COA 378070 IN RE DC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re DC.
PRESTON ROSS,
Petitioner-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2026
9:31 AM
v No. 378070
Washtenaw Probate Court
DC, LC No. 25-000710-MI
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this civil commitment action under the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1001 et seq.,
respondent, DC, appeals as of right the probate court order for involuntary mental health treatment
following a jury trial. We dismiss this appeal as moot.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DC was a client of Washtenaw County Community Mental Health (WCCMH) and its
Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness (PATH) program. DC was 74 years old,
had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and depression, was homeless, and had a history of
involuntary hospitalizations for mental health treatment. These hospitalizations included three
prior psychiatric admissions. On August 25, 2025, petitioner Preston Ross, a social worker with
the PATH program, petitioned the Washtenaw County Probate Court to order DC to undergo a
mental health examination and engage in involuntary mental health treatment. The petition alleged
that DC had a mental illness and that he left several voice mail messages on Ross’s work phone in
which he threatened physical harm to Ross and other PATH employees.
On September 3, the court appointed DC counsel and ordered WCCMH to assess
alternatives to hospitalization. Thereafter, DC requested a jury trial and, following the close of
proofs after a one-day trial on October 6, 2025, the jury returned a verdict that DC had a mental

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illness and that he was a “person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401(1). Based on the
verdict, the trial court entered an order that clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that
DC required treatment under all three separate statutory subsections: that, as a result of his mental
illness, DC could reasonably be expected to physically injure himself or others; that DC could not
attend to his basic physical needs; and that DC’s judgment was so impaired that he did not
understand the need for treatment. MCL 330.1401(1)(a)-(c). That same day the trial court ordered
DC to undergo involuntary mental health treatment for up to 180 days, including up to 60 days of
hospitalization. The court appointed appellate counsel for DC, and this appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
DC raises various claims contesting the admissibility of evidence admitted and discussed
at trial and asks this Court to reverse the probate court’s order. We hold, however, that this appeal
is moot because the order expired and we can provide no remedy that would have a practical legal
effect in this case.
“Whether an issue is moot is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” In re
Tchakarova, 328 Mich App 172, 178; 936 NW2d 863 (2019) (citation omitted). Mootness “is a
threshold issue that a court addresses before it reaches the substantive issues of the case itself.”
People v Richmond, 486 Mich 29, 35; 782 NW2d 187 (2010) (citation omitted). This Court
discussed the mootness doctrine as follows in In re Detmer/Beaudry, 321 Mich App 49, 55-56;
910 NW2d 318 (2017) (citations omitted):
Courts of this state derive their authority from Article VI of the Constitution
of the state of Michigan of 1963. An “essential element” of our courts’ judicial
authority is that the courts do “not reach moot questions or declare rules of law that
have no practical legal effect in a case.” One of “the most critical” aspects of
judicial authority, as opposed to legislative or executive authority, is the
requirement that there be a “real” controversy between the parties, as opposed to a
“hypothetical” one.
Thus, “[a] matter is moot if this Court’s ruling cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect
on the existing controversy.” In re Tchakarova, 328 Mich App at 178 (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In re Tchakarova, however, recognizes two exceptions to the mootness doctrine in civil
commitment proceedings. The first allows this Court to address otherwise moot claims if the order
has collateral legal consequences for the respondent, like rendering the respondent ineligible to
own a firearm. Id. at 179. In this case, DC identifies no collateral legal consequences stemming
from the order. Further, DC previously had been ordered to undergo involuntary mental health
treatment, so the October 2025 order does not present any new collateral legal consequences that
constitute an exception to the mootness doctrine.
The second exception to the mootness doctrine is if the case involves an issue of public
significance that is likely to recur yet evade judicial review. Id. at 180. “An issue is likely to
evade judicial review if the time frames of the case make it unlikely that appellate review can be
obtained before the case reaches a final resolution.” Id. at 180, citing Socialist Workers Party v

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Secretary of State, 412 Mich 571, 582 n 11; 317 NW2d 1 (1982); In re Midland Publishing Co,
Inc, 420 Mich 148, 152 n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984). An order for a maximum treatment period of
180 days, with up to 60 days of hospitalization, like in DC’s case, typically will evade judicial
review given the pace at which appeals as of right proceed in the appellate system. Socialist
Workers Party, 412 Mich at 582 n 11. Thus, whether this Court reaches the merits of DC’s appeal
hinges on whether he has identified an issue of public significance.
In re Tchakarova recognizes circumstances when the public may have “a significant
interest in ensuring that [involuntary commitment] orders curtailing a person’s liberty are properly
entered.” 328 Mich App at 181. DC, however, does not attempt to argue that his case raises an
issue of public significance, nor does he cite any supporting legal authority, meaning he has
abandoned this argument. Maple BPA, Inc v Bloomfield Charter Twp, 302 Mich App 505, 517;
838 NW2d 915 (2013); Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999).
Thus, instead this appeal presents only abstract questions of law without any practical legal effect
on an existing controversy, meaning it is moot. In re Detmar/Beaudry, 321 Mich App at 56.
DC only argues the merits of the issues he appeals, namely, that the court erred when it:
(1) admitted two voice mail recordings without proper authentication and petitioner’s hearsay
testimony about the recordings, and (2) permitted petitioner’s counsel to argue to the jury that DC
made violent threats to WCCMH employees, which he says was not proven at trial.
Acknowledging that he seeks no “immediate, recognizable remedy for” those alleged errors, DC
asks this Court to issue an opinion “to instruct the trial courts to ensure that recorded evidence is
properly entered into the record by a witness who has the credentials to testify to its authenticity.”
But DC’s requested relief confirms that he will not benefit from this Court’s ruling. Thus,
DC’s arguments concerning general evidentiary issues about hearsay and authentication of
evidence are not unique to civil commitment proceedings and can be addressed in other cases
where a ruling from this Court will have a practical legal effect on the case. In re Detmer/Beaudry,
321 Mich App at 55-56. Therefore, this appeal is moot and is dismissed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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