COA 377890 PEOPLE OF MI V NICHOLAS ALLEN MADDEN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/2/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 02, 2026
1:55 PM
v No. 377890
Eaton Circuit Court
NICHOLAS ALLEN MADDEN, LC No. 25-020133-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
O’BRIEN, J. (concurring).
I concur with the result reached by the majority opinion.
“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” People v Hammerlund, 504
Mich 442, 451; 939 NW2d 129 (2019). “Because of endless variations in the facts and
circumstances implicating the Fourth Amendment, reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that
does not lend itself to resolution through the application of bright-line rules.” People v Williams,
472 Mich 308, 314; 696 NW2d 636 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also
People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 212; 931 NW2d 557 (2019) (“The Fourth Amendment demands
nothing more or less than reasonableness. And reasonableness does not lend itself to bright-line
rules.”).
Defendant here asks this Court to announce a bright-line rule. He concedes that the officer
who pulled him over had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry1 stop when she initiated the
seizure in the public roadway.2 But because defendant continued driving and entered the curtilage
of his home before submitting to the officer’s show of authority, he was seized within the curtilage
of his home. Defendant contends that this Court should announce a bright-line rule that, the
1 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 889 (1968).
2 Defendant writes in his brief on appeal that the officer did not have probable cause for an arrest
but “had reasonable suspicion satisfying a stop pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868,
20 L Ed 889 (1968).”

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moment that an individual enters the curtilage of their home, an officer needs probable cause to
seize them. The majority opinion is right to reject defendant’s invitation to announce such a rule.
There are, of course, variations of facts in which an officer’s conduct of following an individual
into the curtilage of their home and seizing them is unreasonable and thus violates the Fourth
Amendment, even if the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the individual before they entered
the curtilage of their home. But that is not the case here because, under the facts of this case, the
officer’s conduct was reasonable.
In general, “[a] lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation
of a traffic violation,” and the “seizure . . . remains reasonable[] for the duration of the stop.”
Arizona v Johnson, 555 US 323, 333; 129 S Ct 781; 172 L Ed 2d 694 (2009). See also People v
Lyons, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 370840); slip op at 3. As the
majority opinion recounts, the officer here began a lawful roadside stop well outside the curtilage
of defendant’s home by illuminating the overhead lights of her police vehicle on the public
roadway. Defendant had ample opportunity to pull over on the public roadway, but he instead
ignored the flashing lights of the officer’s car and continued driving until he reached the curtilage
of his home. The officer then followed defendant and continued the traffic stop that was initiated
on the public roadway inside the curtilage of defendant’s home. Under these facts, I agree with
the majority opinion that the officer’s conduct was reasonable, and as our Supreme Court has
explained, “[t]he Fourth Amendment demands nothing more or less than reasonableness.” Mead,
503 Mich at 212.3
I therefore conclude that the seizure in this case did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights, even though the seizure occurred in the curtilage of defendant’s home and the
officer only had reasonable suspicion.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
3 I also have concerns about the perverse incentives that defendant’s proposed bright-line rule
would create. To hold that the standard that an officer needs to complete an-already-initiated
traffic stop changes from reasonable suspicion to probable cause the moment that an individual
drives their vehicle into the curtilage of their home incentivizes drivers to ignore clear commands
to pull over.
Additionally, I question the practicality of defendant’s proposed rule. Certainly, someone
who pulls into the curtilage of a stranger’s home does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
there. Yet, any time that a traffic stop is initiated near a home, the vehicle can simply pull into the
curtilage of that home. How is the stopping officer to then know whether the vehicle is pulling
into the curtilage of a home that the individual has (or does not have) an expectation of privacy in?
This is merely one reason that defendant’s bright-line is unworkable, and all those reasons stem
from the fact that “reasonableness does not lend itself to bright-line rules.” Mead, 503 Mich at
212.

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