COA 379323 IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF EJ Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re Guardianship of EJ.
GUARDIAN CARE, INC.,
Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2026
1:50 PM
v No. 379323
Oakland Probate Court
INFINITY GUARDIANSHIP, INC., Guardian of EJ,
a legally incapacitated individual,
LC No. 2020-392886-GA
Appellee.
In re Conservatorship of EJ.
GUARDIAN CARE, INC.,
Appellant,
v No. 379324
Oakland Probate Court
INFINITY GUARDIANSHIP, INC., Conservator of
EJ, a legally incapacitated individual,
LC No. 2010-329859-CA
Appellee.
Before: BAZZI, P.J., and PATEL and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

-- 1 of 9 --

-2-
These consolidated appeals arise from the guardianship and conservatorship of EJ, a legally
incapacitated person.1 In Docket No. 379323, appellant, Guardian Care, Inc. (Guardian Care),
appeals as of right the order removing it as guardian for EJ. In Docket No. 379324, Guardian Care
appeals as of right the order removing it as conservator for EJ. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we reverse and remand in both Docket Nos. 379323 and 379324.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
EJ suffered a closed head injury as a result of a car accident, leading to a traumatic brain
injury and other serious complications. According to Guardian Care, it served as EJ’s guardian
for over 15 years. Guardian Care was subsequently appointed as EJ’s conservator on
December 11, 2019. On August 4, 2023, Guardian Care filed a change of address with the court,
indicating that EJ relocated from Oakland County to Macomb County.
On November 6, 2025, Guardian Care moved to change the venue of both the guardianship
and conservatorship matters to the Macomb Probate Court “for the convenience of the parties,
witnesses, or attorney[s]” as EJ resided in Macomb County. On December 15, 2025, the probate
court moved sua sponte to determine whether modifications of the guardianship and
conservatorship were appropriate. The court ordered Guardian Care to serve notice to all interested
parties, and Guardian Care then notified EJ and two of her siblings. The probate court further
ordered Guardian Care to provide a list of all its wards whose matters were before the Oakland
Probate Court, and include the following details: (1) which judge oversaw each matter; (2) the
county in which each ward resided; and (3) whether Guardian Care filed a petition to change venue
for each ward located outside of Oakland County. The court’s orders indicated that it requested
the information to determine whether Guardian Care was forum-shopping. The produced list
revealed that Guardian Care had filed petitions to change venue for 11 cases overseen by Oakland
County Probate Court Judge Traci L. Richards in which the wards resided outside of Oakland
County. Guardian Care had filed no such petitions for matters pending before the other three
Oakland County Probate Court judges.
Guardian Care subsequently objected to the modification of EJ’s guardianship and
conservatorship. Guardian Care contended that it served as EJ’s guardian for a substantial period
of time and that removing Guardian Care as guardian “would disrupt Ms. EJ’s life without
providing any benefit.” Guardian Care further asserted that it was still willing and suitable to serve
as EJ’s guardian, and that there was no indication that Guardian Care breached any fiduciary duty
owed to EJ. Guardian Care additionally argued that the probate court improperly determined that
Guardian Care’s motion to change venue was untimely, that Guardian Care was forum-shopping,
and that the appointment of a guardian ad litem for EJ was unnecessary.
On December 30, 2025, the probate court held an eight-minute hearing on its own motions
to modify the guardianship and conservatorship of EJ, in addition to Guardian Care’s petition to
1 The appeals were consolidated by this Court to advance the efficient administration of the appellate
process. In re Guardianship of EJ, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 11,
2026 (Docket Nos. 379323 and 379324).

