COA 375853 STACEY J ROBACH V MICHAEL P ROBACH Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
STACEY J MOREA, formerly known as STACEY J
ROBACH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2026
10:29 AM
v No. 375853
Kent Circuit Court
MICHAEL P ROBACH, LC No. 14-000628-DM
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and YOUNG and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this postjudgment divorce case, defendant appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s
May 12, 2025 order granting plaintiff’s motion to set aside its October 3, 2022 stipulated order2;
the stipulated order incorporated the parties’ agreement to share the cost of healthcare expenses
for their adult children. We vacate the May 12, 2025 order granting plaintiff’s motion and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
When the parties divorced in 2014, a Uniform Child Support Order required defendant to
maintain healthcare coverage for their three daughters until they attended their last day of high
school on May 20, 2022. After that date, the parties negotiated a new agreement under which
defendant would continue to maintain healthcare insurance for the children, and defendant and
plaintiff would share out-of-pocket healthcare expenses equally. The agreement included a
1 Robach v Robach, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 6, 2025 (Docket
No. 375853).
2 The May 12, 2025 order refers to the underlying order as the “October 23, 2022 order,” but it is
clear from the context of the proceedings that the trial court was referring to its October 3, 2022
order, which was entered by a predecessor judge.

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provision for late fees if a party failed to timely reimburse the other for his or her share of the
expenses:
5. When requesting payment to cover out-of-pocket costs from the other
party, the requesting party shall provide a clean, unmarked/unaltered copy of the
entire bill/invoice to the other party within thirty (30) days of receipt of such
invoice. . . .
6. The requested party will have thirty (30) days thereafter to pay the fifty
percent (50%) of the amount paid to the requesting party; provided, that the
requesting party complies with all reasonable requests for information received
from requested party. . . .
7. In the event of a breach of any of the provisions of sections 5 and 6,
requested party shall be liable to requesting party for an immediately due and
payable penalty of $100 per breach and then $50 for each week the breach
continues, without prejudice to any other rights provided for by law or under this
Stipulation and Order such as the right to specific performance, the right to an
injunction or the right to claim damages instead of this penalty.
The agreement automatically renewed each year unless either party sent a timely written notice of
his or her intent not to renew. The trial court adopted the parties’ agreement in a stipulated order
dated October 3, 2022. In March 2024, plaintiff provided notice to defendant of her intention not
to renew the agreement, and the agreement terminated on December 31, 2024.
In December 2024, defendant moved for an order to show cause, asserting that plaintiff
had breached the agreement by refusing his requests for reimbursement and making untimely
payments. Defendant provided a spreadsheet to document the allegedly overdue payments and
accrued late fees. On the basis of that documentation, defendant stated in his motion: “As of
December 9, 2024, the total amount due and owing is $83.69 for past medical reimbursements and
$37,200.00 in penalties pursuant to the parties’ order for a total of $39,779.25 plus attorney fees.”3
Defendant requested that plaintiff be held in civil contempt and be required to cure the alleged
breaches by a date certain, or alternatively that she be incarcerated until the contempt is cured.
The trial court entered an order to show cause, and plaintiff pleaded not guilty. Defendant later
admitted that he mistakenly did not account for a $504 payment made by plaintiff in October 2022,
so he revised his spreadsheet and reduced his claim for penalties to $15,950.
Plaintiff moved to set aside the October 3, 2022 order, arguing for a variety of specified
reasons that the agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.4 She claimed an
3 We recognize that the sum of $83.69 and $37,200.00 is not $39,779.25, but these are the numbers
defendant used in his motion.
4 The unconscionability of an agreement that a trial court adopts as a stipulated order is relevant to
the question whether setting aside the order is appropriate under MCR 2.612(C)(1). See, e.g.,
Heugel v Heugel, 237 Mich App 471, 482; 603 NW2d 121 (1999). But unconscionability is also

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imbalance of bargaining power during negotiations5 and described the late fees as “obscene.” She
noted that, although the penalties were “not technically interest,” they far exceeded the 25%
interest rate that would subject a person to liability for criminal usury under MCL 438.41. She
further argued that if the provision for late fees was a liquidated-damages clause, then it was
unenforceable because the fees were so unreasonable that they should be considered penalties.
