COA 377440 PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL DEGRAFFENRIED Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/5/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
June 05, 2026
1:25 PM
v No. 377440
Wayne Circuit Court
MICHAEL DEGRAFFENRIED, LC No. 99-006691-01-FC
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: YOUNG, P.J., and BORRELLO and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order granting relief from
judgment in favor of defendant, Michael Degraffenried. Because the trial court did not apply the
correct legal framework, and because the trial court’s decision contained numerous factual and
legal errors, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.2
1 People v Degraffenried, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 22, 2025
(Docket No. 377440).
2 This is the second time in this case—and one of many occasions the past two calendar years—
where this Court has sent a motion for relief for judgment back to this trial court for proper legal
analysis or factual development. See People v Degraffenried, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered December 22, 2021 (Docket No. 358624); People v Crane, unpublished order of
the Court of Appeals, entered June 6, 2025 (Docket No. 375857); People v Pittman, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 3, 2024 (Docket No. 369182); People v Onumonu,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 21, 2024 (Docket No.
363065). A complete factual record and close adherence to the court rules are critical to avoid
substantial costs in terms of both labor and time to this Court, but more importantly to the
individuals involved in these cases.

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I. FACTS
On June 15, 1999, a drive-by shooting occurred outside a house on Florence Street in
Inkster, Michigan. At the time, there was an ongoing conflict between two neighborhood groups.
Alondrae Davis was killed, while Larry Abullah, Willie Wimberly, and Raymone Williams were
reportedly wounded.
Degraffenried and his girlfriend, Tiya Manning, were arrested and charged with first-
degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(a); two counts of assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83; and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. At their preliminary examination, Manning’s
statement to police, in which she implicated Degraffenried and Williams as the shooters, was read
into the record. Before trial, a Walker3 hearing was held to determine the voluntariness of
Manning’s statement. The trial court suppressed her statement, and Manning’s trial was severed
from Degraffenried’s. See People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 618-620; 624 NW2d 746
(2000).
At Degraffenried’s trial in 2000, Broderick Ward and Abullah identified Degraffenried as
the shooter. Degraffenried presented an alibi, insisting he was with his grandmother at the Inkster
Police Department picking up his 16-year-old cousin. Multiple witnesses who had implicated
Degraffenried as the shooter testified at trial that officers from the Inkster Police Department,
including Detective Darian Williams, Detective Anthony Abdallah, and Detective Gregory Hill,
threatened and coerced them into identifying Degraffenried. No physical evidence connected
Degraffenried to the shooting. Degraffenried was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317; two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH),
MCL 750.84; and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b. This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See People v Degraffenried,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 14, 2003 (Docket No.
228264).
In April 2017, Degraffenried moved for relief from judgment. In relevant part,
Degraffenried argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and obtain the
hospital records of the three individuals who were wounded, and that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Degraffenried also argued that he was denied
a fair trial and due process because of police misconduct, supported by evidence of Detective
Williams’s 2002 federal extortion conviction, along with a 2007 newspaper article showing
Detective Hill retired abruptly after lying under oath about his education. The trial court denied
Degraffenried’s motion without a hearing.
In July 2019, Wimberly executed an affidavit denying Degraffenried was the shooter.
Wimberly is currently serving multiple life sentences for various offenses, including first-degree
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316a, which occurred in January 2013. In his affidavit, Wimberly
explained he knew Degraffenried at the time of the shooting and stated, “I saw the person who
fired the shot that injured me, but I did not recognize his face.” According to Wimberly, he told
this information to Detective Williams while hospitalized and, during a later interview with
3 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).