-- 2 of 9 --

-3-
change venue.2 Guardian Care attempted to withdraw its venue petition and objected to the court’s
motions. Guardian Care asserted that it had operated as EJ’s fiduciary for more than 15 years, that
it maintained a “good relationship” with EJ, and requested an adjournment to allow EJ “to have
the opportunity to speak to the court.” Guardian Care further shared its concerns regarding the
“continuity of care” for EJ, the absence of a guardian ad litem for EJ, and whether “somebody
could serve her best interest[s].” Guardian Care additionally contended that its petition did not
constitute forum-shopping, and that it had “no authority to determine which Judge would receive
this.” Guardian Care also accused the probate court of exhibiting a bias against it “and other At
Large Guardians.”
The probate court responded that “there is no right to a Guardian Ad Litem in this case,”
because the court was not a party to the underlying action. The court further opined that “with
respect to forum[-]shopping, it’s clear that the chart that you prepared shows that with respect to
all of the Judges in Oakland County, the only Judge which you filed over ten Petitions for Change
of Venue is before this Judge, that’s it.” The probate court additionally stated:
And it also should be noted that previously, Guardian Care has been either
removed or resigned, based on the Court’s knowledge of facts regarding Guardian
Care, breaching their duty. And with respect to breach of duty here, as I’ve
explained before, Guardian Care has a duty to report the condition of the Ward, as
well as to alert the Court to the present living arrangements and changing the
Ward’s living situation. And that was not done in a timely fashion.
The court denied Guardian Care’s request to withdraw its motion to change venue and noted that
Guardian’s Care withdrawal attempt “shows even further that you are only looking after Guardian
Care, as opposed to the Ward.” The probate court characterized Guardian Care as “unethical,”
concluded Guardian Care breached its duty to EJ, and barred Guardian Care from “bill[ing]
regarding this matter” because it did not want Guardian Care “to benefit as a result of this stunt.”
On January 27, 2026, the probate court issued an opinion and order granting Guardian
Care’s motion for a change of venue and removing Guardian Care as the guardian for EJ. The
court opined:
Guardian Care is not fulfilling its duties properly; and is unsuitable due to
misconduct and neglect by moving the ward to another county and maintaining
venue in Oakland County. Based on the evidence, including the list prepared by
Guardian Care, the Court made a finding that Guardian Care filed the instant
petition for an improper purpose. The Court took judicial notice of Guardian Care’s
various removals and resignations due to the Court’s dissatisfaction with Guardian
Care’s performance of its duties and responsibilities. As further corroboration of
Guardian Care’s forum[-]shopping, despite having wards on the list who reside in
2 While the probate court solely mentioned its motion to modify the guardianship during the
hearing, the probate court’s December 15, 2025 order of adjournment provided that it also was
“setting this matter for a review to determine whether modification of the conservatorship is
appropriate.”

-- 3 of 9 --

-4-
other counties for the three other Oakland County Probate Judges, Guardian Care
only filed to change the venue of all out of county cases pending before Judge Traci
Richards . . . .
The probate court further asserted, “Forum shopping fosters gamesmanship and judge-shopping
which is detrimental to the administration of justice and in this matter, the welfare of the wards.”
On January 28, 2026, the court issued orders removing Guardian Care as EJ’s guardian and
conservator, and appointing appellee, Infinity Guardianship, Inc. (Infinity Guardianship), as the
successor guardian and conservator. This appeal ensued.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A probate court’s removal of a fiduciary is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which “occurs
when the court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” In re
Conservatorship of Bittner, 312 Mich App 227, 235; 879 NW2d 269 (2015). “The trial court
necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” In re Nikooyi, 341 Mich App
490, 494; 991 NW2d 619 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court may also
abuse its discretion by failing to operate within the correct legal framework.” In re Estate of
Vansach, 324 Mich App 371, 385; 922 NW2d 136 (2018). The court’s factual findings, on the
other hand, are reviewed for clear error, Bittner, 312 Mich App at 235, and “[a] finding is clearly
erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made, even if there is evidence to support the finding,” id. at 236 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Id. at 235. “The rules of statutory
construction require the courts to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Universal Underwriters
Ins Group v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 256 Mich App 541, 544; 666 NW2d 294 (2003). “This Court
should first look to the specific statutory language to determine the intent of the Legislature, which
is presumed to intend the meaning that the statute plainly expresses.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute
reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Further, “[a] court must not read into a statute anything that is not within the
manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
III. REMOVAL OF GUARDIAN
Guardian Care argues that the probate court violated the procedures laid out in the Estates
and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., by sua sponte removing it as
guardian rather than in response to a petition seeking such relief. We agree.
“In Michigan, laws concerning the affairs of protected individuals and legally incapacitated
individuals are set forth in EPIC.” Vansach, 324 Mich App at 382. Pursuant to MCL 700.5306(1),
“The court may appoint a guardian if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence both that
the individual for whom a guardian is sought is an incapacitated individual and that the
appointment is necessary as a means of providing continuing care and supervision of the