During a hearing on the motion, defendant argued that plaintiff’s motion to set aside the
order was an untimely motion for relief under MCR 2.612. He also argued that the agreement
could not be unconscionable because plaintiff herself had proposed the terms of the late-fee
provision after rejecting defendant’s offer of more onerous fees. The trial court declined to address
the issue of unconscionability and instead indicated that, acting as a court of equity, it would set
aside the order under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). The court referred to the doctrine of laches and noted
that the alleged unpaid medical expenses was only $83.69, but that defendant had allowed the late
fees to reach a “ridiculous” amount of $37,200 before moving the court for an order to show cause.6
It further criticized the late fees as “grossly inequitable” and “violative of usury laws,” and it
believed that defendant used “spurious accounting” methods to “arbitrarily calculate[]” the amount
owed. The court indicated that it would not enforce the October 3, 2022 order, but it maintained
the scheduled proceedings on the order to show cause “related to the $83.69 and any other
reimbursements that the parties believe[d] are owed to them.” It entered an order granting
plaintiff’s motion and continuing the show cause hearing “to permit the parties to put on proofs
regarding outstanding reimbursements, previous penalties paid pursuant to the October 23, 2022
Order, and competing requests for attorney’s fees and costs.” This appeal followed.
II. MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted plaintiff’s motion
to set aside the October 3, 2022 order. We agree that the trial court did not articulate proper bases
for setting aside the October 3, 2022 order under MCR 2.612(C)(1), and we therefore vacate the
trial court’s May 12, 2025 order and remand for further proceedings.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for relief from judgment for
an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of
an independent basis for setting aside a stipulated order. See Limbach v Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd
Comm’rs, 226 Mich App 389, 394; 573 NW2d 336 (1997) (“[A] stipulation may be set aside where
there is evidence of mistake, fraud, or unconscionable advantage. Indeed, a stipulation is a type
of contract, and contract defenses are available to a party who seeks to avoid a stipulation.”)
(citation omitted).
5 Neither party was represented by counsel in the negotiations, but defendant himself is an attorney.
6 It is not clear from the record whether the trial court was aware that defendant had reduced his
claim for late fees to $15,950.

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principled outcomes.” Int’l Outdoor, Inc v SS Mitx, LLC, 349 Mich App 212, 222; 27 NW3d 365
(2023). A court also abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Id.
B. ANALYSIS
We begin by addressing what we are and are not deciding on this appeal. Our review is
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to identify proper bases for
setting aside the October 3, 2022 order under MCR 2.612(C)(1). But we do not express an opinion
as to whether plaintiff should be held in contempt for failing to reimburse defendant for any
medical expenses or to pay any late fees. Nor do we decide any issue, including issues already
raised by the parties below, that might form an independent basis for reducing or eliminating
plaintiff’s obligation to pay the expenses or late fees on remand. We do not decide, for example,
whether the late-fee provision is unconscionable, whether the late-fee provision is a reasonable
liquidated-damages provision or an unenforceable penalty provision, whether defendant failed to
provide the bills or invoices required to trigger plaintiff’s payment obligation under the agreement,
whether the doctrine of laches applies, or whether defendant should be sanctioned for his conduct
during the proceedings. We also do not preclude the trial court from later setting aside the
October 3, 2022 order under MCR 2.612(C)(1) if circumstances change or the parties present
evidence that would satisfy the requirements for doing so, including evidence of extraordinary
circumstances arising out of improper conduct by defendant not relied upon by the trial court, as
long as the trial court’s reasoning is consistent with this opinion and any other applicable law.