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Detective Williams and Detective Hill at Wimberly’s home, he denied Degraffenried was the
shooter. Wimberly explained he did not want to testify at Degraffenried’s preliminary examination
because he “was still traumatized from the shooting” and “was only 16 years old,” but he ultimately
did testify. In pertinent part, Wimberly was asked by the prosecutor whether certain people,
including Degraffenried, were present outside the home at the time of shooting:
Q. When you got there, were there other people out in front of that location?
A. Yes.
Q. And were those people Larry Abdullah, Curtis Abdullah, Earl Young,
Valerie and LaKeisha Shelby, or LaKeisha and Tiffany Shelby, Alondre Davis, and
Broderick Ward?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any other people there?
A. No.
Wimberly later discussed his testimony with his cousin, Ward, whom Wimberly did not
recall seeing at the scene of the shooting. Nevertheless, Ward also testified and identified
Degraffenried as the shooter. Wimberly stated: “I told Ward that was not true and he just shrugged
his shoulders. I asked why he lied about [Degraffenried] being the shooter and he told me that he
did not like [Degraffenried].” Wimberly was not called to testify at Degraffenried’s trial and did
not remember trial counsel contacting him at any point. Wimberly asserted he would have testified
that, although he did not recognize the shooter, the shooter was not Degraffenried.
Degraffenried filed a successive motion for relief from judgment, attaching Wimberly’s
affidavit. Degraffenried raised four issues: (1) the prosecution committed a Brady4 violation by
failing to disclose Manning’s “second police statements and testimony from her Walker Hearing
regarding being coerced by Detective Williams to fabricate her statement;” (2) newly discovered
evidence in the form of Wimberly’s affidavit entitled Degraffenried to a new trial; (3) newly
discovered evidence of “criminal misconduct of Inkster police officers who are alleged to have
coerced and threatened four witnesses in this case” “severely undermined” the “soundness” of
Degraffenried’s convictions; and (4) trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective for failing to
interview Wimberly, failing to call Wimberly as a witness at trial, and failing to confirm Williams
was actually shot.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing that included the testimony of Degraffenried,
Wimberly, and Vicki Yost, the former Chief of Inkster Police, who now owned a professional
investigation agency. During her investigation into Detective Williams, Yost discovered his
federal extortion conviction. Yost also discovered Detective Abdallah was demoted during his
tenure with the Inkster Police Department, but it was unclear why. Yost discovered Detective
4 Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963).

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Abdallah “was involved in a couple lawsuits involving exonerees George Clark and Kevin
Harrington who have just been exonerated by the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office[.]”
Wimberly denied that he lied during the preliminary examination when he confirmed Ward
was present, explaining that he answered the prosecutor’s compound question in the affirmative
because some of the named individuals were present. Wimberly testified that he was just trying to
get through his testimony because he was 16 years old and traumatized from being shot. He
explained that he only offered more than a yes-or-no answer when required. According to
Wimberly, Ward was not present at the time of the shooting, but had been at the house earlier,
before leaving to obtain alcohol and marijuana.
Wimberly was in the ambulance while Davis was dying and was told on arrival at the
hospital that he could have died too. At that point, Wimberly did not want anything to do with the
case. Wimberly did not know everyone in the neighborhood and, although he did not recognize
the shooter’s face, he was nonetheless afraid of the unidentified individual. Wimberly did not
want to be viewed as a “snitch,” because there were repercussions for snitches in his neighborhood.
The trial court granted Degraffenried’s motion for relief from judgment. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” People v Christian, 510 Mich 52, 74; 987 NW2d 29 (2022). “An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. An abuse of
discretion necessarily occurs when a trial court makes an error of law.” People v Oslund, 516
Mich 49, 62; 33 NW3d 332 (2024) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
“A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” People v Johnson, 502 Mich
541, 565; 918 NW2d 676 (2018), citing MCR 2.613(C). “Clear error occurs if the reviewing court
is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The trial court necessarily abused its discretion by making an error of law when granting
Degraffenried’s successive motion for relief from judgment. Oslund, 516 Mich at 62. Motions
for relief from judgment are governed by MCR 6.500 et seq. Generally, a defendant is “limited to
‘one and only one motion for relief from judgment’ with regard to a conviction.” People v Lemons,
514 Mich 485, 514; 22 NW3d 42 (2024), quoting MCR 6.502(G)(1). However, MCR 6.502(G)(2)
provides limited exceptions to this rule. In relevant part, a defendant “may file a second or
subsequent motion” based on “a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first
such motion was filed . . . .” MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b). The trial court may also “waive the provisions
of this rule if it concludes that there is a significant possibility that the defendant is innocent of the
crime.” MCR 6.502(G).
“Upon satisfaction of the procedural threshold set forth in MCR 6.502(G), a defendant
must then establish entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508.” People v Allen, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 373427); slip op at 3. Under MCR 6.508(D)(3), a court
“may not grant relief to a defendant if the motion alleges grounds for relief that could have been

