COA 379800 IN RE ORR MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2026
9:19 AM
In re ORR, Minors.
No. 379800
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2025-000288-NA
Before: BAZZI, P.J., and PATEL and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
to his minor children, CJO and LRO, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) and (m)(i). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2024, the Michigan State Police and the Department of Homeland Security
Investigations Unit executed a search warrant at respondent-father’s family home in response to a
tip provided to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. The tip alleged that
respondent-father possessed and distributed child sexually abusive material (CSAM). Law
enforcement located 14 images and 16 videos depicting CSAM on respondent-father’s cell phone.
He was thereafter arrested on federal charges for possessing and distributing CSAM, and he
remained in custody on those charges for the duration of the instant proceeding.
During a subsequent forensic interview, CJO disclosed that he saw “a lot of” CSAM on
respondent-father’s cell phone, including images of nude girls that were approximately 6 to 12
years old. LRO did not make any disclosures initially but later reported that her mother and other
family members told her that she would go into foster care if she made any disclosures.
After Children’s Protective Services (CPS) conducted its own investigation, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition seeking to terminate

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respondent-father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), (k), and (m)(i)-(iii).1 The
petition detailed the circumstances of the federal CSAM charges and the results of the CPS
investigation, and it further alleged that respondent-father pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-I) against a victim under the age of 13 in 1997, resulting in his registration
as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act, MCL 28.721 et seq. The trial court
conducted a preliminary hearing, authorized the petition, and removed the children. They were
placed with DHHS for care and supervision, and respondent-father was granted supervised
visitation as allowed by the federal facility where he was detained.
At the adjudication trial, several law enforcement witnesses testified regarding the tip that
led to the search warrant, the evidence recovered during the warrant’s execution, and how the
officers determined that respondent-father received, possessed, and distributed CSAM using his
cell phone. The witnesses found no evidence that the phone was hacked or that anyone other than
respondent-father used the phone. The images and videos were found in multiple locations on the
phone and were accessed on various dates after they were downloaded.
A CPS specialist testified that, during the investigation, she interviewed the children’s
mother, who reported that she was aware of respondent-father’s CSC-I conviction but “she forgave
him for his past and didn’t want to hold anything against him.” She informed the specialist of an
incident in December 2024 in which she discovered “some inappropriate photos that [the children]
took of their private areas on their own tablets.” Mother supported a continuing relationship
between respondent-father and the children and did not believe he posed a risk to them, though
she indicated later that she would not allow him to be around the children unsupervised. After the
presentation of evidence, the court concluded that there were statutory grounds to exercise
jurisdiction over the children and that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), though it declined to find grounds to terminate under subsection (g) and
reserved its ruling on subsection (m)(i) pending the best-interest hearing.
At the best-interest hearing, DHHS presented a best-interest evaluation prepared by Family
Assessment Services in which the clinician opined that termination of respondent-father’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. The clinician noted a link between the CSAM found on
respondent-father’s phone and the children’s own inappropriate photographing, opining that the
children’s conduct resulted from respondent-father’s negative influence. The clinician noted that
the children were impressionable and susceptible to manipulation and coercion. During the
evaluation, respondent-father was evasive, avoided accepting responsibility for his conduct,
minimized his role in the circumstances giving rise to the petition, and failed to appreciate the
impact his behavior had on his children, leading the clinician to conclude that respondent-father
was unlikely to change.
After closing arguments, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
additionally supported termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m)(i), and it concluded that
1 Though the children’s mother was a respondent to the petition, DHHS did not seek to terminate
her parental rights, and she is not a party to this appeal. DHHS later narrowed the statutory grounds
for termination of respondent-father’s parental rights to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j), and (m)(i).

