COA 371232 PEOPLE OF MI V TERRY LEE HORNE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/26/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2025
9:32 AM
v No. 371232
Genesee Circuit Court
TERRY LEE HORNE, LC No. 2021-048878-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of two counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) and MCL 750.520b(2)(b). The trial court sentenced
defendant to 25 to 80 years’ imprisonment for each CSC-I conviction, to be served consecutively.
We affirm defendant’s convictions against his claims that the trial court violated his due-process
rights by referring to jurors only by numbers and infringed his confrontation right by allegedly
permitting the victim to testify with her face obscured. However, we vacate defendant’s sentence
and remand this case for resentencing for the purpose of amending defendant’s judgment of
sentence to reflect that the sentences are concurrent rather than consecutive.
I. BACKGROUND
The victim disclosed to her great-grandmother and her mother that defendant, her mother’s
boyfriend, had been sexually assaulting her inside the family home. The abuse occurred over a
four-month period and involved acts of penile penetration of the victim’s vagina while she was
under the age of 13, and when defendant was around the age of 30. The victim initially testified
at trial that defendant assaulted her at least three to four times. After reviewing the preliminary-
examination transcript, though, she clarified that the number was at least seven times. The victim
confirmed that two of these incidents occurred in different rooms inside the home on different
days. A police officer interviewed defendant, and he admitted that he had vaginal intercourse with
the victim twice, inside the home, on different days. Defendant was arrested, and the case
continued to a trial.

-- 1 of 5 --

-2-
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court asked both parties whether they had received
“juror packets” containing information obtained from juror questionnaires. Both parties agreed
that they had received these packets. The trial court subsequently requested both parties refer to
the potential jurors by number instead of by name. The trial court stated that it preferred referring
to the jurors by number based on feedback from past jurors and to avoid making the jurors feel
uncomfortable. Once the jury pool entered the courtroom, the court advised potential jurors that
it would identify jurors by number instead of by name to avoid “yelling [their] names out in court
all the time.” Neither party objected.
During trial, outside the presence of the jury, but before the victim testified, the trial court
addressed the issue of the victim wearing a hat in the courtroom. The victim arrived to court
wearing a baseball-style hat connected to a wig that partially obscured her face. Defense counsel
objected to the victim wearing the hat during her testimony and argued that it would have impaired
the jury’s ability to assess her credibility. The trial court asked the victim to remove the hat, and
a video recording of the courtroom confirmed that the victim was not wearing a hat during her
testimony. After trial, the jury convicted defendant of two CSC-I charges.
At sentencing, the prosecutor stated to the trial court that it had the discretion to sentence
defendant consecutively under MCL 750.520b(3). Defendant did not object to this statement, but
requested the trial court not sentence him to consecutive terms of imprisonment. Nevertheless, the
trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 25 to 80 years’ imprisonment for each CSC-
I conviction. Defendant now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. ANONYMOUS JURY
Defendant first argues that his constitutional due-process rights were violated because the
trial court referred to the potential jurors by number instead of their names during voir dire. He
argues that the trial court should have instructed the jurors to ensure that they did not consider this
fact as a negative against his presumed innocence. We disagree.
To preserve a challenge to the trial court’s decision to refer to jurors by number rather than
by name, a defendant must object to that decision in the trial court. People v Hanks, 276 Mich
App 91, 92; 740 NW2d 530 (2007). Because defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court, it
is unpreserved. We review unpreserved issues for plain error, regardless of whether the issue has
constitutional implications. People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). Under
plain-error review, “a defendant must prove that (1) error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e.,
clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights.” People v Davis, 509 Mich 52,
67; 983 NW2d 325 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “An error has affected a
defendant’s substantial rights when there is a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the
outcome of the lower court proceedings.” People v Walker, 504 Mich 267, 276; 934 NW2d 727
(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“An ‘anonymous jury’ is one in which certain information is withheld from the parties,
presumably for the safety of the jurors or to prevent harassment by the public.” People v Williams,
241 Mich App 519, 522; 616 NW2d 710 (2000) (citation omitted). Courts have recognized that