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previously raised, unless the defendant demonstrates both good cause for failing to raise such
grounds earlier as well as actual prejudice.” Johnson, 502 Mich at 565.
In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its
materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not
cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result
probable on retrial. [Id. at 566, citing People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664
NW2d 174 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).]
“As our Supreme Court has explained, Cress’s first three prongs relate to the good-cause
requirement of MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a), and the fourth prong relates to the actual-prejudice
requirement of MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b).” Allen, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3.
A. THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD OF MCR 6.502(G)(2)
To establish that evidence is newly discovered, “a defendant need only demonstrate that
the evidence in question ‘was not discovered before’ the defendant filed his or her first motion for
relief from judgment.” Allen, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5.
First, the trial court properly determined Wimberly’s affidavit was newly discovered.
Wimberly executed his affidavit in 2019, and Degraffenried filed his first motion for relief from
judgment in 2017. The prosecution does not claim Degraffenried discovered the information about
Ward before filing his successive motion for relief from judgment. Because there is no indication
this information existed before 2019, the affidavit clearly constitutes new evidence under MCR
6.502(G)(2). See Allen, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7 (finding a 2019 affidavit that reiterated
trial testimony but also included a recantation constituted new evidence under MCR 6.502(G)(2)
because the new evidence “did not exist” until 2019).
As for Manning’s Walker hearing testimony, the trial court likewise concluded that this
evidence was new evidence for purposes of MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b). However, we cannot find
support in the record for this conclusion. Again, to clear the procedural bar of MCR
6.502(G)(2)(b), a defendant must “make some offer of proof that the evidence in question ‘was
not discovered before’ the defendant filed his or her first motion for relief from judgment.” Allen,
___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6. Degraffenried filed his first motion for relief from judgment in
2017. Manning’s statement was discovered before then because, as discussed, it was read into the
record at Degraffenried’s 1999 preliminary examination. Indeed, Degraffenried refers to
Manning’s “coerced second statement” in his first motion for relief from judgment, citing to the
preliminary examination transcript. Manning’s second statement therefore does not appear to be
newly discovered evidence under MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b).

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The same is true for some5 of Degraffenried’s allegations of police misconduct. In his first
motion for relief from judgment, Degraffenried attached multiple exhibits outlining Detective
Williams’s federal extortion conviction and Detective Hill’s sudden retirement for lying under
oath. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred by concluding that all the police misconduct evidence
was not discovered before his first motion for relief from judgment was filed.
MCR6.502 (G)(2)(b). See also MCR 6.508(D)(2) (explaining that a court may not grant relief if
the motion “alleges grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in a prior appeal
or proceeding . . . ”). However,
a court is not precluded from considering previously decided claims in the context
of a new claim for relief, such as in determining whether new evidence would make
a different result probable on retrial or if the previously decided claims, when
considered together with the new claim for relief, create a significant possibility of
actual innocence[.] [MCR 6.508(D)(2).]
As a result, we vacate the trial court’s findings and holding as to all evidence excepting the 2019
affidavit. We remand to consider the procedural hurdle anew as to the allegedly newly discovered
evidence, again excepting the 2019 affidavit. Only once the procedural hurdle is met can the trial
court then determine whether that same evidence can survive substantive review.
B. MCR 6.508 AND THE CRESS FACTORS
1. REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND GOOD CAUSE
The trial court made legal errors in applying the Cress factors to the newly discovered
evidence at issue here. Again, for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, a defendant must show “good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the
prior motion” and “actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief.”
MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) and (b). A defendant may demonstrate good cause by showing that he “could
not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial.” Cress, 468
Mich at 692. A defendant’s duty to use reasonable diligence extends to both the discovery and
production of evidence; therefore, “when a defendant is aware of evidence before trial, he or she
is charged with the burden of using reasonable diligence to make that evidence available and
produce it at trial.” People v Rao, 491 Mich 271, 283; 815 NW2d 105 (2012).
5 As for Degraffenried’s new allegations of police misconduct, we note that, although these
allegations may be sufficiently new to clear the procedural bar set forth in MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b),
Degraffenried bears the additional burden of “establishing entitlement to the relief requested.”
People v White, 337 Mich App 558, 568; 977 NW2d 138 (2021), citing MCR 6.508(D). The
prosecutor tries to foreclose this second layer of review by arguing that other cases involving
Detectives Williams, Abdallah, and Hill, are unrelated, and that no evidence substantiating police
misconduct occurred in Degraffenried’s case. We take no position on this argument because the
relevant personnel records have not yet been provided to the trial court. That information should
be considered when deciding whether a different result would be probable at a retrial.