A party seeking relief from judgment must show that one of the circumstances enumerated
in MCR 2.612(C)(1) exist:
(1) On motion and on just terms, the court may relieve a party or the legal
representative of a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding on the
following grounds:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
(b) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial . . .
(c) Fraud (intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party.
(d) The judgment is void.
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; a prior
judgment on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated; or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The trial court based its decision to set aside the October 3, 2022 order on
MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), which generally “provides the court with a grand reservoir of equitable

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power to do justice in a particular case and vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate
judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Heugel v Heugel, 237 Mich
App 471, 481; 603 NW2d 121 (1999).7 In Heugel, this Court outlined the requirements for setting
aside a judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f):
In order for relief to be granted under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), the following
three requirements must be fulfilled: (1) the reason for setting aside the judgment
must not fall under subsections a through e, (2) the substantial rights of the opposing
party must not be detrimentally affected if the judgment is set aside, and (3)
extraordinary circumstances must exist that mandate setting aside the judgment in
order to achieve justice. [Heugel, 237 Mich App at 478-479 (citations omitted).]8
This Court in Heugel affirmed the trial court’s finding that extraordinary circumstances
existed that mandated that the property settlement and spousal support provisions of a judgment
of divorce be set aside. Specifically, where the husband—whose wife was disabled from working
yet received no spousal support other than a lump sum that appeared instead to be her share of the
marital assets— promised his wife that they would remarry and then remained in the marital home,
the Court agreed that the husband had secured the judgment of divorce through improper conduct,
having “abused the unique nature of the husband-wife relationship to lead defendant to believe
that the entry of the divorce judgment was an irrelevant formality.” Id. at 481. The Court stressed
that “[g]enerally, relief is granted under subsection f only when the judgment was obtained by the
improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered.” Id. at 479.
But in this case, the trial court did not identify any improper conduct by defendant by which
he obtained entry of the October 3, 2022 stipulated order. Defendant’s alleged “spurious
accounting” and delay in filing a motion to show cause did not constitute extraordinary
circumstances because MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) is typically reserved for scenarios in which “the
judgment was obtained by the improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered.”
Heugel, 237 Mich App at 479. The alleged “spurious accounting” and delay in enforcement
occurred after the judgment was entered. A party’s alleged misconduct when enforcing a judgment
may justify a motion for sanctions, but not relief from the judgment.
We are therefore unable to find that there are “extraordinary circumstances” that mandate
setting aside the order in order to achieve justice. On the current record, this appears simply to be
a situation in which recurring late fees accrued over a long period of time because of payments
7 A motion to set aside judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) must be made within a “reasonable
time.” MCR 2.612(C)(2). Although defendant argued in the trial court that plaintiff’s request was
untimely, he does not argue that position on appeal, so he has abandoned that subissue. See Etefia
v Credit Technologies, Inc, 245 Mich App 466, 471; 628 NW2d 577 (“Insufficiently briefed issues
are deemed abandoned on appeal.”).
8 In this case, the first requirement was satisfied. None of the circumstances identified by the trial
court as influencing its decision—including its belief that the late fees were grossly inequitable,
violated usury laws, and were arbitrarily calculated—are encompassed in the other subsections.

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that were allegedly never made, which is a potential scenario that the parties should have been
aware of at the time that they agreed to the late-fee provision. See Rose v Rose, 289 Mich App 45,
59; 795 NW2d 611 (2010) (“In striking their deal, both parties deliberately risked that future
circumstances would render their contract inequitable.”).