-- 4 of 9 --

-5-
incapacitated individual . . . .” As to the resignation or removal of a guardian under EPIC, MCL
700.5310 provides:
(1) On petition of the guardian and subject to the filing and approval of a
report prepared as required by section 5314, the court shall accept the guardian’s
resignation and make any other order that is appropriate.
(2) The ward[3], a person appointed guardian in a will or other writing by a
parent or spouse under section 5301, or any other person interested in the ward’s
welfare may petition for an order removing the guardian, changing the designated
standby guardian, appointing a successor guardian, modifying the guardianship’s
terms, or terminating the guardianship. A request for this order may be made by
informal letter to the court or judge. If a request under this subsection is made by
the person appointed by will or other writing under section 5301, the person shall
also present proof of the person’s appointment by will or other writing. A person
who knowingly interferes with the transmission of this kind of request to the court
or judge is subject to a finding of contempt of court.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in the order finding incapacity, on
receiving a petition or request under this section, the court shall set a date for a
hearing to be held within 28 days after the receipt of the petition or request. An
order finding incapacity may specify a minimum period, not exceeding 182 days,
during which a petition or request for a finding that a ward is no longer an
incapacitated individual, or for an order removing the guardian, modifying the
guardianship’s terms, or terminating the guardianship, must not be filed without
special leave of the court.
(4) Before removing a guardian, appointing a successor guardian, changing
the designated standby guardian, modifying the guardianship’s terms, or
terminating a guardianship, and following the same procedures to safeguard the
ward’s rights as apply to a petition for a guardian’s appointment, the court may
send a visitor[4] to the present guardian’s residence and to the place where the ward
resides or is detained to observe conditions and report in writing to the court.
In In re Guardianship of Redd, 321 Mich App 398, 405-407, 410; 909 NW2d 289 (2017),
this Court clarified the standard for removal of a guardian of a legally incapacitated individual
under EPIC, holding that “the probate court must find that the guardian is no longer suitable or
willing to serve” by a preponderance of the evidence. To determine whether an existing guardian
remains “suitable,” the “particularly relevant evidence would include evidence on whether the
3 “ ‘Ward’ means an individual for whom a guardian is appointed.” MCL 700.1108(a).
4 MCL 700.5101(d) defines “visitor” as “an individual appointed in a guardianship or protective
proceeding who is trained in law, nursing, or social work, is an officer, employee, or special
appointee of the court, and has no personal interest in the proceeding.”