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termination was in the children’s best interests. The court entered an order terminating respondent-
father’s parental rights, and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
a statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established. In re
Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 333; 985 NW2d 912 (2022). We review that
finding for clear error. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, giving due regard to the trial court’s
special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).
On appeal, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by finding clear and
convincing evidence to support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). However, the trial court
also found clear and convincing evidence to support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m)(i),
and respondent-father does not challenge that finding. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
trial court erred in its findings as to subsection (j), any error would not entitle respondent-father to
relief because the trial court need only find that one statutory ground has been proven by clear and
convincing evidence to support termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3). See In re
Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 90; 896 NW2d 452 (2016). Stated differently, because respondent-
father does not challenge the independent basis for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m)(i),
affirmance is required notwithstanding any purported errors in the court’s findings concerning
subsection (j), and we therefore decline to address the merits of respondent-father’s arguments
concerning that subsection.
B. BEST INTERESTS
Even if a trial court finds that statutory grounds for termination are established by clear and
convincing evidence, “it cannot terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.” In re
Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). We review a trial court’s
best-interest determination for clear error. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44
(2021).
In making a best-interest determination, the focus “is on the child, not the parent.” In re
MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 62; 27 NW3d 122 (2023). Relevant considerations include:
the child’s bond with the parent; the parent’s parenting ability; and the child’s need
for permanency, stability, and finality. Other factors that the court may consider
include the parent’s history, the parent’s psychological evaluation, the age of the
child, and a parent’s substance-abuse history. The court may also consider whether
the parent can provide a permanent, safe, and stable home. Additionally, the court
may consider the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the [child’s] well-being while in care, and the
possibility of adoption. [Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in
original.)]

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Further, “[t]he trial court’s findings need not be extensive; brief, definite, and pertinent findings
and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient.” Id. (cleaned up).
In this case, the trial court considered the strong bond between respondent-father and the
children and that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights would not result in adoption
because mother retained her parental rights, and it weighed those considerations against
termination. It found, however, that those factors were outweighed by the substantial risk of
mental, emotional, and physical harm posed by respondent-father’s continued presence in the
children’s lives. In so finding, the court highlighted respondent-father’s CSC-I conviction and
pending charges for possessing and distributing CSAM, the children’s demonstrated exposure to
and imitation of sexualized conduct, the clinician’s concerns that the children were impressionable
and susceptible to manipulation and coercion, and respondent-father’s failure to appreciate the
repercussions of his conduct. The court also noted the clinician’s conclusion that respondent-
father’s history and “lifetime of sexual deviance and the sexual abuse of children suggests a pattern
of sexual behaviors towards children that are predatory, that are manipulative and that are coercive
in nature.” Finally, the court found that the children’s need for permanency, stability, and finality
supported termination.
The record supports the court’s findings. Respondent-father’s 1997 CSC-I conviction
evidenced a history of predation against children, and his possession and distribution of CSAM in
2024 demonstrated that his predatory conduct remained ongoing. Not only did that conduct expose
the children to the risk of being sexually exploited, but it also exposed the children to emotional
harm. During a forensic interview, CJO acknowledged seeing “a lot of” CSAM on respondent-
father’s cell phone, and CJO estimated that the girls depicted in the CSAM were between the ages
of 6 and 12 years old—an age range both children fell within at the time of termination. Mother
later found the children taking inappropriate nude photographs of their own bodies. The clinician’s
opinion concerning the impressionability of the children and the link between respondent-father’s
conduct and the children’s own behavior further supports the court’s conclusion that respondent-
father’s behavior posed a risk of physical, mental, and emotional harm to the children. And the
trial court’s conclusion is supported by respondent-father’s failure to accept responsibility for or
appreciate the impact on his children of his conduct, demonstrating that he is unlikely to refrain
from harmful conduct in the future.
The children’s need for permanency, stability, and finality likewise supported termination.
Respondent-father remained incarcerated pending trial on the CSAM charges for the duration of
this proceeding, did not qualify for reunification services while incarcerated, and by his own
estimate faced years of imprisonment if convicted, leaving him unable to provide care and poised
for release when LRO reached approximately the same age as respondent-father’s CSC-I victim.
On this record, a continued parent-child relationship with respondent-father offered the children
no realistic path to stability or permanency.
On appeal, respondent-father asserts that termination was not in the children’s best interests
because the children were likely to be returned to mother’s home in the future, which was
appropriate and stable, and because of the strong bond he shared with the children. Those
arguments are unpersuasive. While the record supports that respondent-father and the children
shared a strong bond, a child’s bond with a parent is but one of many factors a trial court considers
when determining the child’s best interests. See id. Here, the trial court acknowledged the bond

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but found it outweighed by the risk of harm respondent-father poses to the children, and
respondent-father presents no argument or authority challenging that finding.
Moreover, the prospect that the children may be returned to mother’s care does not obviate
the risk of harm respondent-father posed if his parental rights remained intact. Mother supported
a continuing relationship between respondent-father and the children and, although she testified
that she would require his contact with the children to be supervised, she also stated that she did
not believe he posed any risk to the children’s well-being. That evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that prospective placement with mother would not protect the children from the risk of
harm posed by respondent-father’s conduct. Respondent-father has not established that the trial
court clearly erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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