In Rose, the parties entered into a consent divorce judgment in which the defendant agreed
to pay the plaintiff $230,000 annually in spousal support in exchange for the plaintiff’s agreement
to forgo any interest in the defendant’s business, which was valued at $6 million. Id. at 47. The
agreement included a provision stating that the amount and duration of spousal support could not
be modified. Id. Two years later, the business failed suddenly and unexpectedly, through no fault
of the defendant. Id. at 48. The defendant’s income was reduced to $52,000, and even if he
liquidated all his assets, he could only continue the spousal-support payments for another three
years. Id. at 56. The defendant moved for relief from judgment, but this Court held that even
though the radical change in the defendant’s financial circumstances made his spousal-support
obligations inequitable, the contract should be enforced as written because by making the
obligation nonmodifiable, the parties had accepted that future circumstances could make the terms
unfair to one party or the other. Id. at 60. This Court described the business’s sudden failure as
“tragic, but hardly extraordinary,” explaining that a business failure was not “so unexpected and
unusual” that it would justify setting aside the consent judgment. Id. at 62.
The circumstances in this case appear even less extraordinary than in Rose. The $15,950
in claimed late fees is substantially less than the amount at issue in Rose and, unlike in Rose, there
is no evidence in the record that the claim would cause a financial hardship to the party seeking
relief from judgment. Like in Rose, the contract was operating exactly as the parties contemplated
at the time they entered into it. By agreeing to a weekly late fee with no limitations, the parties
deliberately risked that a single missed payment potentially could snowball into thousands of
dollars in late fees.9 The difference between the unpaid reimbursement and the total late fees may
have shocked the trial court, and it may or may not be justifiable for other reasons, but it was not
an unexpected or unusual circumstance that would mandate setting aside the order.
We also conclude that the trial court’s decision to set aside the order detrimentally affected
defendant’s substantial rights to the late fees, including any late fees that the parties had already
paid. The court informed the parties that it would entertain requests “retroactively” for an
“accounting or reimbursement” of any expenses or penalties that either party had already paid to
the other, now that it had set aside the order. So even though the agreement had already terminated
pursuant to plaintiff’s notice of nonrenewal, the trial court indicated that it intended not only to
deny defendant’s claim for the outstanding late fees, but also potentially to reverse previous
payments of expenses and late fees. This clearly affected defendant’s substantial rights.
As noted, our conclusion does not definitively determine defendant’s right to any late fees.
Plaintiff argues, for example, that the agreement was unconscionable, which is a pertinent
9 We recognize both (1) the marked disparity between the claimed deficiency of $83.69 and the
claimed late fees of $15,950 (originally $37,200.00), and (2) defendant’s position that,
notwithstanding the trial court’s characterization, the claimed late fees did not result from a single
deficiency but rather of multiple deficiencies over a significant period of time.

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consideration independent of a MCR 2.612 analysis. See Limbach v Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd
Comm’rs, 226 Mich App 389, 394; 573 NW2d 336 (1997) (explaining that a stipulated order may
be set aside because of contract defenses such as unconscionability). The issue of
unconscionability is also pertinent to an analysis under MCR 2.612 because defendant’s
substantial rights would not be affected by setting aside the order if the agreement were determined
to be unconscionable. See Heugel, 237 Mich App at 482 (“We cannot find that plaintiff’s
substantial rights are detrimentally affected because he is not permitted to enforce an
unconscionable agreement.”). Plaintiff is generally correct that setting aside a stipulated order or
consent judgment does not affect a party’s substantial rights if the agreement was unenforceable
to begin with.10 But unlike in Heugel, the trial court in this case declined to address whether the
agreement was unconscionable, so unconscionability was not an identified basis for its decision to
set aside the order under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). Because we must reverse on the current record for
a lack of extraordinary circumstances, we need not address whether the agreement was
unconscionable. To the extent that unconscionability may be relevant for plaintiff’s defense in
subsequent show-cause proceedings, either under MCR 2.612 or independently, we leave that for
the trial court to address in the first instance on remand.11
We similarly do not address whether the late fees are unreasonable liquidated damages.
“[L]ate fees are similar to liquidated damages, in that they are contractual obligations designed to
cover expenses engendered by a breach of contract.” Id. at 419. A liquidated-damages clause is
unenforceable if the stipulated damages are unreasonable in relation to the possible injury suffered.
