COA 380515 IN RE R BELCHER MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
October 09, 2026
11:56 AM
In re R. BELCHER, Minor.
No. 380515
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 26-141313-NA
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order removing her infant son from her care and
authorizing a neglect petition. We affirm.
I. FACTS
On March 1, 2026, when the child, RB, was just about one month old, Children’s Protective
Services (CPS) received detailed allegations that the child was at risk of harm and was not being
cared for by respondent. The allegations also included that the child’s putative father and
nonrespondent, Raymond Gilbert,1 was a methamphetamine user and may have been using drugs
in the child’s presence, and that Gilbert “does not work and cannot supply anything for” the child.
A CPS investigator spoke with respondent’s mother, the child’s grandmother, who reported that
respondent and Gilbert had no interest in the child and did not know how to care for him,
referencing specific examples. The grandmother told CPS that she had access to respondent’s text
messages, where respondent and Gilbert stated “evil things about hurting” the child. Finally, the
grandmother reported the child appeared to be sick and in need of medical care and believed the
child should be removed and placed in foster care immediately.
1 Gilbert was not named in the child’s birth certificate, had not signed an affidavit of parentage,
and was not a party to any Friend of the Court proceeding.

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CPS investigators also interviewed respondent on March 1. During the interview she
admitted that Gilbert was a drug addict, but she left the child with him at times. She also admitted
texting Gilbert that “if it were legal she would kill her child,” and that she acted on her thoughts
by shaking the child with such force that a medical wellness assessment was required. Respondent
demonstrated to investigators how she shook the child. Respondent also revealed she and the child
were currently living with Douglas Heckel, a convicted sex trafficker who trafficked her when she
was a minor. Respondent admitted she was creating pornographic videos with Heckel in motel
rooms and in exchange for money. The grandmother would not allow respondent and the child to
live with her. Following the interview, it appears respondent took the child to the hospital for
medical evaluation, then voluntarily committed herself for inpatient psychiatric treatment because
of the threats made toward the child.
Further investigation by CPS on March 2 revealed text messages between respondent and
Heckel which suggested respondent was creating pornographic videos while in the child’s
presence. The text messages also suggested Heckel and respondent may have been sexually
abusing the child and using him to create pornographic videos or making plans to do so. Other
text messages between respondent and Gilbert demonstrated she punched the child and told Gilbert
to “throw [him] out in the snow.”
On March 3, 2026, following the CPS investigation, petitioner, the Department of Health
and Human Services, offered a child neglect petition to the trial court to take jurisdiction of the
child under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) that contained the allegations set forth above as well as
other details. By the time of the emergency removal hearing on March 3, the child had been
evaluated and was medically cleared for discharge but had nowhere to go. Respondent was not
present at the hearing because she was still hospitalized and had made no arrangements for the
child’s care upon his release from the hospital. However, an attorney was present on respondent’s
behalf, and a lawyer-guardian ad litem had been appointed for the child. The CPS investigator
who prepared the petition provided testimony on the allegations contained in it, including that
there was no suitable relative with whom the child could be placed. CPS was still attempting to
contact Gilbert, who was “transient” and without a home address. The trial court ordered the child
be removed from respondent’s care and immediately placed in petitioner’s custody and care
because of respondent’s “mental health issues, physical abuse, and threatened harm.” The trial
court suspended respondent’s parenting time and adjourned the preliminary hearing until
respondent could be served with the neglect petition. Respondent was served a copy of the petition
on March 5, 2026, while still in the hospital.
The trial court continued the preliminary hearing on the petition on April 7, 2026.
Respondent was present and represented by counsel and waived a formal reading of the petition.
By this time, respondent was seeing a therapist and was on psychotropic medication. The trial
court heard testimony from a different CPS investigator than the one who offered the petition for
filing, but the new investigator testified that she spoke with the prior investigator and was familiar
with the case. The trial court found sufficient probable cause to authorize the petition and found
the allegations in the petition fell within MCL 712A.2b(1) and (2) because the “physical
abuse,” . . . “as well as [respondent’s] mental health issues, made the home environment an unsafe
place for the child to live.” Respondent’s attorney asked that the court grant supervised parenting
time, but the court ordered that parenting time remain suspended until a psychological evaluation
could be completed, or a copy of one could be obtained from respondent’s in-patient psychiatric

