintiffs also argue Harnden’s 2014 arrest for disturbing the peace put defendant on notice that
Harnden would later commit sexual misconduct. However, under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act, defendant could not have considered these arrests in making employment decisions. MCL
37.2205a(1) (“An employer . . . shall not in connection with an application for employment . . . or
in connection with the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . request, make, or
maintain a record of information regarding a misdemeanor arrest, detention, or disposition where
a conviction did not result.”).

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750.520E1A (criminal sexual conduct - 4th degree). Moreover, the length of time between
Harnden’s previous crimes with the instant offense further weighs against foreseeability. See
Hamed v Wayne County, 490 Mich 1, 16, n 36; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (noting that “the temporal
distance and the dissimilarity between past conduct and the conduct at issue make it unreasonable
to conclude that an employer could have foreseen that” the employee would engage in the sexual
conduct at issue in the case).
Second, plaintiffs argue that Frank was acting as an agent of defendant and therefore
Frank’s alleged knowledge of the December 24 incident was imputed to defendant. See Upjohn
Co v New Hampshire Ins Co, 438 Mich 197, 214; 476 NW2d 392 (1991).6 As already mentioned,
at Frank’s deposition, he could not recall whether Peterson ever told him about the December 24
incident and he did not recall ever reporting it to Jullie. Jullie also testified that she was never
informed of the incident either until Harnden’s arrest on December 27. Because there is no
evidence that plaintiffs reported Harnden’s inappropriate statements to defendant prior to the
December 27 incident, we find no questions of fact and no error in the trial court’s decision to
dismiss this claim. See LaDuke v Ziebart Corp, 211 Mich App 169, 173; 535 NW2d 201 (1995)
(holding that an employee’s alleged knowledge of a coworker’s threats was not imputed to the
defendant-employer when the employee did not report the threats to the employer).
3. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION AND TRAINING CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT
When reviewing claims of negligent supervision and training, courts must analyze the
foreseeability of an employee’s actions. Mueller, 323 Mich App at 577. Our Supreme Court in
Mueller found that even where the defendant employer created an environment of “grossly
incompetent or nonexistent” supervision and training, such as employing a “drunk and
irresponsible” business owner and knowledge of frequent physical fights at the premises, the
employer did not breach its duty when employees engaged in unforeseeable criminal conduct. Id.
In Mueller, several employees and former employees of the defendant employer chased a patron
after he left the employer’s premises and beat him to death. Id. at 569. The court concluded that
the employees’ conduct so “radically depart[ed] from expected social norms” that a business would
not “perceive a need to craft rules and training against that degree of blatantly criminal
misconduct.” Id. at 578.
Here too, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim on the basis that Harnden’s sexual
misconduct was unforeseeable. Because Harnden’s sexual misconduct was outrageous and fell
outside social norms, we agree with the trial court. Plaintiffs argue that there was “little done” by
defendant during the hiring and training process. But we note that defendant did have some
protocols including (1) three days of new hire training; (2) maintaining security cameras
overseeing almost all areas of the gas station store; (3) Jullie personally visiting the store multiple
6 Though not adequately briefed by plaintiffs, the parties discussed whether Frank acted as an agent
of defendant at oral argument in addition to the short interval between the December 24 and
December 27 incidents. The record is clear that, in the 36-hours between these two incidents, no
notice was provided to defendant.

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times a week to check in; and (4) employees reporting concerns directly to Jullie. Plaintiffs fail to
show how these protocols are inadequate and ignore the fact that, in Michigan, employers can
assume that their employees will not engage in criminal conduct. Brown, 478 Mich at 555; Hamed,
490 Mich at 15 (declining to impose an employer liability standard that would require employers
to become “insurers responsible for recompensing victims for the criminal acts of their
employees”). The trial court therefore correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ negligent supervision and
training claim.
4. PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENTS REGARDING HARNDEN’S PRIOR ALLEGED
INCIDENTS CONSTITUTE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in failing to consider plaintiffs’ statements
regarding what Trooper McClure allegedly told them about Harnden’s prior misconduct. We again
disagree.
Belanger testified that McClure told her that his “wife’s sister or sister-in-law” allegedly
had a prior encounter with Harnden, and Peterson testified that McClure told her that his “sister or
sister-in-law” had a prior alleged encounter with Harnden. This testimony is inadmissible hearsay.
MRE 801(c); MRE 802. To survive a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR
2.116(C)(10), a non-moving party must provide documentary evidence to establish a genuine issue
of material fact. MCR 2.116(G)(4). Importantly, courts may consider this evidence only to the
extent that it is substantively admissible. MCR 2.116(G)(6) (“Affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and documentary evidence offered in support of or in opposition to a motion based on subrule
(C)(1)-(7) or (10) shall only be considered to the extent that the content or substance would be
admissible as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the motion.”) (emphasis added).
Thus, the trial court was correct to not consider this inadmissible evidence in awarding summary
disposition.
Further, even if these statements were admissible, they would not have attributed liability
to defendant. Plaintiffs could not identify who exactly McClure was talking about or any details
related to the alleged encounter. The testimony further failed to indicate that defendant knew or
should have known of the alleged prior encounters. “Parties opposing a motion for summary
disposition must present more than conjecture and speculation to meet their burden of providing
evidentiary proof establishing a genuine issue of material fact.” Libralter Plastics, Inc v Chubb
Group of Ins Cos, 199 Mich App 482, 486; 502 NW2d 742 (1993).
5. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS’ LOSS OF
CONSORTIUM CLAIM FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW
Finally, we agree with the trial court that Kenneth cannot recover for loss of consortium
because the negligence claim upon which it relies fails. Under Michigan law, a spouse’s claim for
a loss of consortium is derivative of the injured spouse’s underlying claim. Eide v Kelsey-Hayes
Co, 431 Mich 26, 29; 427 NW2d 488 (1988) (explaining that a loss of consortium claim is
derivative because “it does not arise at all unless the other, impaired spouse has sustained some
legally cognizable harm or injury”); Moss v Pacquing, 183 Mich App 574, 583; 455 NW2d 339
(1990) (“ [A spouse’s] recovery for loss of consortium stands or falls upon [the other spouse’s]

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recovery of damages.”). Without Belanger prevailing on her negligent hiring, retaining,
supervision, and training claims against defendant, Kenneth cannot recover for loss of consortium.
Because that negligence claim fails as a matter of law, so too does Kenneth’s loss of consortium
claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

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