Solomon v Dep’t of State Hwys & Transp, 131 Mich App 479, 484; 345 NW2d 717 (1984). “To
determine whether the amount stipulated as liquidated damages is reasonable, the Court looks to
conditions at the time the contract was entered into, not at the time of breach of the contract . . . .”
Id. The trial court found that the nearly $37,200 of late fees accrued after the alleged breach (which
was nearly double what defendant actually claimed after correcting his accounting mistake) was
“obscene,” but it did not characterize the fees as unreasonable liquidated damages, nor did it
address whether a one-time $100 penalty and $50 weekly fee was reasonable as of October 3,
2022. In fact, plaintiff only made a conclusory allegation that the late fees were unreasonable.
She presented no evidence about the possible injury that defendant or her daughters could have
suffered from her allegedly late or missing payments, so it was impossible for the trial court (or
this Court, on appeal) to determine whether the late fees were reasonable in relation to that injury.
10 To the extent that the trial court held that the late-fee provision was unenforceable because it
violated usury laws, that legal conclusion was erroneous. Michigan’s civil usury limit is 5%,
although parties may stipulate to a maximum interest rate of 7%. MCL 438.31. “This statute
applies to interest charged on a debt arising from the sale of goods or services,” but “late payment
charges ordinarily do not constitute interest.” Souden v Souden, 303 Mich App 406, 418; 844
NW2d 151 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the late fees were not interest,
they did not violate any usury laws.
11 With respect to defendant’s alleged “spurious accounting” or unreasonable delay in bringing a
motion to show cause or other enforcement action, we note that unconscionability is determined
by the conditions existing at the time the contract is entered, not when it is enforced. See Rayford
v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket
No 163989); slip op at 31 n 23, 37.

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Therefore, we cannot hold that the late-fee provision is unenforceable, and we leave that question
to the trial court if it becomes relevant in subsequent proceedings.
Under the less-than-extraordinary circumstances identified by the trial court, in which the
parties’ contract operated exactly as written with no intervening events that undermined the
purpose of the late-fee provision, MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) did not provide a basis for setting aside the
October 3, 2022 order. See id. at 478-479. The trial court therefore abused its discretion when it
granted plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f).12
We note that, apart from the grounds relied upon by the trial court, the parties have alleged
several factual circumstances that would be relevant to whether the contract was unconscionable,
and to whether it was obtained by improper conduct by the person in whose favor the stipulated
order was rendered13 that may constitute the extraordinary circumstances needed to justify setting
aside the order under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). For example, plaintiff alleged in her motion to set
aside the order that defendant had superior bargaining power because he was an attorney (and she
was not represented by counsel), that he had pressured her to come to an agreement in an unfair
and accelerated timeline, and that he had threatened to disclose their negotiations to the children
(as well as other financial documentation) and to deny them health insurance coverage if plaintiff
did not sign the agreement. In his response, defendant denied that he pressured plaintiff into
signing the agreement and further alleged that the parties had extensively negotiated the agreement
and that plaintiff herself had proposed the late-fee amounts that she now challenges as
unconscionable. Whether these facts, if proven, would show that plaintiff had no “realistic
alternative” but to agree to the contract, see Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich
___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No 163989); slip op at 31 (quotation marks and citation
omitted), and whether the late-fee provision, without considering the actual amount of claimed late
fees, “shocks the conscience,” see id. at 36 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted), are
questions that we leave to the trial court on remand.
12 Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on its general equitable
powers when it granted plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order. A court’s equitable powers do not
allow it to grant relief on the basis of its application of general equitable principles when there is
binding law (in this case, MCR 2.612 and associated caselaw) that clearly dictates the limitations
and procedures for exercising that power. Other than observing that it as a court of equity it can
provide relief under MCR 2.612(C), the trial court did not claim to have relied on its general
equitable powers when it set aside the October 3, 2022 order, but to the extent that it did, that
decision was also an abuse of discretion.
13 The trial court has not decided, and we express no opinion on, whether the October 3, 2022 order
was rendered (in whole or in part) in favor of one party over another.

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Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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