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stay in March 2023. The trial court ordered that reasonable efforts to reunify the family be made,
and a pretrial hearing was set for April 29, 2026.
Respondent appeals and challenges the trial court’s orders removing the child and the order
authorizing the petition.
II. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Authorizing a child protective proceeding petition “is merely a determination that the
petition is sufficient to be delivered to, and accepted by, the clerk of the court.” In re KNK, ___
Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 370841); slip op at 3-4 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Because authorization is a threshold determination made at the preliminary
hearing, a parent must object at or before that preliminary hearing to preserve the issue for
appellate review. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 14; 934 NW2d 610 (2019).
At the March 3, 2026 emergency removal hearing, respondent’s attorney did not challenge
the trial court’s decision to place the child in petitioner’s protective custody, but merely stated, in
response to petitioner’s request that parenting time be suspended: “just [] for a general denial on
mom’s behalf.” It appears this “general denial” was only to the suspension of parenting time. At
the continued preliminary hearing on April 7, 2026, respondent, petitioner, and the child’s lawyer-
guardian ad litem waived presenting additional evidence or raising any challenge to authorizing
the petition. Respondent again did not object to the trial court’s initial removal order or
authorization of the petition and only challenged the trial court’s order to suspend parenting time.
Therefore, respondent’s challenges to the removal order and the order authorizing the petition are
unpreserved. Id.
Unpreserved issues in child protective proceedings are reviewed for plain error affecting
substantial rights. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011); In re Utrera,
281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253, 260 (2008).2 “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule,
three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or
obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” In re VanDalen, 239 Mich App at 135.
Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of
the proceedings. Id. at 9. The asserting party bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
prejudice. In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020).
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact underlying its decision to
assume jurisdiction. In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich App 436, 463, 861 NW2d 303 (2014).
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, “after reviewing the entire record, we are definitely and
firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake.” Id. The application of factual findings to a
2 Petitioner’s brief on appeal states that we review the trial court’s decision to authorize the petition
for an abuse of discretion, citing In re Nikooyi, 341 Mich App 490; 991 NW2d 619 (2022). But
that is wrong, as the procedural posture of that case was different: it involved a preserved challenge
to the dismissal of a petition for lack of standing and did not reach the merits under MCL 712A.2b.
Id. at 494-500.

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statute “presents a question of law that we review de novo.” In re Leach, 347 Mich App 26, 30;
14 NW3d 178 (2023).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, respondent argues the trial court plainly erred when it removed the child from
her custody and care and authorized the neglect petition because there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s decisions. We disagree.
As an initial matter, respondent incorrectly asserts that “preponderance of the evidence”
was the applicable standard of proof to authorize the petition. Only probable cause needs to be
established for an initial removal and for authorizing a petition, which is a lower threshold than
the preponderance standard that is applicable to the adjudication phase of a child protective
proceeding. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich at 15. “Probable cause requires a quantum of evidence
sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief” that the matter asserted is true. People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126; 659 NW2d
604 (2003) (cleaned up).
A child protective proceedings petition must include facts that, if proven, would allow the
trial court to assume jurisdiction over the child. Under MCL 712A.13a(2), a trial court may
authorize a petition for child protective proceedings after a preliminary hearing, or inquiry “upon
a showing of probable cause that 1 or more of the allegations in the petition are true and fall within
the provisions of [MCL 712A.2(b)].” See MCR 3.965(B)(12) and MCR 3.962(A).
MCL 712A.2b)(1) and (2) permit a trial court to exercise jurisdiction over a minor child:
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide
proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary
for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or
her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other
custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. . . .
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunken-
ness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or
other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.
The trial court need only find one statutory ground exists to take jurisdiction. In re SLH, 277 Mich
App 662, 669; 747 NW2d 547 (2008).
When a petition requests placement of the child and the child has been taken into protective
custody, the trial court must conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether to authorize the
filing of the petition and, if it is authorized, whether the child should remain in the home, be
returned home, or be placed in foster care pending trial. MCR 3.965(A)(1) and (B)(12). If the
court authorizes the petition but finds that returning the child to the home would be contrary to the
child’s welfare, it may order that the child be temporarily placed in foster care. MCR
3.965(B)(12)(b) and (C).

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A. EMERGENCY REMOVAL
The trial court did not plainly err in removing the child from respondent’s care and placing
the child in protective custody at the hearing on March 3, 2026.
MCL 712A.13a(9), mirrored by MCR 3.965(C)(2), allows for removal and placement into
foster care if all the following conditions are met:
(a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm
to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.
(b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the
child is reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from the risk as
described in subdivision (a).
(c) Continuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s
welfare.
(d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.
(e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to
safeguard the child’s health and welfare.
The trial court must make a sufficient record of its findings regarding each of these conditions to
enable meaningful appellate review, although it is “not obligated to articulate extensive findings
regarding every conceivable detail.” In re Williams, 333 Mich App 172; 183, 958 NW2d 629, 636
(2020). The record in this case does not support respondent’s claim that the trial court failed to
adequately articulate its factual findings supporting the statutory requirements for removal under
MCL 712A.13a(9)(a), (b), (c), and (e).
The testimony at the March 3 hearing created a sufficient record regarding each of these
conditions, which the trial court addressed. The CPS investigator testified that respondent
admitted to shaking the child with force requiring medical assessment. Respondent also made
homicidal threats toward the child as revealed in text messages she sent to Gilbert. According to
the petition, respondent repeated some of those threats to care providers during her in-patient
psychiatric stay.
Respondent argues that court intervention was unnecessary and that the trial court
improperly relied heavily on her statements about harming the child which were made during a
mental-health crisis, and that the child was not physically harmed. But respondent’s threats, and
acting on those threats by shaking the child, and potentially punching the child (according to the
texts she sent to Gilbert), were enough to find physical abuse, and so the threat of physical harm
to the child existed under MCL 712A.13a(9)(a). Even though the child was examined and no
physical injury resulted from respondent’s actions, courts need not wait for actual physical injury
to intervene to protect a child. In re Middleton, 198 Mich App 197, 199-200; 497 NW2d 214
(1993).

