COA 362870 PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN RONALD ESPIE Opinion - On Remand SCt - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
April 09, 2026
10:04 AM
v No. 362870
Shiawassee Circuit Court
JOHN RONALD ESPIE, LC No. 1999-002999-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and PATEL and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case returns to this Court after remand to the trial court. Defendant was convicted of
first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole resulting from a
murder that occurred when defendant was 16 years old. After the United States Supreme Court
decided Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), defendant was
resentenced to 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment. See MCL 769.25a(4)(c).
Defendant appealed his resentencing, and this Court held that the trial court erred by failing
to order certain corrections to defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSIR). People v Espie,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 25, 2024 (Docket
No. 362870) (Espie I), p 3-6. Because it was unclear whether the improperly included information
in the PSIR affected defendant’s sentence, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for
clarification. Id. at 6. If the trial court determined that the information affected its decision, then
defendant was entitled to resentencing; if the information did not affect the sentence, then the trial
court only needed to correct the PSIR. Id. This Court did not retain jurisdiction and did not address
proportionality. Id. at 4, 8.
Defendant applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which vacated in
part this Court’s order in Espie I. People v Espie, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025) (Docket No. 167361)
(Espie II); slip order at 1. Our Supreme Court directed us to retain jurisdiction while remanding
to the trial court for further proceedings in order to review defendant’s proportionality claim. Id.

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All other aspects of defendant’s application for leave to appeal were denied. Id. Following the
Supreme Court’s directive, this Court remanded the case to the trial court to make the necessary
findings and retained jurisdiction. People v Espie, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered April 16, 2025 (Docket No. 362870) (Espie III). On remand, the trial court made the
corrections to the PSIR, found that its sentencing decision was not affected by information
erroneously included in the PSIR at the time, declined to resentence defendant, and concluded the
remand.
After remand, defendant argues that the trial court erred by not resentencing defendant
because the trial court used erroneously included information in the PSIR. We review for an abuse
of discretion the trial court’s decision on sentencing. People v Skinner, 502 Mich 89, 131; 917
NW2d 292 (2018). The trial court abused its discretion if its decision “falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes” or the trial court made an error of law. People v Wiley, 324
Mich App 130, 165; 919 NW2d 802 (2018). If errors in the PSIR played a role in the trial court’s
sentencing decision, then the trial court must resentence defendant; otherwise, the trial court may
affirm defendant’s sentence. People v Thompson, 189 Mich App 85, 88; 472 NW2d 11 (1991).
Here, the trial court complied with this Court’s order when it stated that the erroneously
included information did not affect defendant’s sentence. The Court determined in its last opinion
that it was unclear from the record whether the improper information from the PSIR contributed
to the trial court’s sentencing decision and therefore remanded for clarification. Espie I, unpub op
at 6; Espie III, unpub order at 1 (ordering the trial court to “determine if the pertinent improperly
considered information affected its sentencing decision”). The trial court stated that the improper
information did not affect its decision. The trial court did not have to prove or provide additional
explanation to this Court to support that the erroneously included information did not affect its
decision.
Defendant argues that the trial court’s statements during resentencing suggested that the
improper information played a role in its sentencing decision. Although the trial court may have
considered the information when it resentenced defendant, that does not necessarily mean that the
information affected or played a role in the trial court’s decision. See People v Maben, 313 Mich
App 545, 556; 884 NW2d 314 (2015) (“It is unclear to what extent the trial court may have relied
on the challenged information in sentencing.”). Because it was unclear to this Court whether the
trial court relied on the information when coming to its decision, we remanded for clarification.
The trial court has now provided the requested clarification when it stated that it did not use the
information when it sentenced defendant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it did not resentence defendant based on the improper information in the PSIR because it has
now made clear that the trial court did not rely on such information in its original sentencing.
Furthermore, defendant renews his argument that the sentence was not proportional
because the trial court improperly disregarded defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor. For
proportionality, defendant’s sentence must be tailored to the particular circumstances of defendant
and his case, considering (1) reformation of defendant, (2) protection of society, (3) discipline of
defendant, and (4) deterrence of others from committing like offenses, while also considering how
defendant’s youth affects these factors. People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 183, 188-189; 987 NW2d
58 (2022). Further, the trial court must consider youth and its correlating characteristics as
“potentially mitigating factors” and not aggravating factors. People v Eads, __ Mich App __, __;

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__ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No. 357332); slip op at 15, lv gtd 25 NW3d 118 (2025). The trial
courts are not required to “articulate their bases for considering an offender’s youth” if the
defendant is sentenced to a term of years. Boykin, 510 Mich at 190.
The trial court here did not overlook defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor and did not
improperly consider it as an aggravating factor. Based on the premeditation evidence presented,
the trial court found that the “impulsivity of youth [did not play] a significant role in these
offenses.” The trial court’s statements indicate that it reviewed defendant’s youth and considered
impulsivity connected to youth as a potentially mitigating factor. But the trial court found that
evidence of premeditation called into question the reliability of evidence of mitigation, including
mitigation related to defendant’s youth. The trial court did not use defendant’s youth as an
aggravating factor. Instead, the trial court considered the goals of punishment and deterrence, the
Miller1 factors, the Snow2 factors, and the principles of proportionality, in addition to considering
defendant’s youth at the time of the offense. After making such considerations, the trial court
sentenced defendant to a proportional sentence that was not an abuse of its discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
1 Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012).
2 People v Snow, 386 Mich 586; 194 NW2d 314 (1972).

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