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We generally agree with the trial court’s analysis as to Wimberly’s affidavit. This evidence
was not cumulative, and the evidence itself appears to have been newly discovered. The
prosecution asserts that, using even minimal diligence, Degraffenried could have explored at the
time of trial Wimberly’s claim that Degraffenried was not the individual Wimberly saw in the
white car. Trial counsel declined to cross-examine Wimberly at the preliminary examination, and
Wimberly denied being interviewed by trial counsel. According to Wimberly’s affidavit, if he had
been called to testify at trial and asked if Degraffenried shot him, he would have testified
Degraffenried was not the shooter. It therefore appears that reasonable diligence on the part of
trial counsel would have led to the discovery of this evidence and its production at trial.
However, Wimberly’s affidavit also contained new claims regarding Ward, and Wimberly
did not claim he would have testified about this new information. Further, both Wimberly’s new
testimony and his preliminary examination testimony indicate that he did not want to testify
initially and that he was not a forthcoming witness. Wimberly and Ward were cousins, and
Wimberly testified they were close. Notably, Wimberly provided the information contained in his
affidavit only after Ward died. Regardless, the prosecution presents no argument that this
information could reasonably have been discovered and produced at trial, and they do not assert
Degraffenried was aware of this evidence. It appears on this record that Degraffenried could not
have produced the evidence he now presents until 2019. Accordingly, Wimberly’s new claims
about Ward and Wimberly’s initial unwillingness to testify would seem to constitute good cause
under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) and satisfy the third Cress factor.
However, the other remaining pieces of alleged new evidence must first clear the
procedural hurdle before the trial court can address the police misconduct and Walker hearing
testimony substantively under MCR 6.508. We note that, if the additional evidence of police
misconduct and prior Walker hearing testimony is newly discovered under MCR 6.502, then
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may, in place of the first three Cress factors, satisfy the
“good cause” requirement of MCR 6.508(3)(a). People v White, 337 Mich App 558, 568-569; 977
NW2d 138 (2021). Notably, this good cause requirement is satisfied by proving ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. See id.
The trial court nonetheless found that trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective as
counsel for failing to (1) investigate Degraffenried’s alibi defense, (2) interview Wimberly, and
(3) obtain ballistics tests. Because of this, the trial court concluded Degraffenried established good
cause for failing to raise these claims previously. Even assuming the trial court was correct about
the myriad ways Degraffenried’s trial counsel was ineffective, that alone is insufficient at this late
stage in the appellate process. The trial court was required to consider Degraffenried’s direct
appeal and his first motion for relief from judgment to assess whether these arguments were
previously addressed and, if not, whether Degraffenried alleged ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. The trial court did not do so when determining good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a),
and its failure to do so was clear error. The proper ineffective assistance of counsel analysis in the
context of good cause is required on remand but, again, this should happen only if the evidence
clears the procedural hurdle under MCR 6.502.