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The trial court also heard testimony that respondent had not arranged for the child’s care
during her inpatient psychiatric stay and he was to be discharged from the hospital the day of the
preliminary hearing with nowhere to go because CPS could not locate Gilbert, and respondent’s
mother refused to provide care. Thus, the trial court correctly found that no other arrangement
except removal of the child was reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from further
physical abuse under MCL 712A.13a(9)(b).
Further, according to the CPS investigator’s testimony on March 3, respondent also
admitted she lacked a bond with the child and was unable to provide basic care for him and had
left him with Gilbert, whom she knew was addicted to methamphetamines and living in a “trap
house” where illicit drugs were sold. Also, there was evidence that, when the child was in
respondent’s custody, respondent was making or planning to make pornographic videos with a
convicted sex trafficker in the child’s presence, and the evidence suggests the child may have been
or was about to be sexually abused as well. This testimony, as well as the testimony that
respondent admitted to shaking the child, supports the trial court’s factual finding that
“[c]ontinuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s welfare due to mom’s
mental health issues, physical abuse, and threatened harm,” under MCL 712A.13a(9)(c).
Finally, respondent argues that the court should have ordered supervised agency parenting
time, but the record does not support her assertion that the trial court failed to consider a less
restrictive alternative to removal. She further contends that, instead of removal, the newborn
should have remained in her care with a safety plan, rather than in protective custody, during a
critical parent-child bonding period. But the trial court did not plainly err in concluding that, given
respondent’s homicidal ideations toward the child and potentially engaging in sexual encounters
for money in the child’s presence or involving the child (as reflected in the text messages to), there
was no other alternative than keeping respondent away from the child, temporarily, pending further
proceedings. The trial court was correct to consider that even in supervised parenting time upon
respondent’s release from in-patient psychiatric care, “we don’t know . . . how stable she is,
because in a split second, she could shake that child even if she’s at the department. This is a six-
week-old child. Even if they’re watching her, she can choke this child, shake this child, and this
child could be severely injured before even a worker can get across the room.” Given these
considerations, the trial court made a sufficient record that “conditions of child custody away from
the parent are adequate to safeguard the child’s health and welfare” under MCL 712A.13a(9)(e).
Thus, the trial court did not plainly err in removing the child because the facts showed, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that returning the child to respondent upon her release from
inpatient psychiatric care would be contrary to the child’s welfare, and there was sufficient record
of each of the challenged conditions listed in MCL 712A.13a(9). See also MCR 3.965(B)(12)(b)
and (C).
B. AUTHORIZING THE PETITION
Nor did the trial court plainly err in authorizing the petition under MCL 712A.2(b) at the
continued preliminary hearing in April 2026.
Respondent asserts the trial court erred because it did not meaningfully consider her
changed circumstances between March 3 and April 7, 2026, and that there was no evidence she

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injured the child, when it authorized the petition. Respondent emphasizes her voluntary
completion of inpatient psychiatric treatment, her use of psychotropic medication, and her
participation in therapy. While respondent took steps toward addressing her mental health issues,
the trial court appropriately recognized lingering concerns regarding resolution of her mental-
health issues that left in doubt whether she could safely care for the child.
Respondent also contends that the trial court improperly authorized the petition based on
the limited testimony of a caseworker who was not the original CPS investigator. But it is well
established that a child protective action is a single continuous proceeding, In re Hudson, 294 Mich
App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011), meaning evidence admitted at one hearing remains pertinent
in all subsequent hearings within such a proceeding. And respondent does not explain why the
testimony was inadmissible or improper to consider. The trial court therefore properly considered
all testimony and evidence when determining whether to authorize the petition in the later
preliminary hearing.
Finally, respondent argues that the court “effectively punished” her for experiencing a
psychiatric crisis, even though she sought treatment and cooperated with intervention. But that is
not an argument that the trial court somehow erred in authorizing the petition. Also, the trial
court’s decisions were not the end of the proceedings: the trial court stated that it planned to revisit
respondent’s parenting time later and ordered that reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and the
child be made. The court was sensitive toward the child’s age, encouraging petitioner to arrange
a psychological evaluation or obtain a release of one with “some expedience [] because this is a
young child that does need bonding time with mother.” Nor did the trial court foreclose on the
opportunity for supervised parenting time in the future. It stated parenting time would resume
after the psychological evaluation was obtained and the results were reviewed.
In light of the evidence, the trial court reasonably concluded that that the child was without
proper custody or guardianship and respondent had not met the child’s basic physical needs under
MCL 712A.2b(1), due to respondent leaving the child in the care of a known drug addict and her
inability to properly care for the child. Further, the trial court reasonably concluded that the home
or environment was an unfit place for the child to live in under MCL 712A.2b(2) due to physical
abuse and respondent’s mental health issues. The record supported the court’s factual findings of
probable cause that one or more of the allegations in the petition were true and supported the trial
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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