-- 5 of 9 --

-6-
guardian was still qualified and able, and (2) evidence on whether the guardian did, in fact,
satisfactorily provide for the ward’s care, custody, and control in the past.” Id. at 408.
Given the procedures outlined by EPIC for the resignation and removal of a guardian, the
probate court abused its discretion by sua sponte removing Guardian Care without the filing of a
petition. As Guardian Care suggested, the probate court could have appointed a guardian ad litem
to evaluate the matter and, if warranted, have the guardian ad litem file a petition seeking Guardian
Care’s removal as a “person interested in the ward’s welfare” under MCL 700.5310(2), rather than
initiating removal proceedings sua sponte in response to Guardian Care’s motion for a change of
venue. This Court has expressed similar concerns regarding a trial court’s sua sponte conduct,
albeit in the context of a guardian’s removal under the Mental Health Code (MHC), MCL 330.1001
et seq. See In re Guardianship of IS, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued January 25, 2024 (Docket No. 367266), pp 5-6 (“Considering the sensitive interests
involved in a guardianship proceeding, we decline to overlook the enumerated removal procedures
in the MHC and endorse a view of the statute that would allow the probate court to remove a
guardian on its own initiative.”).5
Moreover, had the Legislature intended to authorize probate courts to remove guardians on
their own initiative, it could have expressly provided for such authority, as it has done elsewhere
in EPIC. See MCL 700.1308(2) (“In response to an interested person’s petition or on its own
motion, the court may at any time order a fiduciary of an estate under its jurisdiction to file an
accounting.”) (emphasis added); MCL 700.7706(1) (“The settlor, a cotrustee, or a qualified trust
beneficiary may request the court to remove a trustee, or a trustee may be removed by the court on
its own initiative.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the language of MCL 700.5310 limiting the avenue
for removal of a guardian to petitions filed by specified parties should be construed as deliberate.
See Botany Worsted Mills v United States, 278 US 282, 289; 49 S Ct 129; 73 L Ed 379 (1929)
(“When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other
mode.”); Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993) (“Courts
cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it
placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there.”).
Further, although the probate court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence
warranted Guardian Care’s removal, its decision did not appear to be supported by proof or account
for the overarching purpose of the statutory scheme governing guardianships. See In re
Guardianship of Malloy, 513 Mich 148, 156; 15 NW3d 142 (2024) (“Broadly stated, a
guardianship is one available legal mechanism for ensuring the safety and well-being of
individuals who are not capable of independently making decisions and caring for themselves.”);
Redd, 321 Mich App at 406-407 (“[T]he purpose of this part of EPIC is to protect incapacitated
individuals with guardians who have the skills and willingness to act in the best interests of those
individuals.”). The probate court declined to adjourn the hearing to permit EJ to participate in the
removal decision or express her views. Nor did the court have a successor guardian in mind when
5 “Unpublished opinions are [] not binding authority but may be persuasive or instructive.”
Haydaw v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 332 Mich App 719, 727 n 5; 957 NW2d 858 (2020).

-- 6 of 9 --

-7-
it ordered the removal of EJ’s long-term guardian,6 or consider whether Infinity Guardianship was
a “suitable and willing” guardian as delineated under MCL 700.5313.
Even assuming that Guardian Care engaged in forum-shopping, it is unclear how that
conduct demonstrated that Guardian Care did not satisfactorily provide for the care, custody, and
control of EJ. Redd, 321 Mich App at 408. Additionally, although the probate court relied on
“Guardian Care’s [prior] various removals and resignations due to the Court’s dissatisfaction with
Guardian Care’s performance of its duties and responsibilities” to justify removal,7 it failed to
adequately explain how Guardian Care’s conduct in this case warranted Guardian Care’s removal
as guardian. While Guardian Care did not timely move to change venue after EJ relocated to
Macomb County, it promptly filed a change of address with the court. Moreover, despite the
probate court stating that Guardian Care neglected to file punctual reports regarding EJ’s
condition, the record indicates that Guardian Care filed its required annual reports as recently as
December 8, 2020, December 20, 2021, December 5, 2022, November 28, 2023, November 20,
2024, and November 21, 2025, before the January 10 due date. Ultimately, because the probate
court legally erred by sua sponte removing Guardian Care, the court necessarily abused its
discretion.
IV. REMOVAL OF CONSERVATOR
Guardian Care argues that the probate court lacked good cause for Guardian Care’s
removal as conservator. We agree.
Under EPIC, a conservator is a fiduciary. MCL 700.1104(e). In their fiduciary capacities,
conservators must observe the standard of care applicable to trustees. MCL 700.5416.
A fiduciary stands in a position of confidence and trust with respect to each
heir, devisee, beneficiary, protected individual, or ward for whom the person is a
fiduciary. A fiduciary shall observe the standard of care described in section 7803
and shall discharge all of the duties and obligations of a confidential and fiduciary
relationship, including the duties of undivided loyalty; impartiality between heirs,
devisees, and beneficiaries; care and prudence in actions; and segregation of assets
6 The probate court opined that the appointment of a guardian ad litem was not warranted because
the court was not a party to the proceeding. However, MCL 700.5306a(1)(x) provides that a ward
is entitled “[t]o the same rights on a petition for modification or termination of the guardianship
including the appointment of a visitor as apply to a petition for appointment of a guardian, as
provided in [MCL 700.5310].” Thus, because MCL 700.5303(3) and MCL 700.5306a(1)(e)
instruct that the court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the “allegedly incapacitated
individual” unless that individual has legal counsel, it follows that the probate court was required
to do so here, when there was no indication that EJ maintained representation.
7 We note that no evidence was presented establishing the circumstances of these alleged removals
and resignations.