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2. THE PROBABLE OUTCOME AND ACTUAL PREJUDICE
The trial court should only reach actual prejudice if the alleged new evidence clears the
procedural hurdle under MCR 6.502 and advances past the “good cause” requirements under MCR
6.508 and the first three Cress factors. If the record clearly reflects that these two prerequisites
are met, then “[w]hen analyzing actual prejudice under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b) and the fourth Cress
factor, the trial court must begin by determining whether the proffered evidence is credible.” Allen,
___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 9.
In making this assessment, the trial court should consider all relevant factors
tending to either bolster or diminish the veracity of the witness’s testimony. A trial
court’s function is limited when reviewing newly discovered evidence, as it is not
the ultimate fact-finder . . . . In other words, a trial court’s credibility determination
is concerned with whether a reasonable juror could find the testimony credible on
retrial. [Johnson, 502 Mich at 567 (citations omitted).]
A trial court should deny a defendant’s motion for relief from judgment if the trial court determines
that, because of the witness’s lack of credibility, “no reasonable juror” would entertain a reasonable
belief in the witness’s veracity. Id. at 568. “However, if a witness is not patently incredible, a
trial court’s credibility determination must bear in mind what a reasonable juror might make of the
testimony, and not what the trial court itself might decide, were it the ultimate fact-finder.” Id.
As to the affidavit, which we agree meets both the procedural and good cause requirements,
the trial court found Wimberly’s testimony was credible because he had no reason to lie, was no
longer 16 years old, and was serving two life sentences in an unrelated matter. But the trial court
appears not to have properly analyzed the issue at hand. The trial court stated, “I believe that all
of the testimony that I heard was true. Particularly I thought that Mr. Wimberly’s testimony was
credible because he had absolutely no reason at this juncture to lie.” However, the trial court was
required to determine “whether a reasonable juror could find the testimony credible on retrial.”
Johnson, 502 Mich at 567. The trial court found the jury should have “had the benefit of evaluating
Mr. Wimberly’s credibility,” which is distinct from concluding a reasonable juror could find the
testimony credible. As a result, we vacate the fourth prong of the Cress analysis as to the affidavit
and on remand, the court shall faithfully apply this standard.
In assessing credibility on remand, the trial court should bear in mind that “[t]raditionally,
courts have considered recantation evidence with suspicion.” People v Rogers, 335 Mich App
172, 198; 966 NW2d 181 (2020). “As a rule, the court is not impressed by the recanting affidavits
of witnesses who attempt to show that they perjured themselves at the trial.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). However, such testimony may not be deemed incredible merely because it
is a recantation. Allen, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10. “Rather, as with other newly discovered
evidence, the trial court ‘should consider all relevant factors tending to either bolster or diminish
the veracity of the witness’s testimony.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
For example, the trial court could consider “the strength of the witness’s original testimony,
whether the record evidence supports the recantation, whether the recantation testimony is more
credible than the witness’s original testimony, and the importance of the witness’s original
testimony to the defendant’s conviction.” Id. “[W]hen evaluating a motion for new trial based on

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newly discovered evidence, the court must consider the evidence admitted at the original trial and
all of the record evidence that has come to light to-date that could be used at the retrial.” Rogers,
335 Mich App at 197. “In examining whether this new evidence makes a different result probable
on retrial, the trial court must consider the evidence that was previously introduced at trial.”
Johnson, 502 Mich at 571 (quotation marks and citation omitted). From some statements on the
record below, the trial court appeared to lack clear understanding of the evidentiary landscape of
Degraffenried’s trial.6 That must be remedied on remand.
IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the trial court’s order granting Degraffenried’s successive motion for relief from
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note that, only as
to the Wimberly affidavit, the trial court for the most part correctly analyzed the evidence under
MCR 6.502 and MCR 6.508 but fell short in applying the fourth prong of Cress. We cannot say
the same about Manning’s Walker hearing testimony or Degraffenried’s newer allegations of
police misconduct. For those pieces of evidence, the trial court must begin with the procedural
hurdle set forth in MCR 6.502. It is critical to public trust and judicial efficacy that the trial court
closely adhere to the court rules and review the full record on remand. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
6 The trial court found “there was absolutely no investigation of this case” by trial counsel,
explaining trial counsel never investigated Degraffenried’s alibi, never interviewed his alibi
witnesses, and never obtained any ballistics tests. But the trial court’s assessment of trial counsel’s
investigation was based exclusively on the testimony from the successive 6.500 hearing and
ignores that Degraffenried’s alibi was in fact presented at trial. Multiple witnesses testified at trial
on behalf of Degraffenried, confirming his alibi. Trial counsel attempted to introduce an incident
field report confirming Degraffenried’s cousin was released to his grandmother, but it was denied.
Further, trial counsel extensively questioned multiple Inkster police officers about the ballistics
tests performed. When trial counsel moved for a directed verdict, he noted officers refused to give
Degraffenried a ballistics test, and asserted a ballistics test was performed on at least one of the
vehicles but was never provided. This is indicative of something more, and maybe significantly
more, than “absolutely no investigation.”

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