COA 378143 IN RE PETITION OF STATE TREASURER FOR FORECLOSURE FOR UNPAID TAX Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re PETITION OF STATE TREASURER FOR
FORECLOSURE FOR UNPAID TAX.
STATE TREASURER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
July 17, 2026
11:45 AM
v No. 378143
Livingston Circuit Court
DOUGLAS WEBSTER and VALERIE WEBSTER, LC No. 2013-027515-CZ
Claimants-Appellees.
STATE TREASURER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v No. 378144
Livingston Circuit Court
NICHOLSON-BRIGHTON LLC and ROY
NICHOLSON,
LC No. 2013-027515-CZ
Claimants-Appellees.
STATE TREASURER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v No. 378147
Livingston Circuit Court
STEFANIE DEVER as Personal Representative of
ESTATE OF SUZANNE JOSEPHSON,
LC No. 2013-027515-CZ
Claimant-Appellee.

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Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and PATEL and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases,1 petitioner, the State Treasurer, appeals by right the trial court’s
October 24, 2025 orders to disburse the surplus proceeds generated by three tax-foreclosure sales
of real property owned by claimants.2 While the instant appeals were pending, this Court decided
In re Petition of State Treasurer for Foreclosure for Unpaid Tax, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d
___ (2026) (Docket Nos. 376481, 376482, 376653, 376655, and 376656) (In re Petition I), which
arose from trial-court orders previously entered in the same proceeding, involved all of the parties
that are present in these appeals, and addressed the same issues. Because this Court’s decision in
In re Petition I is dispositive of all issues and parties before us, we vacate the orders to disburse
and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of petitioner.
The background and facts of these cases are set forth at length in In re Petition I. In a
nutshell, petitioner initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2013 against claimants’ properties for
failure to pay property taxes, and the circuit court entered judgments of foreclosure against those
properties in 2014. The properties were sold at public auction that same year, the properties sold
for more than the amount owed, and petitioner retained the surplus proceeds.
In Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, 505 Mich 429; 952 NW2d 434 (2020), our Supreme Court
held that the government’s retention of surplus proceeds under such circumstances violates the
Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 10, § 2, and property owners are
entitled to return of surplus proceeds. The Legislature then amended the General Property Tax
Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., effective December 22, 2020, to create by statute a procedural
mechanism for property owners to claim and receive such proceeds after a foreclosure sale. See
MCL 211.78t. In Schafer v Kent Co, 515 Mich 1; 29 NW3d 25 (2024), our Supreme Court held
that Rafaeli applies retroactively, thereby allowing at least some owners of property sold through
foreclosure before Rafaeli to use the GPTA’s procedure as well. The Schafer Court, however, said
that its holding did not “revive claims that were not subject to pending litigation and were already
time-barred before December 22, 2020.” Id. at 50 n 123.
After Schafer was decided, claimants initiated proceedings under MCL 211.78t to recover
the surplus proceeds from the 2014 foreclosure sales. Petitioner moved for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that claimants’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. According to petitioner, claimants’ claims accrued in 2014 when petitioner retained
the surplus proceeds generated by the foreclosure sales. Claimants opposed the motion, arguing
1 In re Petition of State Treasurer for Foreclosure for Unpaid Tax, unpublished order of the Court
of Appeals, entered January 22, 2026 (Docket Nos. 378143, 378144, and 378147) (consolidating
these appeals “to advance the efficient administration of the appellate process”).
2 Three separate orders are at issue, and the trial court stayed execution of the orders pending
appeal.