-- 2 of 5 --

-3-
using an “anonymous jury” has the potential to impact “two interests of the defendant: (1) the
defendant’s interest in being able to conduct a meaningful examination of the jury and (2) the
defendant’s interest in maintaining the presumption of innocence.” Id. at 522-523. “In order to
successfully challenge the use of an ‘anonymous jury,’ the record must reflect that the parties have
had information withheld from them, thus preventing meaningful voir dire, or that the presumption
of innocence has been compromised.” Id. See also Hanks, 276 Mich App at 93.
Defendant relies heavily on several federal cases, quoting portions that discuss
considerations relevant to addressing jurors by name rather than by number. Although those
quotations appear to support his position, the cases themselves do not. Each of the authorities he
cites ultimately holds that the use of juror numbers, in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, does
not constitute reversible error. In this case, defendant has offered no evidentiary basis to
substantiate his assertion that he suffered prejudice from the trial court’s decision to refer to jurors
by number rather than by name. Contrary to defendant’s implicit assertion that he was unable to
conduct meaningful voir dire, the record establishes that his trial counsel received a “juror packet”
containing pertinent biographical information related to the potential jurors. Moreover, the record
establishes that defense counsel conducted extensive voir dire; in particular, defense counsel
exercised several peremptory challenges. Therefore, there is no evidence to support defendant’s
argument that his ability to conduct voir dire was obstructed. See Williams, 241 Mich App at 523
(“There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that any information was actually
withheld from the parties. At most, the names of the jurors were replaced by numbers.”).
Defendant also argues that his presumption of innocence was compromised because the
trial court did not properly instruct the jurors as to how they should perceive reference to them by
number instead of by name. We have cautioned trial courts to give such an instruction and to limit
the cases where juror numbers are used instead of names. Williams, 241 Mich App at 524; Hanks,
276 Mich App at 94. We have also held that it is proper to decline to review claims of prejudice
in the withholding of jurors’ names when there is no evidence in the record of prejudice. Williams,
241 Mich App at 524.
In this case, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the jurors construed the use
of numbers as a negative to be held against defendant. The record suggests that both the trial court
and the jurors understood the use of numbers as a purely logistical choice devoid of any greater
meaning. See id. at 524-525; Hanks, 276 Mich App at 94. Therefore, we conclude that defendant’s
due-process rights were not violated by using juror numbers instead of names at trial.
B. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Defendant next argues that his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him
was violated because the trial court allowed the victim to testify while wearing a hat that partially
obscured her face to the jury. We disagree.
Whether a defendant’s right of confrontation has been violated is reviewed de novo.
People v Washington, 514 Mich 583, 592; 22 NW3d 507 (2024). Under the de novo standard, we
review the issue independently without any deference to the courts below. Id.

-- 3 of 5 --

-4-
“The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 20 of Michigan’s
Constitution provide a defendant with the right to confront the witnesses against him.”
Washington, 514 Mich at 592. “The right of confrontation insures that the witness testifies under
oath at trial, is available for cross-examination, and allows the jury to observe the demeanor of the
witness.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under certain circumstances, a trial court
may limit a defendant’s right to face his or her accuser in person and in the same courtroom without
violating that defendant’s constitutional rights. See People v Rose, 289 Mich App 499, 515-517;
808 NW2d 301 (2010). See also MCL 600.2136a.
In this case, defendant argues that the trial court allowed the victim to testify while wearing
a hat that partially obscured her face. He argues further that this decision violated his constitutional
rights because the jury was unable to see the victim’s face and reactions while she testified and,
therefore, the jury was impaired in its ability to assess her credibility. However, this argument is
entirely misplaced. Video footage of the courtroom depicting the victim’s cross-examination
testimony clearly shows that the victim was not wearing a hat. Moreover, her face was fully visible
throughout her testimony. The record also indicates that the jury was closely observing her
testimony because it submitted at least one clarifying question for the trial court to ask the victim
directly. Accordingly, this claim lacks merit.
C. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked statutory authority to
sentence him to consecutive sentences under MCL 750.520b(3). The prosecutor concedes and
agrees on appeal that defendant was entitled to concurrent sentencing under MCL 750.520b(3).
MCL 750.520b(3) states that “[t]he court may order a term of imprisonment imposed under
this section to be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed for any other criminal
offense arising from the same transaction.” Although the phrase “same transaction” is not defined
in the statute, this Court has held that crimes committed in a continuous time sequence constitute
crimes committed in the same transaction. People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388, 402; 819 NW2d
55 (2012).
In this case, the victim disclosed, and defendant admitted to the police, that the criminal
acts occurred on separate days. Accordingly, the two events that defendant was convicted of were
not “part of a continuous time sequence,” and the statutory discretion to impose a consecutive
sentence under MCL 750.520b(3) was not triggered. People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 725;
873 NW2d 855 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court’s decision
to impose consecutive sentences without proper statutory authority was plain error. Bailey, 310
Mich App at 726. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to
consecutive sentences, we need not address defendant’s argument in the alternative that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the consecutive sentencing. See Bailey, 310 Mich App
at 728 (“[D]efense counsel’s failure to challenge the conclusion that the defendant was subject to
consecutive sentencing likely constituted ineffective assistance. However, since we remand the
case for resentencing, we need not address trial counsel’s performance in this regard.”).

-- 4 of 5 --

-5-
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm defendant’s convictions, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand for
resentencing for the purpose of amending his judgment of sentence to reflect that his sentences are
concurrent rather than consecutive.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

-- 5 of 5 --