-- 7 of 9 --

-8-
held in the fiduciary capacity. With respect to investments, a fiduciary shall
conform to the Michigan prudent investor rule. [MCL 700.1212(1).]
Pursuant to MCL 700.5414, a probate court “may remove a conservator for good cause, upon
notice and hearing, or accept a conservator’s resignation.”8
Because the statute does not define “good cause,” this Court may turn to the dictionary.
See Sullivan v Michigan, 328 Mich App 74, 80-81; 935 NW2d 413 (2019) (“Undefined statutory
terms must be given their plain and ordinary meanings, and it is proper to consult a dictionary for
definitions.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed) defines
the term as “[a] legally sufficient reason.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (12th ed)
defines “good cause” as “a substantial reason put forth in good faith that is not unreasonable,
arbitrary, or irrational and that is sufficient to create an excuse for an act under the law.”
Accordingly, a probate court may remove a conservator if there is a legally sufficient or substantial
reason to do so.
In the present case, the probate court omitted any discussion of the conservatorship or
“good cause” standard, both during the subject hearing and in its subsequently issued opinion and
order. Instead, the court addressed only the issue of guardianship. The probate court did not
explain how Guardian Care failed to adequately perform its duties as a conservator, or otherwise
act in EJ’s best interests, such that there existed a legally compelling or substantial reason for its
removal. See In re Conservatorship of Jaye, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued January 24, 2019 (Docket No. 342195), p 7 (holding that the probate court
properly determined no good cause existed to remove conservator when the record indicated that
she “substantially complied with her duties”). But see In re Conservatorship of IL, unpublished
per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 20, 2026 (Docket No. 371470), p 5 (ruling
that because the conservator “violated his fiduciary duty to manage [the ward’s] finances
prudently,” the probate court had good cause to remove him); In re Conservatorship of
Montgomery, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 22, 2017
(Docket No. 332507), p 4 (opining that good cause existed when the conservator “was unsuitable
to be conservator because her strong emotional connection to her mother interfered with her ability
to act in her mother’s best interest[s].”). And even considering the rationale the probate court
provided for Guardian Care’s removal as guardian, the same concerns apply here: the record
contains no meaningful evidence of problematic conduct by Guardian Care, nor does the court
explain how alleged forum-shopping constitutes a breach of Guardian Care’s fiduciary duties.
Further, the record indicates that Guardian Care consistently filed inventories and accounts, with
8 Under MCL 700.5415(1)(d), “a person interested in the welfare of an individual for whom a
conservator is appointed may file a petition in the appointing court for an order to . . . remove the
conservator and appoint a temporary or successor conservator.” Guardian Care argues on appeal
that the probate court impermissibly removed Guardian Care as conservator without the filing of
a petition. While this subsection allows an interested person to petition for removal, this does not
mean that an interested person must file a petition in order for the probate court to act. There is no
language in MCL 700.5414 that limits a probate court’s removal authority in such a way, unlike
MCL 700.5310, which pertains to removal of a guardian.

-- 8 of 9 --

-9-
the probate court approving Guardian Care’s fifth annual account less than two months before
removing Guardian Care as conservator and after Guardian Care sought to transfer the case. In
light of the foregoing, the probate court abused its discretion in removing Guardian Care as
conservator.9
V. CONCLUSION
In Docket Nos. 379323 and 379324, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
9 While Guardian Care asks this Court to remand the matter to a different judge, Guardian Care
omits any briefing of this issue. See Cheesman v Williams, 311 Mich App 147, 161; 874 NW2d
385 (2015) (“An appellant may not merely announce a position then leave it to this Court to
discover and rationalize the basis for the appellant’s claims; nor may an appellant give an issue
only cursory treatment with little or no citation of authority.”). Further, because the probate court
granted Guardian Care’s motion to change venue to Macomb County, it is likely a different judge
will oversee the matter regardless. We further decline to address Guardian Care’s remaining
arguments on appeal because we have already determined that it is entitled to relief in both matters.

-- 9 of 9 --