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that their claims accrued in 2024 when Schafer held that Rafaeli was retroactive, thereby enabling
them to use MCL 211.78t to recover proceeds from pre-Rafaeli foreclosure sales.
The trial court agreed with claimants and therefore denied petitioner’s motions for
summary disposition in separate opinions and orders dated July 15, 2025. Petitioner appealed
those orders by leave granted,3 and those appeals eventually yielded this Court’s opinion in In re
Petition I. Proceedings in the trial court were not stayed pending appeal, however, and following
a hearing the trial court entered final orders on October 24, 2025, just a few months after denying
petitioner’s motions for summary disposition. In the final orders, the trial court ordered petitioner
to disburse the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sales to claimants “for the reasons stated on
the record, including the court’s prior written findings in the July 10, 2025 Opinion and Order[s].”
The cases now before this Court are petitioner’s appeals by right from the October 24, 2025 final
orders to disburse the surplus proceeds.
Meanwhile, while the instant appeals were pending, this Court issued its opinion in In re
Petition I, petitioner’s interlocutory appeal from the July 10, 2025 orders. In In re Petition I, the
Court agreed with petitioner that claimants’ claims accrued in 2014, when the foreclosure sales
occurred and petitioner retained the surplus proceeds. In re Petition I, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
op at 5. The Court explained that claimants had a constitutional right to just compensation at that
time and could have pursued recovery of the surplus proceeds through inverse-condemnation
claims. Id. at ___; slip op at 6. “The Legislature’s subsequent enactment of MCL 211.78t
established a statutory mechanism for vindicating that right. It did not create the substantive right
itself.” Id. Further, the Court held, the statute of limitations was three years. Id. at ___; slip op
at 7. So with the claims accruing in 2014, the limitations period expired in 2017. Id. “Neither
Rafaeli nor the Legislature’s enactment of MCL 211.78t revived claims that were already time-
barred.” Id. Therefore, this Court held, claimants’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations
and the trial court erred by denying petitioner’s motion for summary disposition. Id. at ___; slip
op at 8. Accordingly, the Court “[r]eversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in
favor of petitioner.” Id.
Returning to the appeals now before us, In re Petition I is dispositive in every respect. As
a published decision, In re Petition I is binding because it established a rule of law that we must
follow. MCR 7.215(J)(1). Even if it weren’t published, because it arises from the same case, it
establishes the law of the case. See Rott v Rott, 508 Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d 789 (2021) (“[A]s
a general rule, an appellate court’s determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on
remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Nor are we aware of any case developments between the July 10, 2025 orders and the October 24,
2025 orders that would change the outcome. Cf. South Macomb Disposal Auth v American Ins
Co, 243 Mich App 647, 655; 625 NW2d 40 (2000) (not applying the law of the case because “the
facts did not remain materially the same”). Further, In re Petition I remanded with specific
3 In re Petition for Foreclosure, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 12,
2025 (Docket No. 376653); In re Petition for Foreclosure, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered August 12, 2025 (Docket No. 376655); In re Petition for Foreclosure,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 12, 2025 (Docket No. 376656).

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instructions for “entry of summary disposition in favor of petitioner,” see id. at ___; slip op at 8,
and we see no grounds upon which we may interfere with “the duty of the lower court or tribunal,
on remand, to comply strictly with the mandate of the appellate court,” K & K Constr, Inc v Dep’t
of Environmental Quality, 267 Mich App 523, 545; 705 NW2d 365 (2005) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Consequently, because this Court held in In re Petition I, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 8, that the trial court erred by denying petitioner’s motions for summary disposition on
statute-of-limitations grounds, we hold that the trial court necessarily erred by subsequently
ordering petitioner to disburse the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sales to claimants. In
short, In re Petition I governs our decision and compels the relief that petitioner seeks.4
The trial court’s October 24, 2025 orders to disburse proceeds are vacated, and these cases
are remanded to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of petitioner. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
4 Aside from the statute of limitations, claimants advance a number of other arguments that were
likewise considered and rejected in In re Petition I, ___ Mich App at ___ & n 2; slip op at 7-8 &
n 2. Specifically, claimants assert that the trial court’s orders should be affirmed on grounds of
equitable estoppel, petitioner’s failure to strictly comply with MCL 211.78t’s statutory procedures,
and because petitioner’s motion for summary disposition was procedurally improper. Because we
are bound by In re Petition I, we need not address these arguments again here.

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